IX. Why Would Modern Military Commanders Study the Franco‐Prussian War?

Abstract

Staff Ride Question: Can such things as enduring lessons be drawn from previous eras? Discuss with reference to the Franco‐Prussian campaigns of 1870.

Notes

1 The German forces in the Franco‐Prussian War included the North German Confederation, of which Prussia was the dominant member, and the South German states of Baden, Wuerttemberg and Bavaria. To conform to common usage, the North German Confederation and its allies are referred to as the ‘Prussians’ throughout this article.

2 Simon Trew and Gary Sheffield (eds.), 100 Years of Conflict: 1901–2000 (Stroud, UK: Sutton Publishing 2001) p.26. France never recovered the position that she had held before 1870. After the war, the country was slower to continue industrialising than Germany, and it fell decisively behind Great Britain as Europe’s leading financial power and foreign investor.

3 Michael Howard, The Franco‐Prussian War (London: Hart‐Davis 1961) p.3.

4 General (later Field Marshal Count) Helmuth Karl Bernhard von Moltke (the Elder) (1800–91) was appointed Chief of the Prussian General Staff in 1858. He also masterminded the Prussian victories over Denmark (1864) and Austria (1866). His nephew (Moltke the Younger) was Chief of the German General Staff at the start of World War I.

5 Peter Paret (ed.) Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton UP 1986) p.289.

6 John Keegan, The Face of Battle (London: Jonathan Cape 1976) p.20.

7 The British Army Staff College conducted battlefield tours in Alsace and Lorraine prior to World War I. The future Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir Henry Wilson, spent time ‘rambling and bicycling’ around the sites of Sedan and on the Franco‐Prussian marches, both as a student (1892–93) and as the Commandant (1907–10). Bernard Ash, The Lost Dictator: A Biography of Field‐Marshal Sir Henry Wilson (London: Cassell 1968) p.69. In France, the events of 1870–71 became the basis of the tactical training of the postwar army. Richard Holmes, The Road to Sedan: The French Army 1866–1870 (London: Royal Historical Society 1984) p.4.

8 Simpson outlines 12 reasons why servicemen should study military history including, inter alia, for intellectual curiosity, inspiration and the generation of esprit de corps. Keith Simpson, ‘The Value of Military History to the Serviceman’, RUSI Journal 133/1 (Spring 1988) pp.64–5.

9 Michael Howard , The Lessons of History (Oxford: Clarendon 1981), quoted in Simpson (note 8) p.64.

10 Quoted by Jay Luvaas , ‘Clausewitz and the American Experience’, unpublished lecture, US Army War College c1982–87, p.4.

11 Holmes, Road to Sedan (note 7) p.1.

12 Stephen Badsey, The Franco‐Prussian War 1870–1871 (London: Osprey 2003) p.16.

13 Service in the Armée d’Afrique was voluntary. The ‘Africains’ had a different style and ethos to the conscripted Metropolitan French troops. The pressure of war undoubtedly emphasised these differences and the resultant polarisation created friction and problems of morale and leadership. Holmes (note 7) pp.29–32. Some French officers who had served in Algeria developed a disdain for their opponents, which proved dangerous in other theatres of war. Ibid. p.53.

14 Badsey, Franco‐Prussian War (note 12) p.25.

15 Holmes (note 7) p.97.

16 Badsey (note 12) pp.21–2.

17 Quoted in Howard, Franco‐Prussian War (note 3) p.39.

18 Ibid. p.39.

19 The French declared war over a minor issue, the circumstances of which had undoubtedly been engineered by Bismarck, the Prussian Minister‐President. In Sept. 1868, the last ruler of Spain from the house of Bourbon, Queen Isabella II, was overthrown in a revolt. The Spaniards established a more liberal constitution and sought a suitable candidate for a constitutional monarchy. The preferred choice was Leopold, the eldest son of Prince Karl Anton of Hohenzollern‐Sigmaringen, a branch of the ruling house of Prussia. The family was reluctant, but Bismarck recognised the opportunity for confrontation and persuaded them to accept. The French protested and their ambassador in Berlin met with King Wilhelm I several times at Bad Ems near Koblenz. On 12 July 1870, it was announced that Leopold had renounced his candidacy, but France demanded more: a guarantee that Leopold would never accept the Spanish throne and an apology for the insult to France. King Wilhelm I politely declined to do this and by publishing the famous Ems Telegram, Bismarck contrived to convince the French that King Wilhelm I had insulted the French Ambassador. French public opinion demanded war, which the Assembly formally voted for on 15 July. Whereas Moltke was authorised to implement his war plans and begin mobilisation on 16 July 1870, the formal French declaration of war was delivered to Bismarck in Berlin on 19 July 1870.

