Missile warfare and violent non-state actors: the case of Hezbollah

Abstract

Over the last three decades, Hezbollah adapted its military strategy and the operational function conferred to its missiles. Starting in 1992, rocket warfare became one of the primary tactics of the group to compel Israeli Forces in Lebanon. After the Israeli withdrawal in 2000, the strategy evolved into a deterrence posture to support the Party’s objective to remain the primary military power inside Lebanon. Hezbollah’s posture could serve as a template for smaller terrorist groups. It would broaden the array of strategic options for violent non-state actors, allowing them to implement military postures that could be described as rudimentary and low-cost denial of access strategies. However, this scenario would require the same level of state support that Hezbollah currently enjoys from Iran, and that other non-state actors (Hamas, Houthi insurgents) do not at this stage.

Keywords:

• Terrorism
• missile
• deterrence
• Israel
• Hezbollah
• Middle East

Notes

1. In the article, we use the concepts of compellence and deterrence as being both types of coercion, according to Thomas Schelling’s definition in Arms and Influence, New York: Praeger, 1977. Compellence is understood as the threat to an adversary to change his behavior vis-à-vis the conflict, while deterrence is the threat intended to keep this adversary from changing his position. In his seminal book, Schelling underlines the “difference between inducting inaction [deterrence] and making someone perform [compellence]” (Schelling, Arms and Influence, 70).

2. Each field trip lasted one to several weeks and included meetings with officers, diplomats, politicians, journalists, as well as scholars. In total, about 60 interviews were made. Given the sensitivity of the topics and the official responsibilities of the interviewees, interviews were not recorded and we decided to maintain general anonymity and to refer only to the exchanges by mentioning the professional affiliation of the person.

3. On the definition and implications of military revolutions, see Gray (2002, 2006), Krepinevich (1994), and Hundley (1999).

4. On the historical context of Hezbollah’s birth, see Norton (2014) and Avon and Khatchadourian (2012).

5. The journalist Nicholas Blanford writes about Mughniyah that he “would achieve international notoriety as the elusive, cunning and resolute military commander of Hezbollah and alleged architect of large-scale suicide bomb attacks against Western targets and kidnappings of foreigners in the war-ravaged Lebanon of the 1980s” in: Blanford, Warriors of God, p. 27.

6. See the report Human Rights Watch (1997).

7. Interviews conducted by the author with Israel’s military representatives in Tel Aviv, February 2012.

8. Interviews conducted by the author with Israel’s military representatives in Tel Aviv, January 2015.

9. Saddam Hussein’s use of Scud missiles striking Tehran as means of compellence was corroborated by the release of his archives. In 1984, before the war of the cities started, the Iraqi leader was explaining to his Air Force officers: “Sometimes what you get out of a weapon is when you keep saying, ‘I will bomb you’ [and] it is actually better than bombing him. It is possible that when you bomb him the material effect will be 40 percent, but if you stick it up to his face the material and the spiritual effect will be 60 percent, so why hit him? Keep getting 60 percent!” Quoted in: Woods et al. (2010, p. 259).

10. Hezbollah would nevertheless get involved in various terrorist operations outside of the area (in Europe, Africa, or Latin America) as described in Levitt (2013).

11. See on the topic Krepinevich (2010), Van Tol et al. (2010), and Cliff et al. (2007).