The European Union (EU)Footnote 1 has developed from a closed economic community to a significant actor in the international system with its own aspirations to become a truly global player.Footnote 2 Throughout the EU’s evolution the attainment of peace and security has been a central consideration. To prevent a repetition of the devastation that occurred across the continent during World War II, the founding fathers of the EU utilised economic integration as the primary mechanism to effectuate lasting reconciliation between France and Germany.Footnote 3 Almost 50 years since the Treaty of Rome, the EU has expanded from six members to become a union of 25 states with over 450 million people producing a quarter of the world’s wealthFootnote 4 through the processes of integration and enlargement.
Both these processes have contributed to peace and stability across Europe. Wæver argues that integration has been the main pillar of stability on the European continent creating a ‘security community’.Footnote 5 Similarly, Missiroli argues that enlargement has made instability and conflict on the continent ever less likely by extending the EU’s values and rules to successive applicants. In other words, he considers enlargement to be ‘a security policy in its own right’. Furthermore, he claims that new members have brought with them interests and capabilities that have broadened the scope of common policies and strengthened the EU as an international actor.Footnote 6
If enlargement delivers such benefits, then why has Turkey’s potential membership to the EU been so controversial? The debate has not been raging or widespread within Turkey. The Turkish public has been continuously supportive of its country’s bid for membershipFootnote 7 as it sees inclusion within the EU as a ‘logical consequence’Footnote 8 of its Kemalist Western orientation and as a means of finally confirming Turkey’s European identity.Footnote 9 Instead, heated discussion has taken place within the EU. Turkey’s inclusion in the EU has been considered problematic because of its economic problems, shortcomings in upholding democratic principles, the Kurdish issue, the Cyprus problem, and size of population.Footnote 10
While these factors pose an obstacle to membership, they are not exclusive to Turkey; previous candidates have also had their share of economic and political problems, yet have gained membership.Footnote 11 EU member statesFootnote 12 are not polarised on issues surrounding the Copenhagen Criteria.Footnote 13 They have all agreed that Turkey must meet the prerequisite entry standards and regard that an overall settlement with Greece of bilateral disputes and a solution to the Cyprus problem would almost certainly be a sine qua non for Turkish membership.Footnote 14 Essentially, the heart of the debate is about how this particular enlargement would affect the future security and identity of the EU.
This debate has been in the margins ever since Turkey made its application for full EU membership in 1987. However, it moved to centre stage after the 1999 Helsinki Summit, when Turkey was finally granted candidate status and intensified especially after the events of 11 September 2001. The debate is likely to persist because on 17 December 2004 the EU Council announced that accession negotiations with Turkey would commence from October 2005, with talks expected to least a decade. Given that previous EU candidates who have reached this stage have eventually qualified for full membership,Footnote 15 this decision is historic, as Turkey’s membership would change the EU forever. The EU would share common borders with the Middle East and the South Caucasus, and its predominant Christian population would expand considerably to include a substantial Muslim minority.Footnote 16 Several EU member states are alarmed by this prospect, perceiving Turkey’s position in the midst of unstable regions and the influx of Islamic radicalism as threats to Europe:Footnote 17
Europe would implode
Frits Bolkestein,Footnote 18 Dutch European Commissioner
Other EU member states have a different, perhaps strategic, perspective. They believe that Turkish accession would promote greater stability in its ‘near‐abroad’ ultimately benefiting the EU, and finally dispel Huntington’s notion of a ‘clash of civilizations’Footnote 19 along the cultural fault‐lines of Christianity and Islam:
Turkey anchored in Europe .. would deal a heavy blow to those who stoke up mistrust and division and it could be an inspiration to many others in the Muslim world.
Jack Straw,Footnote 20 UK Foreign Minister
This situation can be best summarised as two groups within the EU that have drawn contradicting conclusions about Turkey’s membership of the EU, with one side viewing it as a security risk and the other seeing it as a security opportunity.
Rather than ask directly whether Turkey in the EU would be a security risk or an opportunity, therefore raising the difficulties in predicting the international environment and measuring such a subjective concept as security, it might be more profitable to focus on understanding why there is this polarisation of views within the EU. Not only does this approach allow an analysis of the domestic situation in Turkey and its foreign relationsFootnote 21 within the geographical EU milieu, it also exposes pertinent issues about the EU.
To facilitate this study, three inter‐related hypotheses have been adopted. This article will first consider whether the EU and Turkey are compatible by comparing their strategic culture and security perspectives. Second, it will then consider how Turkey could affect the security objectives of the EU. Third, the paper will analyse EU‐Turkey relations. Finally, the three hypotheses will be woven together to contend that Turkey presents to the EU both a security risk and security opportunity, but its position by 2015 (the earliest that an EU membership decision could be made) will be highly dependent on the future vision of the EU.
Compatibility: Turkey and the EU – A Good Match?
Actors that share identical or similar values and views of the world are better able to cooperate.Footnote 22
Expanding this hypothesis further, EU member states may perceive Turkey as a security opportunity if its values and views of the world converged with those of the EU. Contrarily, if its outlook were divergent or contradictory from the EU, then Turkey would be perceived as a security risk. Analysing the strategic culture and security perspective of the EU and Turkey would assess the extent of their compatibility. However, before doing so it is germane to explore the post‐Cold War security agenda and to briefly outline the evolution of the EU and Turkey as security actors to provide a degree of contextual understanding.
The term ‘security’ is an essentially contested term. A simple definition for security may be ‘the absence of threat’; a more sophisticated one may be ‘security is taken to be about the pursuit of freedom from threat and the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and functional integrity against forces of change which they see as hostile’.Footnote 23 In the post‐Cold War era, the security environment is perceived to be more complex because of its multifaceted nature. Security is now broader than the traditional military focus (to include interrelated economic, political, social and environmental factors), with the referent object of security being at multiple levels: individual, community and state.Footnote 24
Contemporary security threats emanate from quite different sources and are transnational in nature making it mostly impossible for an individual state to deal with alone.Footnote 25 Furthermore, these perceived security threats need a ‘mix and match’ of military (‘hard power’) and civilian (‘soft power’) responses. Arguably, as a supranational body with executive powers to harness the national resources of 25 states, the EU should be well placed to deal with these threats.
Creating security across Europe was the driving factor in establishing the EU. During the Cold War, the EU evolved to become a powerful economic bloc via the EC (European Community)Footnote 26 and NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) provided the collective defence against external threats, making use of ‘hard power’. However, the stabilising effects of ‘soft power’ during this time should not be underestimated. It can be argued that by establishing and promoting (via the enlargement process) precise norms and values (e.g. respect for human rights, the rule of law and democracy), overlaid with political and economic interdependence, the EU created its own ‘security identity’ that made the requirement to use military force to solve disputes between member states unthinkable.Footnote 27 Additionally, in the global arena, the EU sought to reduce levels of insecurity through its development initiatives.Footnote 28
However, the uncertain strategic environment, created by the end of the Cold War and increasing globalisation, made this singular adoption of ‘soft power’ appear inadequate in providing comprehensive security for EU citizens. Thus, security was formally enshrined within the EU polity with the 1993 Maastricht Treaty. As security and defence are at the heart of national sovereignty, it was agreed that any cooperation between nations would be on an inter‐governmental basis. The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) became the second ‘pillar’ of the EU. The third ‘pillar’, the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), aimed to promote police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters to combat cross‐border organised crime and illegal immigration.Footnote 29 The ‘EU Security System’ can therefore be conceptualised as three synergistic functions providing economic security, internal security and politico‐military security via the EC, JHA and CFSP respectively.
