Dirty war: chemical weapon use and domestic repression

Abstract

The utilization of chemical weapons to quash domestic rebellion is a drastic action for a regime facing domestic challengers to take, especially given the reputation costs and risk of international intervention. However, recent developments have illustrated that some regimes have contemplated and implemented extraordinary measures (including the use of chemical munitions) to quash rebellion. This study addresses the question of why some states utilize chemical weapons against domestic challengers while others refrain from this level of state repression. I argue that the utilization of chemical weapons has both domestic and international elements. Specifically, that ethnic cleavages that lead to secessionist challenges and factors associated with inter-state rivalry impact the likelihood that a state utilizes the employment of chemical munitions. I test my argument and other explanations regarding repression with a casestudy approach utilizing captured Iraqi Government documents comparing Iraq’s Al-Anfal campaigns with developments during the recent Syrian Civil War.

Keywords:

• Chemical weapons
• political repression
• secession
• civil war
• rivalry

Notes

1. Given the rarity of political repression utilizing chemical weapons some may argue that longstanding international norms regarding the use of chemical weapons as well as the protection of human rights are sufficient to deter state actors from engaging in this behavior. However, there are numerous instances of wide-scale repression being tolerated by the international community for geo-strategic purposes. US economic aid to Iraq after the Iran–Iraq war and China’s conflict with Vietnam over the latter’s intervention against the Khmer Rouge are good examples how international condemnation can be mitigated when extreme levels of repression occur due to geo-strategic considerations.

2. Due to the nature of the research design associated with this study, caution is warranted in assigning causal weight regarding the factors associated with political repression utilizing chemical weapons. Specifically, the no-variance case study is utilized to determine potential hypotheses associated with the outcome of interest rather than explicating testing of a causal mechanism. In short, the explanatory factors associated with this study are viewed as necessary conditions but determination whether they are both necessary and sufficient factors is beyond the scope of this study.

3. I should note that some scholars make a qualitative difference between domestic and foreign investment rates. This is an important distinction since it highlights relevant international factors that might impact the likelihood for repression. See Emilie Hafner-Burton, “Right or Robust? The Sensitive Nature of Repression to Globalization,” Journal of Peace Research 42:6 (2005a), pp. 679–698 and “Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade Agreements Influence Government Repression,” International Organization 59:3 (Summer 2005b), pp. 593–629.

4. It should be noted that within the document, chemical attacks is referred to as “Special Strikes,” which the Iraqi High Tribunal on the Al-Anfal campaigns illustrated was covert referral to chemical weapon strikes, see Saddam Hussein Collection (SH-GMID-D-000-468) – 22 March 1988.

5. It should be noted that the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons has received credible reports that Syrian regime forces may have also been the victims of chemical attacks in Jober in August 2014. In short, the Syrian regime may have been responsible for the chemical weapon attacks in Ghouta, but it is very possible they are not the only actor that has employed chemical munitions during the conflict (see OPCW 2015, p. 2).

6. I should note that this does not mean that there are no secessionist dynamics associated with the Syrian conflict. Sporadic reports regarding Kurdish opportunities to secede in Northern Syria and the possibility of an Alawite-centered secession have been voiced, but there is no concrete determination how viable these claims are.