Beyond the Trinitarian Institutionalization of the Warrior Ethos – A Normative Conceptualization of Soldier and Contractor Commitment in Post-Modern Conflict

Abstract

Traditionally in liberal normative theory the warrior’s ethos has been defined on basis of the warrior’s raison d’être as the trinitarian protector of the social contractarian discretionary association of society and state. Since the post-modern warrior, whether serving in state uniform or as an employee of a commercial enterprise, is increasingly asked to provide security as a global rather than public good on the liberal state’s behalf in non-trinitarian contingency operations, this paper provides a broader normative conceptualization of the post-modern warrior ethos. Trinitarian operations in this respect are defined as those operations that revolve around the state soldier’s primary trinitarian function of providing security for society and state as a member of the Clausewitzian trinity of society, state and soldier. Instead of solely conceptualizing the warrior’s ethos as a narrow trinitarian institutionalization process, this paper demonstrates that for the warrior who provides security increasingly in non-trinitarian operations, the post-modern warrior ethos becomes more and more an alternatively institutionalized characteristic of spirit beyond the social contractarian trinity. Shaping both the soldier’s and the contractor’s commitment in non-trinitarian contingency operations, the alternative non-trinitarian institutionalization of the warrior’s ethos ensures that the post-modern warrior remains a virtuous and committed security service provider amid high operational risks even when serving the interests of common humanity rather than of his family, state and nation.

Notes

1 See M. Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (New York: Free Press 1960); see S. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP 2003).

2 In this article I will define the trinity of society, state and soldier through the prism of liberal theory as a concept constituted by the liberal Social Contract and its inherent raison d’être of providing physical and moral security for society. In this respect, the trinity will be considered to serve the security interests of a society as a discretionary, fiduciary association constructed for sole mutual benefit of those individuals within this association.

3 In this article I will define the contractor narrowly as an armed employee of a private security company operating in a high-risk environment in support of liberal state sponsored contingency operations overseas.

4 N. Machiavelli, ‘How Many Kinds of Military There Are, and Concerning Mercenary Soldiers’ (Chapter XII), in The Prince [1513] (Univ. of Chicago Press 1998); D.P. Baker, ‘To Whom Does a Private Military Commander owe allegiance? in P. Tripodi, and J. Wolfendale, (eds.), New Wars and New Soldiers: Military Ethics in the Contemporary World (London: Ashgate Publishing 2011) p.196; U. Steinhoff, ‘What are Mercenaries?’ in Andrew Alexandra, Deane-Peter Baker and Marina Caparini (eds.), Private Military and Security Companies: Ethics, Policies and Civil-Military Relations( London: Routledge 2008) p.21; J. Pattison, Deeper Objections to the Privatisation of Military Force’,Journal of Political Philosophy 18/(2010) p.441);

5 The Concise Oxford English Dictionary, 8th ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1999).

6 C. Clausewitz, On War (Princeton UP 2008) p.101.

7 M.L. Cook, The Moral Warrior (Albany: New York State UP 2004) p.40.

8 US General Patton cited in S. Hirshson, General Patton: A Soldier’s Life (New York: Harper Collins 2002) p.200.

9 C. Coker, The Warrior Ethos: Military Culture and the War on Terror (New York: Routedge 2007) p.7.

10 Concise Oxford English Dictionary (note 5)

11 S. P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, CT: Yale UP 1968) p.394.

12 J.G. Marchand J.P. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics (New York: Free Press 1989) p.17.

13 Coker, The Warrior Ethos (note 9); Huntington, The Soldier and State (note 1); Cook, The Moral Warrior (note 7); Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (note 1).

14 See Clausewitz, On War (note 6) p.89.

15 T. Hobbes, Leviathan [1651] (Sioux Falls, SD: Nuvision Publications 2004) p.99.

16 John Locke, The Two Treatises of Government. Essay Two. Chapter IX: ‘Of the Ends of Political Society and Government’ (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company 1980) § 123.

