Uncomfortable neighbors: NATO, Russia and the shifting logic of military exercises in the Baltics

ABSTRACT

To what ends do allies employ military exercises? In order to further our understanding regarding the logic and utility of military drills, this paper focuses on NATO’s eastern flank. Specifically, with the help of newly compiled data, we tracked two decades of exercises in the Baltic states. Our analysis speaks to the fact that the size, tempo, and character of military training events in this region have manifestly changed. In the early 2000s, military drills were primarily conceived as a mechanism to modernize Baltic armed forces and ensure their adequacy to NATO membership standards. The 2014 Crimea crises, however, dealt a serious blow to the regional order. This event was the primary driver behind a considerable spike in the overall exercise numbers. At the same time, we observe that it was not only a mere quantitative shift that transpired. From parachute drops into remote areas, rehearsals of river crossings to moving of combat power via narrow land corridors, the staging of military exercises after 2014 were overhauled into events that accentuated NATO’s reinforcement capabilities. In this context, military exercises can be seen as a crucial element to credibly signal capacity and resolve within the concept of deterrence by reinforcement.

KEYWORDS:

• Military exercises
• the Baltics
• NATO
• deterrence by reinforcement

Introduction

Military exercises can serve a number of purposes ranging from tests of interoperability and readiness to geopolitical signalling. States can use such costly signals to reveal their military power and to send signals of resolve to use it with the intent to deter potential aggressors but also to reassure alliance partners of their support. Depending on the geopolitical climate and the perception of threat these signals can be more or less pronounced and their logic can prioritize one purpose over another. In times of relatively harmonious regional cooperation military exercises presumably follow predominantly more peaceful aims such as testing interoperability and building further trust, whereas more conflictual times with high mutual distrust and threat perceptions lend themselves to geopolitical signalling and a deterrent logic while continuing to practice and develop interoperability.

In the past years, military exercises have regained their salience as essential tools of statecraft. Nowhere has this been more pronounced than in the Baltic Sea region, where both NATO and Russia have organized their largest training events since the end of the Cold War. In order to further our understanding regarding the logic and utility of military manoeuvres, this paper focuses on NATO’s eastern flank. Specifically, with the help of newly compiled data, we have been able to track two decades of allied military drills in the Baltic states, evaluating their objectives, involved scenarios and messaging efforts that surround them. The peculiar positioning of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania – sitting on a geopolitical fault line, provides us with an ideal opportunity to gain deeper insights into the value of allied military exercises.

Our analysis reveals how at different time periods exercises have been employed to support various political and military objectives. Mirroring the changing security landscape, the size, complexity, and logic that underpins such exercises have shifted considerably. In the early 2000s, military drills were primarily conceived as a mechanism to modernize Baltic armed forces, ensure their adequacy to NATO membership standards and prepare personnel for out-of-area operations in the Middle East and Balkans. For a brief period of time, maritime exercises in the Baltic Sea further served as a rare venue for engaging the Russian senior military leadership. A deteriorating regional security environment, however, elevated military drills on whole another level of importance. Russia’s forceful takeover of territory from its neighbour Ukraine in 2014 was a critical juncture that instantly prompted a change in perceptions about Moscow’s intentions. As a result, the number of military training events across the Baltic republics spiked. At the same time, we observe that it was not only a mere quantitative change that transpired. Upon closer inspection of individual exercises in the Baltics, we identify a clear paradigm shift as to their overall mode of function.

Whereas previously exercises primarily served the purpose of preparing Baltic armed forces for far-flung combat areas, the bulk of military exercises in the post-Crimea era “turned inward.” Having studied the lessons of Ukraine, scenario scripts were flipped over and directed towards the defence of Baltic cities, roads, airfields, and seashores. Allied exercises in the Baltics essentially became an interlocking element between already pre-positioned, but very limited multinational troop deployments in the region, and much larger follow-on forces. In this context, the purpose to practice and enhance interoperability and testing new equipment became a central aim of military trainings given the increasingly multinational character of NATO presence and reinforcement. From the vantage point of NATO, military manoeuvres on the alliance’s eastern flank formed a critical facet of the overall deterrence posture as they aimed to convey that, despite Russian advantages in force ratios and geography, the alliance would be able to move fast in a crises situation in support of its treaty allies. Stated differently, by organizing exercises on the basis of swift movement of forces, NATO aimed to establish deterrence by reinforcement.

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The first section briefly surveys theoretical underpinnings of why states exercise. Subsequently, the paper lays out the curious geopolitical context in which the Baltic states find themselves and the impact that this may have had on NATO’s adopted deterrence posture and implemented exercises. Following that, we present our research design, data gathering methods, and used sources. With the help of our data collection, the paper then proceeds to outline the general patterns of military drills across the Baltics. Next, the analysis offers a more granular assessment of selected military exercises: Baltops, Saber Strike, and Spring Storm. This allows us to make the case that a substantial shift has taken place not only in terms of overall exercise numbers in the region but also concerning their underlying objectives. The article concludes with a summary of the key findings and identification of possible avenues for future research.

Why states exercise?

Current scholarly literature offers multiple explanations for why actors conduct individual and allied military drills. To begin with, military manoeuvres figure prominently in classical works of deterrence, which can be defined as “the use of a threat by one party in an attempt to convince another party to refrain from some action” (Quackenbush 2015, 2). In order to deter an opponent, an actor must be in possession of certain military capabilities. Hard power alone, however, does not deter. Physical capability must be combined with credibility, which in Morgan’s (2003, 15) terms is “the quality of being believed.” Simply stated, an opponent must believe that the defender will follow through on its announced threats to use force in order to protect its interests in question. Signals about foreign policy interests and the willingness to use force are more credible if costs are attached (Fearon 1997). Financially quite costly military exercises can credibly communicate a resolve to employ force. Joint exercises can be considered as one of the foundational elements for reinforcing credibility behind mutual defence commitments (Bernhardt and Sukin 2021, 859).