Effective military capability would be essential for the success of CFSP, yet the EU had failed to provide for its own military security, instead choosing to rely on the United States (US). The experiences of the Balkans conflicts further emphasised the need for the EU to have the capacity for autonomous action and provided the political impetus to develop a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).Footnote 30 Since setting ‘Headline Goals’ at the 1999 Helsinki Summit, ESDP has been declared operational (2001 Laeken Summit) and continues to evolve. Latest efforts are focused on refining the quantity and quality of military and civilian (police, legal, administrative) capabilityFootnote 31 necessary to undertake ‘Petersberg tasks’.Footnote 32 Thus the EU’s ‘soft power’ is being reinforced and complemented by credible ‘hard power’, enabling the EU to achieve the CFSP objectives declared in the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, especially that of ‘preserving peace and strengthening international security’.Footnote 33
Whereas the EU was established in the aftermath of World War II, the Republic of Turkey was born in 1923, from the remnants of a diminished Ottoman Empire ruined by World War I and military resistance to foreign intervention, inspired by its military leader Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk). The Kemalist ideology, which decreed Westernisation, secularism and national unity (devoid of minorities) within the territories of Anatolia and Eastern Thrace, aimed to create a nation‐state that was far removed from its Ottoman past.Footnote 34 The primary goal of the new republic was to maintain the hard‐fought‐for territorial integrity of the state against internal (for instance pan‐Islamic revisionist doctrines or Kurdish secessionist movements) and external threats.Footnote 35 This latter reason was central to Turkey’s decision to remain ‘neutral’ during World War II.Footnote 36
Alarmed by Soviet demands for territory and control over the Turkish Straits in June 1945, Turkey saw that its security interests would be best served by being firmly anchored in the West. Turkey formed a strategic partnership with the US in 1947, which provided security and the catalyst for democratic reform. Subsequently, Turkey became a member of NATO in 1952 guarding the southern flank, thus establishing its strategic importance to the West.Footnote 37 These three responsibilities: maintaining national unity; defending one‐third of the Alliance’s land borders against the Warsaw PactFootnote 38 while protecting over 300,000 square miles of land and thousands of miles of coastline necessitated an effective military apparatus.Footnote 39 In essence, the military became the ‘guardian of the state’ playing a central role in domestic and foreign affairs.Footnote 40
The end of the Cold War was a mixed blessing for Turkey. Although Soviet power had now retreated from its borders and its influence shrank in Iran and Syria, Turkey acutely felt the emerging instability in its neighbourhood (resurgence of nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism), and also at home as the intensity of Kurdish separatism found expression in greater terrorist activity. In contrast to EU nations who believed that there was no longer a conventional threat to their security, Turkey deemed it necessary to increase its defence spending.Footnote 41 The Turkish state remained the referent object of security.Footnote 42
The disintegration of the Soviet Union did however provide several opportunities. Turkey was able to rekindle ethnic and religious ties with the emerging Turkic nations contributing to their nation building through economic and cultural support.Footnote 43 Additionally, Turkey was instrumental in setting up the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) aimed at encouraging political stability through economic cooperation among the states surrounding the Black Sea.Footnote 44 Turkey, freed from the restraints of the Cold War, was now becoming more active as ‘regional actor’, and was making greater use of ‘soft power’ having observed the successes of the EU.
The prospect of EU membership has also been a major influence on Turkey, making the use of ‘soft power’ a more attractive, but not yet the de facto approach for dealing with internal and external security threats. Turkey realises that any ‘hard power’ usage would be heavily criticised by Brussels, as illustrated by the EU’s extreme disappointment at scenes of police brutality during an early 2005 women’s demonstration.Footnote 45
Evidently, the security postures of the EU and Turkey are evolving, although having started from opposite ends of the ‘power’ spectrum. An immediate reaction would be to suggest that the EU and Turkey are totally incompatible. However, failure to recognise what is essentially a historical posture would slay the hopes of pragmatists wishing for a happy coincidence somewhere in the middle of the spectrum; a more balanced use of both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power by the EU and Turkey could create long‐lasting stability in the region and beyond. It is extremely unlikely that the EU will evolve completely into a hard security actor like NATO, because of limited defence budgets, whereas Turkey becoming ‘softer’ will depend on whether there is ‘peace at home, peace abroad’.Footnote 46
The evolving security postures of the EU and Turkey illustrate how experience influences strategic culture, the other two variables being geopolitics and identity: ‘cultures comprise the persisting socially transmitted ideas, attitudes, traditions, habits of mind and preferred methods of operation that are more or less specific to a particular geographically based security community that has had a unique historical experience’.Footnote 47
Any expectation that the EU has a consistent strategic culture has proved to be a fallacy. Member states share common values of democracy and respect for human rights; many have a culture based on Christian‐Judaeo beliefs; many are also members of NATO. Yet there appears to be disagreement regarding the application of force, as ruthlessly demonstrated prior to the 2003 Iraq conflict. The EU is not a monolithic organisation, but a heterogeneous supranational polity blending the national perspectives of member states, occasionally to the lowest common denominator to achieve the necessary consensus for action and progress. The shared experience of warfare on the continent, when millions lost their lives, has had a dramatic impact on the strategic culture of individual member states, but in varying ways. Germany’s role in both World Wars has created a culture that decries expansionism such that ‘soft power’ has almost become the instinctive response.Footnote 48 Some EU states are neutral, while others such as the United Kingdom and France (the victors) maintain that force must be used to defend (their) interests.Footnote 49
Turkey’s strategic culture, on the other hand, has been shaped by Ottoman history; Islam and Turkic ethnicity; its geostrategic position; Kemalist ideology and realpolitik.Footnote 50 Do these differing influences mean that Turkey and the EU have incompatible strategic cultures? Perhaps the answer to this question is best illustrated by two examples. First, the Bosnian conflict in which Turkey, naturally concerned for its ‘ethnic kinsmen’, did not take on a unilateral interventionist role, despite pressure from its populace who watched with frustration the paralysis of the EU. Rather, Turkey became an advocate for action and settlement within the international framework. Ankara provided significant economic and social contributions to the Bosniaks.Footnote 51 The second example relates to Cyprus when in 1997–98 Turkey credibly threatened to attack Russian‐supplied S300 surface‐to‐air missile sites if the system was installed on the island; the missiles were not deployed.Footnote 52 Kramer helpfully describes Turkey’s actions:
Turkey favours a multilateral, negotiation‐orientated policy in … cooperation with its allies. If, however, immediate national security concerns are involved, Turkish diplomatic policy takes on certain rigidity and one‐dimensionality with regards to means. Inflexible persistence on what Ankara thinks is a rightful and legitimate position, often in combination with open or disguised military threat, conveys the image of a regional bully.Footnote 53
Therefore, arguing the compatibility or otherwise of Turkey’s strategic culture with that of the EU will be dependent on the context of the security challenge. However, if Turkey continues to adhere too strongly to the notions of national sovereignty and is prepared to use military force to defend its rights then Brussels will perceive Turkey as a security risk, as this paradigm does not match the supranational characteristics and ‘security identity’ of the EU.Footnote 54
Not surprisingly, this fervent focus on preserving the security of the Turkish state is the only significant deviation when analysing the security perspectives of Turkey and the EU. This difference is present because of the asymmetric nature of the comparison: a state with a supranational institution. But more importantly, it emphasises that Turkey’s strategic culture and propinquity to unstable regions shape its security perspective. This republic is not like Germany; which is surrounded by friendly EU states.
Otherwise, convergence exists between the EU and Turkey when identifying security threats, geographic priorities, security partners (NATO and the United Nations) and recognition of the strategic role of the US and Russia. The European Security Strategy (ESS) identifies the key threats to EU security to be international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflict, failed states and organised crime,Footnote 55 and these are echoed in the Turkish Defence White Paper 2000: ‘Turkey also believes that… the fight against international terrorism in the world, the illegal arms trade, drugs smuggling and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction occupy an important place in providing regional and world peace.’Footnote 56
Furthermore, the ESS states: ‘It is in the European interest that countries on our borders are well‐governed. Neighbours who are engaged in violent conflict, weak states with organised crime flourish, dysfunctional societies or exploding population growth on its borders all pose problems for Europe.’Footnote 57 The Balkans, the South Caucasus, the Middle East are specifically mentioned; all are Turkey’s neighbours.Footnote 58 Whereas convergence appears to exist at the policy level, in practice another picture emerges. In October 2004 the EU Commission reported that: ‘Turkey’s record of alignment with EU sanctions and restrictive measures, statements, declarations and demarches, demonstrated the considerable extent of common EU‐Turkey views.’Footnote 59
However, the same report also stated that:
…Turkey aligns itself with significantly fewer EU declarations than other candidate countries. This was particularly the case with declarations on issues related to Turkey’s neighbourhood (Georgia, Azerbaijan, Iraq, Ukraine), to certain Muslim countries and on human rights and democracy. Turkey is sometimes hesitant to align itself to EU positions on issues touching its vital foreign policy and security interests. … Turkey’s 2003 voting patterns in the United Nations…leads to a similar conclusion. Divergences mainly related to human rights issues and to the Middle East.Footnote 60
Aydin’s observation provides an explanation of Turkey’s position: ‘… a country that attributes utmost importance to stability and constancy, Turkey has always been sensitive about attempts to change the existing equilibrium within its surrounding region to the extent that the preservation of the current balance is usually considered as part of the Turkish national interest.’Footnote 61
Turkey’s reluctance to challenge the status quo demonstrates the greater influence of realpolitik over its claim to ‘side with democracy, basic rights and the supremacy of law’.Footnote 62 Understandably, Ankara does not wish to create problems with its neighbours especially if economic or cultural ties already exist. Nor is the Turkish government likely to ignore the views of its majority Muslim population. While the nature of the relationships with its neighbours may change in the future, the influence of civic society will permeate and affect foreign policy formulation.Footnote 63 The tension between wishing to conform to the EU’s CFSP and the actual freedom of manoeuvre available could prove problematic for Turkish policymakers, which in turn causes the EU to perceive integration with Turkey as being awkward.
