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Abstract
At the core of waging war and strategy is the creation, control and use of force. This article investigates the volunteer battalions that mobilized in Ukraine during the spring of 2014. It contextualizes the volunteer phenomenon and focuses on the state strategies to establish control over these militias. As ambiguous entities arising from a situation characterized by rapid social change – revolution and war – the volunteer battalions threatened existing hierarchies and questioned state authority. The situation was exacerbated by the war, which deviated from the expectations of Ukrainian combatants and Western military observers alike. The state nevertheless enjoyed a modicum of success in reining in the militias through four strategies of undermining, co-option, incorporation and coercion. While predominantly integrated into a more rigid category of paramilitary forces, the volunteers continue to play a role in both the Ukrainian society and security sector to the unforeseeable future.
Notes
1. Ukrainian MP Mustafa Nayyem, Yale University, New Haven 21st February 2018.
2. Ukrainian volunteer “Maksym” 10th of May 2017, Kyiv.
3. “Maksym” 12th of May 2017, Kyiv. Ukrainian academic, 20th September 2017, personal communication.
4. Ukrainian volunteer “Kolya”, 8th of August 2017, Kyiv and two West Ukrainian civil society reformers, 10th of August 2017, Kyiv.
5. Two West Ukrainian civil society reformers, 10th of August 2017, Kyiv.
6. “Maksym” 10th of May and 29th of September 2017, Kyiv.
7. Interviews of “Maksym”, 10th of May 2017, Kyiv, and “Kolya”, 8th of August 2017, Kyiv.
8. Many of these notables played both economic and political roles. A good example is the oligarch and governor of Dnipropetrovsk oblast Ihor Kolomoyskyi, who financed several volunteer battalions.
9. “Maksym” 7th of August, 2017, Kyiv oblast.
10. “Kolya” 8th of August and 28th of November 2017, Kyiv.
11. Foreign volunteer “Alpha”, 24th of February 2017, personal communication.
12. “Maksym 10th of May, 2017, Kyiv. Kolomoyskyi”s close ties to Israel and the Chechen Dzhokhar Dudayev volunteer battalion also add to this complexity.
13. Foreign volunteer “Bravo” 24th November 2017, 27th of March 2018, personal communication.
14. “Kolya” 8th of August and 28th of November 2017, Kyiv.
15. Ukrainian civil society reformers and politicians, 10–11 August, 24–26 November 2017.
16. This argument is not without its problems, as Russia nevertheless possesses what has been called escalation dominance against Ukraine. As volunteers put it, there were Russian units across the border who pushed back whenever Ukrainian forces pushed too hard. In other words, nothing Ukraine could muster against Russia after the latter began to escalate the situation was enough. This said, the Russian unwillingness to get openly involved in the conflict has meant that its ability to escalate has so far been limited. Also, the prioritization of mass leaves open the question what kind of military would have been able to stop the uprisings from escalating in the first place.
17. “Maksym” 10th of May 2017, Kyiv.
18. “Bravo” 24th November 2017, Kyiv.
19. “Bravo” 24th November 2017, Kyiv.
20. “Bravo” 24th November 2017, Kyiv.
21. Ukrainian volunteer “Taras” 1st of December, 2017, Kyiv.
22. “Kolya”, 8th of August 2017, Kyiv.
23. “Taras” 1st of December, 2017, Kyiv.
24. “Taras” 1st of December, 2017, Kyiv.