Walking the tightrope: successful management of public and private interests in hybrid state-owned enterprises

ABSTRACT

This work is a cs-QCA study which compares eight Brazilian cases involving conflicts of interests between public and private logics, to determine whether and under what conditions it is possible to manage these conflicts. In three cases, the organization was able to satisfy both public and private interests. This resulted from a set of conditions which cannot be considered in isolation from each other. Based on these results, we develop propositions which can be tested in future studies. This paper contributes to the literatures on stakeholders, institutional pluralism and institutional transitions, and to knowledge about strategic management of hybrid SOEs.

KEYWORDS:

• State-owned enterprises
• hybrid organizations
• institutional pluralism
• stakeholders
• cs-QCA
• multiple case-study

1. Introduction

Hybrid State-Owned Enterprises are a kind of state-owned enterprise (SOE) constituted by mixed public and private capital (Zhou 2018).) Hybrid SOEs are not the same as Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) or social enterprises (SE). Rather, PPPs, SEs and hybrid SOEs constitute distinct types of organizational arrangement (World Bank 2022; Fleta-Asín, Muñoz, and Rosell-Martínez 2020; Powell, Gillet, and Doherty 2019; Nel 2018; Pinz, Roudyani, and Thaler 2017; Hodge and Greve 2017; Brakman Reise 2013; Battilana and Dorado 2010; Law 13.303). Unlike SEs, hybrid SOEs have commercial as well as social goals. Unlike PPPs, they are governed by the decision processes of and implemented by a single organization.

Hybrid SOEs are headquartered in both developing and fully developed economies, are responsible for a considerable amount of international trade and around 10% of world GDP (Zhou 2018; Bruton et al. 2015; Kowalski et al. 2013; Fontes and Picolin 2008; Pereira 2008, 2001). The reasons for the existence of hybrid SOEs are many and varied, as evidenced by Koppell (2007), who identifies such objectives as the accomplishment of policy goals, making a government agency more efficient and effective (by transforming it into a hybrid SOE), providing more business freedom, and escaping from public law, among others. The proportion of government ownership in hybrid SOEs can differ considerably from one company to the other, and it is noteworthy that government ownership does not necessarily mean government control of these companies (Bruton et al. 2015).

In Brazil, hybrid SOEs initially were created as a way to bridge the gap between the roles of the State in the execution of public policies and of private initiative in supplying goods and services for consumption (Pinto 1953). However, economic and commercial aims have emerged also as legitimate purposes (Law 13.303). Government ownership of hybrid SOEs in Brazil can range from more than 99.99% in companies like Nuclear Industries of Brazil (INB, 2022) to less than 50%, as recently approved by law for a new configuration of shares for the Eletrobras Group (Governo Federal 2021, Oct 19). The National Treasury reports the existence of seven hybrid SOEs (mixed-capital joint-stock companies) controlled by the Federal Government, in addition to such companies owned by states and municipalities and companies in which government has either full or minority participation (Tesouro Nacional 2020). Brazilian law determines that government is to be controller of hybrid SOEs, by means of holding the majority of voting shares, unless specific laws enacted to govern isolated cases apply (Law 13.303). Overall, most hybrid SOEs in Brazil are subject to the laws that apply to private stock companies, including minority shareholders participation, governance, transparency and accountability, among others (Lei 13.303; Lei 6.404).

For more than 60 years it has been predicted by Brazilian scholars and specialized journalists that Brazilian hybrid SOEs would not survive, given the conflicting logics and interests to which they must continually respond (see, for example, Cristoni 2014; November 27; Scofano 1997; Pinto 1953). Pinto (1953) introduces what Scott & Meyer (1994) and Battilana and Dorado (2010) later would postulate: that organizations attempting to operate in contexts where the institutional demands and logics of more than one type of institution must be met are inherently unstable and would inevitably succumb to one or the other. As pointed out by Pache and Santos (2010), the public and private constituencies of the institutional context of hybrid SOEs represent diverging and even opposing institutional logics.

Nonetheless, what has been observed in Brazil (and in other countries, as well, as Bruton et al. 2015 have noted) is that hybrid SOEs are alive and thriving. It can thus be inferred that these companies are, somehow, managing to satisfy claims and expectations of the different constituencies in their dual institutional context, held by their public and private stakeholders, respectively.

The question our study sought to answer, therefore, is how can the conflicting interests of the public and private stakeholders of hybrid SOEs be successfully managed?

