Counterinsurgency Since 9/11 and its Future

Abstract

Recent US experience in Iraq and Afghanistan has proven that COIN, however revised and updated to fit the globalised era in which we live, is a problematic and ineffective solution to the irregular warfare waged by insurgents. The United States and the West in general will have to accept the chastening lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan lest they repeat it: that they are not good at waging COIN and must try to avoid getting involved in such costly campaigns again. If intervention abroad has to be undertaken, it will have to fulfill a set of demanding conditions. Nonetheless, while COIN in its contemporary guise has failed to deliver long-term, tangible results, thinking about how to counter asymmetric challenges, including the waging of irregular warfare, cannot be ignored, given the likelihood that external interventions will continue to be required in the future. Moreover, while COIN as the basis of a grand strategy is unrealistic, some of its basic principles are useful in orientating future approaches to insurgencies and terrorism towards comprehensive and collaborative approaches, as opposed to merely hard security operations unilaterally undertaken by States, which fail to address the underlying fundamental causes of political violence and which undermine long-term legitimacy.

Notes

1 The term ‘Islamist’ used in this article refers to those who subscribe to extreme, violent interpretations of jihad and is not a reference to the overwhelming majority of Muslims.

2 See, for instance, Peter W. Galbraith, The End of Iraq: How American Incompetence Created a War Without End (New York: Simon & Schuster 2007); Ali Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace (New Haven, CT: Yale UP 2007); and ‘Afghanistan: Exit vs Engagement,’Asia Briefing No. 115, International Crisis Group, Brussels, 28 Nov. 2010.

3 See, for instance, Thomas Mockaitis, ‘Winning Hearts and Minds in the War on Terrorism’, in Thomas Mockaitis and Paul Rich (eds.), Grand Strategy in the War Against Terrorism (London: Frank Cass 2003), and David J. Kilcullen, ‘Countering Global Insurgency’,. Journal of Strategic Studies28/4(Winter 2005) pp.608--9, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/kilcullen.pdf> accessed 21 Jan. 2013.

4 iCasualties.org, <http://icasualties.org/> accessed 21 Jan. 2013.

5 Iraq Body Count, http://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/ accessed 21 Jan. 2013.

6 British Army Field Manual, Vol. 1, Part 10: Countering Insurgency, Oct. 2009, chapter 3, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/16_11_09_army_manual.pdf accessed 21 Jan. 2013.

7 Ibid., 1-2.

8 Ibid., 1-4.

9 Ibid., 1-6.

10 Ibid., 1-7.

11 See Russell R. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy (Bloomington: Indiana UP 1973).

12 Andrew T. H. Tan, ‘East Asia’s Military Transformation: The Revolution in Military Affairs and its Problems’, Security Challenges, 7/ 3, Spring 2011) pp.94--6, and Michael O’Hanlon, Technological Change and the Future of Warfare (Washington DC: Brookings 2000) p.8.

13 Biography.com, David Petraeus, www.biography.com/people/david-petraeus-39448?page=1 accessed 21 Jan. 2013.

14 David H. Petraeus, ‘Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq,’ Military Review, Oct. 2006, pp.81--2, https://ronna-afghan.harmonieweb.org/CAAT/Shared%20Documents/Learning%20Counterinsurgency.pdf accessed 21 Jan. 2013.

15 Ibid., p.83.

16 Ibid., p.- 82.

17 Ibid., p.83.

18 See John Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (Westport, CT: Praeger 2002), and H. R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Chief, and the Lies that Led to Vietnam (New York: HarperCollins 1997).

19 Counterinsurgency Field Manual FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, Headquarters, Department of the Army, 15 Dec. 2006, 2-14, www.cfr.org/defense-strategy/us-military-counterinsurgency-manual-december-2006/p12257 accessed 21 Jan. 2013.

20 Ibid., 1-27 to 1-28.

21 Ibid., Appendix A, A-8

22 Ibid., 1-27 to 1-28.

23 Ibid., 2-2.

24 Ibid., 1-20 to 1-24.

25 Ibid., 5-2.

26 See David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (Melbourne: Scribe 2009).

27 Frederick W. Kagan, ‘Choosing Victory: A Plan for Success in Iraq’, American Enterprise Institute, 5 Jan. 2007, http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.25396,filter.all/pub_detail.asp accessed 21 Jan. 2013.

28 Gen. David H. Petraeus, Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq, 10--11 Sept. 2007, www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/Petraeus-Testimony20070910.pdf accessed 21 Sept. 2013.

29 ‘Will Petraeus Strategy be the Last?’ The Atlantic.com, 17 Sept. 2007, www.theatlantic.com/doc/200709u/petraeus-bing-west accessed 21 Jan. 2013.

30 Tom Bowman, ‘As the Iraq War Ends, Reassessing the US Surge’, NPR.org, 16 Dec. 2011, www.npr.org/2011/12/16/143832121/as-the-iraq-war-ends-reassessing-the-u-s-surge accessed 21 Jan. 2013.

