Water Conflict in Central Asia – Is There Potential for the Desiccation of the Aral Sea or Competition for the Waters of Kazakhstan’s Cross-Border Ili and Irtysh Rivers to Bring about Conflict; and Should the UK be Concerned?

Abstract

There are conflicting views as to whether water scarcity will lead to cooperation or conflict. The central thesis of this paper is that conflict over water scarcity only becomes likely when it causes an existential threat to a population or state. The paper identifies a requirement for a new definition of the most severe levels of water scarcity in response to the concept of virtual water and proposes a new definition for absolute water scarcity based upon the presence of an existential threat to a population. Using the principles identified from a review of the water conflict debate and the new definition, the paper examines two Central Asian case studies to gauge the likelihood of conflict. In the case of the Aral Sea it concludes that regional geopolitics, assisted by international organisations should be able to find a compromise. In the case of Kazakhstan’s Ili and Irtysh Rivers it takes the view that water scarcity, demographics and geopolitics are likely to cause China to export its insecurity to other nations. In so doing it may cause conflict that should be a concern to the UK and other nations.

Notes

1 Ban Ki-moon (UN Secretary-General), ‘Water Is Our Most Precious Natural Resource’, Message on World Water Day (Vienna: UN Information Service, 22 March 2009), <www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/2009/unissgsm100.html> (accessed 8 Aug.2013).

2 Hillary Clinton (US Secretary of State), ‘In Honor of World Water Day’, (Washington DC:US Department of State 2012) <http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2012/03/201203222611.html#axzz1qygmEV7n> (accessed 3 April 2013).

3 Ban Ki-moon (UN Secretary-General), ‘Message to Inaugural Asia-Pacific Water Summit’ New York: UN News and Media Division, 3 Dec. 2007, <www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/sgsm11311.doc.htm> (accessed 8 Aug. 2013).

4 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank, World Development Report 2010: Development and Climate Change (Washington DC: The World Bank 2010) p.139, <www.worldbank.org/wdr> (accessed 4 April 2013).

5 Geopolitics is a term that came into common usage early in the last century when Sir Halford Mackinder postulated and revised a heartland theory that linked power politics to geography. He predicted that social and technological change would end the dominance of naval power and replace it with a land based hegemon spanning the ‘World Island’ that comprised Russia, and the larger part of Eurasia. Mackinder believed that the politics of the World Island and its relationships with other areas of the globe would be affected by the land and its inherent characteristics. Writing on Mackinder’s heartland theory Geoffrey Sloan described that land or territory as a historical arena, whose characteristics shape perceptions and events. The implication for this paper is that hydropolitics does not happen in isolation from the geography, demographics or other contexts that influence power dynamics. G. Sloan, ‘Sir Halford J. Mackinder: The Heartland Theory Then and Now’, in C.S. Gray and G. Sloan, ‘Geopolitics, Geography and Strategy’ (Special Issue), Journal of Strategic Studies 22/2-3 (June/Sept. 1999) pp.15--38.

6 Intended here to constitute Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

7 Alan Boyle, ‘Central Asian Water Problems: The Role of International Law’, in Sally N. Cummings (ed.) Oil, Transition and Security in Central Asia (London: RoutledgeCurzon 2003) pp.205-- 9.

8 SalmanM.A. Salman, ‘The Helsinki Rules, the UN Watercourses Convention and the Berlin Rules: Perspectives on International Water Law’, Journal of Water Resources and Development

23/ 4 (Dec. 2007) pp.625–40.

9 Helga Haftendorn, ‘Water and International Conflict’, Third World Quarterly 21/ 1 (Feb. 2000) p.59.

10 Karl Marx, ‘Critique of the Gotha Program’, in Michael L. Morgan (ed.), Classics of Moral and Political Theory (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company 1992) p.1220.

11 United Nations, Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses, 1997 (np: UN 2005), <http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/8_3_1997.pdf> (accessed 4 April 2013).

12 Liberalism is taken here to be idea of an ameliorating influence alongside the state that softens and makes more cooperative their interactions in an anarchical international system. The basis for the interactions does not rely solely on any one level of the system, but on individual, state and international levels concurrently. The relationships and interactions allow states to find mutual interest in their dealings and thereby absolute gains for all vice relative gains for the strongest. This is in the same sense that it is applied to the writings of Woodrow Wilson, and Jeremy Bentham and described in: Joseph S. Nye, Jnr, Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History, 6th ed. (Harvard: Pearson Longman 2007) p.5.

