Sharpening SOF Tools, Their Strategic Use and Direction: Optimising the Command of Special Operations amid Wider Contemporary Defence Transformation and Military Cuts

Abstract

Focusing on contemporary Special Forces (SOF/SF), this article analyses expanding SF developments in the context of conducting rapidly proliferating multi-functional operations during an overall era of globalised strategic risk. This is while SF simultaneously have to negotiate the not necessarily reconcilable challenge of wider national-to-global-impacting defence transformation and military cuts, which include extending to closely impacting on SF support units. When examining the optimisation of the command of special operations, including better developing Special Operations Commands (SOCOMs) or closest nearest equivalents, and when evaluating the attendant advancement of what can be best characterised as the improved strategic direction and use of SF, several helpful operational-to-strategic and structural-to-cultural lessons soon emerge. For both now and for differently ranging futures, further consideration of these noteworthy lessons is warranted.

Notes

1 The term ‘Special Forces’ (SF) is used throughout this article instead of the term ‘Special Operations Forces’ (SOF). SF are also defined at their broadest in this article.

2 See, e.g., R. Ball, ‘The Strategic Utility of New Zealand Special Forces’, Small Wars & Insurgencies 22/1 (March 2011) pp.119–41.

3 See, e.g., ‘Special Operators Depend on Good Partners, Commander Says’, Defense.gov, 29 January 2013; S.J. Freedberg, Jr., ‘Mac Thornberry: Congress Must Empower Special Operations’, AOL Defense (AD), 13 February 2013; J. Tice, ‘$150K Bonuses Resume for Special Forces’, Army News, 22 January 2013; E. Bumiller and T. Shanker, ‘Pentagon Is Set to Lift Combat Ban for Women’, The New York Times (NYT), 23 January 2013; T. Shanker, ‘Military Sees Broader Role for Special Operations Forces, in Peace and War’, NYT, 2 April 2013; S.J. Freedberg, Jr., ‘Special Operations: What New Powers They Need From Congress & Pentagon’, AD, 15 April 2013; for ‘elite units’, see Lt. Col. L. Freeman, ‘Can the Marines Survive?’, Foreign Policy, 26 March 2013.

4 In Denmark, for example, see Major L.H. Ehrensvärd Jensen, ‘Specialoperationer – Myter og Fakta’ [Special Operations – Myths and Facts], FAK Brief (Copenhagen: Royal Danish Defence College – RDDC/FAK, May 2012); for the US, ‘Ex-Navy Seal Writes Book about Osama Bin Laden Raid’, BBC, 23 August 2012; A.D.M. Svendsen, The Professionalization of Intelligence Cooperation: Fashioning Method out of Mayhem (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2012) p.26; A. Finlan, ‘British Special Forces and the Falklands Conflict: Twenty Years On’, Defense & Security Analysis 18/4 (2002) pp.319–32.

5 D.C. Wilder, ‘An Educated Consumer Is Our Best Customer’, CIA Studies in Intelligence 55/2 (June 2011 [Unclassified]); see also references to SF in G.F. Treverton, Intelligence for an Age of Terror (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 2009) and M.M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (Washington, DC: Sage/CQ Press 2012) 5th ed.; R. Brooks, ‘Shadow Wars: What’s the Difference between a Spook and a Special Operator?’, Foreign Policy, 20 September 2012; Australian Government, Strong and Secure: A Strategy for Australia’s National Security (Canberra: Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 23 January 2013) p.9 and p.36.

6 A. Finlan, Special Forces, Strategy and the War on Terror: Warfare by other Means (London: Routledge 2008) pp.3–4.

7 K.I. Sepp, ‘Special Forces’, in T. Rid and T. Keaney (eds), Understanding Counterinsurgency (London: Routledge 2010) Ch.10, p.128.

8 See, e.g., on Libya, as discussed in A.D.M. Svendsen, ‘NATO, Libya Operations and Intelligence Co-operation – A Step Forward?’, Baltic Security & Defence Review 13/2 (December 2011) pp.51–68; C.S. Chivvis, ‘Libya and the Future of Liberal Intervention’, Survival 54/6 (November 2012) pp.69–92; Major F.M. Luján, ‘Wanted: PhDs Who Can Win a Bar Fight’, Foreign Policy, 8 March 2013, and his report, ‘Light Footprints: The Future of American Military Intervention’, Center for a New American Security, Washington, DC, March 2013; D.W. Barno, ‘Silicon, Iron, and Shadow: Three Wars That Will Define America’s Future’, Foreign Policy, 19 March 2013. On Syria, see, e.g., ‘UK to Step Up Support for Syrian Opposition’, The Guardian (GU, 16 November 2012), and ‘Syria Conflict: Opposition Leaders “Credible” Says Hague’, BBC, 16 November 2012; J. Borger and N. Hopkins, ‘West Training Syrian Rebels in Jordan’, GU, 8 March 2013. On Mali, see A. Nicoll (ed.), ‘France in Mali: Rapid Reaction’, IISS Strategic Comments 19/2 (January 2013); J. Marcus, ‘French Success in Mali May Herald “War of the Shadows”’, BBC, 28 January 2013; M. Delaporte, ‘Mali: France’s Version of Shock and Awe, Add Allies, Crush AQIM’, AD, 19 February 2013.