Turkey’s mixed report only partially explains the polarisation of views within the EU. The remainder can be explained by the presence of contending perspectives within the EU. A liberalist perspective may consider that Turkey appears to be too hard a security actor to be digested within the EU’s soft‐security environment,Footnote 64 yet paradoxically may be appreciative of Turkey’s efforts not to create greater instability in its milieu. Alternatively, realists may argue that if the EU has global aspirations to match its economic clout with credible force then Turkey’s strategic culture could be a valuable influence.
Contribution: Turkey – An Attractive Prospect for the EU?
Enlargement is expected to bring new capabilities and interests that augment the EU’s ability to realize its security objectives. Footnote 65
Expanding this supposition, EU member states may perceive Turkey as a security opportunity if it did fulfil this expectation. Conversely, the EU would perceive Turkey as a security risk if the opposite were true.
The ‘EU Security System’, described earlier, can be further conceptualised as having three distinct roles that operate in a ‘quasi‐geographical pattern of concentric circles’.Footnote 66 The first role concerns providing security within the EU Footnote 67 , against internal and external threats. The second role is about promoting stability and security in its immediate neighbourhood. The final role is to act in a wider (global) security role.Footnote 68 An analysis of Turkey’s likely contribution in each of these roles will now be presented to assess whether Turkey would be an asset or liability in the ‘EU Security System’. Inevitably, aspects of this analysis will be speculative.
Providing internal security for its own citizens is among the essential public duties any state has to deliver.Footnote 69 This notion applies equally to the EU. Security within the EU is inextricably linked to the political and socio‐economic stability of individual member states by virtue of integration and geographical proximity.
Turkish politics has been traditionally characterised by unstable coalition governments that have been ineffective in pushing through the necessary reforms to improve domestic conditions or economic performance. Infighting and patronage within political parties has been the norm.Footnote 70 This poor governance has lead the military, as the self‐imposed guardian of the state (and secular constitution), to intervene with force on three out of four occasions.Footnote 71 The arrival of the AKP (Justice and Development Party) in 2002 was a political milestone in that it ‘bucked the recent trend’. It was the first party in 15 years to win a substantial majority.Footnote 72 For the EU, there is much irony in this outcome. Finally, it was an opportunity for restructuring a political system that had been that struggling with crises for decades. Nevertheless, these potential benefits were overshadowed by the fact that an Islamic‐based party had taken power in a traditionally secular, pro‐Western state. Against the growing backdrop of international terrorism (led by Al‐Qaeda), which analysts believe will continue for at least 30 years,Footnote 73 it would be fair to suggest that security fears in many EU countries were heightened.
However, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has proved his party’s commitment to EU membership by pushing forward massive reforms, such as improving the rights of Kurds (though not completely) in a bid to meet the political elements of the Copenhagen Criteria. Although the EU may feel pleased that its ‘democracy experiment’ is working (albeit gradually), this social re‐engineering in Turkey is also producing potential negative and far‐reaching consequences.
The prospect of EU membership is stimulating further social reforms while previous norms and values held by the Turkish elite are being challenged. Turkey’s secular and Western orientation, including EU membership, is now being questioned. In short, the Turkish republic is suffering from an identity crisis, which is undermining its efforts to be naturally regarded as just another European country. Islamists, although supportive of the democratic reform that has given them a greater voice, fear that Europe’s Christian heritage might foil their decades‐long effort to achieve a Turkish Islamic revival.Footnote 74 The nationalists are fearful over the loss of sovereignty that would naturally be eroded as EU integration deepens, and they strongly oppose the recognition of Kurdish citizens as a distinct minority group. Instead, they propose an eastward orientation, with Turkey playing a leading role in a pan‐Turkic empire.Footnote 75
Ideological confrontation between these various groups could potentially escalate into violence, necessitating the military to step in to restore national unity. Previous instability, due to social and political problems during the 1970s and 1980s, led to the EU becoming the main destination for Turkish political refugees and economic migrants.Footnote 76 Any mass migration during a time of high anti‐Muslim sentiment across the EU would be very unwelcome, as would any human rights violations.
Even if democracy were to mature fully in Turkey, the EU could still face two potential nightmare scenarios. The first situation would find Turkey with shrunken military influence, unable to rein in any Islamist gains achieved by a party that is freely elected to power. The chance of this happening seems slight because the state’s secular nature is firmly rooted in society.Footnote 77 Yet, the establishment of Shari’a law in a country where the majority of the population is Muslim is a constant riskFootnote 78 , aptly illustrated by the AKP’s proposal to criminalise adultery in September 2004; subsequently dropped after admonishment by the EU.Footnote 79 The other extreme situation would see ultranationalists gaining power through the democratic process. This could result in Turkey assuming an unnecessarily defensive, nationalist or even expansionist gestures and thus challenge the dynamics of regional stability and security beyond repair.Footnote 80
Of immediate concern to the EU would be the revival of military tension between Greece and Turkey. Recent relations between the two countries have been improving, despite occasional flare‐ups. In fact, the prospect of EU membership has encouraged Turkey to engage in more constructive dialogue with Greece in order to solve the Cyprus imbroglio and find a mutually acceptable agreement to rights in the Aegean Sea.Footnote 81 The possibility of two EU members resorting to military action against each other would massively affect the stability and unity of the EU, as this situation is inconceivable within the context of democratic peace theory.
The EU Commission has acknowledged these political tensions within Turkey:
Turkey is at present going through a process of radical change, including a rapid evolution of mentalities. It is in the interest of all that the current transformation process continues. Turkey would be an important model of a country with a majority Muslim population adhering to such fundamental principles as liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law.Footnote 82
In other words, Brussels should accept the risk of some minor political instability prior to accession in the hope that Turkey can become more ‘Europeanised’ (internalisation of EU values). Its prototypical transformation would be valuable not only for the security of the EU but it could also be utilised in a wider geopolitical context. Without the EU’s support the alternative could be a lot worse: ‘Turkey’s rejection by the EU could cause a domestic backlash against the West and embolden ultranationalists and religious extremists bent on derailing Turkey’s liberation, democratization and demilitarization.’Footnote 83
Instability in the political arena is of course directly linked to economic instability, either as a cause or an effect. After years of mounting difficulties, a controversial recovery programme was agreed with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 2002, and steady progress is being made towards meeting the stringent economic criteria. Naturally any economic crisis in Turkey, such as spiralling inflation, would have direct and immediate consequences on the rest of the EU.Footnote 84 The potential of Turkey’s vibrant economy, its entrepreneurial strength and expected levels of growth are promising.Footnote 85 Yet, even with a positive outlook, many economic analysts forecast that by the time Turkey joins the EU its unemployment level could remain as high as 10 per cent due to the effects of population growth.Footnote 86
Many EU member states view this prediction with apprehension, as they believe that Turkish economic migrants will flood their country. The Netherlands is a case in point, public opinion there strongly opposes Turkey joining the EU. The country is already home to some 350,000 Turks, and the Dutch are increasingly hostile towards immigrants, magnified by the murder of an outspoken filmmaker by a suspected Islamic extremist.Footnote 87 A similar situation can be found in France and Germany (which is already the home of 2.5 million Turks) with the fear that immigration is destroying their cultural and religious identity is palpable and has manifested itself by the rise of extreme right‐wing politics.