Military drills can be particularly salient in instances of extended deterrence, a type of deterrence that involves more than two parties. In the academic literature, extended deterrence is viewed as “inherently less credible than direct deterrence” (Davis et al. 2019, 6). This is due to the fact that allied partners are often located “thousands of miles away and often much closer to the territory of the aggressor state” (Mazarr 2018, 2). As Stephen Walt (2021) posits, attempting to deter attacks on one’s own soil is by definition more credible, whereas extended deterrence is a more demanding task. In this context, regular military training events with a partner government may be utilized in order to convey a message to the opponent about one’s willingness to sacrifice own soldiers in order to defend an ally under a military threat. In particular, if allies are far away, military exercises can also be used to signal the logistical capabilities to deploy troops quickly over large distances. In their study of various signalling devices that major powers can use to assure support to a protégé, McManus and Nieman (2019) identified joint military exercises as the most important signals of support. Military exercises factored before other signal types, such as arms transfers and troop deployment.

The purpose of military exercises, however, goes beyond mere deterrence and assurance efforts and has been linked to other strategic goals. According to Wolfley (2021), governments can also initiate joint military exercises as a means to recruit partners to join multinational war-fighting coalitions. To illustrate this with a concrete example, NATO’s Partnership for Peace program served to intensify bilateral links between individual nations and NATO while equally preparing them for potential peacekeeping missions in the Balkans and the Middle East (p. 6). In addition, the undertaking of military exercises can be used as a trust and confidence-building measure among rival powers. Training side by side, proponents claim, holds the promise of lessening uncertainty about each other’s capabilities and intentions, thus helping to steer clear of the classic security dilemma scenario (Chau 2011, 57).

Multinational exercises can also be instrumental in honing allied interoperability, mutual understanding, and communication. Here, it is worth stressing that even states that belong to the same military organization tend to have distinct command styles, doctrine, and equipment. One important institutional asset of NATO is its multinational integrated military command and the interoperability of its member states’ national militaries. Over the years regularly recurring exercises helped to build up not only specific assets against a Soviet threat but more general assets for decision-making and planning with procedures and structures that could serve other types of missions adding to NATO’s persistence and adaptability to changing security environments (Wallander 2000). Refining interoperability, however, is an ongoing process. This is particularly the case due to NATO’s absorption of new member states in 2004.

Some of the previous NATO deployments involving troops from multiple countries have brought to the fore issues of incompatible military equipment, lack of adequate English-language proficiency and cultural complexities (Tresch and Coops 2007). To alleviate such problems, regular exercises may serve as means for integrating otherwise diverse military compositions. In addition, multinational exercises are credited for having certain socialization effects whereby common military drills help actors to identify mutual threats and share processes of how to address them (Frazier Derrick and Hutto 2017, 380).

On the other side of the spectrum, military exercises can also serve as a cover for an invasion. Historically, countries have frequently employed exercises as a disguise for a surprise attack on the enemy (Betts 1982). In this context, it is useful to recall that in 2014 Russia first utilized snap exercises in order to move its forces near Ukraine’s border, part of which eventually were deployed for the actual invasion of Crimea (Kofman 2017, 24). A similar scenario played out in February of 2022 with Russia initiating large and protracted military exercises in Belarus and on the borders of Ukraine. Eventually, the Russian forces that were supposedly on a training mission then switched to attempts to take over and occupy large parts of Ukraine. If perceived as threatening, military exercises can also provoke a reciprocal signal of resolve by the adversary, especially if the exercise is large and takes place in proximity (Bernhardt and Sukin 2021). The potential for conflict escalation, however, is smaller if the manoeuvres are conducted within an alliance (Kuo and Blankenship 2021).

The size, location, and frequency of the exercises vary considerably. Training may be carried out in domains such as land, sea, air, cyber, and space. Such events may be open to international monitors or take place behind the veil of secrecy. Moreover, it must be stressed that military exercises are not cheap to organize and execute. Even the preparation stage, Lasconjarias (2020) submits, can be a time and resource-demanding event. In sum, military exercises fulfil multiple functions and can be applied to buttress numerous political and strategic objectives. The aims and priorities of military exercises can change over time depending on shifts in the geopolitical order. They can serve the purpose of sharpening interoperability among alliance partners or be used as confidence and trust-building mechanisms among opponents. By the same token, however, exercises can be utilized as a measure of deterrence or coercion.

In this article, we propose that NATO military exercises in the Baltics, while characterized by continuity in their endeavour to practise interoperability, at the same time underwent major changes in their aims. Mirroring the changing geopolitical conditions, they have evolved through two distinct phases. Initially (2000–2014) they supported the goals of modernizing Baltic armed forces and preparing personnel for foreign missions. After 2014, however, allied exercises morphed into a critical tool for making deterrence credible. In particular, they served as a mechanism to demonstrate the alliance’s capability to quickly reinforce its enhanced Forward Presence units.

Exercises and deterrence by reinforcement in the Baltics

In this study, we have chosen to scrutinize military exercises in the three Baltic states: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Why focus on this specific geostrategic area? We posit that this space, due to its proximity between rival actors, lends us an opportunity to gain important insights into the value and utility of allied military exercises. To put it at its simplest, the structural conditions present in the Baltic Sea region make this area an intriguing object for an academic inquiry. After all, this is where the Western security architecture (NATO) and the Russian Federation psychically meet each other.

The outer edge of NATO and the Russian western border has long been marked by analysts as a geopolitical fault line. Both Baltic and Russian authorities have regularly expressed their discomfort of being in close physical proximity to each other. In this context, scholars like Ralph Clem (2018) have advanced the argument that by ratcheting up the number and size of military exercises, both NATO and Russia are risking greater geopolitical instability. This notion, however, has been countered by the work of Kuo and Blankenship (2021) who suggest that exercises that are conducted within military alliances do not create the type of escalatory dynamics that critics have warned about.

