Why teaching comprehensive operations planning requires transformational learning

Abstract

This article argues that the method outlined in NATO’s Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD) manual is entirely based on systems theory and describes how to apply the principles for managing system change through comprehensive operations projects. Such systems thinking is based on conceptually different principles than traditional military planning methods. Students must therefore be provided with new conceptual tools to understand and handle the complex planning process outlined in the COPD manual. Thereto, they require knowledge of its founding scientific theories to meet academic standards. The concluding message is that military teachers and students must widen their individual mental frames of reference through a transformational learning process to obtain the comprehensive understanding required to fully manage the COPD process. Moreover, they need to prepare for facilitating dialogues in the less mature comprehensive operations planning teams of real-life situations.

Keywords:

• crisis management
• operations planning
• comprehensive approach
• systems thinking
• transformational learning
• academic standards

Notes

1. For a discussion on potentially incompatible methodological positions in the COPD manual, see Erdeniz (Forthcoming).

2. Whitten and Bentley (2007, p. 160) provides this useful definition of systems analysis: “a problem-solving technique that decomposes a system into its component pieces for the purpose of studying how well those component parts work and interact to accomplish their purpose”.

3. The concept of complex adaptive systems is based on work in the natural sciences and is usually described at a high level of abstraction.

4. NATO (2010a, p. 3-2, Note 2) describes comprehensive approach as “a means to ensure a coordinated and coherent response to crisis by all relevant actors”.

5. In Sweden, the National Agency for Higher Education is the governmental authority monitoring higher education institutions.

6. In identifying the applicability of this theory, I have benefited from my dialogues with Ewa Olstedt (SEDU).

7. A closed system is detached from its environment. The operation of a watch has been used to illustrate a closed and relatively self-maintained mechanical system, while René Descartes’ philosophy of dualism (outlining thinking entities [i.e. the human soul] as irreducibly separate from physical entities [i.e. the human body]) represents an example from the social sciences.

8. The OODA loop was created by John Boyd. For a comprehensive presentation of its use in the context of strategic theory, see: Osinga (2007). It value as a tool for getting inside an enemy’s decision cycle in air campaigns has been questioned, but it is a widely used model for proactive decision-making.

9. The PDCA loop was introduced by Walther Shewart and popularised by Edwards Deming.

10. It comprises the NATO Headquarters, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and the Military Committee (MC).

11. This is primarily achieved by Liaison Officers.

12. The CJSOR is a military assessment of the minimum requirement of forces needed to fulfil the political ambition as defined by the NAC (Rynning 2012, p. 126).

13. International Staff and International Military Staff.

14. That is the Provisional CJSOR and Theatre Capability Statement of Requirements (TCSOR).

15. Rules of Engagement Requests and TCSOR.

16. NATO (2012, p. 2-C-5) defines CIMIC as: “The coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including the national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organizations and agencies”.

17. This is based on the author’s experience from managing collaborative operations assessment in multinational exercises involving a UN Headquarters staff and civil organisations, i.e. the NATO Steadfast series and the Swedish-led VIKING exercise series.