Revisiting the Britain-US-Turkey triangle during the transition from Pax Britannica to Pax Americana (1947-1957)

ABSTRACT

This article analyses the triangular relations between Britain, the United States and Turkey in the volatile Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean region at the advent of the Cold War. It examines the political, economic and military strategies that enabled Turkey to adapt to the transitional period from the Pax Britannica to the Pax Americana (1947–1957) in the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean. By focusing on this turbulent decade extending from the Truman Doctrine (1947) to the Eisenhower Doctrine (1957), this study posits that the transition from the waning influence of Britain to the coalitional hegemony of the United States was protracted and multi-layered. In this context, Turkey had to walk a diplomatic tightrope while managing certain aspects of continuity and change in a volatile region.

KEYWORDS:

• Pax Americana
• Pax Britannica
• Turkey
• Cold War
• Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1. Other works that examine bilateral relations from a more general perspective are: Aydın and Erhan (2013); and Çetiner (2015). The latter focuses on the period between 1938 and 1958 and Turkey’s uneasy shift from neutrality to becoming a member of the Western Alliance.

2. This type of alliance formation behaviour is considered very much in line with defensive realism (Levy and Thompson 2010, 37–38).

3. The National Archives of the United Kingdom (TNA), FO 371/16,987 E62976297/44 (21 October 1933).

4. Kori Schake (2017) identifies the 1922 Washington Naval Treaties among one of the nine moments of significance in the peaceful transition from British to American hegemony.

5. TNA, FO 371/20,029 E5702/1373/44 (9 September 1936).

6. ‘Anglo-Turkish Talks: Naval agreement proposed’, The Times, 15 December 1936.

7. For a revisionist history of the Straits within the context of the 1930s, see Gülmez’s (2016) article ‘Turkish foreign policy as an anomaly: revisionism and irredentism through diplomacy in the 1930s’.

8. On the illness and the death of Ertegün, see Mehmet Münir Ertegün, Turkish Foreign Ministry Archives, (TFMA), Sicil No. 63; From Turkish Foreign Ministry to the Turkish Embassy in Washington, Telegram, 11 November 1944, TFMA, no. 301; From the Turkish Embassy in Washington to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, Telegram, 11 November 1944, TFMA, no. 360.

9. Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS). 1969. The Near East and North Africa 1946, vol.7. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 902–903.

10. ‘…We Can Attain a Lasting Peace.’ Addressed by the President, The Department of State Bulletin, vol. XIV, no. 354 (14 April 1946), p. 622.

11. President Harry Truman’s Speech to Joint Session of Congress, 12 March 1947, Congressional Record, 80th Congress, 1st Session, p. 1981.

12. Republican Archives of the Prime Ministry of Turkey (BCA), 30/10/268/806/9 (14 March 1947).

13. BCA, 30/01/132/855/3 (1950), 18–19.

14. BCA, 30/01/42/250/4 (20 December 1947), 1–6. M. W. Thornburg, a former advisor to the US State Department, who visited Turkey as leader of a semi-official economic team in 1947, also defended that Turkey should be included in the Marshall Plan (Thornburg et al. 1949).

15. For the Turkish Foreign Ministry reports about the Marshall Plan, see Report on America’s Economic Aid to Europe, Turkish Foreign Ministry Archives (TFMA), N. America, Political, Box 3, a.13 (25 June 1947); ‘General Report on American Aid to Europe’, TFMA, N. America, Political, Box 3 (25 June 1947).

16. TNA, FO 371/78,661, R1033/1011/44 (12 January 1949).

17. TNA, FO 371/72,531, R9494/23/44 (9 August 1948).

18. National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), NND 853,003 330/18/79 111 FY 1951 Turkey, Memorandum to Chief of Staff from Brigadier R. P. Shugg, (18 February 1950).

19. TNA, FO 371/78,667, R11894/1922/44 (21 December 1949).

20. TNA, FO 371/78,669, R8421/1051/44 (21 November 1949).

21. TNA, FO 371/95,267, 18,134, RK 1011/1 (8 January 1951).

22. Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (McGhee) to the Under Secretary of State, 1 May 1950; The Secretary of State (Acheson) to the Secretary of Defence (Johnson), 31 August 1950; Paper prepared at the Department of State, 11 September 1950; Memorandum of Conversation by the Secretary of State, 19 September 1950; The United States Delegation at the Tripartite Preparatory Meeting to the Secretary of State, 2 May 1950, in FRUS 1950, 3:79–80, 257–261, 279–284, 333–335, 975–976.

23. Indeed, Britain had no interest whatsoever in associating its units in Korea with the Turkish contingent. In response to London’s attempt to form a Commonwealth division for Korea, Canada proposed the attachment of non-Commonwealth units to this division, including the Turkish Brigade, to strengthen its UN outlook. The British rejected this proposal on political and practical grounds. Politically, London wanted to preserve a distinct Commonwealth identity for its military contribution. In practical terms, it was not feasible to seek incorporation of non-Commonwealth units because they (including Turkish Brigade) were trained, organized and equipped along American lines (Grey 2017, 1101).

