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Notes
1 Arthur Hulnick, ‘What is Wrong With the Intelligence Cycle’, Intelligence and National Security 21/6 (Dec. 2006) p.978.
2 In a single‐service NATO context, these are G2 (Land), A2 (Air) and N2 (Maritime).
3 Walter Laqueur, A World of Secrets: Uses and Limits of Intelligence (New York: Basic Books 1985).
4 Mark Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (Washington DC: CQ Press 2003).
5 In summary, these are: overestimation; underestimation; subordination of intelligence to policy; lack of communication; unavailability of information; over‐confidence; complacency; received opinion (sometimes called ‘conventional wisdom’); mirror‐imaging; failure to link key bits of intelligence. Such criterion have been commonly referred to in a wide variety of academic texts which discuss the concept of intelligence failure, especially where it relates to military defeat.
6 NATO Allied Administrative Publication 6 (AAP‐6), NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, (NATO Standardisation Agency 2007) describes it as: ‘The sequence of activities whereby information is obtained, assembled, converted into intelligence and made available to users. This sequence comprises the following four phases: A. Direction – Determination of intelligence requirements, planning the collection effort, issuance of orders and requests to collection agencies and maintenance of a continuous check on the productivity of such agencies; B. Collection – The exploitation of sources by collection agencies and the delivery of the information obtained to the appropriate processing unit for use in the production of intelligence; C. Processing – The conversion of information into intelligence through collation, evaluation, analysis, integration and interpretation; D. Dissemination – The timely conveyance of intelligence, in an appropriate form and by any suitable means, to those who need it.’ Online version at 〈www.nato.int/docu/stanag/aap006/aap6.htm〉, accessed on 10 May 2007.
7 Lyman Kirkpatrick, Captains Without Eyes – Intelligence Failures in Word War Two (London: Rupert Hart‐Davies 1969).
8 John Hughes‐Wilson, Military Intelligence Blunders and Cover‐Ups (London: Constable & Robinson 2004).
9 Hulnick (note 1) pp.959–79.
10 Deborah G. Barger, Toward a Revolution in Intelligence Affairs (Washington DC: RAND National Security Research Div. 2006). Online version at 〈www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/2005/RAND_TR242.pdf〉, accessed on 23 July 2007.
11 Saxby Chambliss, ‘We have not Correctly Framed the Debate on Intelligence Reform’, Parameters 35/1 (Spring 2005) pp.5–3. Online version at 〈http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/parameters/05spring/chamblis.htm〉, accessed on 23 Jul 2007.
12 Gregory Treverton, Seth Jones, Steven Boraz and Phillip Lipscy, Toward a Theory of Intelligence (Washington DC: RAND National Security Research Div. 2006). Online version at 〈www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/2006/RAND_CF219.pdf〉, accessed on 17 July 2007.
13 James Norman, The Rise of Surveillance (US Dept. of Defense: USAF Air Univ. 2001) p.28. Online version at 〈https://research.au.af.mil/papers/ay2001/affellows/norman.pdf〉, accessed on 10 May 2007.
14 Edward A. Smith, Effects Based Operations – Applying Network Centric Warfare in Peace, Crisis and War (Washington DC: Dept. of Defense Command and Control Research Program 2003) p.104, classifies effects based thinking as encompassing ‘the full range of political, economic and military actions that a nation might undertake to shape the behaviour of an enemy, would‐be opponent, and even allies and neutrals’. The central idea is that the destruction of an enemy’s forces is just one option that could be considered. Non‐lethal means of engagement are equally valid options in an effects‐based strategy.
15 The tenets of such a concept are described as a robustly networked force improving information‐sharing. This information‐sharing and further collaboration then enhances the quality of information and shared situational awareness throughout the force, which in turn enables ‘self‐synchronization’. In coalescence, these factors dramatically increase mission effectiveness. Taken from David S. Alberts, John J. Gartska and Frederick P. Stein, Network Centric Warfare 2nd Edition (Washington DC: Dept. of Defense C4ISR Cooperative Research Program 2000) p.8.
16 Bruce D. Berkowitz, Best Practice – Intelligence in the Information Age (New Haven, CT: Yale UP 2000) pp.21–2.
17 Hulnick (note 1) p.978.
18 Maj. Gen. J.F.C. Fuller CB, CBE, The Foundations of the Science of War (London: Hutchinson 1926). Online version at 〈www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/fuller2/fuller2.asp〉, accessed on 17 May 2007.
19 From Brig. (Retd) Chris Holtom in discussions with the author dated 18 April 2007.
20 The definition is taken from the Army Doctrine Publication, Land Operations (Shrivenham, UK: Director General Development and Doctrine May 2005) p.193, using the online version at 〈www.carlisle.army.mil/pksoi/StaticDocuments/UK/050719_adp_land_ops_WEB-optimized.pdf〉, accessed on 17 July 2007.
21 Capt. Dave Travers, ‘Brigade ISTAR Operations’, The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin 3/4 and 4/1 (Winter 2000/Spring 2001) pp.47–53. Online version at 〈www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/documents/vol_03/iss_4/CAJ_vol3.4_11_e.pdf〉, accessed on 23 July 2007.
22 Ibid., p.47.
23 This stems from the growth of effects‐based thinking. On operations, every action will have a reaction or effect. These effects can be immediate, which is militarily referred to as ‘first‐order’. The eventual outcomes of an activity are identified as second‐order effects.
24 Hughes‐Wilson (note 8) p.148.
25 Announced by the BBC on 29 Dec. 2006, available at 〈http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/6213121.stm〉, accessed on 25 April 2007. The actual reports in the National Archive are held under reference FCO 7/3206 Foreign Office and Foreign and Commonwealth Office: American and Latin American Departments (formerly referenced as ALW 40/325/1 ANNEX III).
26 ‘Those intelligence requirements for which a commander has an anticipated and stated priority in his task of planning and decision making.’ NATO AAP‐6 (2007) p.2‐P‐8.
27 ‘A plan for collecting information from all available sources to meet intelligence requirements and for transforming those requirements into orders and requests to appropriate agencies.’ NATO APP‐6 (2007) p.2‐C‐7.
28 ‘A directive, usually formal, issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the co‐ordinated execution of an operation.’ NATO APP‐6 (2007) p.2‐O‐3.
29 Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (London: Penguin 2006) p.x.
30 Hulnick (note 1) p.960.
31 Rob Johnston, ‘Testing the Intelligence Cycle Through Systems Modelling and Simulation’, in Analytic Culture in the US Intelligence Community (CIA Centre for Studies in Intelligence 2005) Online version at 〈https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/CSI-publications/books-and-monographs/analytic-culture-in-the-U-S-intelligence-community/chapter_4_systems_model.htm〉, accessed on 18 Dec. 2007.
32 G. Treverton, Reshaping National Intelligence in an Age of Information (Cambridge: CUP 2003).
33 Mark Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 3rd Edition (Washington DC: CQ Press 2005).