The NDH’s Relations with Southeast European Countries, Turkey and Japan, 1941–45

Abstract

This article deals with the history of relationships between the Independent State of Croatia (hereinafter the NDH) and Southeast European countries which joined the Axis bloc. While doing so, we shall also take into account the Balkan views of then‐neutral Turkey, as well as little‐known views of Japanese diplomacy on war events in the Balkans. A central contention is that, in 1941, for Croatia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia, Germany was above all a big power that was to right the wrongs of the old international order, which naturally also included the revision of the Versailles borders. This expectation, however, collided with a range of inherited and already defined premises, so that, in addition to old problems, a whole range of new cracks emerged in the bloc of German satellites.

Notes

1. Židovec was on duty in Sofia from 29 July 1941 to June 1943. After the collapse of the NDH, he withdrew first to Austria and then to Italy where, in 1946, he managed to get Nansen’s passport and Argentinean visa. However he failed to cross the ocean because he was arrested by the British agents in Genovese harbour on 4 March 1947 and was shipped to the Allied prison in Rome. He was extradited to Yugoslav authorities on 27 April 1947 as a ‘war criminal’. In early 1948 Židovec was sentenced to death in a political process held in Zagreb. However, there is evidence that the sentence was not carried out on 3 March 1948 as declared in police documents, and that in prison he wrote analytical reports for the use of the Communist intelligence service.

2. Due to limited space I have singled out the following works of my own choice: Hrvoje Matković, Povijest Nezavisne Države Hrvatske [The History of the Independent State of Croatia] (Zagreb, Naklada Pavličić, 1994); Tko je tko u NDH, Hrvatska 1941–1945 [Who is Who in the NDH, Croatia 1941–1945] (Zagreb, Minerva, 1997); Tomislav Jonjić, Hrvatska vanjska politika 1939–1942 [Croatian Foreign Policy 1939–1942] (Zagreb, Libar, 2000); Nada Kisić Kolanović, Mladen Lorković, Ministar urotnik [Mladen Lorković, The Minister Conspirator] (Zagreb, Hrvatski državni arhiv – Dom i Svijet, 1998); and, Vojskovođa i politika, sjećanja Slavka Kvaternika [Army Leader and Politics, The Memoirs of Slavko Kvaternik] (Zagreb, Golden marketing, 1997); and, NDH i Italija, političke veze i diplomatski odnosi [NDH and Italy, Political Connections and Diplomatic Relations] (Zagreb, Naklada Ljevak, 2001); and Zagreb‐Sofija, Prijateljstvo po mjeri ratnog vremena 1941.–1944 [Zagreb‐Sofia, Friendship Tailored by War Time 1941–1944] (Zagreb, Dom i svijet ‐ Hrvatski državni arhiv, 2003); Jure Krišto, Katolička crkva i Nezavisna Država Hrvatska 1941–1945 [The Catholic Church and the Independent State of Croatia 1941–1945] (Zagreb, Hrvatski institut za povijest, 1998); Jere Jareb, Zlato i novac NDH iznesen u inozemstvo 1944. i 1945 [The NDH Gold and Money Taken Abroad in 1944 and 1945] (Zagreb, Hrvatski institut za povijest – Dom i svijet, 1997); V. Žerjavić, Opsesije i megalomanije oko Jasenovca i Bleiburga: Gubici stanovništva Jugoslavije u drugom svjetskom ratu [Opsessions and Megalomanias over Jasenovac: The Population Losses of Yugoslavia in WW II] (Zagreb, Globus, 1992).

3. For more details on the position of these countries towards the neutral Balkan bloc between 1939 and March 1941, see Lj. Boban, Maček i politika Hrvatske seljačke stranke 1928/1941 [Maček and the Politics of Croatian Peasant’s Party 1928/1941] (Zagreb, 1974), vol.2, pp.303–415.

4. In elite Hungarian circles at one time, one could hear that the NDH was ‘an unhealthy attempt, an unhealthy state formation, which allegedly will not be able to hold its own, where there are incessant riots, and which faces an immediate Communist revolution’. Nada Kisić Kolanović, ed., Poslanstvo NDH u Sofiji, diplomatski izvještaji 1941–1945 [The NDH Embassy in Sofia, Diplomatic Reports 1941–1945] (Zagreb, 2003), vol.1, p.63.

5. Ibid., vol.2, p.265.

6. Ibid., vol.1, pp.26–27 and p.32. In a conversation with Židovec, Bulgarian foreign minister Ivan Popov confirmed that Hitler had reluctantly accepted arbitration in the Romanian–Hungarian dispute over Transylvania, stating to Popov: ‘I will never get involved in such arbitrations again. Now neither are Hungarians satisfied, who think that he has ruined for them St. Stephen’s Kingdom, nor are Romanians who have lost so many of their people’.

