Interdicting Terrorist Financing with Coercion: Strategies for Policy‐Makers to Cut the Cash Flow of Terrorist Organizations

Abstract

The following article examines how the principles of coercion theory can be applied towards the formulation of strategy aimed at countering terrorist financing. In doing so, this article provides a breakdown of coercion’s relevant theoretical concepts on the subject matter. This is followed by an elaboration of the specific coercive approaches—non‐military and military—that can be implemented to counter terrorist finance operations, along with an illustration, based on case‐evidence, of how these approaches can be practically employed with power and policy mechanisms at the state and international levels. The article concludes with a discussion on what is required, from a coercion stand‐point, to successfully counter a terrorist organization’s financial operations, as well as the advantages and limitations involved in such a strategy.

Notes

1 Rob de Wijk, The Art of Military Coercion (Amsterdam: Mets & Schilt 2005) p.11.

2 Alexander L. George, Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War (Washington DC: US Institute of Peace Press 1991) p.4.

3 Agencies, such as non‐governmental organizations and corporations, as well as people, such as drug crop farmers, may also be targeted as well to varying degrees, however given the more limited scope of this paper, elaboration on the applications of coercive diplomacy will stick to the more orthodox consideration where the target is the state.

4 This is not to say that coercive diplomacy (or coercive bargaining for that matter) cannot by utilized against terrorist organizations. Indeed, experiences against the IRA, PLO, Hamas, Albanian National Liberation Army and others show that this can be done – however, this can only be pursued in regards to the broader conflict itself, as opposed to the actual means and methods pursued, for which there is little historical evidence to demonstrate either its applications or success in such an instance.

5 Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, NY/London: Cornell UP 1996) p.4.

6 It should be mentioned that military coercion certainly has been waged against nations harboring terrorists within their borders (examples include Afghanistan, Jordan and Lebanon among others) as well as for possible complicity in the organization’s acts of terrorism (see US operations against Libya and Iraq). However, there is little evidence available to suggest that coercion has ever been waged against other states primarily – or only – for complicity with, or support for, terrorist finance operations.

7 Robert Charles, testifying in the Hearing before the Committee on International Relations House of Representatives, 108th Congress, 2nd Session, ‘Afghanistan Drugs and Terrorism and US Security Policy’, Serial No. 108–84 (12 Feb. 2004) p.41.

8 Hans Koechler, ‘The United Nations and International Terrorism: Challenges to Collective Security’, IPO Research Papers presented at the International Conference on International Terrorism and Anti‐Terrorism Cooperation in Shanghai, China, 15 Nov. 2002, p.4.

9 Anne L. Clunan, ‘US and International Responses to Terrorist Financing’, Strategic Insights 4/1 (Jan. 2005) p.4, ⟨www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2005/Jan/clunanJan05.asp⟩ accessed 15 Feb. 2007.

10 Ibid.

11 UN Security Council, ‘Security Council Unanimously Adopts Wide‐Ranging Antiterrorism Resolution: Calls for Suppressing Financing, Improving International Cooperation’, Press Release SC/7158, 28 Sept. 2001, pp.3–5.

12 Clunan (note 9).

13 Jonathan M. Winer and Trifin J. Roule, ‘Fighting Terrorist Finance’, Survival 44/3 (Autumn 2002) p. 92.

14 Clunan (note 9).

15 Winer and Roule (note 13).

16 Kenneth Katzman. ‘Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors 2002’, Congressional Research Report for Congress, the Library of Congress , 13 Feb. 2002, p.41.

17 Gary Clyde Hufbauer , Jeffery J. Schott and Barbara Oegg et al. ‘Using Sanctions to Fight Terrorism’, International Economics Policy Brief 01–11 (Nov. 2001) p.2, ⟨www.petersoninstitute.org/publications/pb/pb.cfm?ResearchID=79⟩ accessed 15 Feb. 2007.

18 Hufbauer et al. (note 17).

19 Ibid. p.3.

20 Ibid. p.7.

21 Ibid. p.9.

22 Ibid.

23 Ibid. p.4.

24 Ibid. p.2.

25 Ibid. p.14.

26 Javier Fernandez Leal, ‘Costs of the War in Colombia: A Strategic Vision of the End of the Conflict’, US Army War College (USAWC) Strategy Research Paper (Carlisle, PA 2005) p.15.

27 Henry J. Hyde, testifying in the Hearing before the Committee on International Relations House of Representatives, 108th Congress, 2nd Session, ‘Afghanistan Drugs and Terrorism and US Security Policy’, Serial No. 108–84 (12 Feb. 2004) p.5.

28 Karen P. Tandy, testifying in the Hearing before the Committee on International Relations House of Representatives, 108th Congress, 2nd Session, ‘Afghanistan Drugs and Terrorism and US Security Policy’, Serial No. 108–84 (12 Feb. 2004) p.19.

29 Leal (note 26) p.15.

30 Hyde testimony (note 27) p.7.

31 Tandy testimony (note 28) p.16.

32 Ricardo Vargas, ‘The Anti‐drug Policy, Aerial Spraying of Illicit Crops and Their Social, Environmental and Political Impacts in Colombia’, Journal of Drug Issues 3 (Winter 2002) p.3.

33 Ibid. p.2.

34 Hyde testimony (note 27) p.7.

35 Ricardo Vargas Meza, ‘Strategy for Controlling the Drug Supply: Illicit Crops and Alternative Development Policy Recommendations’, paper presented at the seminar ‘Cultivation of Illicit Crops and Alternative Development, the Case of Colombia as Compared to Laos and Afghanistan’, Uppsala Univ., Sweden, 17 March 2004, p.3.

36 Ibid.

37 Robert Charles, testifying in the Hearing before the Committee on International Relations House of Representatives, 108th Congress, 2nd Second Session, ‘Afghanistan Drugs and Terrorism and US Security Policy’, Serial No. 108–84 (12 Feb. 2004) p.28.

38 Ibid. p.41.

39 Ibid. p.28.

40 Ali M. Koknar, ‘Piracy and Terrorism are Joining Forces and Creating Troubled Waters for the Maritime Industry’, Security Management Online (June 2004), ⟨www.securitymanagement.com/library/001617.html⟩ accessed 18 Jan. 2007.

41 HE Jose Luis Jesus, ‘Protection of Foreign Ships Against Piracy and Terrorism at Sea: Legal Aspects’, International Journal of Maritime and Coastal Law 18/3 (2003) p.376.

42 Ibid. p.365.

43 David McKeeby, ‘NATO’s “Active Endeavor” Operation Safeguards the Mediterranean’, International Information Programs, US Dept. of State, 7 Nov. 2006, p.1, ⟨http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-english&y=2006&m=November&x=20061107103535idybeekcm0.2729456⟩ accessed 12 Jan. 2007.

44 NATO, ‘Combating Terrorism at Sea’, NATO Briefing (July 2006) p.3.

45 Jesus (note 41) p.374.

46 Since the launch of Operation ‘Active Endeavor’, 488 vessels have been escorted, 79,000 merchant vessels have been monitored, over 100 vessels have been boarded, 84 civilians have been rescued, and immigrant smuggling has been uncovered. NATO – Allied Joint Force Command Naples. ‘Operation Active Endeavor’, 13 Dec. 2006, ⟨www.afsouth.nato.int/JFCN_Operations/ActiveEndeavour/Endeavour.htm⟩, accessed 18 Jan. 2007.

47 NATO, ‘NATO and the Fight Against Terrorism’, NATO Briefing (March 2006) p.3.

48 Koknar (note 40).

49 Tandy (note 28) p.19.

50 Ibid.