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Notes
1 With the exception of Great Britain, which retired its last remaining NSNW system and its associated warheads in the late 1990s.
2 This range results from adding the total non‐strategic stockpiles of all nine de facto nuclear weapons states, as explained below.
3 See statement by George W. Bush, 13 Dec. 2001 at ⟨http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601‐3.html⟩. Also see ‘US‐Russia Agreed Joint Statement’, Moscow, 24 May 2002; National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington DC: The White House, Sept. 2002); National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington DC: The White House, Dec. 2002); and Sidney D. Drell and James E. Goodby, What Are Nuclear Weapons For? Recommendations for Restructuring U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces (Washington DC: Arms Control Association, April 2005) pp.5–8.
4 See Andrea Gabbitas, ‘Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons: Problems of Definition’, in Jeffrey A. Larsen and Kurt J. Klingenberger (eds.), Controlling Non‐Strategic Nuclear Weapons: Obstacles and Opportunities (Colorado Springs: USAF Institute for National Security Studies 2001).
5 Amy F. Woolf, ‘Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons’, CRS Report for Congress, FL32572, 9 Sept. 2004.
6 DoD Dictionary of Military Terms ⟨http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/index.html⟩.
7 The US non‐strategic nuclear weapons stockpile exceeded 20,000 tactical warheads at one point. See Kevin O’Neill, ‘Building the Bomb’, in Stephen I. Schwartz, Atomic Audit (Washington DC: Brookings, 1998), Figs. 1–4, p.46; Hans M. Kristensen, U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe: A Review of Post‐Cold War Policy, Force Levels, and War Planning (Washington DC: Natural Resources Defense Council, Feb. 2005) p.24; and Jeffrey A. Larsen, ‘Tactical Nuclear Weapons’, in James J. Wirtz, Eric A. Croddy and Jeffrey A. Larsen (eds.), Weapons of Mass Destruction: An Encyclopedia of Worldwide Policy, History, and Technology, Volume 2: Nuclear Weapons (Santa Monica, CA: ABC Clio 2005) pp.371–2.
8 Robert S. Norris, Hans M. Kristensen, and Christopher E. Paine, Nuclear Insecurity: A Critique of the Bush Administration’s Nuclear Weapons Policies (Washington DC: Natural Resources Defense Council, Sept. 2004) p.2.
9 For an in‐depth analysis of the Montebello Decision and its consequences for NATO nuclear force structure and planning, see Jeffrey A. Larsen, ‘The Politics of NATO Short‐Range Nuclear Modernization 1983–1990: The Follow‐On to Lance Missile Decision’ (Princeton University, NJ: PhD Dissertation, May 1991). The official text of the Montebello Decision can be found in Larsen and Klingenberger (note 4) Appendix A.
10 On the INF deployments, opposition, dual‐track approach, and eventual treaty, see Maynard W. Glitman, The Last Battle of the Cold War: An Inside Account of Negotiating the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2006; J. Michael Legge, Theater Nuclear Weapons and the NATO Strategy of Flexible Response (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 1983); Jeffrey Record, NATO’s Theater Nuclear Force Modernization Program (Cambridge, MA: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1981); and John Cartwright and Julian Critchley, Cruise, Pershing, and SS‐20 (London: Brassey’s, 1985).
11 For the US Presidential Nuclear Initiative and Russia’s responses, see Larsen and Klingenberger (note 4) Appendices C and D, pp.273–90. The text of the initiative is also available at the archives of the George Bush Presidential Library and Museum ⟨http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/papers/1991/91092704.html⟩.
12 For the text of the Helsinki Agreement, see Larsen and Klingenberger (note 4) Appendix F, pp.307–8, also available at the Arms Control Association, ⟨http://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/MARCH/js.html⟩.
13 Norris et al. (note 8) p.1.
14 Unclassified excerpts from the Nuclear Posture Review (Washington DC: The White House, Jan. 2002) can be found at ‘Special Briefing on the Nuclear Posture Review’, J.D. Crouch, 9 Jan. 2002, available at ⟨http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2002/t01092002_t0109npr.html⟩, and ⟨http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm⟩; also William J. Arkin, ‘Commentary: Secret Plan Outlines the Unthinkable’, Los Angeles Times, 10 March 2002, at ⟨http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la‐op‐arkinmar10.story⟩.
15 See Michele A. Flournoy and Clark A. Murdock, Revitalizing the U.S. Nuclear Deterrent, CSIS Report (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2002).
16 Article IX of the 1968 Nuclear Non‐proliferation Treaty defines a nuclear weapons state as ‘one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967.’
17 Woolf (note 5) p.13.
18 The lower figure does not include an additional 435 B‐61 bombs in reserve, according to Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, ‘NRDC Nuclear Notebook: US Nuclear Forces 2005’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Jan./Feb. 2005) pp.73–5. These authors claim that ‘most or all’ of those reserve bombs are slated for retirement and dismantlement in coming years as a result of the Department of Energy’s June 2004 decision to retire ‘nearly half” of the US nuclear arsenal. In another report the same authors project that the 2012 US nuclear stockpile will still contain 840 NSNW warheads: 500 operational B‐61 bombs, plus 80 spares; and 100 SLCM warheads, with 160 spares. Norris et al. (note 8) Table 1, p.4.
