Civilian Combatants, Military Professionals? American Officer Judgments

Abstract

States have increasingly replaced military personnel with armed civilian contractors. Are these civilians members of the military profession? I address this question in two ways. First, I assess whether armed contractors exhibit the characteristics of the profession of arms: expertise in the application and management of violence, provision of cost‐effective solutions within the jurisdiction of warfare, legitimacy derived from the state and polity, and a recognized corporate identity. Then I assess the views of 260 elite American field grade officers. I find that armed contractors do share many of the characteristics of military professionals but that officers do not view the civilian contractors as military professionals, are uncomfortable with their intrusion into the profession of arms, and are cognizant of their negative effects but some ambivalence in their responses suggests that the boundaries of the profession of arms are being permeated by civilian contractors acting in combat roles.

Notes

1 David R. Segal and Karin De Angelis, ‘Changing Conceptions of the Military as a Profession’, in Suzanne C. Nielsen and Don M. Snider (eds.), American Civil‐Military Relations: The Soldier and the State in a New Era (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP 2009).

2 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil‐Military Relations, (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard UP 1957) p.15.

3 Ibid.

4 Peter W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 2003) p.41.

5 Gary Schaub, Jr. and Volker Franke, Contractors as Military Professionals?’ Parameters 39/4 (2009/2010) p.96.

6 The International Peace Operations Association website ⟨www.ipoaworld.org/eng/aboutipoa.html⟩, accessed 10 Oct. 2009.

7 Harold D. Lasswell, ‘The Garrison State’, American Journal of Sociology (1941) p.455; Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (New York: The Free Press 1960), Chapter 1; and Samuel P. Huntington, ‘Power, Expertise, and the Military Profession’, Daedalus 92 (Fall 1963) p.785.

8 Huntington, ‘Power, Expertise, and the Military Profession’ (note 7) p.787.

9 Ibid. pp. 785 and 787.

10 ‘They belong to the officer corps in its capacity as an administrative organization of the state, but not in its capacity as a professional body’, since a reservist ‘only temporarily assumes professional responsibility’ while enlisted personnel and noncommissioned officers ‘have neither the intellectual skills nor the professional responsibility of the officer. They are specialists in the application of violence not the management of violence’, (Huntington, Soldier and the State, note 2, pp.12, 17–18). Huntington later added ‘commitment to officership as a career’ to his requirements to distinguish between junior officers who leave upon fulfilling their commitment upon accepting a commission and senior officers who remain, (Huntington, ‘Power, Expertise, and the Military Profession’, note 7, p.786). On the other hand, Gwyn Harries‐Jenkins argued that ‘the ambiguous professional status of enlisted personnel’ is a ‘dysfunctional consequence’ of the distinction between the application and management of violence. Those following Huntington, ‘argue that it is primarily the advanced education and training of officers, especially in post‐experience courses after initial qualification, which justify such accreditation. Other studies draw attention to the importance of such variables as a sense of responsibility, a code of ethics, and a system of prestige ranking as determinants of a claim to professional status; these are linked exclusively to the officer corps. The continuing irony, however, is that evaluation of this kind ignores the existence among NCOs and enlisted personnel of a value system and normative codes, many of the elements of which replicate the principles of the set of values and norms of the officer corps.’ (Gwyn Harries Jensen, ‘The Concept of Military Professionalism’, Defense Analysis 6/2 (1990) pp.121–2).

11 See Andrew Abbott, The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert Labor (Univ. of Chicago Press 1988); Nadia Schadlow and Richard A. Lacquement Jr, ‘Winning Wars, Not Just Battles: Expanding the Military Profession to Incorporate Stability Operations,’ in Nielsen and Snider, American Civil‐Military Relations (note 1).

12 See Andrew Abbott, ‘The Army and the Theory of Professions’, in Lloyd J. Matthews (ed.), The Future of the Army Profession (New York: McGraw‐Hill Primis Custom Publishing 2002) pp.525–7.

13 Huntington, Soldier and the State (note 2) p.14.

14 Peter D. Feaver, ‘The Civil‐Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Problem of Civilian Control’, Armed Forces and Society 23/2 (Winter 1996) pp.155–6.

15 Huntington, ‘Power, Expertise and the Military Profession’ (note 7) pp.793–7; Paul Gronke and Peter D. Feaver, ‘Uncertain Confidence: Civilian and Military Attitudes about Civil‐Military Relations,’ in Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn (eds.), Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil‐Military Gap and American National Security, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 2001) pp.132–5.

16 Charles Moskos argued that ‘Military service has had many institutional features. One thinks of the extended tours abroad, the fixed terms of enlistment, liability for 24‐hour service availability, frequent movements of self and family, subjection to military discipline and law, and inability to resign, strike, or negotiate over working conditions. All this is above and beyond the dangers inherent in military maneuvers and combat operations.’ Charles C. Mosksos Jr, ‘From Institution to Occupation: Trends in Military Organization’, Armed Forces and Society 4/1 (Fall 1977) p.42.