As NATO’s easternmost members, the Baltics share considerable borders with what they perceived to be a threatening revanchist power. These countries are almost completely cut off from their NATO peers. Only Lithuania shares a thin stretch of land, commonly referred to as the Suwalki gap, with fellow alliance member Poland. In the view of Riho Terras, a former Estonian Chief of Defense Forces, the Baltics are “like an island” due to the fact that the gap between pro-Moscow Belarus and the Russian enclave Kaliningrad is negligible (cited in Jones 2016). Kaliningrad itself poses a significant challenge as it gives the Russian side an additional platform for power projection into the Baltics (Nieto 2011).

Being sparsely populated, the Baltic republics are not in a position to mount a defence purely by own means. Thus, in strategic matters, they are heavily reliant upon NATO partner governments’ promise to protect them. In this context, academic scholarship abounds with references to the Baltics as the alliance’s most exposed link. Sceptics have even implied that territories located in Europe’s deep corner are outright indefensible militarily. In the view of Barry Posen (2021), the defence of the Baltics is not a practical matter due to their unfavourable geography. In its immediate neighbourhood, the Russian Federation is by far superior in terms of conventional military force as well as holding an advantage in the geographic set-up (Veebel 2018; IISS 2021). What is more, Russian military capabilities are considered to be most formidable and advanced in its Western Military District. Certain war-gaming simulations have concluded that Russia, in a hypothetical scenario, could overwhelm and overrun the Baltics in a matter of few days (Shlapak and Johnson 2016).

In hindsight, with the Russian armed forces struggling tremendously in achieving their war aims in Ukraine despite outnumbering their opponent by a significant margin, analysts have been forced to rethink their baseline assumptions about the “defensibility” of the Baltic states. As put by one of the lead Russian military experts Michael Kofman, the Ukraine war has proved that the Russian military is not exactly “twelve feet tall.” That, Kofman advises, however, should not lead us to the other extreme whereby we assume that it is “four feet tall” and incapable of operational success in a different setting (cited in Chotiner 2022). One ought to bear in mind that by their territorial size, population, and the number of active-duty troops, the Baltic states and Ukraine are in entirely different categories.

Tellingly, Baltic officials themselves have also talked about being entrapped in an “uncomfortable geography” (Larter 2019). In the words of former Estonian Minister of Foreign Affairs, “while NATO collectively is far superior to Russia […] there is one corner where Russia enjoys local advantage and that’s the Baltic Sea region” (Mikser 2018). During relatively harmonious geopolitical climate, Baltic geographic disadvantages as well as Russia’s upper hand in local conventional force ratios, have largely been a non-issue. In the immediate aftermath of the Ukraine crises, however, as the Baltic region became a focal point of tension between Russia and NATO, geographic considerations, in Mattelaer’s (2018, 346) telling, “returned with a vengeance.” Similarly, Studemeyer (2019, 789) points out that while the Baltic “geographic position on NATO’s eastern periphery was of little concern in a post-9/11 world,” the annexation of Crimea visibly changed the importance that was accorded to NATO’s eastern flank.

The Baltic strategic predicament created a considerable dilemma for NATO. On the one hand, the alliance was unwilling to recreate a Cold War-type of deterrent with massive troop numbers facing each other. On the other hand, the deteriorating security landscape called for a credible deterrence posture on its eastern flank. The solution, at least in part, was found in regular allied military exercises. To begin with, as part of NATO’s effort to bolster its presence in the East, allied governments in 2016 agreed to implement the enhanced Forward Presence model – an innovative force structure consisting of a diverse group of nations. While a historical milestone for the alliance, the deployment of roughly 5500 NATO troops in the Baltics and Poland did not, however, appreciably alter the balance of power in the region. In itself, forward-based tripwire forces across the Baltics are clearly not in a position to deny Russia its military objectives.

By any measure, Moscow still retains notable quantitative and qualitative superiority in the region. Rather, the task of these limited forward-based units in a hypothetical Russian advance scenario would be to buy time and delay its advance until the arrival of larger NATO forces (Lanoszka and Hunzeker 2016). As elaborated by the Estonian Defence Minister, the enhanced Forward Presence model should be viewed only as “one piece of the puzzle,” that is connected to the “reinforcement strategy, the goal of which is to ensure the rapid arrival of allied forces in the Baltic states” (Estonian Ministry of Defence 2018). In such a set-up, we suspect that regular military exercises after 2014 more distinctly contain core elements that signal the alliance’s capacity for swift movement of forces and reinforcement. Such exercises can thus be considered an anchor point for making deterrence credible.

Baltic exercises over time

In order to capture the key patterns regarding exercises, we collected empirical data covering military drills in the Baltic states between the years 2000–2019. This time period includes the years before the Baltic states’ NATO accession and ends before 2020 when major exercises were cancelled or notably limited due to the Covid pandemic. As it pertains to data collection on military exercises, one has to acknowledge that it is fraught with challenges. The only available global data collection on joint military exercises (D’Orazio 2013) that we are aware of ends in 2010. In a comparison of Russian and NATO military manoeuvres (2015–17), a group of Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung journalists relied mostly on press releases to assemble a systematic overview. In doing so, the lead author (Hemicker 2017) points out that because there are no readily available overviews of such exercises, the “data must be assembled from hundreds of pieces like a mosaic.”

Here, we followed a similar approach by marshalling empirical evidence from the following publicly available sources: Baltic News Service (BNS), annual NATO reports on allied exercises and the official website of the Lithuanian Armed Forces. We relied on an automated keyword search (“military exercises” and “military manoeuvres”) in LexisNexis for the Baltic News Service, the region’s leading news wire, to identify relevant articles which we then screened manually to identify the ongoing manoeuvres. Our data collection encompasses 72 military exercises that took place in the Baltics at land, sea and/or air. This includes exercises that are repeated annually as well as exercises that are nonrecurring. A list of the identified exercises can be found in the online appendix.

We have counted only those military exercises that are multinational in nature. That is to say that at a minimum two NATO members had to be involved in the military drill for it to be included in our analysis. As part of the data gathering process, we sought to establish the name of the exercise, location, size, participating countries as well as estimated troop numbers. For our research purposes, we counted only those events that involved at least 1000 participants. Following the example set by Castillo (2016), we chose this particular cut-off point due to the fact that an exercise of this magnitude would likely be reported in the press.

