Challenges of institutional coordination in complex defense acquisition programs: the case of the Republic of Korea’s F-X program

Abstract

Decision-making in defense acquisition programs in the Republic of Korea (ROK) has been problematic, especially in highly advanced complex systems. The highly disputed force modernization program for the ROK Air Force’s fifth-generation fighter, dubbed the Fighter eXperiment, went through extreme turbulence during the type selection phase. The gist of the turbulence became evident through poor institutional coordination within the defense acquisition authorities that eventually forced them to rescind the decision generated from their own yearlong efforts, thus basically shooting themselves on the foot. The paper highlights the background of the program and reviews the institutional elements that influenced the decision-making process, and conclude that the absence of an effective coordination mechanism has made decision-making in complex defense programs even more troublesome.

Keywords:

• F-X program
• defense acquisition system
• force modernization
• institutional coordination

Notes

1. MTDP is a result of a joint effort between the military services and the acquisition authorities. MND and DAPA consolidates the prioritized force requirement extracted from the JSOP list and transforms the list into an executable plan with a five-year forecast for implementation.

2. Testimony of DAPA Administrator Lee Yong Geol at the National Assembly.

3. For instance, during the first F-X program (F-X1) in 2002, the acquisition authorities went through a nine month long process to review the three proposals from Boeing (F-15K), Dassault (Rafale), and EADS (Eurofighter), which included 38 rounds of bidding sessions.

4. Conformal weapons bay allows to carry armaments internal to the aircraft, which significantly reduces the signature of the aircraft against enemy radar detection.

5. Subsequent administrations initiated a full scale investigation over a number of questionable defense programs and allegedly prosecuted a weapons dealer named Cho Poon Eon, who was believed to have secretively collaborated and supported President Kim Dae Jung’s Presidential Campaign.

6. The first F-X in 2002 went through a similar experience as well when the acquisition authorities demanded to circumvent the complex grading system of the ROKAF whereas to simply determine the performance of each contending aircrafts on a pass/fail basis.

7. Officials claimed that most of the guidelines were directed from the senior executive levels of DAPA and the Blue House, thus, the ROKAF’s role was marginalized in that respect.

8. During the Lee Myong Bak Administration, the ROK Government was in need to solicit the support from the US to sponsor international events such as the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics, G-20 Summit, and Nuclear Summit.

9. The University of Chicago educated Dr Kim Tae Hyo was a strong supporter of the US Government’s East Asia regional strategy, especially on the part of aligning Korea–Japan–US into a trilateral military alliance.

10. The decision was allegedly accused by the public as a gesture to leverage the US Government by appeasing it with defense sales that would favor the US political leadership.

11. The aging F-4E and F-5E/F fighters from the ROKAF will be phased out from active duty no later than 2020. KF-X is intended to replace these obsolete aircrafts through indigenous development.

12. Comment made by National Assemblyman Ahn Kyu Baik during the 2013 National Assembly Audit, 22 October 2013.