13 Haftendorn, ‘Water and International Conflict’(note 9) p.52.

14 Boyle, ‘Central Asian Water Problems’(note 7) p.204.

15 Salman, ‘The Helsinki Rules, the UN Watercourses Convention and the Berlin Rules’ (note 8)

p.626.

16 Stephen C. McCaffrey, Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (np: United Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law 2008), <http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/pdf/ha/clnuiw/clnuiw_e.pdf> (accessed 25 March 2013).

17 United Kingdom, House of Commons, Hansard Written Answers , 5 Dec. 2007, Column 1258W, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmhansrd/cm071205/text/71205w0012.htm> (accessed 8 April 2013).

18 Salman, ‘The Helsinki Rules’ (note 8) pp.632-9.

19 Noted in Boyle, ‘Central Asian Water Problems’(note 7) 211.

20 Salman, ‘The Helsinki Rules’ (note 8) pp.638.

21 Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law, 5th ed. (Cambridge, UK: CUP 2003) pp.810--20, 845 and 853.

22 Michael Byers, Custom, Power and the Power of Rules, International Relations and Customary International Law (Cambridge, UK: CUP 1999) p.3.

23 T.F. Homer-Dixon, ‘Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases’, International Security 19/ 1 (Summer 1994) p.35.

24 Shlomi Dinar, ‘Conflict and Cooperation along International Rivers: Scarcity, Bargaining Strategies and Negotiations’, in idem (ed.), Beyond Resource Wars (London: MIT 2011) p.165.

25 Gleick cites attempts by the Arab League to divert the Jordan River away from Israel as a contributing factor to the 1967 Arab--Israeli war. Peter H. Gleick, ‘Water and Conflict. Fresh Water Resources and International Security’, International Security 18/1(Summer 1993) pp.9--112.

26 Homer-Dixon, ‘Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict’ (note 23) pp.35--6.

27 Peter Greste, ‘‘“Water Wars”:’ The dam that divides Ethiopians’, BBC News, Ethiopia, 2009, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/7959814.stm> (accessed 7 April 2013).

28 Africa Resources Working Group, A Commentary on the Environmental, Socioeconomic and Human Rights Impacts of the Proposed Gibe III Dam in the Lower Omo River Basin of Ethiopia (np: African Resources Working Group 2009), <www.arwggibe.org/uploads/ARWG_COMMENTARY.GIBE_III_DAM.downstreamEIA.pdf> (accessed 7 April 2013).

29 Dinar questions whether scarcity leads to conflict or resource poor areas engender poor governance that cannot sustain relationships and institutions that have the requisite competence to prevent tensions becoming conflict. Shlomi Dinar, ‘Conflict and Cooperation along International Rivers’ (note 24) p.168.

30 Haftendorn, ‘Water and International Conflict’(note 9) p.52.

31 Dinar, ‘Conflict and Cooperation along International Rivers’(note 24) p.165.

32 Miriam R. Lowi, ‘Rivers of Conflict, Rivers of Peace’, Journal of International Affairs 49/ 1 (Summer 1995) pp.123--41.

33 These definitions draw on Dinar, Haftendorn and Homer-Dixon, but include the UN Watercourses Convention terminology for sufficiency.

34 Greste, ‘‘Water Wars’ (note 27)...

35 Dinar, ‘Conflict and Cooperation along International Rivers’(note 24).

36 J. Warner, ‘Virtual Water – Virtual Benefits? Scarcity, Distribution, Security and Conflict Reconsidered’, in A.Y. Hoekstra (ed.), Virtual Water Trade: Proceedings of the International Expert Meeting on Virtual Water Trade, Value of Water Research Report Series No. 12. (Delft: UNESCO-IHE Institute for Water Education 2003), <www.waterfootprint.org/Reports/Report12.pdf> (accessed 10 April 2013).

37 For an amusing review see Alex Madrigal, ‘The Many Failures and Few Successes of Zany Iceberg Towing Schemes’, The Atlantic, 10 Aug. 2011, <www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2011/08/the-many-failures-and-few-successes-of-zany-iceberg-towing-schemes/243364/> (accessed 11 April 2013).