Supporters of Turkey believe that its membership would encourage the 10 million Muslims already living in the EU to feel more confident about the EU’s cultural tolerance and thus be more willing to integrate into their host societies.Footnote 88 This in turn should create a better understanding and acceptance of Islam. Whether this would actually happen in practice is questionable, when many public minds instinctively associate the global war on terror with battling Islam, despite the rhetoric of politicians.
Perhaps a more circumspect view of migration should be taken as population growth in the more developed EU nations has almost stagnated. This factor combined with longer life expectancy is reducing the size of the working population. A smaller labour force in the EU means less economic growth; migration is therefore necessary for sustained economic success. Turkey’s young and vibrant workforce could make a major contribution in sustaining the EU’s economic performance amid strong competition from Asia, particularly China.
Turkey could also positively contribute to the EU’s future economic security through its various plans for securing oil and gas for itself and others in Europe.Footnote 89 EU member states are already fearful about being too dependent on oil from the Middle East or from Russia, as there are concerns that as the latter’s economy develops oil supplies will dwindle. The construction of the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, following the emergence of the Caspian basin as a significant source of oil and natural gas, highlights the fact that Turkey is geographically and culturally close to 65 per cent of all world oil and natural gas reserves.Footnote 90
The EU recognises that transnational crime; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and international terrorism are key threats to its internal security.Footnote 91 Turkey’s position at the periphery of a prosperous region makes it a source, destination and transit route for transnational crime. Many third country nationals from the Middle East, Africa and Asia try to travel through Turkey in an attempt to reach Europe.Footnote 92 It is generally accepted that the principal supply of heroin into the EU region comes through Turkey and that the vast majority of opium/morphine that transits that country from the Golden TriangleFootnote 93 and Golden CrescentFootnote 94 is also processed into heroin there.Footnote 95 Turkey in the EU could act as the frontline against these ever‐growing ‘soft threats’ through beneficial cooperation in JHA.
The regions adjacent to Turkey pose one of the greatest challenges to the global nonproliferation regime. Ankara has chosen a defensive and realist approach by being party to global and regional nonproliferation agreements while simultaneously investigating the need for a ballistic missile defence system.Footnote 96 Though such a move may be viewed as pragmatic, it could also be argued that deploying such a system could invite an attack on the EU.
International terrorism is not a new phenomenon for Turkey. For the past two decades, the country has been fighting Kurdish terrorists. Whereas this conflict was ethnically fuelled, the 2003 bombings in Istanbul demonstrated that Turkey was not immune from Islamic terrorism. The AKP stressed that these bombings were planned and inspired from abroad. However, the poverty and disillusionment in the east of Turkey provides fertile ground for recruitment for groups such as Turkish Hizballah.Footnote 97 Concerns that these groups will be able to move freely across open borders into the heartland of Europe are fuelling the perception of Turkey as a security risk:
As far as the Islamic world is concerned – including the Islamic extremists, even bin Laden – they’re rejoicing over the entry of Turkey into the EU. This is their Trojan horse.
Muammar Gaddafi,Footnote 98 Libyan Leader
It is highly unlikely that international terrorism will be defeated in the near‐term, however Turkey’s inclusion within the EU could create two effects. First, at a strategic level it would demonstrate that ‘Christian Europe’ is not the enemy of Islam. Second, Brussels could utilise Turkey’s advanced military and intelligence capability in its struggle against this threat.Footnote 99
The EU has recognised that its own security is highly dependent on the stability and security of its near neighbourhood. To that end it launched the European Neighbourhood Policy to develop a ring‐fence of well‐governed countries by extending the benefits of the EU’s economic and political cooperation.Footnote 100 It could be argued that Turkey being at the crossroads of the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle East and at the door of Central Asia, holds a strategic position which gives its a role of major importance, on the one hand as a pole of stability in this particularly troubled region, and on the other, as a moderating element in the many regional conflicts at its doorstep.Footnote 101 Turkey has a complex web of relationships with these regions, including commercial, cultural, linguistic, ethnic and historical links.Footnote 102 It is this complexity that causes observers to differ on whether Turkey is ‘part of the problem’, or ‘part of the solution’ in regional security terms. But by any definition, the state is a pivotal actor whose own security depends on others:
Turkey…supports…the objective of providing stability and permanent peace in the Balkans…finding permanent peaceful solutions.. is the basic goal of Turkey’s policy for Caucasia…Turkey is of the opinion that the prevalence of peace and stability in the Middle East has a crucial importance for its own security and for regional and global peace and security.Footnote 103
The following analysis assumes a ‘politically benign’ Turkey, neither overly nationalistic nor Islamic fundamentalist in its foreign policies, yet still protective of its sovereignty and security.
Since the end of the Cold War, the stability of the Balkans has been a pressing concern for the EU and it has with NATO invested heavily in peace enforcement to contain spillover effects. Turkey is interested in the region for two reasons. A considerable part of its people, perhaps 10 per cent of the overall population, has family bonds with various parts of the Balkans. Second and perhaps more importantly, the Balkans is a strategic link between Turkey and Western Europe, with more than half of Turkish foreign trade being conducted with the region. Securing regional stability is a means for guaranteeing easy and unhindered land access to Western Europe.Footnote 104 Turkey contributed to NATO and United Nations missions, although Greece and Serbia were sensitive that its involvement could exacerbate the situation.Footnote 105 Turkey is presently participating in the EU‐led Operation ‘Althea’ in Bosnia. Turkish personnel are also present in Macedonia as part of the EU police mission Operation ‘Proxima’.Footnote 106 Macedonia remains a weak state, which feels under some pressure, due to neighbouring Kosovo’s continued calls for independence from Serbia. If granted, Macedonia’s Muslim population may also push for autonomy, potentially causing civil war.Footnote 107 Despite strong ethnic and religious links, Turkey has always been opposed to separatism in the Balkan states.Footnote 108
Any policy reversal by Turkey would certainly undermine its own economic security, especially as it seeks to upgrade transit roads and extend gas pipelines across the region.Footnote 109 However, it is unlikely that Turkey would have any influence in preventing these conflicts, but based on previous national behaviour, it is judged that Turkey would become a partisan supporter of Muslim peoples. Such support could bring Ankara into conflict with the rest of the EU, especially Greece.
To date the EU has refrained from playing a substantial role in the South Caucasus.Footnote 110 The region has been subjected to inter‐ethnic rivalry leaving states fragile and unable to capitalise on the full benefits of democracy after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the EU in 2007 will entail new neighbours for Brussels across the Black Sea. These reasons, together with the discovery of energy resources in the region, have brought the Caucasus to the attention of the EU. Turkey’s established relationships within the South Caucasus states could be considered an asset for the EU. Unfortunately, these relationships with Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia are not impartial and thus could harm the EU’s future involvement in this region.
Turkey’s relationship with Georgia is based on ensuring the territorial integrity of Georgia, for example against any spillover from the Chechnya conflict, and cooperating in law enforcement against transnational crime, particularly narcotics trafficking.Footnote 111
Turkey has developed a close partnership with Azerbaijan with which it shares a common language, culture and history. For this reason it supported Azerbaijan in its struggle with Armenia over Nagorno‐Karabakh.
Turkey’s relations with Armenia remain poor due to historical legacies and the border remains closed affecting the trade of both countries.Footnote 112 It is in Ankara’s interest to normalise relations with Armenia for two reasons. First, it is one of the conditions imposed by Brussels on all candidates to resolve any outstanding disputes. Second, it is only through Armenia that Turkey can economically tap into the energy resources of the Caspian. If a resolution could be reached, then Turkey could potentially play a significant role in supporting the democratisation and modernisation of all these countries.Footnote 113 However, if the situation in the region were to deteriorate due to the resumption of inter‐ethnic rivalry, then it is likely Turkey would intervene politically and militarily, triggering a similar response from Russia.Footnote 114
European policy towards the Middle East has been shaped by political and economic concerns. Brussels wants to protect major sources of its oil supplies in the Middle East and it also wants to prevent political violence spilling over into the EU.Footnote 115 Although Turkey’s principle has been not to interfere in the Middle East, in order to move closer to the West, its relationship with its neighbours Iraq, Syria and Iran has been plagued by disputes over resources (water), territorial claims and ideology. Only through increased economic ties have these disputes not escalated to conflict. Ankara’s relations with its Islamic neighbours have been further strained by its strategic alliance with Israel, despite the counterbalance of good relations with Palestine. Turkey’s potential for promoting security in the Middle East would be constrained by these existing factors. One could argue that perhaps it would be better for the EU if Turkey acted as a security insulator,Footnote 116 but on further consideration this is not realistic due to the volatility of the region.