Differences in the objectives of the public and private spheres of activity have long been identified (Rainey, Backoff, and Levine 1976). Nevertheless, there remains a fuzzy area where it is not easy to determine one from the other (Freeman 2011; Fassin 2008). Recent literature on institutional pluralism and hybrid organizations casts new light on this discussion, identifying a variety of logics that can underpin the actions taken by different societal institutions.

Kraatz and Block (2008) have defined institutional pluralism as the situation faced by organizations that operate in multiple institutional environments. Each of these institutions has its own central logic, which may differ and even conflict from one institution to another. Hybrid SOEs are embedded in the institutional environments of both the capitalistic market and the bureaucratic state (Friedland and Alford 1991). While recent research maintains that organizations in general are subjected to conditions of institutional pluralism and complexity (Besharov and Smith 2014; Pache and Santos 2017), we argue that hybrid SOEs represent an extreme case of organizations embedded in pluralistic environments for the long term.

Peng (2003) has drawn attention to the fact that the literature on strategic choice has focused principally on decisions made by firms in the context of relatively stable institutional environments. He points out that in emerging economies, such as those in Latin America, among others, the overall institutional context, rather than stable, is itself undergoing transition. The institutional context in Brazil has been marked by changes since the 1970’s, resulting from economic and technological transformations. Depending upon the government in power, these have often included neoliberal approaches to public management, but have also involved the social, political and economic realms (Borinelli and Neto 2011).

Peng (2003) affirms that in the course of such institutional transitions, practices oriented to individualism, market competition and rule-based, arm’s length transactions are introduced, coexisting with and eventually, perhaps, replacing former interpersonal and interorganizational relationship-based exchanges. This institutional transition involves a cultural transformation provoked, at least in part, by the increasing exposure of developing economies to international markets and, thus, to their institutions (Graffney et al. 2014). Zheng, Singh, and Chung (2017) cite economic growth, deregulation and privatization among the drivers of institutional transition. It is in this kind of context of institutional transition that the cases presented here have taken place.

Stakeholder theory offers relevant research and insights with respect to the management of the conflicts that can arise among the various stakeholders of an organization (e.g. Bondy and Charles 2018; Fassin 2008; Mitchell, Agle, and Wood 1997). Hybrid SOEs must constantly deal with tensions between the objectives of their shareholders (government and private investors, respectively) in addition to those noted in purely private organizations (Shapiro 2005). If the hybrid SOE were to carry out public policy objectives to the detriment of the objectives of its private shareholders, these might withdraw their support. If, over time, one set of interests (public or private) were to prevail over the other, the hybrid SOE would lose its fundamental hybrid characteristic and could be transformed into another type of organization (Battilana and Dorado 2010; Scott and Meyer 1991; Pinto 1953). Why has this not happened?

In the following sections, we present the theoretical framework, the methods and the principal results of our study, offering a number of propositions that can be tested by researchers and managers.

This paper contributes to both theory and practice. The findings of this study help in understanding how organizations, in general, deal with conflicting institutional pressures, and which aspects of their strategy and their internal and external contexts can enhance the chances of favourable outcomes. We suggest that the conflict between public and private institutional logics observed in Brazilian hybrid SOEs reflect the pressures arising from the on-going process of institutional transition towards arm’s length transaction structures (Peng 2003); and we demonstrate not only that the balancing of diverging-logic interests is possible but also under which circumstances it can occur.

Drawing from eight real cases found in three large Brazilian hybrid SOEs operating in diverse sectors, we offer an explanation for success in balancing the conflicting interests of public and private stakeholders, and also suggest reproducible strategies that may enhance chances of success in managing these conflicts, of potential interest to management practitioners and scholars alike. In this study, we provide evidence that greater exposition to and adoption of private (market-supporting) institutional values, structures and rites augment chances of success in balancing private and public interests in hybrid SOEs. Contributing to theory, our paper offers support for an approach to stakeholder management that seeks the conjoining of demands arising from institutional pluralism, taking into consideration the dominant institutional logics that underly these stakeholder demands. We also provide grounds for re-evaluation of the question of whether stakeholder salience should always be treated as determinant in stakeholder management (Mitchell, Agle, and Wood 1997). Methodologically, our paper contributes by focusing on the complex and relatively unstudied strategic problem of balancing stakeholder interests in hybrid organizations through the lenses of Pettigrew’s (1985) framework of context, process, and content, while using Qualitative-Comparative-Analysis (QCA) to categorize and understand how the repetition and/or variation of context, process and content conditions affect outcomes across the cases investigated.