19 Flournoy and Murdock (note 15) p.96.
20 Ibid. This number is going lower as a result of the 2005 BRAC decisions. The United States currently has 48 DCA aircraft stationed in Europe.
21 Base Realignment and Closure Commission, 2005, at ⟨http://www.defenselink.mil/brac/⟩.
22 Interviews in Europe, March 2006.
23 Flournoy and Murdock (note 15) p 96; also Norris and Kristensen (note 18) p.75.
24 These countries are Great Britain, Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, Italy, and Turkey, according to Norris and Kristensen (note 17) Appendix A: ‘US Nuclear Weapons in Europe, 2005’, p.75.
25 NATO Nuclear Factsheets (Brussels: NATO Graphics Studio, 2004).
26 Woolf (note 5) p.13.
27 US NSNW were removed from South Korea in 1991. ‘Seoul Says it Now Has No Nuclear Arms,’ New York Times, 19 December 1991.
28 Interviews in Washington DC, Albuquerque, New Mexico and Europe, Aug. 2005 to March 2006.
29 On 21 April 2005, for example, the Belgian Senate passed a unanimous resolution calling for the gradual withdrawal of all American nuclear weapons from Europe in fulfillment of Article VI of the Nuclear Non‐Proliferation Treaty. On 23 April 2005 several parties in the German Bundestag (the FDP and Green parties) called on the government to raise the question about eventual nuclear withdrawals in the NATO Nuclear Planning Group and with its European allies. On 5 June 2005 the Schröder government decided not to pursue this position since a new government was expected later that year. ‘Rot‐Grün kippt Forderung nach Abzug der US‐Atomwaffen’, Der Spiegel, 5 June 2005, at ⟨http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/vorab/0,1518,358961,00.html⟩.
30 Brian Alexander and Alistair Millar estimate between 3,500 and 22,000; see Alexander and Millar, Tactical Nuclear Weapons (Dulles, VA: Brassey’s 2003) p.14. Woolf (note 5) estimates between 3,000 and 8,000. A similar estimate is found in ‘NRDC Nuclear Notebook: Russian Nuclear Forces 2006,’ Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists March/April 2006, p. 67; the authors estimate some 2330 operational NSNW, and an additional 4170 in reserve. US intelligence sources estimate the number as between 3500 and 5000, according to interviews in Washington, May 2006.
31 Woolf (note 5) p. 8.
32 Ibid., p.14; also David S. Yost, ‘Russia and Arms Control for Non‐Strategic Nuclear Forces’, in Larsen and Klingenberger (note 4) pp.119–57; and Alexander G. Saveliev, ‘Implementing the Nuclear Posture Review: The Impact on Russia’, in James J. Wirtz and Jeffrey A. Larsen, Nuclear Transformation: The New U.S. Nuclear Doctrine (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2005) pp.195–204; and Mark Schneider, ‘The Nuclear Forces and Doctrine of the Russian Federation’, Publication No.3, United States Nuclear Strategy Forum, 2006.
33 Woolf (note 5) p.17.
34 One approach to dealing with this notable lack of transparency, and the associated concerns about potential loss, theft, or sale of Russia’s NSNW warheads, can be found in Timothy D. Miller and Jeffrey A. Larsen, ‘Dealing with Russia’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Cash for Kilotons’, Naval War College Review 155/3 (Autumn 2004) pp.64–86.
35 Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal, and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats, 2nd edn. (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2005), ‘France’, p.191; Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, ‘Nuclear Notebook: French Nuclear Forces, 2005’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (July/Aug. 2005) pp.73–5; and David S. Yost, ‘France’s New Nuclear Strategy’, unpublished paper, 7March 2006.
36 According to French defense expert David Yost, ‘France maintained three SSBNs at see at all times from January 1983 to June 1992, when the requirement was reduced to two SSBNs. With the reduction from six to four SSBNs during the 1990s, the requirement was cut back to a minimum of one SSBN at sea at all times.’ Personal correspondence with the author, May 2006.
37 ‘Speech by Jacques Chirac, President of the French Republic, During his Visit to the Strategic Forces’, 19 Jan. 2006 ⟨http://www.elysee.fr⟩; also ‘Chirac Reasserts French Nuclear Weapons Policy’, Disarmament Diplomacy, no. 82 (Spring 2006) ⟨http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd82/82chirac.htm⟩, and interviews in Paris, March 2006.
38 Cirincione et al. (note 38), ‘The United Kingdom’, p.197; ‘Bagehot: A Ticking Bomb’, The Economist, 18 March 2006, p.34.
39 Michael Clarke, ‘Does my Bomb Look Big in This? Britain’s Nuclear Choices After Trident,’ International Affairs, 80/1 (2004), p.50.
40 Clarke, p.58; Michael Quinlan, The Future of United Kingdom Nuclear Weapons: Shaping the Debate,’ International Affairs, 82 (2006), p.628.
