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ABSTRACT
In an era of cyber threats, drones and artificial intelligence, will the future of inter-state warfare at sea inevitably be high tech? This paper challenges assumptions about the ubiquity and importance of high technology in any future naval clash between China and America. While taken as a given that the most advanced weapons and platforms will be vital to such a conflict, both navies also employ legacy weapons and older technologies. A case study is offered here of medium calibre naval guns, seen on the very latest naval surface combatants of both China, the USA, and other major navies. Why do modern navies persist with such seemingly old weapons? To what extent are they likely to be important in any future conflict? It is argued that overly focusing on the latest high-tech weapons risks a type of naïve technological determinism and obscures how high- and low-tech weapons are often complementary. It is this synergy that requires greater understanding and attention. Moreover, relatively low-tech weapons like guns could be surprisingly relevant in the context of hybrid and amphibious warfare scenarios involving China and the USA, especially for the diplomacy of the “shot across the bows”.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1. The simplest definition of these is “maneuvering weapons that fly at speeds of at least Mach 5” (SaylerRS, 2020, 2)
2. These can be defined as a launcher “that uses electricity rather than chemical propellants (i.e., gunpowder charges) to fire a projectile” (O’Rourke/CRS, 2020, 21, fn.42).
3. People’s Liberation Army
4. This terms relates to “realistic photo, audio, video, and other forgeries generated with artificial intelligence (AI) technologies” (Sayler and Harris/CRS, 2019, 1).
5. Chief of Naval Operations. Zummwalt was CNO from 1970 to 1974.
6. Naval mine warfare, for example, is characterized by ongoing high-tech improvements in fuzes and electronics alongside the fact that many very old mine types and warheads remain in global service and some of these continue to employ older forms of triggering whose origins are in the World Wars, because they are cheaper and easier to maintain (Friedman Citation2006, 773–774).
7. Calibre means the width of the inner-barrel and therefore also the projectile. It is measured in inches or millimetres. Calibre is often further described more precisely by reference to the overall length of the projectile, including the shell casing. For example, the Russian and Chinese 76 mm/60 is a different gun and shell from the Italian/western 76 mm/62. The Italian shell is longer here, the 62 indicating it is 62 times as long as it’s width in mm. For further information see: http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/Gun_Data.php
8. These are my estimates from various open sources.
9. Some Royal Navy’s Leander class frigates (designed 1950s) had their 4.5 inch gun turret removed and replaced by missiles, although a few were kept with their guns. The Broadsword class (designed 1970s) were originally conceived without any gun turret. However, the Batch 3 of this class were redesigned in the 1980s to take a 114 mm gun turret.
10. The US Navy kept a number of Baltimore and Des Moines class cruisers armed with nine 8 inch (203 mm) guns in service until the mid 1970s. The Royal Navy kept modernized helicopter cruisers HMS Tiger and HMS Blake in service until 1978–79, each carrying World War 2 era 6 inch (152 mm) guns, while the Dutch Navy kept De Zeven Provinciën, with 6 inch guns, in operation till the mid 1970s. The Soviet Navy’s Sverdlov cruisers with a dozen 6 inch guns remained in service probably into the 1980s. The Argentine Navy’s Belgrano cruiser which was sunk by a Royal Navy submarine in 1982 was equipped with 6 inch guns.
11. British 4.5 inch naval ammunition used to be produced at the Royal Ordnance Factory, Birtley/Gateshead, as far back as the First World War. BAE systems in 2012 built a new factory at Washington nearby, which can produce a range of munitions.
12. More details of the Royal Navy’s Type 31 frigate emerge”, September 15th, 2019https://www.savetheroyalnavy.org/more-details-of-the-royal-navys-type-31-frigate-emerge/
13. “French Navy FTI Frigate: From 57 mm to 127 mm, Naval Gun System Choice Still Open”, 28 October 2016,https://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/news/naval-exhibitions/2016/euronaval-2016/4535-french-navy-fti-frigate-from-57mm-to-127mm-naval-gun-system-choice-still-open.html
14. United Defence emerged from the FMC corporation in the mid 1990s, which itself had acquired Northern Ordnance in 1964. Northern Ordnance were originally founded in 1940 as a division of the Northern Pump Company, producing 5 inch guns at a site on the upper Mississippi river (Frindley, Minnesota). BAe continues to conduct research and development at this site but naval gun manufacturing has mostly shifted to Louisville (Kentucky).
15. The various fire control technologies used to support modern naval guns are not immune to electronic warfare, but the basic guns and munitions themselves are impossible to jam or spoof unlike radar or infra-red guided missiles.
16. House of Commons, Minutes Of Evidence, Taken Before Defence Committee, “Future Capabilities”, Wednesday 24 November 2004, Admiral Sir Alan West GCB DSC ADC,https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200405/cmselect/cmdfence/uc45-i/uc4502.htm
17. Testimony by Admiral Sir Mark Stanthorpe, at 118, House of Commons, Defence Committee, Ninth Report-Operations in Libya, 25 January 2012, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmdfence/950/95007.html
18. These are probably Non-Line of Site “Tamuz” Spike missiles which could have a range of 25 km, but the Israeli’s also have much bigger and longer-range missiles, in calibres of 160 mn and 300 mm with ranges between 50–150 km. It is unclear whether these are deployed on Israeli vessels. The US Navy have added Hellfire missiles to their Littoral Combat Ships.
19. MLRS is an American Multiple Launch Rocket System, 227 mm calibre, developed at the end of the Cold War. The High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) is a 1990s development of MLRS using a wheeled vehicle and capable of firing fewer, but longer range, rockets.
20. Interestingly, this doctrine statement details that “on-call fire support should also be planned to support the amphibious raid force if it is detected en route and requires assistance to break contact, conduct an emergency withdrawal, or continue to the objective” (JSOC, 2019, Ibid).
21. Missile control radars can be used to warn and threaten another warship or aircraft by illuminating them with fire control radars or lasers. However, it is not as tangible as “shots across the bow”.
22. Allen (Citation2006) provides the example of the failed US Coastguard interception of Panamanian registered MV Hermann in 1990, which refused to stop despite machine gun and light cannon fire. The ship escaped.
23. A typical US Navy Arleigh Burke destroyer carries circa 600 × 127 mm munitions (Bradley et al. Citation2020, 11).
24. Smart munitions in 57 mm calibre include the ALaMO round optimised to destroy small fast boat threats and the so-called MAD-FIRES 57 mm guided munition to intercept missiles. See: https://chuckhillscgblog.net/2019/11/14/guided-rounds-for-the-57mm-mk110-alamo-and-mad-fires-an-update/. BAe have also developed a 57 mm smart round called the ORKA. See: http://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=3465)
25. See: NavWeapons, 155 mm (6.1”) Future Naval Gun and Alternativeshttp://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNBR_61-52_future.php
26. Leonardo have been working on advanced munitions for at least two decades. Collaboration is with the German firm Diehl and BAe (Naval Technology Citation2017).
27. Naval Strike Missiles (of Norwegian origin) will be fitted to Littoral Combat Ships giving them an ability to hit ships and fixed land targets at ranges of 100 km. There are several unmanned surface and sub-surface vessels programmes for the US Navy, see: Hoehn and Ryder/CRS (2020) and O’Rourke (2020).
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Brendan Flynn
Dr. Brendan Flynn is a lecturer at the School of Political Science and Sociology, NUI, Galway. His research interests include maritime security and defence and security studies more broadly.