Turkey is watching events in post‐Saddam Iraq extremely closely since there is the potential for fragmentation of the Iraqi state. It has been the Kurds’ long‐standing ambition to establish a homeland and the present circumstances in Iraq provide the ideal opportunity. Having made significant gains in the January 2005 election, the Kurds may declare an independent Kurdish state. Turkey is anxious that such a move would intensify the Kurdish separatist movement within its own borders. It can be argued that Turkey would take military action to prevent the establishment of a Kurdish state when taking into account its actions in 2003. However, specific conditions such as deteriorating relations with the US and the EU plus a credible threat against its territorial integrity would need to be present for Ankara to ignore the wishes of the international community.
Evidence that Iran is developing a nuclear capability is causing concern, not only for Turkey but also for the international community. Although Iran has been Turkey’s rival because of differences in ideology and competition for influence in the Caucasus, they share common interests such as dealing with Kurdish separatism and exploiting energy resources. Turkey would gain no benefit from any military intervention, as it is already aware that Iran’s ballistic missile capability would negate its conventional power projection capabilities.Footnote 117
The EU’s strategic objective in its relations with the West Bank and Gaza Strip is ‘to contribute to the creation of an independent, democratic and viable Palestinian state living side by side in peace and security with Israel’.Footnote 118 Analysts have suggested that NATO, under a UN mandate, could support the implementation of the road map by guaranteeing the security interests of the Israelis as they withdraw from the occupied areas.Footnote 119 The partisan and colonial links of some EU states (e.g. UK and France) would make their presence unacceptable to the Israelis.Footnote 120 Turkey, which has good relations with both sides, could be an ideal candidate to lead operations instead. Ankara has already indicated its readiness to make a contribution to the peace efforts.Footnote 121
The EU is seeking to take more responsibility in global matters within the framework of multilateralism and international law. While it is already an influential economic actor and development agent, for example in South America and South Africa, it now wants to reinforce these capabilities, if and when necessary with the ability to use force when its vital interests are at stake and to be able to respond more effectively to crises.Footnote 122 Turkey’s participation in the EU’s possible military operations could contribute significantly to their success and, maybe, could determine their feasibility.Footnote 123 Turkey’s geographical location, NATO‐class military infrastructure and logistical means constitute an indispensable environment for European military power projection to theatres of operation outside the EU. In short, Turkey could become a force multiplier in ESDP, especially when considering that the EU member states have armed forces that number 1.2 million, yet only 80,000 of these can be deployed overseas.Footnote 124 No less than 2.4 per cent of Turkey’s gross domestic product is spent on the military and its capability will be further enhanced by a multi‐billion pound procurement programme.Footnote 125 Turkey also has the second largest army in NATO and thus already has a long experience of working with many European armed forces, sharing the same defence doctrines and training procedures.
Turkey has also been involved in numerous UN missions, notably in Somalia, East Timor, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo demonstrating its political willingness and ability to contribute to global security. Turkey’s success as lead nation for operations in Afghanistan during 2002 was considered due in part to the Turks’ cultural awareness and sensitivity for the Afghan people based on long‐standing relations.Footnote 126
These cultural and religious values could become a significant asset especially in a world where Islam is the fastest growing religion. Turkey has been a member of the Organisation of Islamic Conference since 1960. The EU has acknowledged that, ‘Dealing with problems that are more distant and more foreign requires better understanding and communication.’Footnote 127 Turkey could provide the vital link between the EU and the Muslim world, although some commentators believe that the Turkish republic is quite marginal in the Arab and Muslim world as Ankara’s secular and pro‐Western project is hard to understand.Footnote 128
Turkey has substantial military capabilities that could bolster the EU’s security objectives, yet these capabilities also could pose a risk to regional security because that state is surrounded by insecurity and may respond assertively to protect its own interests. Turkey’s Muslim identity creates both negative and positive relationships within the EU and elsewhere. For these two reasons, it is impossible to apply binary logic and label Turkey as being either an asset or a liability in the ‘EU Security System’.
Commitment: Turkey and the EU – A Relationship based on Trust?
Trust is the cornerstone of any successful relationship, which needs continuous reinforcement through behaviour that demonstrates commitment to that relationship.
Elucidating this proposition further, the EU would trust Turkey if it proved its ongoing commitment by conforming to the EU ‘security identity’. Brussels would then see Turkey as a security opportunity. Turkey, having gained the trust of the EU, would then respond accordingly by being more committed. If these dynamics were absent, then the EU would perceive Turkey as a security risk. Analysing EU‐Turkish relations in general and with respect to three particular security issues would assess to what extent trust exists between them.
Although the formal relationship between the EU and Turkey began when the latter applied for associate membership back in 1959, the nature of interaction between them has been coloured to a great extent by the issue of identity. For centuries, the Ottoman Empire had been defined as Europe’s adversarial ‘other’ where differences in culture and religion formed the identity of each. While the Muslim Ottoman Empire and Christian Europe have become secular Turkey and post‐Christian Europe, in some quarters Turkey is still considered the ‘other’ of Europe:Footnote 129
Turkey…has a different culture…It is not a European country.
Valéry Giscard d’Estaing,Footnote 130 Former French President
…when we are in government in 2006 we will do everything…to prevent full Turkish membership in the EU.
Edmund Stoiber,Footnote 131 German Christian Social Union Party Leader
Therefore, despite the EU draft constitution stating that its values are universally shared and not affiliated to any one religion,Footnote 132 such sentiments do not engender trust, as Brussels is perceived to be backtracking on its promises. Turkey remains fearful that even if it meets the Copenhagen Criteria, that it will be not accepted into the EU because of being Muslim. From Turkey’s perspective this apprehension is well founded for at least three reasons.
First, several EU member states such as France and Austria, in response to strong xenophobic public attitudes have promised to hold a referendum as the ultimate safeguard against possible Turkish membership.Footnote 133
Second, the EU is proposing restrictions against the free movement of persons.Footnote 134 Thus, Turkey would not receive the full benefits of membership.
Third, the EU is imposing onerous conditions (outside the Copenhagen Criteria) such as recognition of Cyprus and the (alleged) Armenian genocide.Footnote 135 These conditions are almost impossible for the Turkish government to meet, even if it had the will to do so, as there would be too high a political price to pay since these particular issues are ingrained within the national psyche.Footnote 136 When compared to the most recent enlargement, which included the Central and Eastern European Countries, Turkey’s claim of discrimination therefore has some foundation:Footnote 137
What we demand is nothing more than our legitimate rights. We will not accept any injustice.
Abdullah Gül,Footnote 138 Turkish Foreign Minister
Even if Turkey’s complaint is legitimate, it must be relegated in favour of the EU’s position. The nature of the relationship between Brussels and a candidate is not two‐way but asymmetric with the EU fully in control of proceedings – the term ‘negotiations’ is illusionary.Footnote 139 Candidates need to demonstrate credible and irreversible policy reforms such that they can be easily absorbed into the EU, maintaining the stability and security that has been built up over the past 50 years.Footnote 140
From Turkey’s perspective, it believes that it has demonstrated its strong commitment to the security of the EU (and wider Europe) through: its full participation in NATO and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); its associate membership of the Western European Union (WEU);Footnote 141 and its indirect contribution to the operation of ESDP by enabling the ‘Berlin Plus’ arrangements.Footnote 142 Perhaps during the Cold War, this argument may have held some sway, but not today. The EU is seeking commitment of an entirely different nature; one which would entail major transformation of Turkey’s strategic culture, such that the issues of Cyprus, human rights and civil‐military relations would be resolved to the satisfaction of Brussels.