7. Ibid., vol.1, p.31. After gaining the Southern Dobrudž a, Bulgaria agreed to pay 1 billion Romanian leis to Romania on account of realised investments. Bulgarian foreign minister Popov claimed that Romania ‘has done nothing at all’ in Dobruž da; on the contrary, he claimed that considerable damage was done intentionally on public buildings when they were leaving the area. Popov also asked for an extension of the voluntary emigration period, since Romania had stalled the issue on purpose.

8. Hrvatski državni arhiv [Croatian State Archive; here after HAD] Zagreb, Poslanstvo NDH u Bukureštu [NDH Embassy in Bucharest], microfilm [mf.] 2, image [im.] 175: Branko Benzon, Tjedno izvješće, [Weekly Report] no. 9/42, 2–8 March 1942.

9. Kisić Kolanović (note 4), vol.1, pp.92–3.

10. Ibid., p.258.

11. HDA, MVP NDH, Poslanstvo NDH u Bukureštu, mf. 2, im. 162; mf. 2, im. 179.

12. Kisić Kolanović (note 4), vol.1, pp.74–5. Nonetheless, the German ambassador Beckerle could not completely devalue the territorial problem of Dalmatia, so in October 1941 he commented that ‘he is familiar with the problem of Dalmatia, that he knows it is Croatian land, which belongs and must belong to Croatia’. When Secretary of German Embassy Ewald von Massow said to Židovec that ‘Germany has an intention to settle all European problems, including this one, not before this winter is over, after the victory over Russia’, he had in mind Dalmatia.

13. HDA, 013.0.56; V. Židovec, Moje sudjelovanje u političkom životu [My Participation in Political Life], p.249.

14. HDA, Poslanstvo NDH u Bukureštu, mf. 2, im.253.

15. Kisić Kolanović (note 4), vol.1, p.98. Caranfil also judged that Germany’s chances to end the war through compromise were growing slim. Since he thought that Berlin could not ‘sit at a green table as an equal partner’, Caranfil predicted that ‘in 1943 Germany would try everything in order to achieve a decisive success in Russia, thus gaining a free hand for waging war in the Near East and Africa so it could finally reach an equal position with England and force her to conclude a compromise peace’.

16. Ibid., pp.222–3.

17. HDA, Poslanstvo NDH u Bukureštu, mf. 2, im. 171 and 172.

18. HDA, MVP NDH, Poslanstvo u Bukureštu, mf. 2, im. 177–9; Branko Benson (note 8), no. 11/42, 9–15 March 1942.

19. Kisić Kolanović (note 4), vol.1, pp.114–15.

20. Ibid., pp.781–2. Židovec was not at all surprised by the fact that the Communist idea of a ‘free Soviet Republic of Macedonia’ had become increasingly popular in Macedonia.

21. Ibid., pp.2, 137–8. Kovalevski also asserted that Ukraine ‘has a great interest in Southeast Europe and especially in gaining the passage to the Adriatic Sea, which will render the friendship between the Ukrainian state and Croatia to the utmost importance in the future’. It is no surprise that Židovec’s interpretation of the conversation gave preference to his anti‐Bolshevik attitude, so in his report to Pavelić he pointed out that such statements were an expression of ‘that natural and traditional Russian policy for gaining an access to the Mediterranean Sea, only this time it should be in the friendship with the Croatian state and no longer with the Serbs’.

22. HDA, Poslanstvo NDH, Poslanstvo NDH u Bukureštu, mf. 2, im. 171.

23. Kisić Kolanović (note 4), vol.1, p.291.

24. The Ustaše leadership decided to construct the Zagreb mosque in August 1941. The Museum of Visual Arts served this purpose (with a number of interior alterations), and three minarets were erected around it. The mosque was ceremoniously opened in August 1944.

25. Kisić Kolanović (note 4), vol.1, pp.133–5.

26. Šahinović’s criticism of Turkey is undoubtedly related to his views on the Croatian ‘ethnic character’ of Bosnian‐Herzegovian Muslims. He also believed that Turkey had a pan‐Islamic mission, which he understood as ‘pan‐Islamic in a modern sense’. Therefore he rejected all considerations and pointed out clearly the need of even greater liberalisation in Turkey. M. Šahinović‐Ekremov, Turska, danas i sjutra, presjek kroz život jedne države [Turkey, Today and Tomorrow, Cross‐section through a State’s Life], (Sarajevo, 1939), pp.192, 135 and 145.