To get a better handle of the role that military exercises play in the region, we further fused quantitative data with in-depth qualitative analysis. To that end, we have scrutinized public statements and strategic documents by NATO, Russia, and the Baltic states. Consequently, we have been able to better assess the driving logic behind military exercises in the Baltics. Our presented findings serve to fill a notable void in the academic scholarship. While a number of scholars and policy analysts (Brzezinski and Varangis 2016; Norberg 2018; Ploom et al. 2020) have made important strides in exploring the topic of military exercises in the Baltic Sea region, such studies have focused either on a selection of individual large exercises, or they have covered a maximum of 8 years of exercises in the region.

To date, no systematic analysis has yet been presented that thoroughly maps and assesses two decades of exercises. Without systematic data collection and in-depth analysis, we risk drawing conclusions that suffer from selection bias. Relying on very few exercises or a short time can be misleading indicating a shift in patterns where there might only be an outlier. Our contribution is to investigate how military exercises in the region evolved over time and whether key international events had a large and enduring impact in the pattern of joint trainings. By grounding our analysis in a longer time period, we are able to develop a richer understanding of the role that military drills have played in the Baltic Sea region and how they have changed over time. Moreover, our contribution goes beyond capturing the size and frequency of exercises. We furthermore assess the character and scripts of military exercises and thus add more detail, again in particular with a focus on how they changed over time.

In the first step, we present some descriptive patterns of the military exercises in our data collection. Graph 1 reveals that military exercises in the Baltics took a different course after the annexation of Crimea We can see a clear spike in the frequency and size of military exercises. Graph 1a provides us with an overview of the number of joint military manoeuvres that were performed in the Baltics per year. Up until 2012 we observe typically one or two military exercises per year, with a certain increase after 2010 to three and even four exercises per year in 2013. In 2014, the number of joint exercises that took place in the Baltics doubled to eight and remained high until 2019.

Graph 1. (a) NATO military exercises in the Baltic states (yearly basis). (b) Average number of troops per military exercises (monthly basis).

Military exercises did not only take place more frequently after 2014, they also increased in size. Graph 1b portrays the average size of a military exercise in terms of participating troops on a monthly basis. Until 2014, military drills were held on a rather regular basis usually in May or June. The average size of a manoeuvre in the early years of our period of study was about 3,000 (2,927) ranging from 1,000 (the minimum size to be included in our data collection) to 6,000 participating soldiers in the Steadfast Jazz exercise in October 2013. After the annexation of Crimea, military exercises took place with far greater frequency, spread over more months in a year and also increased in size to an average of almost 5,000 (4,798) troops. The largest exercise in our data collection with 18,000 troops is Saber Strike 2018.

In the early 2000s, military exercises in the Baltic states primarily served the purpose of preparing these nations to meet the alliance’s technical standards as well as readying them for missions in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq. State officials regularly framed exercises with allies as opportunities to modernize forces and acquire new skill-sets. Commenting on a multinational exercise Baltic Eagle 2000, Estonian President Lennart Meri stressed that these types of activities help the nation to gain “sound and intelligent administrative experience and modern military training” (Meri 2000). After the Baltic states’ NATO accession in 2004, our data does not reveal much change in the pattern of exercises. In 2005, the Lithuanian Ministry of Defence emphasized that the guiding objective of exercising with partner governments has been to “to develop interoperability among NATO and PfP forces and to improve multinational unit command and control in NATO-led Peace Support Operations” (Lithuanian Ministry of National Defence 2005).

The Baltic states were highly concerned with the developments in Georgia in 2008. Relations between Russia and NATO became increasingly strained. NATO reacted to the Russian military invasion in Georgia by suspending military and political cooperation; in turn, Russia suspended its participation in military exercises and other cooperation but continued logistical support for NATO’s Afghanistan mission (Forsberg and Herd 2015). In the graphs above, the Georgian-Russian war did not leave a pronounced mark on the number and size of military exercises conducted in the Baltic states. The number and size of manoeuvres remained relatively stable with a slight increase after 2009. Russia did not participate in the Baltops exercise in 2009 but already joined again in the military training exercise a year later.

The Ukraine crises was a clear turning point in NATO-Russia relations. All cooperation was put to an enduring halt. No joint exercises with Russia have been held since. Instead, NATO increased its military presence in the Baltic states and beyond. This includes the military exercises in the Baltics as reflected in the graphs. Already in 2014, NATO officials vowed to “establish an enhanced exercise programme with a focus on exercising collective defence” (NATO 2014). Concurrently, the alliance’s predominant power, the United States, pledged to increase the number of multilateral exercises in the Baltic region (White House 2014). The presented analysis attests that these promises were translated into tangible action. NATO, as part of its deterrence posture, put a premium on sharpening the ability to move allied troops and equipment across Europe. To that end, military exercises stressed readiness, speed of movement, and compatibility.

From parachute drops into remote areas, rehearsals of river crossings to moving of combat power via narrow land corridors, the staging of military exercises after 2014 were overhauled into events that, first and foremost, accentuated the alliance’s swift reinforcement capabilities. By probing the character of allied military drills, we find that exercises were scripted and implemented in a manner to convey the message that the alliance can act on short notice and that even the most exposed members on its frontier will be defended. As explained by the former NATO assistant secretary-general, the task at hand for the alliance was to demonstrate that it is in a position to move “forces where they are needed and to move them quickly. And send a signal to a potential adversary that NATO will be ready to defend” (Brauss 2021). Simply put, by directing its attention toward rehearsing a quick response to a potential crisis in the Baltics, NATO used exercises as a means for establishing deterrence by reinforcement.

Beyond communicating that the alliance can rapidly move military fighting power into and within the Baltic operational area, military drills have also been instrumental in sharpening interoperability among multinational deployments in the region. Shortly after the setting up of the enhanced Forward Presence model in 2017, these forces were incorporated into various NATO training schemes, primarily to ensure that multinational battalions are able to function together as cohesive units under the common alliance’s flag. Moreover, we find that allied exercises in the Baltics have also served as important feedback channels for lawmakers and military planners. While large-scale exercises clearly had a performative dimension to them – an audience for which they were played out, there was also a very practical and educational side to the regular movement of military equipment and personnel across the European continent. Exercises served as a testing device for identifying one’s own deficiencies, thus laying the groundwork for what needs to be rebuilt in the physical infrastructure.