This work is also novel in the sense that it offers insights on the reasons why hybrid SOEs – an important but understudied class of firms in global and intra-national economies (Bruton et al. 2015) - are still thriving, contrary to predictions. We propose that the findings of our study are applicable to hybrid SOEs operating in similar institutional contexts.

This paper is divided in five sections, of which this is the first. The second presents the theoretical framework orienting our study, the third contains the description and details of the methods that we employed, the fourth presents the findings and respective discussions and, finally, the fifth section presents the conclusions.

2. Theoretical framework

In this section we examine how stakeholder and institutional theories treat conflicts of stakeholder interests and how these theories conceptualize the management of these conflicts in order to achieve balance of the respective interests involved, considering institutional pluralism.

Our literature review revealed no studies on conflicts of interests in hybrid SOEs from the viewpoint of plural institutional logics. We found a few studies regarding stakeholder interests in SOEs (eg.: Wasowska and Postula 2018; Mbo and Adjasi 2017; Roper and Schoenberger-Orgad 2011; Astami et al. 2010; Arens and Brouthers 2001; Cauley, Cornes, and Sandler 1999), but no works that deal with the issue of public and private stakeholder conflicts in stakeholder management. However, we found that Schwarzmüller et al. (2017) in their study classified stakeholders dichotomously in terms of their rent-seeking or non-rent-seeking interests, which strategy we employed in our study.

2.1. Conflicting stakeholder interests

As Kujala, Heikkinen, and Lehtimäki (2012, 53) have pointed out, ‘stakeholders have interests, and they mobilize to influence companies to protect these interests’. Harrington (1996) notes that the interests of different stakeholders can compete or conflict; and the firm may be unable to satisfy every one of these demands (Mitchell, Agle, and Wood 1997). This web of conflicting interests and unmet demands can jeopardize the firm (Kujala, Heikkinen, and Lehtimäki 2012; Oliver 1991), resulting in reputational penalties and loss of legitimacy (Haase 2019; Love and Kraatz 2016). Best, Moffet & McAdam (2019, p.4) observe that ‘public services are typically more complex, encompassing a broader range of stakeholders [… and] the need for public sector organizations to meet the multiple and often divergent stakeholder interests […] has accelerated’, and it seems also the case with hybrid SOEs, due to their partly public nature. Scholars have been considering the balancing of stakeholder needs to be a strategic concern (Scholz 2019; Bondy and Charles 2018; Fassin 2012, 2010; 2009; 2008; Mitchell, Agle, and Wood 1997).

In general, studies on stakeholder interests have dealt with the question of their identification and prioritization (as in Mitchell, Agle, and Wood 1997, for example); and this was deemed a ‘central question’ by Parent and Deephouse (2007, 1). Freeman et al. (2010), however, argued that stakeholders and their interests should ultimately be conciliated, rather than merely traded-off. Given the fact that hybrid SOEs could have to, on occasion, trade-off interests of their public and private stakeholders, it is to be expected that their efficiency would plunge, due to the increased use of resources to satisfy these conflicting demands. The unexpected prosperity of hybrid SOEs could mean that conciliation of such interests rather than trade-off may be occurring.

2.2. Prioritizing vs. conjoining interests of stakeholders

Studies have focused on how to identify and appropriately assign priorities in the relationships with the stakeholders of an organization (e.g. Mitchell, Agle, and Wood 1997; Clarkson 1995; Freeman 1984; Freeman and Reed 1983), or on how CEOs prioritize stakeholders in management (Bondy and Charles 2018; Schwarzmüller et al. 2017). Harrison and Wicks (2013) observed that the literature in this sense has an economic bias and, thus, focuses on the asymmetries in appropriation of the organization’s resources by stakeholders. Mitchell, Agle, and Wood (1997), accepting such imbalances as inherent in the prioritization of stakeholder demands, prescribed asymmetrical treatment in stakeholder management, with the objective of obtaining the best return for the firm.