27. Kisić Kolanović (note 4), vol.1, p.510.

28. HDA, Zbirka mikrofilmova 301449 – Mladen Lorković, Izvješće Hivzije Košarića M. Lorkoviću, ministru vanjskih poslova, o putovanju u Tursku od 20. srpnja 1942. godine [Collection of microfilms 301449 – Mladen Lorković, Report of Hivzija Košarić to M. Lorković, foreign minister, on the trip to Turkey of 20 July 1942].

29. Kisić Kolanović (note 4), vol.2, pp.119–34.

30. HDA, RSUP SRH SDS, 012.0.60, Dosje V. Židovec [The V. Židovec File].

31. Kisić Kolanović (note 4), vol.1, p.762.

32. HDA, RSUP SRH SDS, 013.0.56; V. Židovec (note 13), pp.255–6.

33. HDA, MVP NDH, Poslanstvo u Rumunjskoj [Embassy in Romania], mf. 2, im. 299, Poslanstvo u Bukureštu, Izvješće B. Benzona [Embassy in Bucharest, Report of B. Benzon], V.T. no. 72/42, TI, 23–29 November 1942.

34. Dušan Lukač, Treći Rajh i zemlje jugoistočne Evrope 1941–1945 [The Third Reich and the Southeast European Countries 1941–1945], (Beograd, 1987), vol.3, pp.502 and 527.

35. Kisić Kolanović (note 4), vol.1, pp.751–2.

36. Nikola Rušinović, Moja sjećanja na Hrvatsku [My Memories of Croatia] (Zagreb, 1996), p.184.

37. Kisić Kolanović (note 4), vol.2, pp.638–46. Rušinović confirmed that the rupture of diplomatic relations with Germany caused ‘panic’ in Turkey. As a result the government kept officially emphasising that this was in no way tantamount to a ‘declaration of war’. Diplomatic staff were evacuated from Ankara, and a large number of civilians retreated from big cities to villages.

38. Ibid., p.44–5.

39. Ibid., vol.1, p.446.

40. Umeda asked the director of the Bulgarian press, Aleksandar Nikolaev, to make enquires at court as to whether the ‘Bulgarian emperor would like to become in the same time Ukrainian ruler’. The answer was that the emperor ‘does not see any possibility at all of something like this becoming reality’. Umeda also kept convincing Židovec that ‘a close alliance between Ukraine and Bulgaria would be in the interest of Germany’; ibid., vol.2, pp.45–7.

41. N. Kisić Kolanović, Mladen Lorković, Ministar urotnik, Zagreb, 1998, p.228.

42. Kazuichi Miura, Japanac o Japanu [A Japanese on Japan], Nakladna knjižara Velebit, Zagreb 1944, p.12.

43. Rušinović, Moja sjećanja [My Memories], p.182.

44. Kisić Kolanović (note 4), vol.1, pp.357–8. For Umeda it was not unexpected that ‘war will take place, that Yugoslavia will be ruined and that free Croatia will be created under the leadership of Poglavnik’. He had sent such a report before the breakdown of Yugoslavia, and when the NDH was proclaimed, he did not hide his interest in taking over the duty of Japanese ‘observer’ in Zagreb.

45. Ibid., vol.2, pp.428–30.

46. Ibid., pp.68–73.

47. Ibid., pp.169–72.

48. HDA, RSUP SRH, SDS, V. Židovec, Moje sudjelovanje u političkom životu, p.252.

49. Kisić Kolanović (note 4), vol.2, p.150. Also see: HDA RSUP SRH, 012.0.60, V. Židovec, Dodatak sistemtskom i stvarnom kazalu, Bilješka od 12. ožujka 1948. godine [Appendix to Systemic and Actual Index, Annotation of 12 March 1948].

50. Ibid., pp.428–9. It is interesting that as early as September 1942 the Japanese ambassador in Bucharest presented the view that ‘Italy, as a matter of fact, must be rewarded for its victims, but the Mediterranean Sea cannot become Italian sea because the Germans also have interest in it for its trade’. He also stated that Japan expected that in the new order ‘Europe will be under the leadership of Germany’, while Japan would dominate in Asia, which would need a lot of industrial products, which would be supplied ‘from settled Europe’. Also compare: HDA, Poslanstvo NDH u Bukureštu, mf. 2, im. 265, Poslanstvo u Bukureštu, Izvješće B. Benzon, V. T. no.60/42, 27 September to 4 October 1942.

51. HDA, RSUP SRH, V. Židovec, Zapisnik saslušanja kod Udbe za Hrvatsku od 1. listopada 1947. godine [Minutes of interrogation at Udba for Croatia of 1 October 1947].

52. Kisić Kolanović (note 4), vol.2, pp.497 and 501.

53. HDA, RSUP SRH, V. Židovec, Zapisnik saslušanja kod Udbe za Hrvatske od 1. listopada 1947. godine [Minutes of interrogation at Udba for Croatia of 1 October 1947].