9 Sepp (note 7) p.128; ‘Socom Commander Discusses Progress in Afghanistan’, Defense.gov, 6 March 2012; S. Aftergood, ‘Special Ops Forces Create “Visible and Dramatic Effects”’, FAS Secrecy News, 7 March 2012, and B. Starr, ‘High Level Meeting Focuses on Future of Special Ops in Afghanistan’, CNN Security Clearance, 7 March 2012; see also J. Rogin, ‘Next Afghanistan Commander Supports Troops There Past 2014’, The Cable Blog – Foreign Policy, 15 November 2012; J. Ahmad, ‘Afghanistan’s Special Forces are a Bastion of Hope’, AFPAK Channel – Foreign Policy, 24 January 2013. For North Africa, see P. Bergen, ‘Should We Still Fear Al Qaeda?’, CNN, 3 February 2013; B. Riedel, ‘New Al-Qaeda Generation May Be Deadliest One’, Al Monitor/Brookings, 24 January 2013; ‘Reachback from Mali’, Strategy Page, 4 March 2013; J. Kitfield, ‘U.S. Using Local Soldiers to Fight Al-Qaida Allies in East Africa’, National Journal/Global Security Newswire, 11 March 2013; see also essays in M.A. Innes (ed.), Making Sense of Proxy Wars (Washington, DC: Potomac Books 2012).

10 See also R. Norton-Taylor, ‘The Army’s Big Dilemma: What Will It Do When the Afghan War is Over?’, GU, 5 July 2012; ‘Briefing: The War After This One’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 5 October 2012; R. Chaudhuri and T. Farrell, ‘Campaign Disconnect: Operational Progress and Strategic Obstacles in Afghanistan, 2009–2011’, International Affairs 87/2 (March 2011), pp.271–296; I. Duyvesteyn, ‘The Escalation and De-escalation of Irregular War: Setting Out the Problem’, and ‘Some Observations and Conclusions’, Journal of Strategic Studies 35/5 (2012) pp.601–11 and 735–42.

11 See, e.g., A. Finlan, ‘The (Arrested) Development of UK Special Forces and the Global War on Terror’, Review of International Studies 35 (2009) pp.971–82; A.G. Stolberg, ‘How Nation-States Craft National Security Strategy Documents’, <www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil> (October 2012); J. Angstrom and J.W. Honig, ‘Regaining Strategy: Small Powers, Strategic Culture, and Escalation in Afghanistan’, Journal of Strategic Studies 35/5 (2012) pp.663–87; O. Kreisher, ‘Special Operators Try Again To Get More Dough, Control; Battles Likely With Hill and JCS’, AD, 29 November 2012; G. Miller, ‘DIA Sending Hundreds More Spies Overseas’, The Washington Post (WP), 2 December 2012; ‘Special Operations: SOCOM Spies Told to Stand Down’, Strategy Page, 17 December 2012; A. Feickert, ‘US Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress’, CRS Report, 3 January 2013; ‘Special Ops Command South Presses for Increased Engagement’, Defense.gov, 30 January 2013.

12 See also J.A. Quelch and K.E. Jocz, All Business is Local (London: Portfolio/Penguin 2012); H. de Blij, The Power of Place (Oxford: Oxford UP 2009).

13 P.F. Walsh, Intelligence and Intelligence Analysis (London: Routledge 2011) p.68.

14 See, e.g., A.D.M. Svendsen, ‘Collective Intelligence’, in G. Moore (ed.), Encyclopedia of US Intelligence (EUSI) (New York: Taylor & Francis forthcoming); K. Dilanian, ‘US Intelligence Tests Crowd-Sourcing against its Experts’, Los Angeles Times, 21 August 2012; S. Weinberger, ‘Intelligence Agencies Turn to Crowdsourcing’, BBC Future, 10 October 2012; ‘Intelligence: Organizing The Crowd’, strategypage.com, 15 February 2013.

15 J.R. Clapper, US Director of National Intelligence, Unclassified Statement for the Record on the Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 31 January 2012; ‘Cuts Make Intelligence Failures Likely, Top Intel Official Says’, Defense.gov, 18 April 2013.

16 D. Barno and T. Sharp, ‘SOF Power’, Foreign Policy, 14 February 2012; see also T. Shanker and E. Schmitt, ‘US Plans Shift to Elite Units as It Winds Down in Afghanistan’, NYT, 4 February 2012; US Army HQ, ‘Special Operations’, Publication 3-05 (Washington, DC: 31 August 2012); T. Shanker, ‘Mapping Military Needs, Aided by a Big Projection’, NYT, 11 September 2012; ‘Dempsey Discusses Importance of Embracing, Managing Military Change’, Defense.gov, 20 September 2012; ‘Special Ops Official Discusses Adaptation, Strategy’, Defense.gov, 18 April 2013.

17 See, e.g., Lt. Col. J. Hammond, ‘Special Operations Forces: Relevant, Ready and Precise’, Canadian Military Journal (Autumn 2004) pp.17–28; T.E. Ricks, ‘Army Contests Rumsfeld Bid on Occupation’, WP, 16 January 2005; B. Gellman, ‘Secret Unit Expands Rumsfeld’s Domain’, WP, 24 January 2005; US DoD, QDR Report (3 February 2006) pp.5, 42 and 44; S.D. Naylor, ‘SOCom Directive Announces Major Changes’, Army Times, 30 August 2009; S. Aftergood, ‘Special Operations Forces on the Rise’, FAS Secrecy News, 2 May 2011; ‘NDU Honors Special Operations Community’, Defense.gov, 19 November 2012. For several overlapping concerns, see, e.g., L. Robinson, ‘The Future of Special Operations: Beyond Kill and Capture’, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2012; ‘The Future of Hard Power: Tools and Techniques’, This Week at ISN, 10–14 December 2012; ‘US Needs a Rulebook for Secret Warfare’, Lawfare, 6 February 2013; J. Russell, ‘America’s Leadership Decapitation Policy is Prescription for Endless War’, GU, 12 February 2013; ‘Why the Administration Needs to Get Congress on Board for Its Stealth War’, Lawfare, 7 March 2013; D. Lewis, ‘Zero Six Bravo Proves That Too Much Secrecy over Special Forces is a Bad Thing’, The Spectator, 3 April 2013; ‘NATO, Karzai Reach Agreement on Withdrawal of Special Forces from Wardak Province’, AfPak Daily Brief – Foreign Policy, 20 March 2013; E. MacAskill and M. Mahmood, ‘Pentagon Investigating Link between US Military and Torture Centres in Iraq’, GU, 7 March 2013; A. Goodman, ‘Dirty Wars: Jeremy Scahill’s Antidote to Zero Dark Thirty’s Heroic Narrative’, GU, 28 January 2013.