Refinements have been introduced in how stakeholders can be classified in terms of their relationship and relevance to the firm (Fassin 2012, 2008); but problems related to prioritizing key stakeholders continue to be an object of discussion (Bondy and Charles 2018; Fassin 2012; Kujala, Heikkinen, and Lehtimäki 2012; Parent and Deephouse 2007). Several studies have shown that the power wielded by stakeholders, particularly economic power, influences stakeholder prioritization and management (Bondy and Charles 2018; Fassin 2012; 2009; Miles and Mangold 2014; Parent and Deephouse 2007). This may, however, be short-sighted, because determining the respective saliences of stakeholders is not an easy task, nor is salience a fixed quality. Rather, it is dynamic and complex (Bondy and Charles 2018; Blanco-Mesa, Gil-Lafuente, and Merigó 2018; Văduva et al. 2016; Solaimani, Guldemond, and Bouwman 2013; Kujala, Heikkinen, and Lehtimäki 2012; Freeman et al. 2010). This is a particularly sensitive issue in the case of hybrid SOEs having the government as controller, because it is supposed that this stakeholder is the most salient (Bruton et al. 2015) due to its power. If power alone is defined as the major criterion for prioritizing stakeholders, the demands of government would thus always be prioritized, to the dissatisfaction of private stakeholders and unforeseen consequences for the firm.

Firms may establish and prioritize relationships with their stakeholders based on limited and asymmetrical information and, in doing so, may put the legitimacy of the firm at risk (Haase 2019; Love and Kraatz 2016; Verhezen 2015). Rather than prioritizing stakeholders in order to manage overwhelming or conflicting stakeholder demands, Freeman et al. (2010, 27) suggest seeking to conjoin these interests. Harrison and Wicks (2013) point out that companies doing so tend to perform better, while O’Riordan (2017, 417) argues that ‘connecting the various stakeholder interests leads to greater value creation for all groups’. In hybrid SOEs, neglecting to satisfy a relevant stakeholder, whether representative of either public or private institutional logic can be disastrous, because the legitimacy of these firms is derived from and driven by their mixed-nature (Kraatz and Block 2008). Hence, to prioritize the demands of one type of stakeholder and ignore those of the other means ignoring the very reasons for the existence of a hybrid SOE.

For Campbell (2007), the way a firm treats its shareholder and non-shareholder stakeholders depends on the institutional environment in which it operates. These institutions can be political, cultural or others, and the context of the firm (Pettigrew 1985) serves to mediate the influence of certain groups of stakeholders on the outcomes of management decisions. Companies tend to favour rent-seeking or non-rent-seeking logics in accord with the influences of their institutional context (Campbell 2007), and this is of special concern to hybrid SOEs, because usually there are public (considered to be non-rent-seeking) and private (considered to be rent-seeking) institutional logics pressing on the behaviours of their public and private stakeholders, respectively.

It is thus highly relevant in the investigation of how hybrid SOEs deal with conflicting stakeholder interests to consider the ways in which companies deal with pressures from the institutional environment. For that reason, we turn next to the institutional literature to look at the question of institutional pluralism, conflicting institutional logics, institutional transitions and strategies for dealing with institutional pressures.

2.3. Institutional pluralism, conflicting institutional logics and institutional transition

Kraatz and Block (2008) argue that institutional theory is limited in its ability to deal with the complexities that confront organizations that operate in contexts of institutional plurality, which they define as

… the situation faced by an organization that operates within multiple institutional spheres … . Such an organization is subject to multiple regulatory regimes, embedded within multiple normative orders, and/or constituted by more than one cultural logic […]. It thus possesses multiple, institutionally derived identities which are conferred upon it by different segments of its pluralistic environment […]. Because the pluralistic organization is a unit of multiple institutional systems, its internal functioning reflects the contradictions between the larger systems themselves”. (Kraatz and Block 2008, 243)

Hybrid SOEs can be seen as a special case of what Kraatz and Block (2008) depicted as organizations operating in multiple institutional logics. Their mixed public and private capital, representing interests from divergent stakeholders, also embodies at least two different societal institutions.

Friedland and Alford (1991) identified five core institutions of society – the capitalist market, the bureaucratic state, families, democracy, and religion – and suggested that each of these operates with its own central logic. Thornton, Ocasi, and Lounsbury (2012) excluded democracy and added community, profession and corporation to this list. Given the make-up of hybrid SOEs, we initially considered the logics of state and market to be of more direct relevance to our study. As summarized by Thomann, Lieberherr, and Ingold (2016), state logic emphasizes legality, equity, security and correctness, while market logic emphasizes profit, performance, competition, effectiveness and efficiency. Pache and Santos (2017) found that hybrid organizations had to conciliate institutional pressures from commercial logic and social welfare logic. With commercial logic what is rewarded are efficiency and control and the goal is to produce and sell goods or services for a profit. From the point of view of the social welfare logic, the predominant goal is addressing social needs. Economic returns are, thus, a means for pursuing the social goal desired. The pluralism of institutions in a society and the relationships among them is studied, as well, in the literature on institutional transitions (Zheng, Singh, and Chung 2017; Graffney et al. 2014; Gaur and Delios 2006; Peng 2003), which depicts institutions as dynamic and capable of changing over time. These authors argue that the emerging economies of the late 20^th and early 21^st centuries offer a privileged field for observation of how institutional transitions occur and the strategic choices of firms that operate in contexts of institutional transition. Exposure to technological development and international trade and financial markets is bringing firms in emerging countries – where institutionalized transaction structures tend to be ‘relation-based, personalized exchanges that involve the need (and costs) to build strong social networks’ and to rely on informal social controls rather than on impersonal, third-party enforcement (Peng 2003, 279) – in contact with foreign firms and investors accustomed to working within ‘arm’s length’ transaction structures which rely on impersonal, third-party enforcement of laws and regulations (Graffney et al. 2014; Peng 2003).