38 A.Y. Hoekstra, ‘Virtual water: An introduction’, in idem (ed.), Virtual Water Trade (note 36) p.13.

39 Ibid.

40 J.A. Allan, ‘Overall Perspectives on Countries and Regions’, in P. Rogers and P. Lydon, Water in the Arab World: Perspectives and Prognoses (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP 1994) pp.65--100.

41 Thomas Malthus was an English economist whose most famous work, published in 1798, entitled ‘An Essay on the Principle of Population’ suggested that populations would increase reducing the available arable land for food production. The population would then be limited by its ability to produce food. BBC History, ‘Thomas Malthus (1766--1834)’, <www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic_figures/malthus_thomas.shtml> (accessed 13 April 2013).

42 Warner, ‘Virtual Water – Virtual Benefits?’ (note 36) p.125.

43 And a few of the author’s.

44 See note 12.

45 Neorealism as developed by Kenneth Waltz gave rise to part of the conversation with liberals such as Karl Keohane, who ascribed to the international institutions part of the ability of the interconnected world to find peace through striving for absolute rather than relative gains. Neorealists like Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer acknowledge the importance of institutions, but see nations as fixed in their place in the anarchical structure of international relations, which creates institutions and then enforces the norms that created them; each nation only being fundamentally different from another by virtue of its power. Robert Jackson and Georg Sørensen, Introduction of International Relations: Theories and Approaches, 3rd ed. (Oxford: OUP2007)pp. 45--6 and 79--81.

46 D. Renault, ‘Value of Water in Food: Principles and Virtues’, in Hoekstra, Virtual Water Trade (note 36), pp. 86--7.

47 Ibid., p.82.

48 Warner, ‘Virtual Water – Virtual Benefits?’(note 36) p.128.

49 H. Yang, P. Reichert, K.C. Abbaspour and A.J.B. Zehnder, ‘A Water Resources Threshold and its Implications for Food Security’, in Hoekstra, Virtual Water Trade (note 36) p.111.

50 Ibid., p.111.

51 Warner, ‘Virtual Water – Virtual Benefits?’p.130.

52 Ibid. p.132.

53 The UN appears to be so unsure of the term absolute scarcity or its interpretation of it, that while lower levels of scarcity -- water stress and water scarcity – get no special treatment, ‘absolute scarcity’ gets the full double quote treatment. UN-Water, ‘Water for Life – Water Scarcity’, United Nations, <www.un.org/waterforlifedecade/scarcity.shtml> (accessed 11 April 2013).

54 Haftendorn, ‘Water and international conflict’(note 9) p.51.

55 This would potentially, but not necessarily exclude hydropower as one of the ‘legitimate uses’. For the tribes of the Omo River basin access to electricity is not a pre-requisite for their survival; but it could be argued that if a state was unable to meet the power demands to support its population and economy it may present an existential threat, either to the state or if it had expansionist tendencies, to its neighbours.

56 Homer-Dixon refers to these potential causes of water wars as simple-scarcity conflicts between states; population movement and group-identity conflicts; economic deprivation, institutional disruption and civil strife. While the second and third causes are potentially inter- or sub-state in their application, the first is specifically at the state level. This paper has removed the state descriptor for direct competition to reflect a potential for intra-state as well as inter-state competition. Homer-Dixon, ‘Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict’(note 23). pp.18--31.

57 Lowi, ‘Rivers of Conflict, Rivers of Peace’ (note 32) p.127.

58 T.F. Homer-Dixon, Environment, Scarcity, and Violence (Princeton UP 1999) pp.139--41.

59 Iran as a client state and Afghanistan as host to a Soviet invasion from 1979--89. Here the analysis concentrates on the Central Asian countries as Iran and Afghanistan are peripheral to the basin, as well as to its exploitation; and hence in deciding the fate of the Aral Sea.

60 P. Micklin, Managing Water in Central Asia, Central Asian and Caucasian Prospects Series (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs 2000) p.1.

61 Richard Burger, Water Legislation and Pricing in Kazakhstan, Newly Independent States Environmental Economics and Policy Project, Environment Discussion Paper No. 40 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Institute for International Development 1998) p.2.

62 NASA, Aral Sea Continues to Shrink,.August 2009,.’ (np: NASA Earth Observatory 2009), <http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/IOTD/view.php?id=39944> (accessed 12 April 2013).