18 For background, see, e.g. A.D.M. Svendsen, ‘“Flectas Non Frangas”: Revisiting Early Twenty-First Century UK–US Defence Relations (2000–05) after Five Years’, Defense & Security Analysis 28/3 (September 2012) pp.235–46; J. Baylis and J.J. Wirtz, ‘The US–UK “Special Military Relationship”: Resetting the Partnership’, Comparative Strategy 31/3 (2012) pp.253–62; A.D.M. Svendsen, ‘“Strained” Relations? Evaluating Contemporary Anglo-American Intelligence and Security Co-operation’, in S. Marsh and A. Dobson (eds), Anglo-American Relations: Contemporary Perspectives (London: Routledge 2012) Ch.8. For Australia, see, e.g., B. Schreer and S. Lee, ‘The Willing Ally? Australian Strategic Policy in a Contested Asia’, and A. Davies, ‘Australia’s Next Defence White Paper’, RUSI Journal 157/5 (October 2012); ‘Australian Army Chief Warns That Further Budget Cuts Could Hurt Capability’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 29 October 2012.

19 R. Dover and M. Phythian, ‘Lost over Libya: The 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review – An Obituary’, Defence Studies 11/3 (2011), pp. 420–444; M. Phillips, ‘Lessons from the Strategic Defence and Security Review’, RUSI Journal 157/1 (February/March 2012), pp.28–35; P. Cornish and A.M. Dorman, ‘Smart Muddling Through: Rethinking UK National Strategy beyond Afghanistan’, International Affairs 88 (2012) pp.213–222; Norton-Taylor (note 10).

20 Prof. Michael Clarke, ‘The Long and Winding Road: Army 2020’, RUSI Analysis Commentary, 9 July 2012; A. Nicoll (ed.), ‘Redesigned British Army: Smaller, with More Reserves’, IISS Strategic Comments 19/1 (January 2013); N. Hopkins, ‘MoD Announces 5,300 Army Job Cuts’, GU, 22 January 2013; for the US, see ‘Panetta: Military Will Be Smaller, More Agile, Deployable’, Defense.gov, 12 January 2012. In Denmark, see, e.g., W. Mitchell, ‘Three C2 Models for Military Agility in the 21st Century’, FAK Brief (Copenhagen: RDDC/FAK, November 2012).

21 K. Sengupta, ‘Revealed: Plan to Split Army into Two Forces; Structural Reforms Will Include Expanding Special Operations’, The Independent, 19 June 2012; see also ‘Spain’s New Defence Directive Outlines Strategic Outlook’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 3 August 2012.

22 See, e.g., P. Smyth, ‘CiF: The British Army Has Lost Out in Libya’, GU, 4 October 2011; ‘UK MPs Warn Defence Cuts Threaten Military Capacity’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, 16 February 2012; N. Hopkins, ‘Army Warns Olympic Games Recovery Will Take Two Years’, ‘G4S Olympic Effort Shows Limits of Private Sector, Says Philip Hammond’, and ‘Olympics – Lessons for Security as well as Sport’, GU, 13–14 August 2012; ‘MI5 and MI6 “Under Pressure” Because of Olympics’, BBC, 12 July 2012; GU - Defence & Security Blog, August 2012; A. Wade, ‘2020 Vision: CDS Looks Ahead to the Future of Defence’, UK Ministry of Defence (MoD), 11 September 2012; ‘Policy: Providing Versatile, Agile and Battle-Winning Armed Forces and a Smaller, More Professional Ministry of Defence’, UK MoD, 12 December 2012.

23 See also, e.g., J. Jowit, ‘MoD to Axe One in Four Senior Military and Civil Staff’, GU, 19 August 2012; Norton-Taylor (note 10); for the US, see P.W. Singer, ‘Separating Sequestration Facts from Fiction’, TIME/Brookings, 23 September 2012. On ‘reserves’, see, e.g., J.E. Peters, B. Shannon and M.E. Boyer, National Guard Special Forces: Enhancing the Contributions of Reserve Component Army Special Operations Forces, RAND, October/November 2012; ‘Consultation Launched on the Future of Britain’s Reserve Forces’, UK Ministry of Defence, 8 November 2012; and ‘Defence Secretary Reveals Plan for “Radical Shift” in Army Reservists’ Role’, BBC, 8 November 2012.