Baltops: from trust-building to confrontational flyovers

In the following, we closely scrutinize selected military exercises – their shifting size and logic. We chose to do so for annually recurring exercises that took place several years before and after 2014 to better demonstrate changes. The annual exercises of Spring Storm, Saber Strike, and Baltops that regularly take place in May and June account for half of our observations and doubled roughly in size. We bring out key episodes and inflection points of these exercises and assess the drivers behind them. To begin with, our analytical focus here turns to Baltops, a longstanding annual maritime exercise in the Baltic Sea, led and sponsored by the United States since 1971. Over the course of their history, these maritime exercises have served multiple functions.

Graph 2 depicts the yearly Baltops exercises in terms of troop size in the Baltic Sea. While relatively stable in size until 2011, after a marked drop in Baltops 2012 and 2013, the number of participating sailors as well as participating states increased in 2014 and after. The graph shows that the exercises have been truly multilateral in nature all along with a high number of participating countries. Besides the US as the lead nation, the exercises have regularly hosted NATO as well as non-alliance participants. The regular participants included the NATO members that are littorals of the Baltic Sea but also other countries of Northern Europe as well as France, and occasionally Canada. Baltops also regularly included non-NATO members Finland and Sweden and for a few years also Georgia in its training exercises. After 2014 the number of participating NATO states increased extending to include countries from Southern Europe, such as Italy, Spain, or Turkey.

Graph 2. BALTOPS annual military exercise.

Over the years, the Baltic Sea has served as a rare venue for the military-to-military engagement between NATO and Russia. After a two-year absence due to policy disagreements over the conflict in the Balkans, the Russian navy resumed its participation in Baltops in 2001. The 9/11 terror attacks had a profound effect on the overall NATO-Russia dynamics. A common enemy in the form of transnational terrorism laid the groundwork for a rapprochement between the two sides. In a 2001 meeting between NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson and the Russian President Vladimir Putin, the former stressed:

For some forty years NATO and Russia sat and glowered at each other, for another ten years we tip-toed around each other but now I believe that we are entering an era where substantial and practical cooperation is going to build a unique relationship between us. (NATO 2001)

Against this backdrop, in 2002 Washington and Moscow produced a joint declaration of a new strategic relationship. Among other policy points, it emphasized the need for “the expansion of joint exercises” (US Department of State 2002). For the next six years, Russia would send its naval forces to conduct drills in the Baltic Sea together with other NATO member countries. In 2003, NATO Secretary-General, Lord Robertson, offered an optimistic outlook for NATO–Russia relations by stressing that joint exercises such as Baltops have provided important lessons that contributed to building of stronger links between the two sides (NATO 2003).

That summer, the US Marines, within the framework of Baltops, reached a historical milestone by landing “side-by-side on a beach in Poland with their counterparts from the Russian military” (Josar 2003). It was the first instance of US Marines and Russian Naval Infantry taking part in common large-scale military drills. Commenting on the value of Baltops, Vice-admiral of the US Navy Thomas Kilcline emphasized that it has been great to see countries that have “historically not gotten along work well together” (cited in Brown 2004). These engagements can be viewed through the lens of confidence-building measures that should ameliorate uncertainty and unpredictability between large military powers.

The shortly fought war between Russia and Georgia resulted in a temporary one-year suspension of Russian participation from the annual Baltops manoeuvres in 2009. The Russian newspaper Pravda even speculated that in the absence of the Russian navy, exercises had now turned into yet “another provocation against Russia” (Pravda 2009). Moscow did, however, regain its Baltops participant status in 2010. Baltic leaders would later openly air their disappointment regarding the fact that in the aftermath of the Russo-Georgian conflict, NATO in its relations with the Kremlin went back to “business as usual” within a couple of months (Linkevičius 2021). In the years 2011–2013, Russia even participated alongside participants from Georgia. Just a month before Russia’s eventual takeover of Crimea in 2014, Russian military representatives had conveyed that in the spirit of cooperation, Russian military ships would participate in Baltops exercises (Tass 2014). According to Russian Vice-admiral Viktor Kravchuk, the intention was that “the Baltic Fleet will become a center for active international cooperation in 2014” (Interfax 2013).

After Russia’s annexation of Crimea, NATO’s cooperation with it was fully terminated on several fronts. This included Russian participation in common military manoeuvres. The 2014 Ukraine crises was a major regional rupture with far-reaching consequences. In response to being side-lined from this annual training activity, Russia instantly embarked upon individual naval drills in its enclave of Kaliningrad (Tass 2014a).¹ Once a regular party of Baltops, Russia now felt the need to closely observe and “shadow” naval manoeuvres held in the Baltic Sea waters. In 2015, Russian fighter jets overflew ships that were taking part in this exercise (Osborn 2015). Citing growing tension in the region, the Russian Baltic Fleet’s warships would regularly track and monitor Baltops exercises (Tass 2019).

Since 2014, Baltops itself underwent a noteworthy reorganization by moving towards a deterrent logic. As French and Dombrowski (2016) observe, in the light of Russia’s actions in Ukraine, the curriculum for Baltops shifted from peacekeeping and humanitarian efforts to “naval and amphibious warfare.” Indeed, the official NATO communique now stressed that allied participation in these drills demonstrated “NATO’s resolve to defend the Baltic region” (NATO 2016). Similarly, US Navy leadership reasoned that these exercises took place in order to deter Russian maritime expansion (Shalal 2016). Whereas in the early 2000s this annual event served as a platform for cooperation between NATO and Russia, it had now turned into a mechanism for reassuring regional NATO partners and deterring Russia (French and Dombrowski 2018).