17 Sir John Hackett, The Profession of Arms (London: The Times Publishing Co. 1963) p. 63. Hackett also argues that the military of necessity inculcates the qualities of ‘courage, fortitude and loyalty’ as ‘in the profession of arms they are functionally indispensable. The training, the group organizations, the whole pattern of life of the professional man at arms is designed in a deliberate effort to foster them, not just because they are morally desirable in themselves, but because they contribute to military efficiency’. (pp.45–6).

18 Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (note 7) p.227; Huntington, ‘Power, Expertise, and the Military Profession’ (note 7) pp.792–3.

19 See Moskos (note 16).

20 James Burk, ‘Expertise, Jurisdiction, and Legitimacy of the Military Profession’, in Lloyd J. Matthews (ed.), The Future of the Army Profession, 2nd ed. (Boston: McGraw‐Hill 2005) pp.44–5.

21 See Daniel Hughes, ‘The Military is not a Profession’, unpublished manuscript draft of Sept. 2008. However, Abbott refers to the Army as a ‘strongly vocational profession’ in Abbott, ‘The Army and the Theory of the Professions’ (note 11) p.529.

22 Erik D. Prince, ‘How Blackwater Serves America’, Wall Street Journal, 16 Dec. 2008, p.23.

23 Ibid.

24 Although their lack of access to continuing professional developmental education suggests that their professional knowledge will not advance further and may decay.

25 Singer, Corporate Warriors (note 4) pp.91–100.

26 Volker Franke and Marc von Boemcken, Attitudes, Values, and Professional Self‐Conceptions of Private Security Contractors in Iraq: An Exploratory Study (Bonn: Bonn International Center for Conversion Aug. 2009) pp.7–9.

27 Singer, Corporate Warriors (note 4) pp.44–8.

28 Ibid. pp.49–70.

29 Jonathan D. Tepperman, ‘Out of Service: Can Mercenaries Protect Hamid Karzai?’, New Republic, 25 Nov. 2002.

30 Bill Sizemore, ‘Blackwater USA Says it can Supply Forces for Conflicts’, Norfolk Virginian‐Pilot, 30 March 2006; Kelly Kennedy, ‘Private Firm Pitches Army‐for‐Hire Plan’, Air Force Times, 10 April 2006, p.23.

31 Michael Bruno, ‘Air Force Calls For More F‐22s, C‐17s, JCA Control’, Aviation Week, 25 Oct. 2007), available at ⟨www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_generic.jsp?channel=defense&id=news/USAF102507.xml&headline=Air%20Force%20Calls%20For%20More%20F=22s,%20C-17s,%20JCA%20Control⟩, accessed 22 Nov. 2009.

32 Interview with Blackwater executive, 25 Sept. 2008.

33 Louis Hansen, ‘Blackwater Sets Sights on Somali Pirates’, Norfolk Virginian‐Pilot, 18 Oct. 2008.

34 For a recent analysis of the legal status of PMFs and their employees, see Jennifer K. Elsea, Moshe Schwartz, and Kennon H. Nakamura, Private Security Contractors in Iraq: Background, Legal Status, and Other Issues, CRS Report for Congress (Washington DC: Congressional Budget Office, updated 29 Sept. 2008).

35 Elsea, Schwartz, and Nakamura, Private Security Contractors in Iraq (note 34) p. 14, note 52. Also see Chia Lehnardt, ‘Private Military Companies and State Responsibility’, in Simon Chesterman and Chia Lehnardt (eds.), From Mercenaries to Market: The Rise and Regulation of Private Military Companies (New York: OUP 2007).

36 Prince, ‘How Blackwater Serves America’ (note 22) p.23.

37 IPOA's code of conduct can be found at ⟨http://ipoaworld.org/eng/codeofconductv11eng.html⟩.

38 Daniel Frisk and R. Derek Trunkey, Contractors' Support of US Operations in Iraq (Washington DC: Congressional Budget Office Aug. 2008) p.1.

39 According to Blackwater Worldwide's website, ‘Blackwater presently employs a wealth of experts, many of whom have previously served their country in the United States military or law enforcement. Their experience and honorable past service make them the kind of employees Blackwater Worldwide looks for – qualified, skilled, and trustworthy … Certain prerequisites may be required of the applicant depending on the purpose of the employment, including physical fitness and psychological requirements and specific certifications. Background checks and personal and employer references are completed on all prospective employees. To ensure customer satisfaction, additional evaluation is done to ensure the candidate meets all of the customer's requirements’, ⟨www.blackwaterusa.com/human_resources/HMR_Recruit_personel.html⟩, ⟨www.blackwaterusa.com/human_resources/HMR_Evaluate.html⟩, visited 11 Oct. 2008. In addition, Blackwater requires its employees and independent contractors to swear an oath to protect and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic – the same oath sworn by officers of the US military.

40 Elsea, Schwartz and Nakamura, Private Security Contractors in Iraq (note 34) p.3.

41 Huntington, Soldier and the State (note 2) p.17.

42 Franke and Boemcke, Attitudes, Values and Professional Self‐Conceptions (note 26) pp.18–19.

43 Peter D. Feaver, Richard Kohn, and Lindsay P. Cohn, ‘The Gap between Military and Civilian in the United States in Perspective’, in Feaver and Kohn, Soldiers and Civilians (note 15) pp.6–7.