Cyprus has been a long‐standing national issue for Turkey and the lack of a solution has not endeared the latter to the EU, mainly through negative lobbying by Greece, because of the ever‐present potential for escalating conflict across the Aegean. After years of passivity, the present Turkish government actively encouraged the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus (TRNC) to accept the UN‐sponsored reunification plan. Prime Minister Erdogan recognised that without a settlement, Turkey’s own progression to EU membership would face further obstacles, especially if Cyprus joined the Union first. Cyprus would then have the right of veto on Turkish membership and, second, Turkey would be occupying part of an EU country while at the same time seeking membership.Footnote 143 Unfortunately, the Greek Cypriots voted against the UN plan, but still gained EU membership in 2004. Now Turkey’s own accession negotiations commencing in October 2005 must be preceded by an extension of its 1963 Ankara Protocol to all new EU member states, including Cyprus. Turkey has repeatedly stated its non‐recognition of the Greek Cypriot government either by direct or indirect means,Footnote 144 and so has been busy seeking alternatives. Prime Minister Erdogan arranged to meet the UN Secretary‐General on the sidelines of an international conference to discuss reviving the Annan Plan.Footnote 145
The second avenue being actively pursued is to seek a reservation to the Protocol to avoid automatic recognition of the Greek Cypriot government.Footnote 146 Looking at this situation from the EU’s perspective, it could be argued that Turkey’s proactive role before the Cyprus referendum indicated a great deal of commitment as there appeared to be a credible policy reversal, but its subsequent actions have dispelled any semblance of permanence.
Similarly, Turkey claims that human rights, including the rights of Kurds, have improved because of far‐reaching changes to the Turkish constitution. While it may be true that there is no longer a death penalty and that television programmes are being broadcast in Kurdish, the EU remains anxious:
Turkey has substantially progressed in its political reform process…Turkey is undertaking strong efforts to ensure proper implementation of these reforms. Despite this, implementation needs to be further consolidated and broadened. This applies specifically to the zero tolerance policy in the fight against torture and ill‐treatment, and the strengthening and implementation of provisions relating to freedom of expression, freedom of religion, women’s rights, trade union rights and minority rights.Footnote 147
In fact, Brussels has warned that accession negotiations could be suspended in cases of serious or repeated violations of human rights.Footnote 148
The final issue of concern is that of civil‐military relations. A major institution that attracts EU attention and criticism in this context is the National Security Council (NSC), a military dominated institution that has been a major organ of decision making for the past two decades.Footnote 149 The present Turkish government has increasingly asserted its control over the military. It could be argued that reforms in this area has been driven more by the need to secure the political survival of the AKP (the previous Islamist government was forced to resign by the military), than to fulfil EU criteria.Footnote 150 The most significant reform has been the appointment of a civilian as Secretary‐General of the NSC. Despite making these wide ranging changes, the EU has found that ‘the armed forces in Turkey continue to exercise influence through a series of informal mechanisms’.Footnote 151
Making the necessary reforms in these areas will be extremely painful for Turkey because of the simple reason that they all deeply affect its interpretation of sovereignty, based on the principles contained in the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne.Footnote 152 Cyprus is viewed as a strategic asset with the stationing of Turkish troops on the island ensuring the balance of power within the Aegean and a means of preventing the Anatolian coast being completely encircled by Greek islands.Footnote 153 Increasing the rights of minorities is being seen by Kemalists as a move to undermine the unity of the state. The Turkish military is highly regarded by the population acting as the bastion against Islamic fundamentalism. There is a paradox here in Turkey’s need to belong to the EU as the sure‐fire means of certifying its European identity, yet mistrusting Brussels because the reforms necessary for membership are perceived to be destroying the Turkish state. Opposition parties and certain quarters of the Turkish media are peddling the infamous ‘Sèvres Syndrome’ as they consider the cost of EU membership to be too high.Footnote 154
Although Turkey has been making steady progress with reform, the slow and uneven implementation is causing the EU to perceive Turkey as a security risk. If Brussels wants accelerated progress then it will have to demonstrate more commitment to Turkey’s membership, otherwise ironically Ankara will also perceive the EU as a security risk.Footnote 155
Conclusion
No other country seeking full EU membership has stirred up so many passions in favour or against its entry as Turkey.Footnote 156 The battle has been raging within and between EU member states as they consider the ramifications of Turkey joining the Union for their future security and identity. Some in the EU would prefer the European geographical identity to remain: a closed inward‐looking, secure and prosperous Christian club, protected against the wave of Islamic migrants from a country that does not, in their opinion, share European values. Then, there are others who visualise the Union’s identity evolving: a multicultural and capable actor impacting on a global scale to create a fairer, more secure and more united world. Furthermore, this section of the EU considers Turkey to be a vital component in achieving this vision because its inclusion could shape the entire geopolitical world order. The new security environment is making retention of the ‘old EU’ almost impossible. However, whether Turkey’s inclusion could actually realise the ‘new EU’ remains the key question. The paradoxical nature of Turkey when superimposed with the perception‐based concept of security makes answering this question with any degree of confidence impossible.
What this analysis has revealed though is that Turkey is in the process of transformation, triggered by the end of the Cold War and the prospect of EU membership. The problem lies in the fact that these triggers have created a dichotomy in Turkey’s domestic and foreign policies. To be accepted into the EU, the Atatürk‐forged republic has to evolve from being a ‘modern state’ to a ‘post‐modern state’ sharing the liberalist‐based values of the EU. Greater compatibility with the EU’s ‘security identity’ would certainly make Brussels perceive Turkey as a security opportunity. But the perpetual instability that surrounds the country also has the potential to engulf it. This external condition together with deep‐rooted beliefs about statehood is compelling Ankara to retain its own strategic culture. Thus, the EU perceives Turkey as a security risk since the country does not appear to be committed to changing its paradigm.
This dilemma of being trapped in the past, at least ideologically, while trying to embrace the ‘highest levels of contemporary civilisation’Footnote 157 is also affecting Turkey’s ability to contribute to greater stability in its near abroad. The republic’s geostrategic location and its cultural richness make this state arguably unique in the world. Turkey has the potential to affect the future security of the Middle East, the Balkans, the Caucasus and Central Asia, as well as that of the EU.
Having considered the main security issues in Turkey and surrounding regions, one might argue that it would be a serious mistake to admit it to the EU. This is true to some extent as Turkey’s proximity to more unstable regions and its own domestic situation would not only bring its internal security problems into the Union but would also lead to a direct entanglement of the EU in the security dynamic of the surrounding regions.Footnote 158
However, today’s security issues are intricate and transnational in nature. Even if Turkey were excluded from the EU, many of these security issues would still continue to threaten Europe. More importantly, Turkey’s exclusion would mean that the EU would lose the opportunity of influencing an important regional actor. In the wider geopolitical context, against the backdrop of growing Islamic‐based terrorism, the EU needs a secular, democratic and stable Turkey for several reasons. First, to demonstrate that Huntington’s prophecy is not self‐fulfilling and second, to demonstrate to the wider world that the EU can act as an inspiration for greater democratic reform leading to security and stability.
Rather than asking whether Turkey’s membership in the EU is a security risk or opportunity, perhaps the salient question is what is the risk of not having Turkey in the EU? The answer to this question, assuming the Turkey has made the necessary transformation, will be dependent on the Europe of 2015 – ‘Old EU’ or ‘New EU’.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Seiju Desai
Seiju Desai, Advanced Command and Staff Course Number 8.Notes
1 The terms ‘European Union’ and ‘EU’ are employed throughout, acknowledging that the term may be used anachronistically since the EU only came into being with the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993.
2 Javier Solana, ‘The Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Security Policy: Current Status and Perspectives’ in Karl von Wogau (ed.), The Path to European Defence (Antwerp: Maklu 2004) pp.36–43, at p.36.
3 Karl von Wogau (ed.), The Path to European Defence (Antwerp: Maklu 2004) p.14.
4 A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy, 12 Dec. 2003, p.2. ⟨http://uc.eu.int/uedocs/cmsupload/78367.pdf⟩.
5 Ole Wæver, ‘The EU as a security actor: Reflections from a pessimistic constructivist on post‐sovereign security orders’ in Morten Kelstrup and Michael Williams (eds.), International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration Power, Security and Community (London: Routledge 2000) p.250.