As part of NATO’s reworked deterrence posture, one of the key angles of Baltops drills was to sharpen allied mobility and lines of reinforcement. The 2018 exercise, for instance, involved an amphibious landing operation on the Lithuanian Sea coast. According to the Lithuanian Ministry of Defence, the goal of Baltops 2018 was to “ensure appropriate readiness to respond to possible crises in the Baltic Sea region and ensure rapid reinforcement of the allies as well as military assistance from sea and air” (Lithuanian Ministry of National Defence 2018). Accordingly, the exercise involved scenarios that were aimed at “possible isolation of the Baltic and Nordic countries and ensuring rapid arrival of allied support in case of aggression” (Ibid). In 2019, multinational troops, in the framework of Baltops, similarly practiced troop landing “on Baltic beaches from two amphibious strike groups” (Gerdžiūnas 2019). According to local journalists that observed the exercise, “the scale and speed of such operations had not been seen in the Baltic states before” (Ibid). The nature of these exercises speaks directly to the high priority that allied partners attached to the need of improving the speed of movement in the Baltic Sea region. In sum, our analysis reveals a change in the size of Baltops exercises after 2014. Simultaneously, the scripts of these exercises moved towards the objective of deterrence with the Baltops becoming a venue to demonstrate allied reinforcement capabilities, thus aiming to provide a credible signal to deter Russia and assure the Baltic states.

Saber Strike and Spring Storm

Another set of regularly repeating exercises in the Baltic states are Saber Strike and Spring Storm which started in 2010 and 2013² respectively and continuously increased in size both peaking in 2018 with 18,000 and 15,000 troops. This brought more than 33,000 troops to the region in May and June 2018. Given their prominence, we explore them in greater detail.

Graph 3. Saber Strike and Spring Storm annual military exercise.

Saber Strike is a US Army-led exercise that takes place, in a rotating order, across the three Baltic states. In its initial phase, these exercises primarily served the purpose of preparing Baltic armed forces for deployments to ISAF mission in Afghanistan. Baltic senior military staff, as well as defence officials, couched these exercises as training opportunities tailored for multinational environments outside the Baltics (Graube 2010). This was clearly reflected in the training programme as it emphasized the following: “improvised explosive device defeat training” as well as “convoy and patrol operations” (US Army 2010). In order to reach the desired training objectives, military drills accentuated those operational scenarios that troops would likely encounter in Afghanistan (Beaulieu-Hains 2012). According to the Director of Training and Exercises for US Army Europe, Saber Strike was a vehicle for allies to train together before being deployed together abroad (U.S. Army Europe Public Affairs 2012). This working assumption held on for a number of years, until 2014.

After 2014, Saber Strike assumed an entirely different shape. Once seen through the lens of deployments abroad, senior Baltic officials now discussed these training opportunities in the terminology of assurance and deterrence (Lithuanian Armed Forces 2014). Having reflected on the lessons from Ukraine, where the Russian side had proven its ability to quickly seize the initiative, Saber Strike exercises equally put a premium on rehearsing and showcasing allied capacity to swiftly move assets and personnel to the Baltic states. In 2015, 2016 and 2017 Saber Strike included a parachute drop component whereby US troops, equipment, and resupplies would land on NATO’s eastern flank (Lamonte 2015; US National Guard 2017). Exercise Saber Strike 2016 had also involved the rapid amassing of large-scale military force, “from loading prepositioned equipment from caves in Norway onto a ship, to organizing the force” in the Baltic theater (Eckstein 2016).

The 2016 Saber Strike was further combined with a Dragoon Ride, “a vehicle road march” that was initiated in Germany, made its way across six countries and concluded in Tapa, Estonia. The working objective, apart from a symbolic demonstration of force and allied solidarity, was to showcase that the alliance is capable of rapid movement of a regiment-size convoy consisting of some 400 tactical vehicles (US Army 2016). The whole point of this event, according to Commander of US Army Europe, was to demonstrate to the Russians that the US military together with allied forces can move swiftly across great distances, through Eastern European villages and small towns (Lyman 2015).

Saber Strike 2017 and 2018 further served as a testament to the changed character of military exercises. The 2017 drills put an emphasis on defending the Suwalki Gap, a strip of land between Poland and Lithuania, that many see as a critical node in the overall Baltic logistics scheme (Schultz 2017). As part of the exercises in 2017, NATO had also officially inaugurated Multinational Corps North-East as the alliance’s High Readiness Forces Headquarters (NATO 2017). According to alliance representatives, the establishment of this component increased NATO’s ability to act promptly in a crises situation. The 2018 Saber Strike exercise similarly accentuated ability to move personnel and assets to alliance’s eastern edge (NATO 2018). The US Army summed up the objective of this training opportunity as follows: “Saber Strike is the platform to validate our collective capability to rapidly respond to and reinforce Allies in a time of crisis” (Brown 2018).³

In addition to the deterrence angle, which figures prominently in nearly all large-scale allied manoeuvres, these training events have equally served as a testing device vis-à-vis the region’s physical infrastructure, providing useful feedback for what and how needs to be rebuilt. Stated differently, allied exercises appear to have generated data points about the abilities of both personnel and infrastructure that support them. As NATO’s own report indicates: “troop movement in real time is a clear barometer of changes in mobility, infrastructure, and legal and regulatory barriers” (NATO 2019, 13). Regular movement of troops and military hardware created a helpful feedback channel through which military planners and lawmakers received information about various shortcomings and inadequacies in its strategic posture.

According to NATO, running exercises such as Saber Strike allowed identifying “critical areas of structural deficiency or bureaucratic impediments” (NATO 2019, 13).⁴ Writing on the reinforcement strategy, the Estonian Defence Minister went on to emphasize that allied governments could not afford “to suddenly realize in a time of crisis that a runway is too short, a bridge too narrow or a tunnel too low” (Luik 2018). Regular movements of troops thus allowed to discover previously unanticipated issues. Here, it is important to stress that many of the drills post-2014 were organized and executed in a manner that intentionally pushed armed forces and physical infrastructure to their limits. Those with previous participant experience in multiple Baltops and Saber Strike exercises attested that post-Crimea training “really ramped up the realism and intensity” (Air Force Magazine 2017). In sum, regular exercises, in addition to the deterrence angle, generated important clues for the decision makers about what and how needs to be implemented or rebuilt in order to make military movement across Eastern Europe more time-efficient.