24 Sengupta (note 21).

25 See, e.g., P. Wintour and N. Watt, ‘Cameron Faces Unfriendly Fire from Military Chiefs over Defence Budget’, GU, 1 February 2013; P. Hennessy, ‘Special Forces Face Big Cuts in Support Network’, The Daily Telegraph, 2 February 2013; see also R. Fox, ‘Intelligence Services under Fire in Squeeze on Funding’, The London Evening Standard, 21 March 2013; see also ‘France Set to Cut 20,000 Posts in Armed Forces’, The Local-France, 29 April 2013.

26 Sepp (note 7) p.134; ‘Senators Quiz McRaven for Top Special Operations Slot’, Defense.gov, 28 June 2011; see also S.J. Freedberg, Jr., ‘Critics Worry Army’s New Global Operations Plan Poaches on Marines’, AD, 16 October 2012.

27 Centre for Military Studies (CMS), An Analysis of Conditions for Danish Defence Policy – Strategic Choices 2012 (Copenhagen: Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, 18 April 2012 [DK ed.]/August 2012 [Eng. trans.]; P.V. Jakobsen and K.J. Møller, ‘Good News: Libya and the Danish Way of War’, Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2012 (May 2012) pp.106–30; J. Isherwood, ‘Defence Command to be Axed’ and ‘SDP-DPP Defence Cut Differences’, Politiken.dk, 7 June/August 2012; C. Wenande, ‘Denmark to Pull Out of Afghanistan Early’, The Copenhagen Post, 19 March 2013; H.L. Saxi, ‘Defending Small States: Norwegian and Danish Defense Policies in the Post-Cold War Era’, Defense & Security Analysis 26/4 (December 2010) pp.415–30; Major L.H. Ehrensvärd Jensen, ‘Specialoperationer kan forøge Danmarks strategiske muligheder’ [Special Operations Can Increase Denmark’s Strategic Options] and his ‘Danske specialoperationer – omfattende reorganisering og nytænkning er nødvendig’ [Danish Special Operations – Comprehensive Re-organisation and New Thinking is Needed], FAK Research Brief (Copenhagen: RDDC/FAK, October 2012); Mitchell, ‘Three C2 Models for Military Agility in the 21st Century’ (note 20); ‘Nordic Nations to Share Warplanes’, IceNews, 16 November 2012; ‘Finland, Sweden: A Step Toward Greater Nordic Security Cooperation’, Stratfor/ISN, 13 November 2012; A.D.M. Svendsen, Understanding the Globalization of Intelligence (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2012) p.85.

28 D. Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (London: Allen Lane 2011); L. Freedman, ‘The Transformation of Strategic Affairs’, IISS Adelphi Paper 379 (London: IISS/Routledge 2006); A.D.M. Svendsen, ‘Intelligence Liaison: An Essential Navigation Tool’, in J. Schroefl, B.M. Rajaee and D. Muhr (eds), Hybrid and Cyber War as Consequences of the Asymmetry (Frankfurt a.M.: Peter Lang International Publishers 2011).

29 ‘UK Special Forces “to Stay in Afghanistan after 2014”’, BBC, 20 May 2012; B. Giegerich and A. Nicoll, ‘The Struggle for Value in European Defence’, Survival 54/1 (2012), pp.53–82; H. Binnendijk, US National Defense University (NDU), ‘Op.-Ed.: A Leaner NATO Needs a Tighter Focus’, NYT, 3 February 2012; J. Mackinlay, ‘After 2015: The Next Security Era for Britain’, PRISM 3/2 (2012) pp.51–60; Cmdr M.J. Hannan, ‘Punching Above Their Weight’, Armed Forces Journal, September 2012; for European defence capabilities, see endnote 11 in Svendsen, ‘“Flectas Non Frangas”’ (note 18) p.241; ‘EU Pooling and Sharing Efforts on Course to Fail, Officials Warn’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 1 November 2012; S. Biscop, ‘The UK and European Defence: Leading or Leaving?’, International Affairs 88/6 (2012) pp.1297–313.

30 See, e.g., ‘Inside NATO’s Special Forces Network’, NATO/YouTube, 22 February 2012; ‘NATO’s Special Forces Network’, NATO, 27 February 2012; ‘NATO Special Operations Headquarters Official Opening’, NATO, 12 December 2012; ‘Building Connectivity between Special Forces and Partners’, NATO, 1 February 2013; ‘New Command Structure Fortifies Special Operations Partnerships’, Defense.gov, 18 April 2013.

31 Jamie Shea, ‘Keeping NATO Relevant’, Carnegie Policy Outlook, April 2012; ‘NATO to Strengthen Ability to Act with Global Partners’, Defense.gov, 5 July 2012; see also Major L.H. Ehrensvärd Jensen, ‘SPECIALOPERATIONER – luftkapaciteters centrale rolle’ [Special Operations – Air Capacity’s Central Role], FAK Brief (Copenhagen: RDDC/FAK, September 2012).

32 ‘Characterizing the Nature of Contemporary Operating Environments’, in Svendsen, ‘Intelligence Liaison’ (note 28); A. Mckenzie, ‘“New Wars” Fought “Amongst the People”: “Transformed” by Old Realities?’, Defence Studies 11/4 (2012), pp.569–593.

33 See also, e.g., G. Schaub, Jr., ‘A PME Survivor on How to Fix the War College System: Take it Back to the Future’, Foreign Policy, 23 May 2012; J. Johnson-Freese, Educating America’s Military (New York: Routledge/Cass Military Studies 2012).

34 See, e.g., Svendsen, The Professionalization of Intelligence Cooperation (note 4) pp.62–7; M. Sommer and O. Njå, ‘Dominant Learning Processes in Emergency Response Organizations’, Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management (October 2012) pp.1–12; for initiatives, see, e.g., Wilton Park’s ‘Defence and Security: Connected Forces, Educated Minds’, from Wilton Park Newsletter/emailing, 14 April 2013.

