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Notes
1 Richard O. Hundley, Past Revolutions, Future Transformations: What can the history of revolutions in military affairs tell us about transforming the U.S. military? MR‐1029‐DARPA (Santa Monica, CA: National Defense Research Institute, RAND 1999) p.27.
2 The following comprehensive studies should be found useful: MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray (eds.), The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300–2050 (Cambridge, UK: CUP 2001); Conrad C. Crane (ed.), Transforming Defense (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Dec. 2001); Elinor C. Sloan, The Revolution in Military Affairs: Implications for Canada and NATO (Montreal: McGill‐Queen’s UP 2002); Hans Binnendijk (ed.), Transforming America’s Military (Washington DC: National Defense UP 2002); Colin S. Gray, Strategy for Chaos: Revolutions in Military Affairs and The Evidence of History (London: Frank Cass 2003); Tim Benbow, The Magic Bullet? Understanding the Revolution in Military Affairs (London: Brassey’s 2004); and Colin S. Gray, Recognizing and Understanding Revolutionary Change in Warfare: The Sovereignty of Context (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Feb. 2006); and Lawrence Freedman, The Transformation of Strategic Affairs, Adelphi Paper 379 (London/New York: Routledge for IISS 2006).
3 See Benjamin S. Lambeth, The Transformation of American Air Power (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 2000); Benjamin S. Lambeth, NATO’s Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 2001); Andrew J. Bacevich and Eliot A. Cohen (eds.), War Over Kosovo: Politics and Strategy in a Global Age (New York: Columbia UP 2001); Stephen Biddle, Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Nov. 2002); Norman Friedman, Terrorism, Afghanistan, and America’s New Way of War (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press 2003); Benjamin S. Lambeth, Air Power Against Terror: America’s Conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom, MG‐166‐CENTAF (Santa Monica, CA: National Defense Research Institute, RAND 2005); Williamson Murray and Robert H. Scales Jr, The Iraq War: A Military History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP 2003); and John Keegan, The Iraq War (London: Hutchinson 2004).
4 Gray (note 2) p.4.
5 Andrew F. Krepinevich, ‘Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions’, The National Interest 37 (Fall 1994) p.30.
6 Milan V. Vego sinks the EBO approach without trace as an extravagant methodology that cannot but be harmful if its application is attempted at the operational and strategic levels of warfare. See his ‘Effects‐Based Operations: A Critique’, Joint Force Quarterly 41 (2nd Quarter 2006) pp.51–7.
7 J.F.C. Fuller, Armament and History (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode 1946) p.31.
8 See James S. Corum, ‘A Comprehensive Approach to Change: Reform in the German Army in the Interwar Period’, in H.R. Winton and D.R. Mets (eds.), The Challenge of Change: Military Institutions and New Realities, 1918–1941 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press 2000) pp.35–73.
9 Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, A War To Be Won: Fighting the Second World War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP 2000) Ch.2 is outstanding.
10 Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (Washington DC: Dept. of Defense March 2005) p.iv.
11 See the latest collective analytical assault on the somewhat intractable problems of the defence planner, in Richard R. Kugler, Policy Analysis in National Security Affairs: New Methods for a New Era (Washington DC: National Defense UP 2006).
12 Terry C. Pierce, Warfighting and Disruptive Technologies: Disguising Innovation (London: Frank Cass 2004) offers most valuable insights from the historical experience of intending radical reforms in the US Navy and Marine Corps.
13 See Vego (note 6).
14 By ‘presentism’ I mean an approach that chooses to expect the future to resemble the present.
15 Gray (note 2).
16 Hew Strachan, ‘The Lost Meaning of Strategy’, Survival 47/3 (Autumn 2005) pp.33–54, provides a powerful reminder of this most central of Clausewitzian arguments.
17 Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis, 1911–1918, Vol. II (London: Odhams Press 1938) p.1442.
18 See Williamson Murray and MacGregor Knox, ‘Thinking about Revolutions in Warfare’, in Knox and Murray (note 2) Ch.1.
19 Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 2004). This book is robustly handled in a high calorie ‘Roundtable review’, in The Journal of Strategic Studies 28/3 (June 2005) pp.413–69. The critical knights at this roundtable are Eliot A. Cohen, Lawrence Freedman, Michael Horowitz and Stephen Rosen, and Martin von Creveld in full battle array. Biddle is allowed a despairing reply essay.
20 Gray (note 2).
21 This view is propounded with admirable directness by no less an authority than Sir Michael Howard. See The Causes of Wars (London: Counterpoint 1983) p.214.
22 Carl von Clausewitz (trans. and ed. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret), On War (Princeton UP 1976) p.75.
23 See Emily O. Goldman and Leslie C. Eliason (eds.), The Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas (Stanford 2003); and Emily O. Goldman, ‘Cultural Foundations of Military Diffusion’, Review of International Relations 32/1 (Jan. 2006) pp.69–91.