20 Badsey (note 12) p.9.

21 Howard quotes Pierre Lehautcourt stating that the German Army in 1870 was the largest force assembled since the time of Xerxes. Howard (note 7) p.23. The structure of both the French and Prussian armies was similar, based on the army corps. The typical army corps was about 30,000 men strong and consisted of two, three or four infantry divisions, a cavalry division and divisional artillery. This all arms formation was equipped and organised to function and fight on its own, if necessary, like a small army. On deployment and once away from the railheads, armies moved on foot averaging about 10 miles a day. Under Napoleon I, the French Army developed the technique of army corps moving separately across country for speed of manoeuvre and ease of supply, either from supply depots or the local countryside. Given the limitations of nineteenth century roads, the army corps moved independently, only coming together for a major battle.

22 One of the most important decisions of the campaign made by Moltke was the choice of the location of the initial assembly area for the army. Moltke himself said: ‘A mistake in the original assembly of the armies can hardly be put right again in the whole course of the campaign.’ Quoted in Meyer (1996) p.38.

23 Holmes (note 7) p.25.

24 The French Intendance was responsible for the supply and distribution of food, fodder, firewood and clothing, the supervision of military administration at all levels, and the organisation and discipline of military hospitals and prisons. It also verified unit accounts. Ibid. p.74.

25 The French offensive plan envisioned a general advance into the South German States. From there, possibly with Austrian and Italian assistance, a march on Berlin was contemplated. In contrast, Moltke based his own plans on the urgent need to get as many troops to the frontier as fast as possible, even leaving supply trains behind at first to increase the number of combat soldiers. His worst‐case assessment was that the French might attack with a force of about 150,000 by 25 July, cutting through the unprepared Prussian formations. Moltke further assessed that if the French had not invaded by 1 August, the Prussians could win a defensive campaign. If the French had still not attacked by 4 August, Moltke determined that the Prussians would take the offensive. Undoubtedly, much of what happened in the first two months of the war stemmed from the reasonable Prussian assumption that the French Army and its generals, belonging to the most powerful country in Europe, were at least as good as themselves.

26 Holmes (note 7) p.179.

27 The Prussian General Staff had three main responsibilities in 1870: planning, coordination and operational readiness. Planning was the most crucial function, assessing potential enemies and writing war plans, which were updated annually. Planning also entailed how to recall reservists quickly on mobilisation and how to transport the forces by rail to their concentration areas. Coordination involved the translation of pre‐war plans into reality. Operational readiness involved the training of officers and soldiers. By 1867, the General Staff was organised into two elements. The first was divided into three geographic departments concerning potential enemies to the east, south and west. Another section was concerned with the railway system. The second element was functional in nature and divided into five sections: military history, geography, topography, the War Room (the centralised display of all relevant information) and the Land Triangulation Bureau (the production of maps).

28 Badsey (note 12) p.19.

29 Holmes (note 7) p.69.

30 The four battles were: the Battles of Wörth, Spicheren (both 6 Aug. 1870), Mars‐la‐Tour (16 Aug. 1870) and Gravelotte–St Privat (18 Aug. 1870).

31 The telegraph had first been used extensively for military command and control during the American Civil War. In 1870, its contribution to rapid mobilisation was enormous. However, the nearer the enemy, the smaller the role it played. The downside of this new technology was that it could encourage over‐control from the rear.

32 Martin van Creveld, Command in War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP 1985) p.145.

33 Meyer (note 22) p.32.

34 General von Steinmetz was a much‐decorated 73‐year‐old officer who, like King Wilhelm I, had begun his career fighting Napoleon I. After the Battle of Gravelotte–St Privat, King Wilhelm I appointed Steinmetz as Military Governor of Posen. The other two Prussian army commanders, Crown Prince Frederick William (the Third Army) and his cousin, Prince Frederick Charles (the Second Army)) were younger (39 and 42 years of age respectively) and were more in tune with Moltke’s command style.

35 Fritz Hoenig, 24 Hours of Moltke’s Strategy (Woolwich, UK 1895) p.175.

36 Creveld, Command (note 32) p.145.

37 Badsey (note 12) p.22.

38 In 1848, the Prussians had adopted a breech‐loading rifle, the Dreyse ‘needle gun’ (so called because of its long needle‐like firing pin), which was a weapon some years ahead of its time. It had an effective range of some 600m and the superiority of the weapon over the Austrian muzzle‐loading rifles was a decisive factor in the Prussian victory at Sadowa in 1866. However, by 1870, the Dreyse was nearly obsolete. As part of their 1868 reforms, the French Army had equipped its troops with a rifle of the next generation, the Chassepot breech‐loader, with a maximum range of 1,200m. The only reported advantage of the Dreyse was that it was better than the Chassepot when used as a club in close‐quarter fighting.