Another prominent and annually run exercise is the Spring Storm. Initially designed as a training opportunity solely for young Estonian military conscripts and reservists, Spring Storm eventually evolved into a NATO-led exercise that brings together allied troops. The exercise reached its peak in 2018 when around 15 thousand uniformed individuals from 15 allied nations took part in it. A core feature of the exercise has been to develop cohesiveness and interoperability between Estonian national troops and the enhanced Forward Presence battalions. As already noted, in 2017 NATO stepped up its presence in the Baltic Sea region by standing up four enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) battalions in the Baltics and Poland. Subsequently, these multinational allied units were brought into various local military training schemes, such as Saber Strike and Spring Storm.

In a short span of time, the Baltics had become hosts to unprecedented mini-coalitions that comprised a broad mix of strategic philosophies, military hardware, cultures, and languages. As acknowledged by NATO, in its initial stages, “the deployment of eFP troops created a steep learning curve” for the host nations (NATO 2019, 9). The need for common training events further stems from the fact that these battalions are rotational in nature. In light of this, training exercises like Spring Storm were utilized to alleviate problems that are commonly associated with managing diverse compositions of military deployments. Exercises became instrumental in improving group cohesiveness, interoperability, and setting common expectations (Rancans 2019).

What is more, exercises involving the eFP battalions in the Baltics may have equally brought some side benefits to NATO as an organization through important lessons learned. Due to its novel force formation, the eFP model has essentially served as a multinational laboratory, which allows assessing the effects of diversity on the overall mission dynamics. As pointed out by the Canadian Ambassador to Latvia, someone who has been deeply involved in the eFP mission in Latvia, the fact that so many different nations have been constantly “training, parading and living together” will likely serve as “one of the best tests of NATO as an organization over its existence” (LATO 2020). Similarly, Rachel Ellehuus, who held a senior-level position at the US Department of Defense, argues that such unprecedented regular exercises of highly diverse multinational deployments may serve as a blueprint for future NATO missions elsewhere (Ellehuus 2020). Simply put, eFP exercises in the Baltics may have yielded important lessons regarding how to best train and organize diverse multinational battalions.

Conclusions

This paper assumed the task of scrutinizing the logic behind allied military exercises in the Baltic states. Military exercises, especially in a multilateral alliance context, serve the purpose to improve interoperability. While practicing joint operations is continuously a core task, the size and scenarios of manoeuvres can vary and give priority to additional purposes. Our analysis speaks to the fact that over the span of two decades the size, tempo and character of military training activities in this region have manifestly changed. First, we demonstrate that from 2000 to 2014 allied exercises primarily centred on preparing local militaries for eventual NATO membership and the alliance’s out-of-area missions. For a brief moment, naval exercises in the Baltic Sea promoted the goal of normalizing relations between Russia and NATO. Moscow’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, however, dealt a serious blow to the regional order. In light of this, the alliance underwent a profound strategic paradigm shift with collective defence once again becoming a key priority. Our data collection on the frequency and size of military training events indicates that the 2014 Ukraine crises was the primary driver behind the spike in the overall exercise numbers in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

Moreover, our analysis supports the argument that the Crimea annexation had a considerable bearing on the very nature of allied-run military manoeuvres. For the Baltic states, the principal lesson from Russia’s offensive in Ukraine was that speed of deployment is of the essence and that adequate force reinforcements in a crisis situation must arrive on short notice. Reflecting this conceptual notion, post-2014 exercises in the Baltic states can be characterized by their focus on rehearsing the timely movement of assets and personnel. Reluctant to station tens of thousands of troops along NATO’s eastern frontier, the alliance instead opted for a limited forward presence, but one that, at least in theory, could be swiftly supported by larger follow-up forces.

In this case, the credibility of deterrent was built not solely around stationed multinational battalions in the region, but on the prospect that considerable NATO reinforcements are able to join them on a short notice. As put by Hodges et al. (2020, 2), “for deterrence to succeed […] the allies need to have, and be able to demonstrate, the ability to move large and heavy military units, at speed, to and across Europe.” Our research attests that after 2014 NATO turned its sights on showcasing its ability for a timely response vis-à-vis alliance’s eastern flank. In this context, military exercises can be seen as a crucial element to credibly signal capacity and resolve within the concept of deterrence by reinforcement.

However, some have expressed skepticism regarding both the size and speed of NATO’s implemented maneuvers. A long-time Russia observer Edward Lucas, for instance, is of the view that allied exercises in the Baltics have been far “too small, too well scripted, and too devoid of complexity” (Lucas 2022). Analysis carried out by the Swedish Defence Research Agency equally pinpointed several deficiencies in the alliance’s adopted deterrence by reinforcement approach (Frisell 2019). In this context, it is also worth noting that after Russia’s full-scale assault on Ukraine in 2022, NATO allies, for the first time in history, activated the NATO Response Force. Consequently, the multinational force managed to reach Romania in 4 days, which is double the deployment time (48 hours) allied representatives had advertised before (NATO 2022). This does indicate that NATO officials ought to carry on with the task of sharpening response time in crises situations.

While a detailed assessment of Russia’s 2022 war in Ukraine is beyond the remit of this article, some limited points regarding the role played by military exercises are in order. Before the breakout of war, the exchange of mutual observers in the context of military exercises was seen as one of the potential stepping stones toward de-escalation and more transparency in the European security architecture. In its initial communique, the Russian side had signalled a willingness to reevaluate military manoeuvres and work towards reforming the Vienna Document that governs their transparency (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2022). Equally though, the Prime Minister of Estonia had warned against too many concessions pertaining to military exercises, given that they are “detrimental to our defence posture” (Kallas 2022). The all-out assault against Ukraine’s sovereignty in the early hours of February 24, however, instantly put an end to negotiations on this matter.