44 Sister service institutions were approached but did not grant access to their students. Therefore the sample significantly over‐represents USAF officers compared to the population of officers attending PME in residence across all of the services.

45 Out of a population of 659, resulting in a 39.45 percent response rate.

46 The Military Commissions Act of 2006 (10 US Congress 948a (Section 1, Subchapter I)) Chapter 47A—Military commission: Subchapter I – General provisions: Sec. 948a. Definitions specifies: ‘(1) UNLAWFUL ENEMY COMBATANT. – (A) The term ‘unlawful enemy combatant’ means – (i) a person who has engaged in hostilities or who has purposefully and materially supported hostilities against the United States or its co‐belligerents who is not a lawful enemy combatant (including a person who is part of the Taliban, Al‐Qaeda, or associated forces); or (ii) a person who, before, on, or after the date of the enactment of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, has been determined to be an unlawful enemy combatant by a Combatant Status Review Tribunal or another competent tribunal established under the authority of the President or the Secretary of Defense. (B) CO‐ BELLIGERENT. – In this paragraph, the term ‘co‐belligerent’, with respect to the United States, means any State or armed force joining and directly engaged with the United States in hostilities or directly supporting hostilities against a common enemy. (2) LAWFUL ENEMY COMBATANT. – The term ‘lawful enemy combatant’ means a person who is – (A) a member of the regular forces of a State party engaged in hostilities against the United States; (B) a member of a militia, volunteer corps, or organized resistance movement belonging to a State party engaged in such hostilities, which are under responsible command, wear a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance, carry their arms openly, and abide by the law of war; or (C) a member of a regular armed force who professes allegiance to a government engaged in such hostilities, but not recognized by the United States.’

47 This relationship is statistically significant at the 0.001 level, meaning that this result could happen by chance less than 0.1 percent of the time.

48 House Committee of the Judiciary, 106th Congress, 2nd Session, Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000, Report 106‐778, Part 1 (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office 2007) p.1. The amendment was not considered in the Senate and therefore did not become law.

49 August Cole, ‘US Tightens Rules for Security Contractors in Iraq’, Wall Street Journal, 19 Aug. 2008, p.14. This was a precursor to a memorandum from the Secretary of Defense to the department, ‘Management of DoD Contractors and Contractor Personnel Accompanying US Armed Forces in Contingency Operations Outside the United States’, issued 25 Sept. 2007.

50 ‘Under the authority of international law, contractors and other civilians working with the military are civilian non‐combatants whose conduct may be attributable to the United States … In an international armed conflict or occupation, only members of regular armed forces and paramilitary groups that come under military command and meet certain criteria (carry their weapons openly, distinguish themselves from civilians, and generally obey the laws of war) qualify as combatants… [C]ontract employees fall outside of the military chain of command’, as specified in US Army Field Manual 31‐220, section 1‐22, (Elsea, Schwartz and Nakamura, Private Security Contractors in Iraq, note 34, pp.4–16).

51 Although Secretary Gates has proposed to convert 30,000 contractor jobs into civil service positions by 2015, (William H. McMichael, ‘Gates calls for huge cuts in weapons programs')’ Army Times (8 April 2009), available at ⟨www.armytimes.com/news/2009/04/military_defense_budgetcuts_040609w/⟩, accessed 28 Nov. 2009.

52 The p‐value for the Pearson Chi‐square with 4 degrees of freedom was 0.143 (2 sided).

53 Combat arms/operations career fields for the Army and Marines were armor, artillery, and infantry; aviator, for the Air Force; and surface/subsurface for the Navy: 146 were in these categories, 113 were not, and 1 did not respond.

54 The p‐value for the Pearson Chi‐square with 4 degrees of freedom was 0.009 (2 sided).

55 The US Army has codified its ‘Warrior Ethos: I will always place the mission first. I will never accept defeat. I will never quit. I will never leave a fallen comrade. [It] is a set of principles by which every Soldier lives. In a broader sense, the Warrior Ethos is a way of life that applies to our personal and professional lives as well. It makes us better people in general –better husbands; better wives; better sons and daughters; better brothers and sisters.’ ⟨www.army.mil/warriorethos/⟩, accessed 11 Oct. 2008). For the USAF, see Master Sgt Mitch Gettle, ‘Air Force fosters ‘warrior ethos’ in all Airmen’, Air Force Print News (21 March 2007), ⟨www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123045702⟩, accessed 11 Oct. 2008; and Stephen J. Lorenz, ‘Transforming Air Force Education for the Long War and Beyond’, Air and Space Power Journal 21/2 (Summer 2007). For a critical evaluation, see Christopher Coker, The Warrior Ethos: Military Culture and the War on Terror (New York: Routledge 2007).

56 Louise Doswald‐Beck, ‘Private Military Companies under International Humanitarian Law’, in Chesterman and Lehnardt, From Mercenaries to Market (note 35) p.117.