Abstract
Few issues are more important yet less understood than how the domestic production of armaments impacts military power. Scholars generally explain states’ drive to develop defense industries in terms of a quest for supply security. Technological changes are, however, rendering an “autonomy preference” increasingly unaffordable. This raises the question of whether states can still derive strategic value from their defense industries. This study addresses the issue by examining whether Israel’s and Serbia’s defense industrial bases contributes to either the traditional goal of supply security or the alternative objective of military adaptability. To preview the conclusion, the strategic value that most states can extract from domestic defense firms lies in enhanced military adaptability. This advantage is far from negligible. Since war is unpredictable, it is often the side that adapts most rapidly to unexpected circumstances that prevails. Domestic defense industries contribute significantly to adapt both because of their technical capabilities and their patterns of routinized cooperation with a states’ armed force. Supply security, by way of contrast, is today unattainable for all but the largest states.
Acknowlegement
I would like to thank the tireless help of my two research assistants, Amy McCudden and Oz Adari, whose efforts contributed greatly to this manuscript. I would also like to thank Caglar Kurc and Stephanie Neumann for organizing a stimulating series of online workshops that gave rise to this special issue. Finally, I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their invaluable feedback.
Notes
1. The term defense technologist is used throughout this study to signify the nexus of managers, engineers, scientists and skilled workers who develop or produce weaponry.