Overcoming uncertainty in cyberspace: strategic culture and cognitive schemas

ABSTRACT

An understanding of strategic behavior in cyberspace is often premised on the uncertainty inherent in the domain. However, little is said regarding the exact nature of this uncertainty and the underlying motivations that direct attempts at overcoming it. In response, this article advances a cognitive-cultural explanation of strategic behavior in cyberspace and argues that behavioral preferences arise from the schematic use of strategic culture as a remedy for uncertainty. However, the suitability of these preferences is moderated by the presence of accuracy goals. These accuracy goals must, in turn, dictate the extent to which these are deemed suitable. While two decades of cybersecurity research hints at the presence and significance of these mechanisms, little effort has gone into advancing this line of inquiry. Consequently, the article consolidates these findings into a robust analytical framework to explain strategic behavior in cyberspace.

KEYWORDS:

• Cyberspace
• strategy
• strategic culture
• schema
• bias

Acknowledgments

I would like to extend my gratitude to Prof. Dr. Wolf Schünemann, Dr. Christopher Whyte, Dr. Aaron Brantly, Dr. Michiel Foulon, and Dr. Eula Bianca Villar for providing substantive feedback that contributed to the development of this article.

Disclosure statement

There are no conflicts of interest associated with this article

Notes

1. The latest version includes incidents from 2000–2016.

2. In comparison to earlier iterations of the literature which espoused the revolutionary potential of cyberspace (Clarke and Knake 2014; Rid 2012; Arquilla and Ronfeldt 1993).

3. Although some scholars may point to the significant amounts of information obtained through cyber espionage, questions linger as to the extent that these may be exploited (Gilli and Gilli 2019).

4. Often choosing to conduct defacement operations or Distributed Denial-of-Service that inflict limited and transient damage.

5. The existence of a single and temporally continuous expression of culture that explains variations in state behaviour

6. In that strategic culture seems to be able to explain all aspects of state behaviour (Lantis 2002).

7. Or continued interaction as with the latest strategy of the United States (Fischerkeller and Harknett 2018a).

8. These may either be un-motivated or motivated in nature. That is to say, the result of either innate cognitive mechanisms or the need to maintain certain beliefs and preferences (Chong 2013).

9. Socialization and norms building are increasingly relevant when it comes to ensuring the stability of cyberspace but are outside the scope of this article.

10. Clandestine operations emphasize the concealment of the operation over that of the identity of its sponsor whereas covert operations seek the deniability of such actions on the part of the sponsor.

11. The cyber operation that disrupted the opening ceremonies of the 2018 Winter Olympics in Pyeongchang were initially attributed to North Korea given the underlying strategic context.

12. The cyber operation that compromised the DoD networks in 1998 were thought to have originated from Iraq given its correspondence with a set of sanctions to be imposed on the Iraqi regime.

13. A cognitive shortcut in which similarities between events and objects are thought to constitute a representative case thus allowing a decision-maker to ignore nuances that would otherwise require greater cognitive effort to process (Kahneman et al. 1982).

14. Moving forward, references to uncertainty is taken to mean the ambiguity of available information.

15. Readers should keep in mind that strategic culture is not exclusive to the military domain.

16. First generation strategic culture theories are thought to be under-determined as they leave little room for alternate explanations of state culture while they are perceived as over-determined as these were viewed as an amalgamation of a wide range of (potentially competing) variables (Bloomfield 2012; Johnston 1995).

17. Jervis (2009) applies this explanation to beliefs, but given the similarity between beliefs and schemas, it follows that schemas function in a related manner as argued by Larson (1994).

18. Decision-making where decisions are informed by both prior information and newly obtained evidence.

19. Although some argue that strategic culture manifests as specific behaviors (Johnston 1995), this article asserts that ideas precede behavior. This avoids the tautology reflected in the first-generation strategic culture scholarship; that behavior is both a cause and effect of strategic culture. As argued later in this article, it is the negative effects of behavioral choices (e.g., policy failure), not the behavior itself, that results in the evolution of strategic culture.

20. As there can be multiple strategic cultures, multiple schemas may exist as well (Morgan 2003).

21. Schemas are activated based on informational queues that coincide with the expectations of a given schema.

22. Strategic power, defined as “momentum, potential energy, force, the strategic configuration of power, strategic advantage” (Valeriano et al. 2018, 150).

23. Bloomfield (2012) defines subcultures as “a different interpretation of a state’s international social/cultural context”. Libel (2016) extends this by arguing that subcultures are manifestations of a worldview adopted by a particular group. Consequently, this article treats subculture as a set of behavioural preferences adopted by governmental organizations that reinforce their preferred worldview.

24. This is a decision-making model proposed by Mintz (2004) in which decisions are the result of a two-step process that utilizes a non-compensatory followed by a compensatory strategy to reduce the range of alternatives.

25. Perspective taking refers to the act of considering the strategic realities faced by an alter and represents a manifestation of accuracy-driven motivations given the cognitive effort required to do so.

26. The causal path highlighted in Figure 3 highlights the mediating effect of both strategic culture and the moderating effects of accuracy goals. It is important to note that decision-makers are still responsive to the empirical realities they face. However, their assessments are likely to be coloured by the need to overcome ambiguous information through schematic thinking and the presence of accuracy goals.

27. Alternatively, simulations with elites may also prove useful in bridging the gap between internal and external validity.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Miguel Alberto Gomez

Miguel Alberto Gomez is a senior researcher at the Center for Security Studies, ETH, and a doctoral candidate at the Universität Hildesheim, Germany. He holds a master’s degree in international security from the Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals (IBEI). He has worked previously as a lecturer at both the De La Salle University and the College of St. Benilde. His area of research is centered around cybersecurity and tackles the cognitive and affective factors that influence decision-making concerning cyberspace.