41 Cirincione et al. (note 38), ‘China’, p.163. In interviews at Sandia National Laboratories in Oct. 2005, some analysts expressed their belief that these numbers for China’s arsenal were too high.
42 Cirincione et al. (note 38), ‘India’, p.221.
43 Ibid.
44 Cirincione et al. (note 38), ‘Pakistan’, p.239; Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (New York: Columbia UP 1998).
45 Cirincione et al. (note 38), ‘Israel’, p.259.
46 This list of issues is from Woolf (note 5) pp.18–22.
47 As one reviewer has pointed out, the emissions were blurred during the Cold War too. The distinction only seemed clear to some people because of the artificial boundaries created for arms control negotiations, especially SALT and START, which focused on delivery systems that could be (it was hoped) verified by national technical means. The Soviets always called US nuclear weapons in Europe ‘forward‐based systems’ and regarded them as ‘strategic’ in terms of their potential effects on Soviet interests.
48 Those aging aircraft are: German and Italian Tornados; Belgian, Dutch, and Turkish F‐16s; and Greek A‐7s. Interviews in Europe, Oct. 2005 to March 2006; also Kristensen (note 7).
49 This is a position held by many disarmament advocates. See, e.g., Henrik Salander, ‘Is There a Role for Nuclear Weapons Today?’ Arms Control Today (July/Aug. 2005) p.9; and Norris et al. (note 8).
50 Woolf (note 5) pp.22–6.
51 The summary for these arguments can be found in Flournoy and Murdock (note 15) p.97.
52 Alexander and Millar (note 30) p.14.
53 The June 2005 meeting of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group, for example, left the language supporting US nuclear deployments unchanged from previous such statements: ‘The nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to NATO continue to provide an essential political and military link between the European and North American members of the Alliance.’ ‘Final Communique: Ministerial Meeting of the Defence Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group Held in Brussels on Thursday, 9 June 2005’, NATO Press Release (2005)075, 9 June 2005, para. 8, at NATO Online Library, ⟨http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2005/p05‐075e.htm⟩.
54 Of course, no US nuclear weapon can be operationally employed without the approval of the president in his capacity as the national command authority.
55 The June 2005 meeting of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group, for example, left the language supporting US nuclear deployments unchanged from pervious such statements: ‘The nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to NATO continue to provide an essential political and military link between the European and North American members of the Alliance.’ ‘Final Communique. Ministerial Meeting of the Defence Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group held in Brussels on Thursday, 9 June 2005,’ NATO Press Release (2005), 075, 9 June 2005, para. 8, at NATO On‐Line Library ⟨http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2005/p05‐075e.htm.⟩
56 NATO’s newest members are restricted from participating in DCA missions by the ‘three no’s’ commitment made by the Alliance to Russia as it announced in 1996 that it would consider new members: The Alliance had ‘no intention, no plan, and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new member countries, nor any need to change any aspect of NATO’s nuclear posture of nuclear strategy, and that it does not foresee any future need to do so.’ Announced by NATO’s Foreign and Defense Ministers, December 1996, and reiterated in the May 1997 ‘Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation, and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation.’
57 For example, see Frank Miller, ‘Is There a Role for Nuclear Weapons Today?’ Arms Control Today (July/Aug. 2005) p.10. For specific recommendations on how the West might deal with Russia’s NSNW stockpile in a capitalist manner, see Miller and Larsen (note 34).
58 They may, indeed, be willing to cut that deal. Removing US nuclear weapons from Europe has been a long‐standing Soviet and Russian arms control objective. However, Russia would prefer to give up nothing to achieve this objective, and the Russian policy for several years now has been to refuse to discuss reductions in Russian NSNW until all US nuclear weapons have been removed from Europe.
59 See Flournoy and Murdock (note 15). NSNW achieve several of the goals for nuclear weapons established by the Strategic Deterrence Joint Operations Concept. See George R. Nagy, ‘The Role of Nuclear Weapons within the DoD Strategic Deterrence Joint Operating Concept’, in Project on Nuclear Issues: The Future Security Environment and the Role of US Nuclear Weapons in the Twenty First Century (Washington DC: CSIS 2005).
60 Flournoy and Murdock (note 15) p.98.
61 In 2002 the White House stated that ‘The United States will continue to make clear that it reserves the right to respond with overwhelming force…including through resort to all of our options — to the use of WMD t the United States, our forces abroad, and friends and allies. ‘National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington DC: The White House, December 2003) p.3.
62 Technological arguments countering this requirement suggest that this would only work in shallow underground bunkers, otherwise the agents are more likely to be ejected in the debris cloud than destroyed. See Drell and Goodby (note 3) pp.20–1; also Michael May and Zachary Haldeman, ‘The Effectiveness of Nuclear Weapons Against Buried Biological Agents’, Science and Global Security 12/1–2 (2004) pp.91–114.
63 See Keith Payne, ‘The Nuclear Posture Review: Setting the Record Straight’, The Washington Quarterly (Summer 2005) pp.169–86.
64 See for example, Yost (note 32).
65 Flournoy and Murdock (note 15) p.100.
66 Ibid. , p.98.