17 A. Buchanan, ‘The Internal Legitimacy of Humanitarian Intervention’, Journal of Political Philosophy 7/1 (1999) p.74.

18 Cook, The Moral Warrior (note 7) p.27.

19 Huntington, The Soldier and the State, (note 1) p.15.

20 Ibid.

21 Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, (note 1) p.194.

22 So as to be able to compare regular soldiers with private contractors, I will limit the focus to armed contractors serving on liberal state institutional contracts. It is important to note that only 25 per cent of all contractors employed by US state institutions provide armed security services. [See M. Schwartz, The Department of Defense’s Use of Private Security Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background, Analysis, and Options for Congress, CRS Report for Congress, 22 June 2010, Washington DC: Congressional Research Servicep. 3; D. Filkinsand S. Scott, ‘Afghan Leader Sees Plan to Ban Private Guards’, New York Times, 16 Aug. 2010.]

23 See Executive Office of the President, ‘Performance of Commercial Activities’, OMB Circular No. A-76, 29 May 2003. Washington DC: The White House (B.1.a.(2))

24 E. Krahmann, States, Citizens and the Privatization of Security (Cambridge, UK: CUP 2012) p.47.

25 Baker, ‘To Whom Does a Private Military Commander Owe Allegiance?’ (note 4) p.196.

26 Steinhoff, ‘What are Mercenaries?’ (note 4). 21.

27 Pattison, ’Deeper Objections to the Privatisation of Military Force’ (note 4) p.441.

28 S. Huntington, ‘The Erosion of American National Interests’, Foreign Affairs. 76/28 (1997) New York: Council on Foreign Affairs, p.36.

29 Ibid. p.30.

30 See A. Krieg, ‘Towards a Normative Explanation: Understanding Western State Reliance on Contractors Using Social Contract Theory’, Global Change, Peace and Security. 25/ (Oct.2013).

31 M. van Creveld, e Transformation of War (New York: Free Press 1991) p.194.

32 N. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society (Oxford: OUP 2003).

33 F.R. Teson, ‘The Liberal Case for Humanitarian Intervention’, in J.L. Holzgrefe et al. (eds.), Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas (Cambridge, UK: CUP 2003) p.94.

34 A. Acharya, ‘The War in Iraq: Morality or the National Interest?’, IDSS Commentaries, (11/2003), Singapore: The Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies.

35 C. McInnes, ‘A Different Kind of War? September 11 and the United States’ Afghan War’, Review of International Studies 29/2 (April 2003) p.175.

36 P.W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 2003) p.206.

37 T. Treves, ‘Piracy, Law of the Sea, and Use of Force: Developments off the Coast of Somalia’, European Journal of International Law. 20/2 (2009) p.412.

38 T.J. Milton, ‘The New Mercenaries- Corporate Armies for Hire?’ Foreign Area Officer Association, Dec. 1997, Springfield, VA: FAOA.

39 Franke and Boemcken argue that the soldier’s responsibilities in non-trinitarian low intensity warfare have undergone a form of ‘constabularization’, whereby the soldier’s duties have been transformed from the traditional management of war to the constabulary activity of security provision. [V. Franke, and M. vonBoemcken, ‘Guns for Hire: Motivations and Attitudes of Private Security Contractors’, Armed Forces and Society 37 (2011) p.728].

40 C.C. Moskos, ‘The American Combat Soldier in Vietnam’, Journal of Social Issues 31/4 (1975) p.26.

41 S. Wessely, ‘Twentieth-century Theories on Combat Motivation and Breakdown’, Journal of Contemporary History 41 (2006) p.260.

42 L. Wong et al. Why They Fight: Combat Motivation in the Iraq War, Strategic Studies Institute Monograph (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College 2003) p.18.

43 C.C. Moskos, The American Enlisted Man: The Rank and File in Today’s Military (New York: Russel Sage Foundation 1970) p.146.

44 D. Segal. and M.W. Segal, ‘Change in Military Organisation’, Annual Review of Sociology 9 (1983) pp.151--70.

45 See D. Winslow, ‘Misplaced Loyalties: The Role of Military Culture in the Breakdown of Discipline in Two Peace Operations’, Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 6/3 (Winter 2004).