24 See Bruce I. Gudmundsson, Stormtroop Tactics: Innovation in the German Army, 1914–1918 (New York: Praeger 1989).
25 See Timothy Travers, How the War Was Won: Command and Technology in The British Army on the Western Front, 1917–1918 (London: Routledge 1992).
26 Clausewitz (note 22) Book II, Ch.1.
27 Uri Bialer, The Shadow of the Bomber: The Fear of Air Attack and British Politics, 1932–1939 (London: Royal Historical Society 1980).
28 See Allan R. Millett, ‘Assault from the Sea: The Development of Amphibious Warfare between the Wars – the American, British, and Japanese Experiences’, in Williamson Murray and Millett (eds.), Military Innovation in the Interwar Period (Cambridge,UK: CUP 1996), Ch.2; and Pierce (note 12) Ch.3.
29 Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York: Touchstone 1988) pp.311–12.
30 Stephen I. Schwartz (ed.), Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences of U.S. Nuclear Weapons since 1940 (Washington DC: Brookings 1998) p.58. The cost approximates that for the RAF’s Typhoon ‘Eurofighter’, though the Manhattan Project was completed in three years (June 1942–July 1945), rather than 20. Of America’s wartime programmes, only the B‐29 was more expensive, with a total then‐year cost of approximately $2.2 billion.
31 Robert B. Strassler (ed.), (trans. by Richard Crawley, revised), The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to The Peloponnesian War (New York: Free Press 1976) p.43.
32 See Saki Dockrill, Eisenhower’s New‐Look National Security Policy, 1953–61 (Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan Press 1996) Chs.2–3.
33 Mark Schneider, The Nuclear Forces and Doctrine of the Russian Federation (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press for the US Nuclear Strategy Forum 2006) currently is authoritative.
34 For opening a window upon Chinese strategic culture, it would be hard to improve upon Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui (trans. by FBIS), Unrestricted Warfare: Assumptions on War and Tactics in the Age of Globalization (Beijing: PLA Literature Arts Publishing House Feb. 1999).
35 Gray (note 2) pp.180–2.
36 See Eliot Cohen’s brief, but well directed, comments in ‘Technology and Warfare’, in J. Baylis et al. (eds.), Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction to Strategic Studies (Oxford: OUP 2002) p.236.
37 Edwin A. Pratt, The Rise of Rail‐Power in War and Conquest, 1833–1914 (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott 1916) remains well worth reading, while Dennis E. Showalter, Railroads and Rifles: Soldiers, Technology and the Unification of Germany (Hamden, CT: Archon Books 1986), Part 1, is justly regarded as a modern classic.
38 For a superior treatment of ‘the tactical crisis’, see Antulio J. Echevarria III, After Clausewitz: German Military Thinkers Before the Great War (Lawrence : UP of Kansas 2000).
39 Bruce Berkowitz, The New Face of War: How War Will Be Fought in the 21st Century (New York: Free Press 2003) is somewhat gung‐ho, but despite that is an excellent analysis and piece of sustained advocacy.
40 Charles E. Callwell, Small Wars: A Tactical Textbook for Imperial Soldiers, 3rd edn. (1906; London: Greenhill Books 1990) p.270. Greenhill’s addition of the subtitle is not useful. Among other sins it is misleading.
41 I am much indebted to the scholarship of a very senior British artilleryman. See Jonathan B.A. Bailey, ‘The First World War and the Birth of Modern Warfare’, in Knox and Murray (note 2) Ch. 8.
42 See David T. Zabecki, Steel Wind: Colonel Georg Bruchmüller and the Birth of Modern Artillery (Westport, CT: Praeger 1994).
43 A description favoured in Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson’s path‐breaking study, Command on the Western Front: The Military Career of Sir Henry Rawlinson, 1914–18 (Oxford: Blackwell 1992). J.P. Harris, Amiens to the Armistice: The BEF in the Hundred Days’ Campaign (London: Brassey’s 1998) provides a valuable, slightly sceptical, complement to Prior and Wilson.
44 See the much celebrated study, J.S. Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform (Lawrence: UP of Kansas 1992).
45 See Rhodes (note 29); Thomas Powers, Heisenberg’s War: The Secret History of the German Bomb (New York: Da Capo Press 1993); Mark Walker, German National Socialism and the Quest for Nuclear Power, 1939–1949 (Cambridge, UK: CUP 1989); and John Cornwell, Hitler’s Scientists: Science, War and the Devil’s Pact (London: Penguin 2004). For the Soviet Union, see David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939–1956 (New Haven, CT: Yale UP 1994).
46 See Natural Resources Defense Council, ‘Table of US Strategic Offensive Force Loadings, 1945–75/1976–2012’ ⟨http://nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datab1.asp⟩ (accessed 10 Aug. 2005).
47 Colin S. Gray, Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt? (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Feb. 2006).
48 Thomas G. Mahnken, Uncovering Ways of War: U.S. Intelligence and Foreign Military Innovation, 1918–1941 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 2002).
49 Goldman and Eliason (note 23).