35 See, e.g., ‘Smart Defence Leads to Smart Immersive Environments’, NATO ACT, 5 March 2012; A. Nicoll and J. Delaney (eds), ‘NATO Leaders to Consider Smart Defence in Chicago’, IISS Strategic Comments 18/19 (May 2012); B. Giegerich, ‘NATO’s Smart Defence: Who’s Buying?’, Survival 54/3 (2012) pp.69–77; ‘NATO Should Launch a Programme Dedicated to Fostering a “Smart Defence Mindset” amongst Military Personnel, National Politicians and Other Stakeholders’, The New Global Security Landscape (2012) p.13; ‘NATO Supports Smart Defence in South-Eastern Europe’, NATO News, 3 October 2012; ‘NATO Ministers Discuss “Smart Defense” Initiative’, Defense.gov, 9 October 2012; ‘NATO Defence Ministers Determined to Improve Capabilities, Cooperation’, NATO News, 9–10 October 2012; for Norway’s approach, see, e.g., as discussed in R. Ingebrigtsen, State Secretary, Norwegian Ministry of Defence, ‘Smart Defence – the Norwegian Perspective’, regjeringen.no, 25 April 2012; ‘NATO’s Role Threatened by Financial and Sovereign Pressures, Says Norwegian Defence Minister’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 5 October 2012; ‘The National Budget 2013 for The Ministry of Defence: More Training, Improved Readiness’, regjeringen.no, 8 October 2012.

36 A.D.M. Svendsen, ‘H-Diplo/ISSF Roundtable Review of: Special Issue on “The CIA and US Foreign Relations since 1947… Section I: Challenges and Reform”’, H-Diplo III/6 (December 2011) pp.34–5; N. Schmidle, ‘Getting Bin Laden’, The New Yorker, 8 August 2011; ‘US Admiral Says Raid was “Easiest” Part of Bin Laden Op’, AFP, 27 July 2012.

37 ‘Special Ops Forces Will Remain Essential, Official Says’, Defense.gov, 30 August 2011; R. Lardner, ‘After Bin Laden’s Death, a Different Kind of Hunt’, AP, 15 March 2012; ‘Report: Navy SEALs to Hunt Cartel Kingpin Like Bin Laden’, Wired: Danger Room, 14 August 2012; D. Byman, ‘Deterring Enemies in a Shaken World’, NYT, 4 September 2011.

38 Svendsen, Understanding the Globalization of Intelligence (note 27) from p.28; A.D.M. Svendsen, Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror: Anglo-American Security Relations after 9/11 (London: Routledge/Studies in Intelligence Series 2010) p.173; UK Her Majesty’s Government, Pursue Prevent Protect Prepare: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism (Norwich: TSO 2009); ‘Interrogating Tsarnaev: No Need for Military Detention Here’, Lawfare, 20 April 2013; E. Pilkington and M. Elder, ‘FBI Faces Questions over Previous Contact with Boston Bombing Suspect’, GU, 21 April 2013; A.D.M. Svendsen, ‘The Federal Bureau of Investigation and Change: Addressing US Domestic Counter-Terrorism Intelligence’, Intelligence and National Security 27/3 (June 2012) pp.371–97.

39 See, e.g., Svendsen, The Professionalization of Intelligence Cooperation (note 4) p.26, and Svendsen, ‘NATO, Libya Operations’ (note 8) p.54; J. Becker and S. Shane, ‘Secret “Kill List” Proves a Test of Obama’s Principles and Will’, NYT, 29 May 2012; J. Crawford, ‘The Bin Laden Situation Room Revisited – One Year Later’, CNN Security Clearance, 1 May 2012; A.E. Kornblut, ‘White House Situation Room Lavished with Attention Following Bin Laden Raid’, WP, 12 May 2011; R. Vaidyanathan, ‘Barack Obama’s Top Secret Tent’, BBC, 22 March 2011; Wing Cmdr A.J. Lyle, RAF, ‘The Decreasing Utility of the Armed Forces: Society, State and War in the Post-Modern World’, Defence Studies 12/3 (September 2012) pp.375–412.

40 See also B. Kellerman, ‘Cut Off at the Pass: The Limits of Leadership in the 21st Century’, Brookings, Washington, DC, August 2012.

41 Svendsen, Understanding the Globalization of Intelligence (note 27) pp.99–107.

42 See throughout, e.g., ibid.; and Svendsen, The Professionalization of Intelligence Cooperation (note 4). See also, e.g., B. Hubbard, ‘Islamist Rebels Create Dilemma on Syria Policy’, NYT, 27 April 2013.

43 On SoS concepts, see, e.g., US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication J-P 3.0 (August 2011) pp.IV–5; see also, e.g., System of Systems Analytics, Inc., via <www.sosacorp.com>; M. Jamshidi (ed.), System of Systems Engineering: Innovations for the Twenty-First Century (Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2009); A. Dupont and W.J. Reckmeyer, ‘Australia’s National Security Priorities: Addressing Strategic Risk in a Globalised World’, Australian Journal of International Affairs 66/1 (2012), pp.34–51.