31 Douglas A. Ollivant, New America Foundation, http://newamerica.net/user/362 accessed 22 Jan. 2013.

32 Bowman, ‘As the Iraq War Ends’ (note 30).

33 Fred Kaplan, ‘The End of the Age of Petraeus: The Rise and Fall of Counterinsurgency,’ Foreign Affairs, Jan. /Feb. 2013, p.85.

34 ‘Is Iraq Getting Better?’ BBC News, 13 Nov. 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7089168.stm accessed 21 Jan. 2013.

35 ‘Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq’, Report to Congress, June 2008, p.vi, www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/Master_16_June_08_%20FINAL_SIGNED%20.pdf accessed 21 Jan. 2013.

36 Kaplan (note 33)’ p.86.

37 Galbraith, The End of Iraq (note 2) pp.9--10.

38 See ‘Failing Oversight: Iraq’s Unchecked Government’, Middle East Report No. 113, International Crisis Group, 26 Sept.’ 2011, Executive Summary.

39 Barack Obama, ‘My Plan for Iraq’, New York Times, 14 July 2008, www.nytimes.com/2008/07/14/opinion/14obama.html?_r=0 accessed 21 Jan. 2013.

40 Michael Hastings, ‘The Runaway General’, Rolling Stone, 22 June 2010, www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the-runaway-general-20100622 accessed 21 Jan. 2013.

41 ‘The Future of Afghanistan: Four Questions Facing Obama and Karzai’, 12 Jan. 2013, CNN.org, http://edition.cnn.com/2013/01/11/us/us-obama-karzai/index.html (accessed 23 Jan. 2013).

42 Petraeus, ‘Learning Counterinsurgency’ (note 14) p.83.

43 Afghanistan Study Group Report, Center for the Study of the Presidency, Washington DC, 30 Jan. 2008, p.17, http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/Afghan%20Study%20Group%20Report.pdf accessed 22 Jan. 2013.

44 ‘Afghanistan: Elections and the Crisis of Governance,’ Asia Briefing No. 96, International Crisis Group, 25 Nov. 2009, p.1.

45 ‘Afghanistan: Exit vs Engagement’, Asia Briefing No. 115, International Crisis Group, 28 Nov. 2010, p.1.

46 ‘Afghanistan: Elections and the Crisis of Governance’, (note 44) p.17.

47 Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Afghanistan and its Implication for International Peace and Security, 20 June 2012, p.14, www.afghanistan-un.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/SGReporttoJune202012.pdf accessed 22 Jan. 2013.

48 Ibid., p.5.

49 Anthony H. Cordesman, ‘The US Cost of the Afghan War: FY2002--FY2013’, 15 May 2012, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), csis.org/publication/us-cost-afghan-war-fy2002-fy2013 accessed 22 Jan. 2013.

50 David Ignatius, ‘David Kilcullen’s Road Map for Afghanistan,’ Washington Post, 19 October 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/18/AR2009031802931.html accessed 22 Jan. 2013.

51 Kaplan (note 33) p.89.

52 Amitai Etzioni, ‘The Great Drone Debate’, Military Review, March--April 2013, p.2.

53 ‘US Withdrawal is Tough Love for Disbelieving Afghans,’ CNN.org, 22 Jan. 2013, http://edition.cnn.com/2013/01/22/opinion/afghanistan-us-tough-love/index.html?hpt=hp_c3 accessed 23 Jan. 2013.

54 Adam Lockyer, ‘Brothers in Arms: Why the Afghan National Army Will Fail’, The Drum Opinion, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 28 Dec. 2012, www.abc.net.au/unleashed/4445782.html accessed 22 Jan. 2013.

55 ‘Storming the Red Mosque’, Time, 10 July 2007, www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1641630,00.html accessed 23 Jan. 2013.

56 ‘Benazir Bhutto Killed in Attack’, BBC News, 27 Dec. 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7161590.stm accessed 23 Jan. 2013.

57 John R. Schmidt, ‘The Unravelling of Pakistan’, Survival 51/ 3 (June--July 2009) pp.38--9.

58 Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Afghanistan (note 47) p.4.

59 Mockaitis (note 3) p.21

60 Bruce Hoffman, ‘Combating Al Qaeda and the Militant Islamic Threat’, Testimony Before the Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities, United States House of Representatives, 16 Feb. 2006, p.14, www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/2006/RAND_CT255.pdf accessed 23 Jan. 2013.

61 Kilcullen, ‘Countering Global Insurgency,’ (note 3). pp.609—11. >1

62 David Kilcullen, ‘Counter-insurgency Redux’, Survival 48/4 (Winter 2006--7) p.122.

63 David Kilcullen, ‘Religion and Insurgency’, Small Wars Journal Blog Post, 12 May 2007, http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/religion-and-insurgency accessed 23 Jan. 2013.

64 Rebecca Weisser, ‘Strategist Behind War Gains’, The Australian, 18 Aug. 2007, www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/defence/strategist-behind-war-gains/story-e6frg8yo-1111114209856 accessed 23 Jan. 2013.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Andrew T.H. Tan

Andrew T. H. Tan, Associate Professor, School of Social Sciences, University of New South Wales, Australia. Email: [email protected]