6 Antonio Missiroli, ‘The EU and Its Changing Neighbourhood’ in Roland Dannreuther (ed.), European Union Foreign and Security Policy Towards a Neighbourhood Policy (London: Routledge 2004) p.16.
7 ‘Turks’ EU expectations run high’, Turkish Daily News, 3 March 2005.
8 Harun Arikan, Turkey and the EU: An awkward candidate for EU membership? (Aldershot: Ashgate 2003) p.1.
9 Meltem Muftuler‐Bac, ‘Turkey’s Role in the EU’s Foreign and Security Policies’, Security Dialogue 31/4 (Dec. 2000) pp.489–502, at p.241.
10 Gulner Aybet, and Meltem Muftuler‐Bac, ‘Transformations in Security and Identity after the Cold War – Turkey’s Problematic Relationship with Europe’, International Journal 55/4 (Autumn 2000) p.568.
11 For instance, Spain and Poland.
12 The term ‘member states’ is employed interchangeably to refer to its countries, politicians and citizens.
13 The three criteria that must be met before countries can join the EU – political, economic and integrating the EU body of law known as the aquis communaitaire.
14 William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774–2000 (London: Frank Cass 2000) p.335.
15 Except Norway which chose not to join .
16 Timothy M. Savage, ‘Europe and Islam: Crescent Waxing, Cultures Clashing’ The Washington Quarterly 29/2 (Summer 2004) p.28.
17 Mehliha Benli Altunisik and Özlem Tür, Turkey: Challenges of Continuity and Change (London: Routledge 2005) p.121.
18 ‘European Union divided as Turks clamour to join’, The Times, 23 Sept. 2004.
19 Samuel P. Huntington, , ‘The Clash of Civilizations?’ Foreign Affairs 72/2 (Summer 1993) p.30.
20 ‘Turkey: This is the moment’, The Times, 16 Dec. 2004.
21 It is acknowledged that Turkey’s strategic relationship with the US would have a bearing on EU‐Turkey relations, but this issue is beyond the scope of this paper.
22 Sten Rynning, ‘The European Union: Towards a Strategic Culture?’ Security Dialogue 34/4 (Dec. 2003) p.481.
23 Barry Buzan, ‘New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty‐First Century’, International Affairs 67 (1991) p.432.
24 Ibid. pp.433–50.
25 Esra Cayhan, ‘Towards a European Security and Defence Policy: With or Without Turkey?’ in Ali Çarkoğlu and Barry Rubin (eds.), Turkey and the European Union: Domestic Politics, Economic Integration and International Dynamics (London: Frank Cass 2003) p.49.
26 The first ‘pillar’ of the EU.
27 H. Tarik Oguzlu, ‘An Analysis of Turkey’s Prospective Membership in the European Union from a ‘Security Perspective’, Security Dialogue 34/3 (Sept. 2003) p.287.
28 Hazel Smith, European Union Foreign Policy – What it is and What it does (London: Pluto Press 2002) p.22.
29 Valsamis Mitselegas, Jorg Monar, and Wyn Rees, The European Union and Internal Security, Guardian of the People? (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2003) p.6.
30 Guy Verhofstadt,, ‘The Need for a Common European Defence’ in Wogau (note 2) p.32.
31 Hans‐Bernhard Weisserth, ‘The European Headline Goal: Current and Future Crisis Management Capabilities’ in Wogau (note 2) p.116.
32 Humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping and tasks of forces in crisis management.
33 Verhofstadt (note 30) p.30.
34 Andrew Mango, Turkey: The Challenge of a New Role (Westport, CT: Praeger 1994) pp.5–11.
35 A.L. Karaosmanoglu, ‘The Evolution of the National Security Culture and the Military in Turkey’, Journal of International Affairs 54 (2000) pp.199–216, at p.201.
36 Hale (note 14) pp.102–4.
37 Ibid. pp.111–19.
38 ‘Turkey’s Security Perspectives and Contributions’, ⟨http://www.mfa.gov.tr⟩ accessed 26 Feb. 2005.
39 James Pettifer, The Turkish Labyrinth (London: Viking/Penguin 1997) p.xxviii.
40 Philip Robins, Suits and Uniforms, Turkish Foreign Policy since the Cold War (London: C. Hurst 2003) p.163.
41 Stephen Lainer, ‘Military Trends in Turkey: Strengths and Weaknesses’, p.7. ⟨http://www.csis.org/burke/trends_turkey.pdf⟩
42 H. Tarik Oguzlu, ‘The Clash of Security Identities: The Question of Turkey’s Membership in the European Union’, International Journal 57/4 (Autumn 2002) p.592.
43 R. Craig Nation, ‘The Turkic and other Muslim Peoples of Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Balkans’ in Vojtech Mastny and R. Craig Nation (eds.), Turkey between East and West: New Challenges for a Rising Regional Power (Oxford: Westview Press 1996) p.105.
44 Heinz Kramer, A Changing Turkey: The Challenge to Europe and the United Statest (Washington DC: Brookings 2000) p.158.
45 ‘EU rage over police beatings not cooling off’, Turkish Daily News, 10 March 2005.
46 Atatürk’s motto.
47 Colin S.Gray, Modern Strategy (Oxford: OUP 1999) p.131.
48 Private lecture at the Joint Services Command and Staff College, 9 March 2005.
49 Rynning (note 22) p.483.
50 Karaosmanoglu (note 35) pp.199–217.
51 Robins (note 40) pp.343–78.
52 Ian O. Lesser, ‘Turkey in a Changing Security Environment’, Journal of International Affairs (Autumn 2000) p.184.
53 Kramer (note 44) p.212.
54 Oguzlu (note 27) p.287.
55 European Security Strategy (note 4) pp.3–5.
56 Turkish Defence White Paper (Ankara: Min. of Nat. Defense Aug. 2000).
57 European Security Strategy (note 4) pp.7–8.
58 Ibid.
59 EU Commission 2004 Regular Report on Turkey’s progress towards accession, p.152.
60 Ibid. pp.154–5.
61 Mustafa Aydin, ‘Twenty Years Before, Twenty Years After: Turkish Foreign Policy at the Treshold of the 21st Century’ in Tariq Y. Ismael and Mustafa Aydin (eds.), Turkey’s Foreign Policy in the 21st Century (Aldershot: Ashgate 2003) p.18..
62 Turkish Defence White Paper (note 56).
63 Don Waxman, Turkey’s Identity Crises: Domestic Discord and Foreign Policy (London: Res. Inst. for the study of Conflict and Terrorism 1998) p.16.
64 Oguzlu (note 27) p.287.
65 Missiroli (note 6) p.16.
66 Wæver (note 5) p.260.
67 Defined as the territory of EU member states to differentiate between the first and second roles.
68 Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler, The European Union as a Global Actor (London: Routledge 1999) p.198.
69 Mitsilegas et al. (note 29) p.6.
70 Metin Heper and E. Fuat Keyman, ‘Double‐Faced State: Political Patronage and the Consolidation of Democracy in Turkey’ in Sylvia Kedourie (ed.), Turkey Before and After Atatürk: Internal and External Affairs (London: Frank Cass 1999) at p.263 of pp.259–77.
71 Kramer (note 44) pp.24–36.
72 William Chislett, ‘Turkey’s EU Membership: The Moment of Truth’ (2004). ⟨http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/documentos/101/wp-17-2004-I.pdf⟩ [accessed 10 Feb. 2005] p.5.
73 Private Lecture 7 March 2005 at the Joint Services Command and Staff College.
74 Ahmet K. Hahn, ‘Turkey’s Entry Bid Will Oblige the EU to Define Its Own Identity’, European Affairs 5/3 (Fall 2004) electronic version.
75 Nergis Canefe and Tanil Bora, ‘The Intellectual Roots of Anti‐European Sentiment in Turkish Politics: The Case of Radical Turkish Nationalism’ in Ali Çarkoğlu and Barry Rubin (eds.), Turkey and the European Union: Domestic Politics, Economic Integration and International Dynamics (London: Frank Cass now Routledge 2003) pp.127–48.
76 Arikan (note 8) p.193.
77 Chislett (note 72) p.14.
78 Ibid.
79 ‘Turkish PM attacks EU pressure’, ⟨http://www.news.bbc.co.uk⟩ accessed 24 Sept. 2004.