63 Tajikistan contributes between 20 and 70 per cent to the basin’s water through glacial melting depending on seasonal variations and these glaciers have shrunk by 20 to 30 per cent during the 20thcentury. Jacob Granit et al., Regional Water Intelligence Report Central Asia: Baseline Report (Stockholm: UNDP Water Governance Facility, Stockholm International Water Institute 2010) p.15.

64 Ibid. p.15.

65 David Lewis, Crisis Group’s Central Asia Project Director quoted in: International Crisis Group ‘The Curse of Cotton in Central Asia’, (Bishkek/Brussels: International Crisis Group, Feb. 2005), <www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/media-releases/2005/asia/the-curse-of-cotton-in-central-asia.aspx> (accessed 13 April 2013).

66 International Crisis Group, ‘The Curse of Cotton: Central Asia’s Destructive Monoculture’, Asia Report No. 93 (Bishkek/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 28 Feb. 2005), <www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/central-asia/093-the-curse-of-cotton-central-asias-destructive-monoculture.aspx> (accessed 13 April 2013).

67 It accounts for 20--35 per cent of GDP in Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, but less than 10 per cent in Kazakhstan, because its GDP is much greater due to hydrocarbon revenues. Granit et al. Regional Water Intelligence Report Central Asia(note 63) p.22.

68 Burger, Water Legislation and Pricing in Kazakhstan (note 61) p.2.

69 Granit et al. Regional Water Intelligence Report Central Asia (note 63) 15.

70 Burger, Water Legislation and Pricing in Kazakhstan(note 63) p.2.

71 Micklin, Managin Water in Central Asia (note 60) p.44.

72 Ibid. pp.45--6.

73 Ibid. p.46.

74 Germana Canzi, ‘Turkmenistan’s Caspian Resources’, in Shirin Akiner (ed.), The Caspian: Politics, Energy and Security (London: RoutledgeCurzon 2004) p.189.

75 Kazakhstan has a population density of only six people per kilometre square, compared to the Russian Federation and the UK that currently have eight and China which has 140. United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, Population Estimates and Projections Sections, <http://esa.un.org/wpp/unpp/p2k0data.asp> (accessed 20 May 2013).

76 According to OPEC figures, Kazakhstan has approximately 2.7 per cent of the confirmed global reserves of oil. Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries,. OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin, 2010--2011 (Vienna: Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 2011).

77 UNDP Kazakhstan, Water Resources of Kazakhstan in the New Millennium (Almaty: UNDP Kazakhstan 2004) p.6, <www.undp.kz/library_of_publications/files/2496-23904.pdf> (accessed 12 May 2013).

78 A cubic kilometre is 1,000,000,000,000 litres of water or a billion cubic metres.

79 UNDP Kazakhstan, Water Resources of Kazakhstan(note 77) p.6.

80 Ibid.

81 Ibid. p.20.

82 Aryks are man-made irrigational channels that provide water to urban and agricultural use and were the primary source for many prior to the expansion of the Soviet pumped network. Kahrizes are traditional gravity-fed underground channels and reservoirs. In the Nakhchivan Autonomous Region of Azerbaijan they are being renovated with the assistance of Swiss funding, where post- Soviet infrastructure is failing. See Chaim Litewski, ‘The Last Kankan of Nakhchivan’ (New York: UNTV 2009), <www.unmultimedia.org/tv/21stcentury/2009/01/the-last-kankan-of-nakhchivan-.html> (accessed 12 April 2013).

83 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank, World Development Report 2010 (note 4) p.367.

84 UNDP Kazakhstan, Water Resources of Kazakhstan (note 77) p.34.

85 Ibid. p.39.

86 Ilan Greenberg, ‘Kazakhstan and China Deadlock Over Depletion of a Major Lake’, New York Times, 8 March 2007, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9505EFD61531F93BA35750C0A9619C8B63 (accessed 14 May 2013).

87 UNDP Kazakhstan, Water Resources of Kazakhstan (note 77) p,30.

88 James R. Lee, Climate Change and Armed Conflict: Hot and Cold Wars, (London: Routledge 2009) p.141.

89 Ibid.

90 Ibid. p.29.

91 UNDP Kazakhstan, Water Resources of Kazakhstan(note 77) p.17.

92 Gulnoza Saidazimova, ‘Kazakhstan: Environmentalists Say China Misusing Cross-Border Rivers’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Prague, 13 July 2006, <www.rferl.org/content/article/1069833.html> (accessed 14 May 2013).