39 After encountering the very good Austrian artillery in 1866, the Prussians re‐equipped with new field and horse artillery guns (calibres of 80mm and 90mm). They seldom opened fire at above 3,000m, which was their effective range, although the 90mm calibre piece had a maximum range of 4,600m. The Prussian siege artillery was equally as impressive, with calibres up to 210mm and ranges of between 4,000m and 8,000m.

40 The main French artillery piece was the 1858 pattern rifled 4‐pounder calibre field gun, with an upper range of 3,300m and the 1839 pattern 12‐pounder smoothbore siege gun, converted to rifling, with a notional upper range of 5,600m.

41 The French artillery also included batteries of the Mitrailleuse, an early machine gun mounted on wheels and treated as the equivalent of a field gun that could fire over 200 rounds a minute out to about 2,500m, with an effective range of about 1500m. The Prussians respected this weapon, but it could have been more effective if the French had deployed it tactically in combination with their infantry. Excessive secrecy resulted in a lack of pre‐war trials and training for its crews. Additionally, the weapon often broke down and its narrow field of fire also made it less effective.

42 Howard (note 3) p.455.

43 At the Battle off Sedan, the French General Felix Douay dug in his VII Corps troops on the spur above Floing in two lines of trenches, 200 yards apart. In their rifle pits holding up to 12 men, the French were able resist a number of strong Prussian attacks.

44 For example, elements of the French Armée du Rhin at the Battle of Gravelotte‐St Privat occupied six farms. The solid walls provided natural fortresses, which anchored the French line. The night before the battle (17/18 Aug. 1870) was spent digging trenches and rifle pits and loopholing farm walls and buildings.

45 For almost the preceding 20 years, cavalry had been told that they were obsolete, since their horses could not survive the increases in firepower. However, there was nothing that could replace them in their two main functions: reconnaissance, which was increasingly important for the new large armies, and shock action by conducting mounted charges to scatter the enemy. For example, Maj Gen. Friedrich Wilhelm von Bredow’s 12th Brigade was committed to ‘win time’. It was an act of desperation, but the ‘Death Ride’ did succeed in disrupting the deployment of the French VI Corps at a crucial point in the battle. At the Battle of Sedan, Gen. Margueritte’s French cavalry division, commanded by Gen. Marquis Gaston de Gallifet, was launched in three repeated charges against the Prussians, attempting to clear a path for the rest of their forces to escape. Each time the Prussian line held firm, the French reformed and charged again, suffering heavy losses with each charge. For the French, prewar training had been poor and their tactical doctrine was outdated.

46 As Liddell Hart observed: ‘the General Staff was essentially intended to form a collective substitute for genius, which no army can count on producing at need’. After 1870, German military ideas and culture replaced those of France around the world as the model to be copied. By 1914, all major European countries had a general staff, as did the United States of America. In addition the European countries, less Great Britain, all adopted the German model of conscription, with essentially the same concept of rapid mobilisation and concentration by railway.

47 The surrender of Napoleon at Sedan was a catastrophic blow to the French Second Empire and the Bonaparte dynasty, which was already unsteady, increasingly unpopular, and could not survive. Leon Gambetta proclaimed the Third Republic and Napoleon III followed his Empress into exile in England. Although Gambetta escaped to the south by balloon to raise new armies, French resistance was effectively over. In Paris, after three successive sorties by the garrison had failed, Louis Trochu, the military governor, sought an armistice with the Prussians.

48 The peace settlement has been described as harsh and the root cause of conflict in the future. France certainly neither forgot nor forgave. At the time, in the Place de la Concorde in Central Paris, where statues symbolise the great cities of France, the figure of Strasbourg was draped in a black shroud of mourning. Emile Zola’s novel of the French defeat, Le Dêbacle, appeared in 1892. The French Army talked of la revanche (revenge) against Germany. But the Treaty of Frankfurt ushered in the longest period of peace between the Great Powers of Europe for more than 200 years. Other than the Russo‐Turkish War (1877–78), there was no major war involving any of the Great Powers for the rest of the century. But, the experience of the war undoubtedly left a lasting hatred on both sides that resurfaced twice in the twentieth century. Badsey (note 12) p. 87.

49 According to Badsey, in general terms not very much changed up to 1914: railways were still key to large‐scale movement; the motor vehicle and the aeroplane were at an early stage of development; and there was still no replacement for the cavalry. Communication also remained much the same; although the telephone and the radio transmitter had been added to the telegraph, none of them could function well on a battlefield. The new generation of weapons that appeared at the end of the nineteenth century – artillery, rifles and machine guns – were an even bigger leap forward in firepower than that which took place after 1815. Badsey (note 12) pp.91–2.