44 Finlan, Special Forces (note 6) p.109.

45 See also, e.g., R.J. Aldrich and J. Kasuku, ‘Escaping from American Intelligence: Culture, Ethnocentrism and the Anglosphere’, International Affairs 88/5 (September 2012), pp.1009–1028; R. Jeffreys-Jones, ‘The End of an Exclusive Special Intelligence Relationship: British–American Intelligence Co-operation Before, During and After the 1960s’, Intelligence and National Security 27/5 (2012) pp.707–21; P.H.J. Davies and K.C. Gustafson (eds), Intelligence Elsewhere: Spies and Espionage Outside the Anglosphere (Washington, DC: Georgetown UP 2013).

46 Sepp (note 7) p.138; J. Crawford, ‘US Special Ops Commander Discusses Role in Serious and Humorous Tones’, CNN Security Clearance, 26 July 2012; ‘Report: Navy SEALs to Hunt Cartel Kingpin Like Bin Laden’, Wired: Danger Room, 14 August 2012.

47 Ball (note 2) p.120.

48 Ibid. p.126.

49 Ibid. p.124.

50 See also US Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), Commander’s Handbook for Strategic Communication and Communication Strategy, Suffolk, VA (24 June 2010 [V.3.0]); T.E, Nissen, ‘Black and White and the 256 Shades of Grey in Between: Reflections on the Question of Attribution for Psychological Operations’, RDDC/FAK Research Brief (Copenhagen: RDCC/FAK, March 2012).

51 See, e.g., A. Feickert, ‘US Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress’, CRS Report, 25 January 2008; ‘McRaven: Special Operations More Than Just Combat’, Defense.gov, 26 July 2012.

52 Finlan, Special Forces (note 6) p.4.

53 Ibid. p.109; see also T.M. Kane and D.J. Lonsdale, Understanding Contemporary Strategy (London: Routledge 2012) pp.184–5; ‘SOCOM Wish List Includes Spy Tools, Radios That Talk to Foreign Allies’, nationaldefensemagazine.org, 23 May 2012; ‘SOCOM Picks Contractor for Signals Intelligence Receiver’, Defense Systems, 9 July 2012.

54 H. Hurlburt, ‘Pentagon Cuts: What Will the New US Military Look Like?’, BBC, 6 January 2012; B. Sutherland (ed.), Modern Warfare, Intelligence and Deterrence: The Technologies That Are Transforming Them (Oxford: Wiley/The Economist 2011); R. Whittle, ‘Air: DoD Tries Buying Pixels, Not Planes, For Flexible ISR; It Ain’t Leasing’, AD, 7 May 2012.

55 See throughout Svendsen, Understanding the Globalization of Intelligence (note 27) and Svendsen, The Professionalization of Intelligence Cooperation (note 4); Mckenzie (note 32); ‘The Revolution in Military Affairs’, This Week at ISN, 8–12 April 2013; ‘Lawfare in Theory and Practice’, This Week at ISN, 15–19 April 2013; ‘Readings: Gabriella Blum, “The Individualization of War: From Collectivism to Individualism in the Regulation of Armed Conflicts”’, Lawfare, 19 April 2013.

56 See, e.g., J. Michaels, The Discourse Trap and the US Military: From the War on Terror to the Surge (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2013); see also, e.g., concerns raised in M. Rosenberg, ‘With Bags of Cash, C.I.A. Seeks Influence in Afghanistan’, NYT, 28 April 2013, and J. Borger, ‘CIA and MI6 Ghost Money May Fuel Afghan Corruption, Say Diplomats’, GU, 29 April 2013.

57 Finlan, Special Forces (note 6) pp.98–9; ‘SOCOM Wants “Invisible” Commandos’, Wired: Danger Room, 26 April 2011; K. Dilanian, ‘With Al Qaeda Shattered, US Counter-Terrorism’s Future Unclear’, Los Angeles Times, 15 April 2013; J. Eligon and M. Cooper, ‘Boston Marathon Blasts Kill 3’, NYT, 16 April 2013; E. Pilkington, ‘MIT Police Officer Killed after Dramatic Night in Boston’, GU, 19 April 2013.

58 See, e.g., Svendsen, Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror (note 38) p.80; see also T. Shanker and E. Bumiller, ‘Looking Back, Gates Says He’s Grown Wary of “Wars of Choice”’, NYT, 18 June 2011; L. Freedman, A Choice of Enemies (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 2008); R.N. Haass, War of Necessity, War of Choice (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2009); S. Zielinski, ‘Norman Ornstein: US Political Culture Has Veered Away from Problem-Solving’, American Association for the Advancement of Science, 18 April 2013.

59 Finlan, Special Forces (note 6) pp.56–7; E. Schmitt, M. Mazzetti and T. Shanker, ‘Admiral Seeks Freer Hand in Deployment of Elite Forces’, NYT, 12 February 2012; see also K. Coleman, ‘Digital Conflict: Cyber Command Chief’s Vision for Improved Operations’, Defense Systems, 23 August 2012; C. Muñoz, ‘New Joint Special Ops Command Won’t Assume Control of Afghan Commandos’, The Hill Blog, 21 August 2012.

60 Finlan, Special Forces (note 6) pp.62–3.

61 See, e.g., as cited in Svendsen, Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror (note 38) pp.87–8.

62 See also Finlan, Special Forces, Strategy and the War on Terror (note 38) p.25, and Svendsen, ‘Intelligence Liaison’ (note 28); see also the ‘complex co-existence plurality’ concept in Svendsen, Understanding the Globalization of Intelligence (note 27) pp.xix, 61, 109, 130 and 139, and Svendsen, The Professionalization of Intelligence Cooperation (note 4) pp.10, 54, 63, 67–8, 75, 115, 116–18, 137 and 147.