93 UNDP Kazakhstan, Water Resources of Kazakhstan(note 77) p.41.

94 Saidazimova, ‘Kazakhstan’ (note 92)’.

95 As a condition of support from China bilaterals include a requirement to recognise a unitary China, which gains support for the Chinese view of Taiwan and more importantly for Kazakhstan the Uighur-Autonomous Region as Chinese. <China.org.cn>, ‘SCO Cooperation to Combat ‘Three Evil Forces’.’, Xinhua News Agency, 22 Sept. 2006, <www.china.org.cn/english/2006/Sep/181910.htm> (accessed 15 May 2013).

96 UNDP Kazakhstan, Water Resources of Kazakhstan (note 77) p.42.

97 Ibid.

98 Rayhan Demytrie, ‘Struggle for Central Asian energy riches’, BBC News, Almaty, 3 June 2010, <www.bbc.co.uk/news/10175847> (accessed 14 May 2013).

99 Rayhan Demytrie, ‘Kazakhs protest against China farmland lease’, BBC News, Almaty, 30 Jan. 2010, <www.bbc.co.uk/news/10175847> (accessed 14 May 2013).

100 China Water Risk, ‘Food Security’, China Water Risk, <http://chinawaterrisk.org/big-picture/food-security/> (accessed 22 May 2013). China water risk facts and figures have been checked against National Bureau of Statistics of China Yearbook 2010 wherever possible. See note 101.

101 National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook 2010 (China Statistics Press 2010), http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2010/indexeh.htm (accessed 22 May 2013).

102 See note 53.

103 China Water Risk, ‘North--South Divide’, China Water Risk, http://chinawaterrisk.org/big-picture/north-south-divide/ (accessed 22 May 2013).

104 China Water Risk, ‘Water Wars’ China Water Risk, <http://chinawaterrisk.org/big-picture/water-wars/> (accessed 22 May 2013).

105 Wang Tao and Wu Wei, ‘Sandy Desertification in Northern China’, in Kristen Day (ed.), China’s Environment and the Challenge of Sustainable Development (London: M.E. Sharpe 2005)

106 China Water Risk, ‘Water Wars’(note 104).

107 China’s Office of the State Council written statement reported in Chris Buckley, ‘China says water supplies exploited by 2030’, (Beijing: Reuters UK Edition,14 Dec. 2007), <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2007/12/14/environment-china-drought-dc-idUKPEK13275320071214> (accessed 25 May 2013).

108 Jian Xie and others, Addressing China’s Water Scarcity: Recommendations for Selected Water Resource Management Issues (Washington DC: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank, 2009) p.20, <http://file.h2o-china.com/user/130/6e.pdf> (accessed 15 May 2013).

109 This gives a direction for further research into the critical mass or percentage of a population required to support civil unrest.

110 United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, Ministry of Defence Strategic Trends Programme: Global Strategic Trends - out to 2040, 4th edn (Shrivenham: Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre 2010) p.10.

111 Lee, Climate change and Armed Conflict p.143.

112 This is an oversimplification as this BBC story demonstrates. The basic point is though that global markets are reactive to local fluctuations in production caused by climatic and social factors. BBC News Business, ‘US cuts wheat production forecast’, BBC News, 10 Sept. 2010. <www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-11262510> (accessed 19 May 2013).

113 United States of America, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Global Water Security,. Intelligence Community Assessment 2012-08 (np: Office of the Director of National Intelligence 2012) p.1, <www.dni.gov/nic/ICA_Global%20Water%20Security.pdf> (accessed 12 May 2013).

114 United Kingdom, HM Government, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy (Command Paper, Cm 7953), (London: The Stationery Office 2010) p.4.

115 United States of America, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Global Water Security (note 113), p.3.

116 Ibid.

117 Ibid.

118 Chinawaterrisk.org. Home Page, <http://chinawaterrisk.org/> (accessed 24 May 2013).

119 Leadership Group on Water Security in Asia, Asia’s Next Challenge: Securing the Region’s Water Future (np: Asia Society2009) p.13, <http://asiasociety.org/files/pdf/WaterSecurityReport.pdf> (accessed 14 May 2013).