80 Canefe and Bora (note 75) p.129.
81 Amikan Nachmani, ‘What says the Neighbor to the West: Greek‐Turkish Relations’ in Barry Rubin and Kemal Kirisci (eds.), Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 2001) pp.85–9.
82 EU Commission Recommendation on Turkey’s progress towards accession (2004) p.4.
83 David L. Phillips, ‘Turkey’s Dreams of Accession’, Foreign Affairs 83/5 (Sept./Oct.2004) p.96.
84 Heather Grabbe, ‘When negotiations begin: the next phase in EU‐Turkey relations’, Centre for European Reform essays (London, Nov. 2004) p.4.
85 Reha Keskintepe, ‘On the Compatability of Islam and Democracy’, Turkish Policy Quarterly 3/1 (Spring 2004) p.15
86 Kirsty Hughes, ‘EU‐Turkey relations’, ⟨EurActiv.com⟩ (June 2004) p.16.
87 ‘Dutch want controls on Turkey’s EU entry talks’, Turkish Daily News, 10 Nov. 2004
88 Keskintepe (note 85) p.16.
89 EU Commission Recommendation on Turkey’s progress towards accession (2004) p.5.
90 Chislett (note 72) p.5.
91 European Security Strategy (2003) p.4.
92 Kemal Kirisci, ‘Turkey: A Transformation from Emigration to Immigration’, Migration Policy Institute, Washington DC (Nov. 2003) p.77.
93 Thailand, Laos, Myanmar.
94 Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran.
95 See John Roper, ‘The West and Turkey: Varying Roles, Common Interests’, The International Spectator 34/1 (Jan.–March 1999). ⟨http://www.ciaonet.org/frame/oljour frm.html⟩.
96 Sebnem Udum, ‘Missile Proliferaion in the Middle East: Turkey and Missile Defence’, Turkish Studies 4/3 (Autum 2003) p.94.
97 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment.
98 ‘Turn on the charm if you want to woo Europeans, Turkey told’, The Times, 17 Dec. 2004.
99 Oguzlu (note 27) p.295.
100 Solana (note 2) p.38.
101 Kramer (note 44) p.xii.
102 Can Buharali, ‘Turkey’s Foreign Policy Towards EU Membership:A Security Perspective’, Turkish Policy Quarterly 3/3 (Fall 2004) pp.95–114.
103 Turkish Defence White Paper (note 56).
104 Kramer (note 44) pp.146–7.
105 Pettifer (note 39) p.171.
106 Turkey’s Security Perspectives and Contributions, ⟨http://www.mfa.gov.tr⟩ accessed 26 Feb. 2005.
107 Private Lecture 9 March 2005 at the Joint Services Command and Staff College.
108 Kramer (note 44) p.53.
109 Michael Emerson and Nathalie Tocci, ‘Turkey as a Bridgehead and Spearhead: Integrating EU and Turkish Foreign Policy’, Centre for European Policy Studies Policy Brief (Aug. 2004) p.11.
110 Ibid. p.13.
111 Ali Murat Koknar, ‘Turkey and the Caucasus: Security and Military Challenges’ in Michael S. Radu (ed.), Dangerous Neighbourhood, Contemporary Issues in Turkey’s Foreign Relations (London: Transaction 2003) p.99.
112 Ibid.
113 Emerson and Tocci (note 109) pp.15–16.
114 Koknar (note 111) pp.104–10.
115 Hazel Smith, European Union Foreign Policy – What It is and What It Does (London: Pluto Press 2002) p.156.
116 Barry Buzan and Thomas Diez, ‘Turkey and the European Union: where to from here?’ Survival 41/1 (Spring 1999) p.52.
117 Udum (note 96) p.76.
118 ⟨http://www.europa.eu.int⟩ accessed 11 Feb. 2005.
119 Steven Everts, ‘The Ultimate Test Case: Can Europe and America Forge a Joint Strategy for the Wider Middle East’, International Affairs 80/4 (2004) p.671.
120 Roland Dannreuther, European Foreign and Security Policy: Towards a Neighbourhood Strategy (London: Routledge 2003) p.162.
121 ‘Turkey can play a role in Mideast’, Turkish Daily News, 2 Feb. 2005.
122 European Union in the World (2000) pp.3–4.
123 Muftuler‐Bac (note 9) p.495.
124 Philip H. Gordon, Chapter 16 in Nicole Gnesotto (ed.), EU Security and Defence Policy: The first five years (1999–2004) (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2004) p.217.
125 Lainer (note 41),
126 Maj. Gen. Hilmi Akin Zorlu, ‘Turkey has been successful as leader of the International Force in Afghanistan’, ⟨http://www.ciao.org/pbei/wincp/policy_2002/2002_682.htm⟩ accessed 9 Feb. 2005, p.1.
127 European Security Strategy (note 4) p.13.
128 José I. Torreblanca, ‘Europe’s Reasons and Accession’, Real Elcano Instituto de Estudios Internacionales y Estratégicos (Madrid 7 Feb. 2005) p.6.
129 Nuri Yurdusev, ‘Perceptions and Images in Turkish (Ottoman)–European Relations’ in Ismael and Aydin, Turkey’s Foreign Policy in the 21st Century (note 61).
130 ‘European Union divided as Turks clamour to join’, The Times, 23 Sept. 2004.
131 ‘The week of destiny with the EU’, Turkish Daily News, 13 Dec. 2004.
132 Preamble to draft EU constitution ⟨http://www.europa.eu.int⟩ accessed 10 Feb. 2005.
133 Bulent Aliriza and Seda Ciftci, ‘Turkey and the EU: Starting the Long Last Chapter’, Turkey Project, Center For Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, 21 Dec. 2004, p.4.
134 ‘EU sets full membership negotiations with Turkey for October 2005’ ⟨http://www.byegm.gov.tr⟩ accessed 9 Feb. 2005.
135 ‘Armenian genocide allegations spark fury in Strasbourg meetings’, Turkish Daily News, 25 Feb. 2005.
136 Aliriza and Ciftci (note 133).
137 Arikan (note 8) pp.211–21.
138 ‘Turkey: This is the moment’, The Times, 16 Dec. 2004.
139 Fraser Cameron, ‘The Commission Perspective’ in Jackic Gowerland and John Redmond (eds.), Enlarging the European Union: The Way Forward (Aldershot: Ashgate 2000) p.16.
140 Mehmet Ugur, ‘The Anchor‐Credibility Problem in EU–Turkey Relations’ in Gowerland and Redmond, Enlarging the European Union (note 139), pp.140–2.
141 William Park, ‘Turkey’s European Union Candidacy: From Luxembourg to Helsinki – to Ankara?’, Mediterranean Politics 5/3 (Autumn 2000) p.31.
142 Cayhan (note 25) p.52.
143 Semin Suvarierol, ‘The Cyprus Obstacle on Turkey’s Road to membership in the European Union’ in Carkoğlu and Rubin (note 25) p.66.
144 Aliriza and Ciftci (note 133) p.4.
145 ‘It’s your turn, Turkey tells Greek side’, Turkish Daily News, 12 March 2005.
146 ‘Turkey, EU try to hammer out Cyprus differences’, Turkish Daily News, 3 March 2005.
147 EU Commission Recommendation on Turkey’s progress towards accession (2004) p.3.
148 Ibid. p.9.
149 Ziga Onis, ‘Domestic Politics, International Norms and Challenges to the State: Turkey–EU Relations in the post‐Helsinki Era’ in Carkoğlu and Rubin (note 25) p. 247.
150 Federic Misrahi, ‘The EU and the Civil Democratic Control of Armed Forces: An Analysis of Recent Developments in Turkey’, Perspectives 22 (Summer 2004) pp.22–43.
151 EU Commission Recommendation on Turkey’s progress towards accession (2004) p.11.
152 Robins (note 40) p.126.
153 Suvarierol (note 143) pp.56–7.
154 ‘Fending off criticism’, Turkish Daily News, 20 Dec. 2004. Sèvres was the 1920 peace treaty very unfavourable to the Turks superseded by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 which recognised Mustapha Kemal’s defeat of the Greeks and his new republic in all Anatolia and eastern Thrace.
155 Oguzlu (note 27) p.298.
156 Chislett (note 72) p.1.
157 Keskintepe (note 85) p.13.
158 Arikan (note 8) p.193.