63 For these ‘levels’ of intelligence and security experience, activity and analysis, see e.g., Svendsen, Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror (note 38) p.167, and Ch. 3 (7.0) of Svendsen, The Professionalization of Intelligence Cooperation (note 4).

64 Finlan, Special Forces (note 6) p.61. On ‘problem-solving’, see A.D.M. Svendsen, ‘Connecting Intelligence and Theory: Intelligence Liaison and International Relations’, Intelligence and National Security 24/5 (October 2009) p.708.

65 See also Svendsen, Understanding the Globalization of Intelligence (note 27) p.43.

66 See, e.g., W. Mitchell, ‘PROJECT KITAE: Battlespace Agility in Helmand: Network vs. Hierarchy C2’, RDDC/FAK Research Papers I–III, his ‘Battlespace Agility 101: The Use of Target Network Modelling to Increase Shared Situational Awareness and Understanding’, and his ‘Battlespace Agility 201: The OODA Moment’, FAK Brief (Copenhagen, August 2011 [2nd ed.]/December 2012/February 2013); W.M. Hall and G. Citrenbaum, Intelligence Collection (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International 2012).

67 Finlan, Special Forces (note 6) p.160; see also E. Schmitt, ‘Elite Military Forces Are Denied in Bid for Expansion’, NYT, 4 June 2012.

68 Ball (note 2) p.132.

69 Ibid. pp.132–3; see also A. Henriksen and J. Ringsmose, ‘What Did Denmark Gain? Iraq, Afghanistan and the Relationship with Washington’, Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2012 (Copenhagen, Denmark: Danish Institute for International Studies - DIIS, May 2012) pp.157–81.

70 A.D.M. Svendsen, ‘Strategy and Disproportionality in Contemporary Conflicts’, Journal of Strategic Studies 33/3 (June 2010) pp.367–99; see also ‘Socom’s Impact Outweighs Its Size, Commander Says’ and ‘Commanders Cite Unpredictable Future Threats’, Defense.gov, 2–4 March 2011.

71 ‘SOCOM Eyes Global Capability Network’, Jane’s International Defence Review, 10 May 2012; ‘Special Operations Delegates from 96 Nations Meet in Florida’, Defense.gov, 24 May 2012; NATO SF sources op. cit (note 30).

72 See, e.g., G. Segell, ‘Book Review: International Intelligence Cooperation and Accountability…’, Political Studies Review 10/3 (September 2012) p.411; Svendsen, Understanding the Globalization of Intelligence (note 27) esp. pp.54–5, 93; ‘Data, Data Everywhere: Adrift on a Sea of Intelligence’, Jane’s International Defence Review, 11 October 2012.

73 See also earlier references to NATO and ‘Smart Defence’.

74 Ball (note 2) p.120.

75 Ibid.

76 See also, esp. for an analysis of the UK’s contemporary national security backdrop after the October 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS) and Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), J. Richards, A Guide to National Security (Oxford: Oxford UP 2012).

77 See, e.g., B. Starr, ‘Pentagon Double Checked Actions of SEALs during Bin Laden Raid’, CNN Security Clearance, 8 September 2012; see also sources such as S. Kelly, B. Keilar and L. Shaughnessy, ‘Filmmakers’ Access to Bin Laden Info’, CNN Security Clearance, 24 May 2012; C. Rosen, ‘“Zero Dark Thirty” Trailer: First Look at Kathryn Bigelow’s Osama Bin Laden Movie (VIDEO)’, The Huffington Post, 6 August 2012; see also M. Hosenball, ‘Navy SEAL Who Wrote Book on Bin Laden Raid Could Face Probe’, Reuters, 23 August 2012; M. Mount, ‘Questions Raised after SEAL’s Identity Revealed’, CNN Security Clearance and ‘McRaven Warns Special Ops Community About Disclosing Classified Information’, Defense.gov, 24 August 2012; G. Miller, ‘Plan for Hunting Terrorists Signals US Intends to Keep Adding Names to Kill Lists’, WP, 24 October 2012.

78 Finlan, Special Forces (note 6) p.162; see also ‘Elite Western Forces Said Poised to Move on Syrian Chemical Arms’, Global Security Newswire, 25 August 2012; R.J. Smith, ‘Suiting Up: What the United States is Doing to Prepare for Chemical War in Syria’, Foreign Policy, 17 January 2013; ‘Syria Conflict: UK Concerns over Chemical Weapon Use’, BBC, 15 April 2013; see also ‘France Protects Niger Uranium Mine’, BBC, 4 February 2013.

79 See, e.g., P. Spiegel, ‘Indirect Approach is Favored in the War on Terror’, Los Angeles Times, 13 October 2008; D. Wagner and J. Margeson, ‘The Globalization of Covert Action’, The Huffington Post, 10 September 2012; J. Muir, ‘Syria: Proxy War Heats Up as Endgame Inches Closer’, BBC, 12 April 2013.

80 Ball (note 2) p.122.

81 See also A. Bacevich, Professor of History and International Relations at Boston University, ‘The Golden Age of Special Operations: Globalizing the Global War on Terror’, The Huffington Post, 29 May 2012; Becker and Shane (note 39); P. Rogers, ‘America’s New Wars, and Militarised Diplomacy’, openDemocracy, 31 May 2012. For official insights, see ‘Socom Commander Outlines People, Mission, Equipment’, ‘Special Operations Faces Soaring Demands, Commander Says’, and ‘Special Operations Focuses on World’s “Unlit Spaces”’, Defense.gov, 8–10 February 2011; see also, for developments elsewhere, ‘Russian Intelligence Officers Seek Speedy Creation of New Special Ops center’, RT, 28 November 2012.