46 G. Dyer, War (New York: Crown Publishing 1985) p.117.

47 Lt. Col. Joe Edkins, Chief of Joint Mission Analysis Cell UNAMSIL Force HQ in 2004 and Operations Officer UNAMSIL in 2002, interviewed 14 May 2011 in London.

48 John H. Faris, ‘The Looking-Glass Army: Patriotism in the Post-Cold War Era’, Armed Forces & Society, 21 (1995) p.420.

49 T. Lynch,and A.J. Walsh, ‘The Good Mercenary?’, Journal of Political Philosophy 8/2 (2000) p.136.

50 Commission on Wartime Contracting Transforming Wartime Contracting: Controlling Costs, Reducing Risks, Final Report to Congress, (Washington DC: Congressional CWC 2011) p.19/29.

51 Franke and Boemcken, ‘Guns for Hire’ (note 39) p.736.

52 P. Higate, ‘Cowboys and Professionals: The Politics of Identity Work in the Private and Military Security Company’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies 40/2, (2012) p.13.

53 Philip Strand, US Army Iraq veteran and former AEGIS contractor in Iraq and Afghanistan, interviewed in London 20 Jan. 2013.

54 J. Scahill, Blackwater: The Rise of the World’s Most Powerful Mercenary Army (New York: Nation Books 2007) p.147.

55 ‘[…] the civilians fleeing that place were walking for 140 kilometres without food only water. They were eating grass and falling over dying. Anybody with the right mind would not enjoy seeing that. It was a sad situation. It was bad seeing people dying. Resupplying or evacuating people, for me, was actually the right thing to do.’[Juba Joubart, Executive Outcomes Contractor (rotary wing pilot), interviewed 2 July 2011 in London].

56 Franke and Boemcken, ‘Guns for Hire’ (note 39) p.735.

57 U. Ben Shalom, ‘Cohesion during Military Operations: A Field Study on Combat Units in the Al-Aqsa Intifada’, Armed Forces and Society 32/1 (2005) p.77.

58 ‘They all have to work together effectively as a team to survive potentially dangerous situations. There are security and survival needs that are going to make them work together cooperatively even if they come from a different cultural and professional background.’ [Chris Sanderson, Director Libya Operations and Government Support at Control Risks, interviewed 23 June 2011 in London].

59 ‘Exceptional cases of incompetent or over anxious contractors arriving on ground are normally dealt with through peer pressure and they would leave of own accord. […] My opinion is that peer and self-pressure determined high levels of commitment.’ [Karl Deats, Executive Outcomes Contractor in Angola and Sierra Leone as well as for various PMSCs in Iraq, interviewed via email 26 Nov. 2011].

60 Juba Joubart, Executive Outcomes Contractor (rotary wing pilot), interviewed 2 July 2011 in London.

61 D.P. Baker, Just Warriors Inc. – The Ethics of Private Force (London: Continuum 2011) p.49.

62 Franke and Boemcken, ‘ Guns for Hire’ (note 39) p.735.

63 ‘It is about commitment to duty. You get paid a salary and you get that money for doing a job. It is not the government paying you but a company. It is about what the client wants in the end of the day and you make sure that you reach the end goal. It is a particular work ethic.’ [Juba Joubert, interview, 2011 (note 55)].

64 Dyer, War (note 46) p.117.

65 Coker, The Warrior Ethos, (note 9) p.5.

66 See Wong, Why They Fight (note 42); Baker, Just Warriors Inc. (note 61) p.49.

67 Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (note 11) p.394.

68 Baker, Just Warrior Inc. (note 61) p.49.

69 ‘Mercenaries and auxiliary arms are useless and dangerous; and if one keeps his state founded on mercenary arms, one will never be firm or secure; for they are disunited, ambitious and without discipline, unfaithful, bold among friends, among enemies cowardly; no fear of God, no faith with men […] The cause of this is that they have no love nor cause to keep them to keep them in the field other than a small stipend, which is not sufficient to make them want to die for you.’ [Machiavelli, ‘How Many Kinds of Military There Are’ (note 4) p.49].