In light of this, the current military configuration on NATO’s eastern flank is set to be overhauled once again, with a formal decision likely to be announced during the (NATO 2022) summit in Madrid. Baltic senior officials have argued that due to the devastating war in Ukraine, the alliance ought to move away from the tripwire-based deterrence framework to the deterrence by denial approach. Moreover, the likely addition of Finland and Sweden to NATO, will have an important imprint on the overall Baltic Sea region military outlook. As the alliance undergoes another strategic posture adjustment, it will be worthwhile for scholars to return to the question of military exercises and their role in the regional security landscape.

Acknowledgments

We would like to thank Nuru Debora Thie for her excellent assistance in gathering data concerning military exercises in the Baltic states. Moreover, we thank all of the participants of the International Relations colloquium at the University of Greifswald, who had an opportunity to comment on the early version of this paper.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Funding

This research has been funded by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research in Germany (BMBF) [01UC2102]

Notes on contributors

Andris Banka

Dr. Andris Banka is a postdoctoral researcher at the Interdisciplinary Centre for Baltic Sea Region Research (IFZO) in Greifswald, Germany. He holds a Ph.D. in Politics and International Relations from the University of Birmingham, U.K

Margit Bussmann

Professor Margit Bussmann is Chair of International Relations and Regional Studies at the University of Greifswald. She is currently focusing her research on security and cooperation in the Baltic Sea region.

Notes

1. In 2014, the Russian Defence Ministry put out the following statement: “The training of the army’s group in the Kaliningrad operational theatre is being held simultaneously with the international (NATO) exercises of Saber Strike-2014 and Baltops-2014” (Reuters 2014).

2. Spring Storm was first set off in 2003 but merged into an international exercise with NATO ally participants in 2013.

3. In addition to Saber Strike, military drills like Iron Wolf (2018, 2019) were equally designed to improve allied ability to mobilize forces and reach the target place in a timely fashion.

4. Occasionally, alliance representatives have been quite open about the problems they encountered. For example, after the Baltops 2019 operation in Lithuania, US and Spanish commanders openly complained about “the shallow and largely unmarked coastline, which slowed down amphibious landing operations” (LRT 2019). Afterward, they vowed to scout the Baltic coastline and hand over the information to the relevant military planners. On other occasions, such discovered deficiencies may likely be discussed behind closed doors.

Appendix.

Table

START DATE	EXERCISE NAME	TROOP NUMBERS
09.10.2000	Baltic Eagle 2000	1000
01.06.2001	Baltops 2001	2000
29.08.2001	Amber Hope 2001	2800
10.06.2002	Baltops 2002	3000
02.09.2002	Baltic Eagle 2002	1500
07.06.2003	Baltops 2003	3600
09.06.2003	Amber Hope 2003	2000
07.06.2004	Baltops 2004	5000
03.06.2005	Baltops 2005	4100
06.06.2005	Amber Hope 2005	2000
02.06.2006	Baltops 2006	4000
04.06.2007	Baltops 2007	4500
18.06.2007	Amber Hope 2007	1700
09.06.2008	Baltops 2008	4500
31.05.2009	Baltic Eagle 2009	1100
08.06.2009	Baltops 2009	4500
07.06.2010	Baltops 2010	4500
13.09.2010	Jackal Stone 2010	1100
01.10.2010	Saber Strike 2010	1700
06.06.2011	Baltops 2011	4500
13.06.2011	Amber Hope 2011	2200
18.10.2011	Saber Strike 2011	2000
01.06.2012	Baltops 2012	1000
10.06.2012	Saber Strike 2012	2000
09.05.2013	Spring Storm 2013	4000
07.06.2013	Baltops 2013	1800
03.06.2013	Saber Strike 2013	2000
02.10.2013	Steadfast Jazz 2013	6000
22.06.2014	Black Arrow 2014	1500
09.06.2014	Saber Strike 2014	4700
16.05.2014	Spring Storm 2014	6000
23.05.2014	Namejs 2014	2200
06.06.2014	Baltops 2014	5600
29.09.2014	Silver Arrow 2014	2100
02.09.2014	Steadfast Javelin II	2000
01.11.2014	Iron Sword 2014	2500
21.03.2015	Summer Shield XII 2015	1100
04.05.2015	Spring Storm 2015	6000
08.06.2015	Saber Strike 2015	6000
05.06.2015	Baltops 2015	5600
11.09.2015	Northern Coasts	3300
14.09.2015	Silver Arrow 2015	1000
01.11.2015	Arcade Fusion	1700
09.11.2015	Iron Sword 2015	2000
06.06.2016	Iron Wolf 2016	5000
11.06.2016	Saber Strike 2016 & Dragoon Ride II	10000
02.05.2016	Spring Storm 2016	6000
09.05.2016	Hunter 2016	1200
03.06.2016	Baltops 2016	6100
08.10.2016	Baltic Piranha 2016	1000
17.10.2016	Silver Arrow 2016	3000
20.11.2016	Iron Sword 2016	4000
22.05.2017	Baltops 2017	6000
17.04.2017	Summer Shield XIV	1800
28.06.2017	Saber Strike 2017	11,000
08.05.2017	Spring Storm 2017	9000
11.06.2017	Iron Wolf 2017	5300
11.07.2017	Tobruq Legacy 2017	2200
16.10.2017	Silver Arrow 2017	3500
02.05.2018	Spring Storm – Siil (Hedgehog) 2018	15,000
01.06.2018	Baltops 2018	4700
04.06.2018	Trojan Footprint 2018	2000
01.06.2018	Saber Strike 2018	18,000
20.08.2018	Namejs 2018	10,000
04.11.2018	Iron Wolf 2018	3500
13.05.2019	Summer Shield XVI	1000
29.04.2019	Spring Storm 2019	10,000
24.05.2019	Baltic Protector 2019	3000
10.06.2019	Iron Wolf 2019 I	4000
09.06.2019	Baltops 2019	8000
23.09.2019	Silver Arrow	3000
18.11.2019	Iron Wolf 2019 II	4000