82 Finlan, Special Forces (note 6) p.158; A. Mumford, The Counter-Insurgency Myth: The British Experience of Irregular Warfare (London: Routledge 2011); for the SOF-intelligence nexus, see L.E. Cline, ‘Special Operations and the Intelligence System’, International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 18/4 (2005) pp.575–92; T. Shanker and S. Shane, ‘Elite Troops Get Expanded Role on Intelligence’, NYT, 8 March 2006; ‘Increased Special Forces Interoperability’ in A.D.M. Svendsen, ‘The Globalization of Intelligence since 9/11: The Optimization of Intelligence Liaison Arrangements’, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 21/4 (2008) pp.668–70.

83 K. Dozier, ‘Stanley McChrystal Book: Retired General Speaks Out, Takes Blame for Rolling Stone Article’, AP, 5 January 2013; for other ‘problems’ experienced, see, e.g., Svendsen, Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror (note 38) pp.157–8.

84 Sepp (note 7) pp.135–6; see also D. Priest and A. Scott Tyson, ‘Bin Laden Trail “Stone Cold”’, WP, 10 September 2006; J.H. Michaels, ‘Agents for Stability or Chaos: Conceptualizing Intelligence “Relevance” in Counterinsurgency’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 34/3 (March 2011), pp.212–227; J. Hardy and P. Lushenko, ‘The High Value of Targeting: A Conceptual Model for Using HVT against a Networked Enemy’, Defence Studies 12/3 (September 2012) pp.413–33.

85 Kane and Lonsdale (note 53) pp.244–5; ‘War by Other Means’, RAND Counterinsurgency Study – Final Report (2008) pp.liii–liv; US Army HQ, ‘Intelligence’, Publication 2-0 (Washington, DC, 31 August 2012); for Canada, see, e.g., Lt. Col. J.A.E.K. Dowell, ‘Intelligence for the Canadian Army in the 21st Century: Enabling Land Operations’, JADEX Papers 5 (Kingston, ON: Canada National Defence, July 2011) esp. pp.42–3 and 46–8.

86 See, e.g., W. Pincus, ‘CIA’s Paramilitary Role Overshadows Spy Work’ and ‘Time to Rethink the CIA?’, WP, 15/16 November 2012; D. Ignatius, ‘Charting a Post-Petraeus Era’, WP, 13 November 2012; J. Foust, ‘Myopia: How Counter-Terrorism Has Blinded Our Intelligence Community’, The Atlantic, November 2012; N. Shachtman, ‘Post-Petraeus CIA Should Kill Less and Spy More, Former Chief Says’, Wired: Danger Room, 13 November 2012; M. Mazzetti, ‘Officer Tied to Tapes’ Destruction Moves Up CIA Ladder’, NYT, 27 March 2013; ‘Complex Environment Increases Demand for Intel, Official Says’, Defense.gov, and M.V. Hayden, ‘Should CIA Be Targeting Terrorists?’, CNN, 18 April 2013.

87 Sepp (note 7) p.132.

88 See, for instance, the several sources on Syria cited throughout this article.

89 See also M. Zenko, ‘The Lethal Bureaucrat: Who is John Brennan?’, Foreign Policy, 11 September 2012. For the importance of maintaining the initiative and ‘edges’, see, e.g., W.M. Hall and G. Citrenbaum, Intelligence Analysis (Westport, CT:Praeger Security International 2010); see also FM Viscount Bernard Montgomery as quoted in Svendsen, The Professionalization of Intelligence Cooperation (note 4), p.17.

90 On ‘strategic culture’ and its debates, see, e.g., Svendsen, ‘Connecting Intelligence and Theory’ (note 64) pp.723–5.

91 Ball (note 2) pp.123–4.

92 Ibid. p.131.

93 Finlan, Special Forces (note 6) p.162 (emphasis added); see also N. Turse, ‘Opinion: The US Military’s Secret Military’, aljazeera.net, 8 August 2011.

94 On ‘strategic narratives’, see, e.g., A. Miskimmon, B. O’Loughlin and L. Roselle, ‘Forging the World: Strategic Narratives and International Relations’, Centre for European Politics Working Paper (2012); J. Boswell, ‘Why and How Narrative Matters in Deliberative Systems’, Political Studies (2012) pp.1–17; see also Michaels, The Discourse Trap (note 56).

95 See also, e.g., Finlan, Special Forces (note 6) p.4.

96 For development of a ‘reach thesis’, see Svendsen, Understanding the Globalization of Intelligence (note 27) esp. pp.109–16, and Svendsen, The Professionalization of Intelligence Cooperation (note 4) pp.147–9.

97 Ball (note 2) p.135.

98 Ibid. p.120.

99 Ibid. pp.136–7.

100 See also, e.g., F. Splidsboel Hansen, ‘An Argument for Reflexivity in Intelligence Work’, Intelligence and National Security 27/3 (June 2012), pp.349–370; for other ‘reframing’ efforts, see Aldrich and Kasuku (note 45); Jeffreys-Jones (note 45); Davies and Gustafson (note 45).

101 See, e.g., the chapters in K. Søby Kristensen (ed.), Danmark i Krig (Copenhagen: DJØF 2013 [Danish only]); J. Cremer, ‘Afghan Death Was First Time Danish Elite Soldier Killed Overseas’, The Copenhagen Post, 3 January 2013; E. Knudsen and S. Klingenberg, ‘Cooperating in War – Coalition Warfare in Afghanistan’, FAK Report (Copenhagen: RDDC, April 2013).