Taking the archers for granted: emerging threats to nuclear weapon delivery systems

ABSTRACT

A reliable capability is essential for deterrence to succeed. While incredible threats coupled with an assured ability to hurt an adversary may be enough to alter behavior, even the most credible threat is left impotent in the absence of a sufficient capability. During the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union at times sought weapons with first-strike potential that threatened the effectiveness of each other’s deterrent. Since then, though, nuclear powers have either committed to a no first use policy or generally refrained from pursuing technologies that could radically upset the strategic balance. Recent trends, however, again pose a threat to this stability. Nascent “left-of-launch” missile defense programs which rely on offensive cyber operations or electronic warfare to target adversary weapon systems prior to launch offer new opportunities for sophisticated state actors to subvert the reliability of these capabilities. This paper assesses what risks there may be to nuclear weapon delivery systems before examining why a country might be motivated to carry out such an act, what the ramifications for deterrence stability might be, and how these threats could be mitigated.

KEYWORDS:

• Nuclear weapons
• delivery systems
• missile defense
• deterrence
• cybersecurity

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1. The deployment of a nuclear weapon delivery system requires long and complex supply chains including everything from warhead development to missile or bomb assembly and production. Distinguishing between preemptive and preventive attacks is difficult as cyber operations can, and may have to, occur initially far left-of-launch and years in advance in order to be used in a crisis.

2. The term cybersecurity is used generically here to describe defense against offensive cyber operations (OCOs) which the U.S. Department of Defense currently defines as “missions intended to project power in and through cyberspace” (USCYBERCOM 2018). OCOs are often accomplished using a combination of cyberspace attacks and cyberspace exploitation (previously referred to as computer network attack and computer network exploitation) and can also involve electronic warfare (i.e., acts involving the electromagnetic spectrum) at the tactical level. See Libicki (2009), Kaplan (2016), and Futter (2018) for detailed discussions of these terms and how they have evolved over the years.

3. Because of their design and controlled production, it is generally assumed that the nuclear warheads themselves are not vulnerable to cyberattack; however, this assumption is impossible to confirm or deny without access to highly classified information.

4. Scholars, media, and arms control activists frequently claim this report concluded that U.S. nuclear weapons are vulnerable to cyberattack even though it says no such thing.

5. For speculation on potential Vanguard cyberattack vectors, see Abaimove and Ingram (2017).

6. For a summary of U.S. missile defense history, see Weiss (2015).

7. Like ballistic missiles, cruise missiles can contain conventional or nuclear payloads but are much more difficult to defend against due to their speed and low altitude. Preliminary efforts though are reportedly underway in the U.S. to develop this capability. See Weisgerber (2015).

8. For a detailed accounts, see Langer (2013) and Lindsay (2013).

9. For a contrary view, see Lewis (2017).

10. See Gartzke and Lindsay (2017) for a thorough discussion of the phenomenon. They argue that despite the downsides, states may find developing a reputation for OCOs may be useful for general deterrence.

11. This is the central dilemma of missile defense arising from Powell (2003) and Quackenbush (2006).

12. If these capabilities are developed in secret, a destabilizing outcome is far more likely. Consider the case where an initially incredible U.S. covertly develops new non-kinetic left-of-launch capabilities. Although the U.S. may become capable enough to possess a credible threat, no one else knows the they now prefer conflict to concession since these capabilities were developed in secret. Thus, North Korea is likely to continue to defect and incur an escalatory response from the U.S. thereby causing deterrence to fail. This same dynamic is identified in Gartzke and Lindsay (2017).

13. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review does recognize the need to modernize the antiquated NC3 system; however, this was also asserted in the 2010 review and neither one directly addresses the cyber risks to nuclear weapon delivery platforms.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Jesse T. Wasson

Jesse T. Wasson is a Senior Analyst and Manager at Systems Planning and Analysis in Alexandria, Virginia where he primarily focuses on threat assessment, security risk, and organizational performance for the U.S. Navy, National Nuclear Security Administration, and private sector clients. Dr. Wasson holds a Ph.D. in political science from the State University of New York at Buffalo and was formerly a visiting assistant professor of political science at the Rochester Institute of Technology.

Christopher E. Bluesteen

Christopher E. Bluesteen is a Principal Analyst and Group Leader at Systems Planning and Analysis in Alexandria, Virginia where he focuses on vulnerability assessment and risk management for the U.S. Navy, National Nuclear Security Administration, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and private sector clients. Prior to this, Mr. Bluesteen served as an Armor Officer in the U.S. Army. Mr. Bluesteen holds a B.S. in computer engineering from The College of New Jersey and a M.S. in operation research from George Mason University.