24. Turks call entry in pact acid test, New York Times, 1 August 1950.

25. BCA, 30/01/60/373/3 (6 March 1951).

26. BCA, 30/01/60/373/8 (14 October 1951), 1–8.

27. TNA, CAB 128/25/36 (15 October 1952), 26.

28. Ibid.

29. BCA, 30/01/102/632/11 (28 December 1951).

30. TNA, CAB 129/56/12 (24 October 1952).

31. NARA, NND 853,005 330/18/78 001/121 Turkey-1950, ‘Memorandum to Colonel Wade Fleischer from Colonel L.C. Metheny’ (25 July 1951).

32. Britain’s possession of Cyprus became more crucial in view of the new US plans for Turkey’s defence. The JAMMAT became immediately involved in Turkish defence planning, and by 1950 US military advisors were convinced that the best Turkish forces could do in the event of a Soviet attack was to withdraw to the so-called Iskenderun pocket on the D + 180 day. There, the Turkish forces would wait for the US-led allies’ help and reinforcements to roll back the Soviet invaders. Without British control of Cyprus, the Turkish defenders’ rear and supply lines would be exposed. Therefore, in the early 1950s, the preservation of the British rule on the island made perfect sense for Turkish decision-makers and military planners. NARA, NND 964,322, RG334/25,076, Conferences TGS, Memorandum for Record (6 December 1950); and Defence of Thrace Studies (10 November 1950).

33. ‘Fuat Köprülü’nün Atlantik Paktı’na dair demeci’, Cumhuriyet, 21 July 1951.

34. For a detailed account of the institutionalization of the Turkish-American alliance, see Yılmaz (2015, 118–136).

35. Turkish Information Office, Turkey’s Foreign Relations in 1952, New York, 1952, p. 6.

36. TNA, FO 371/107,571 W K1193/5 C, From Admiralty to War Office (11 March 1953).

37. BCA, 30/01/84/533/6 (23 March 1953).

38. BCA, 30/01/103/643/6 (18 April 1953).

39. TNA, FO 371/107,553 W K10345, from Ankara to Foreign Office (28 May 1953).

40. BCA, 30/01/40/238/15 (January 1954 and 30 May 1954).

41. BCA, 30/01/88/552/1 (4 July 1955). To give impetus to Turkey-US relations, Ankara replaced Feridun Cemal Erkin with a new ambassador in Washington. BCA, 30/01/127/822/7 (25 June 1955).

42. BCA, 30/01/126/810/7 (1955).

43. British Prime Minister Antony Eden signed this alliance without warning Dulles (McGhee 1990).

44. For a comprehensive analysis of Turkey-US relations regarding this incident, see Sever (2008) in S. C. Smith (ed). Reassessing Suez, 1956: New Perspectives on the Crisis and its Aftermath.

45. See the article by Barlas and Gülmez (2018).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Dilek Barlas

Dilek Barlas has been a Professor of History at Koc University, Istanbul, since 1993. She received her PhD in History from the University of Chicago. She is the author of two books titled: Etatism and Diplomacy in Turkey, 1929-1939: Economic and Foreign Policy Strategies in an Uncertain World (Brill, 1998) and Turkey in the Mediterranean during the Interwar Era (Indiana University Turkish Studies, 2010) (with Serhat Güvenç). Barlas has many articles published in international journals on Balkan and the Mediterranean history, the history of European Integration and Turkish—British—US relations in the 20^th century. Between 2008 and 2014, Barlas was also the Turkish Representative of Standing Committee for the Humanities of the European Science Foundation (ESF).

Şuhnaz Yılmaz

Şuhnaz Yılmaz is a Professor of International Relations and serves as the Associate Dean of College of Administrative Sciences and Economics at Koç University, Istanbul. Dr. Yılmaz received her PhD (2000) from Princeton University, specializing on Near Eastern Studies and International Relations. She conducted her post-doctoral studies at Harvard University. She held visiting faculty positions at Stanford, Princeton and UCLA. In 2008, she received the Distinguished Young Scientist Award (TUBA-GEBIP) of the Turkish Academy of Sciences. She has a book entitled Turkish-American Relations (1800-1952): Between the Stars, Stripes and the Crescent (Routledge Press, 2015). She has also published numerous articles in leading journals in her field, such as International Politics and Political Science Quarterly.

Serhat Güvenç

Serhat Güvenç is a Professor of International Relations at Kadir Has University, Istanbul. His areas of expertise are Turkish Foreign Policy, Turkish Defense, and Maritime Security in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea. He has authored three books and numerous articles published in journals including the Journal of Strategic Studies, the Journal of Military History, The International Journal, and Turkish Studies.