Zhou and Peng (2010) argue that the three core pillars of an arm’s-length institutional framework are laws and regulations that (1) encourage market competition, (2) reduce information problems with respect to corporate and product disclosures and certifications, and (3) enhance legal effectiveness, with particular attention to property laws and contract laws.

In our view, the institutional transitions literature and the institutional logics literature are congruent and mutually enriching. The first places primary emphasis on the institutional structures that govern exchange, while the second focuses on the logics that underpin these structures. Both state and market institutional logics can be seen to underpin arm’s-length, market-supporting institutional arrangements, while relation-based transactions appear to be supported by an underlying family logic. Strategies for dealing with institutional pressures

As noted by Kraatz and Block (2008) and Pache and Santos (2010; 2017), the institutional literature has identified a number of strategies that can be used in dealing with institutional demands, such as loose coupling (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Orton and Weick 1990; Weick 1976) and the typology developed by Oliver (1991). Oliver’s (1991) typology identifies a variety of strategic responses to institutional pressures: acquiesce, compromise, avoid, defy, and manipulate. This typology continues to attract the attention of researchers (e.g. Clemens and Douglas 2005; Kraatz and Block 2008; Pache and Santos 2010; Pache and Santos 2017). Kraatz and Block (2008), suggest four possible ways of responding to disparate institutional demands: (1) a ‘delete’ strategy: challenging the validity of the external claims or the legitimacy of those making the claims or otherwise attempt to coopt, marginalize or escape their influence; (2) a ‘decoupling’ strategy, which involves compartmentalization of the different relationships, attending separately to the respective claimants; (3) ‘balancing’, or seeking trade-offs or cooperative solutions, thus treating as a single strategy what are treated in stakeholder theory as two ways of managing stakeholder demands; and (4) development by the organization of its own identity, becoming an institution itself. Oliver’s (1991) also points to balancing as a possible strategic response to institutional processes, including it as a tactic of the Compromise strategy that involves ‘balancing the expectations of multiple constituents’ (Oliver 1991, 152).

Pache and Santos (2017) identified a strategy of selective coupling by organizations that habitually operate in multiple institutional environments. They found that ‘hybrid organizations combine competing logics in a systemic fashion by selectively coupling, at the organizational level, intact elements’ from the logics of each of the institutional environments in which they operate (Pache and Santos 2017, 973).

In our study, we used the typology proposed by Oliver’s (1991) for analysis of the strategies employed by SOEs for management of differing stakeholder interests and demands and the definition of ‘balancing’ proposed by Kraatz and Block (2008), which includes strategies for conjoining of interests as well as strategies for trade-off.

Thus, the literatures of both stakeholder and institutional theories provide elements for analysing the conflicting demands of multiple stakeholders representing different institutional logics; and strategies for dealing with institutional pressures can also be used to analyse the ways in which hybrid SOEs are approaching the demands from their public and private stakeholders.

3. Methods

In this multiple-case study (Yin 2014), 8 cases were compared, using crisp set Qualitative Comparative Analysis – QCA (Ragin 2014). QCA methods are intended to maintain as much as possible of the richness of the phenomena while introducing an element of generalizability. (Flick 2014; Ragin 2014; Breiger 2009; Rihoux and Lobe 2009).

The QCA methodology is appropriate when the number of cases is in the small to intermediate range (5–50 cases), and this method must not be mistaken for a quantitative approach. Thus, usual stochastic parameters are not considered when employing QCA (Ragin 2014). The premises of and resources available for our study led us to opt for the csQCA method. Table 3 and Appendices E and E provide further, detailed information on how we employed the csQCA method in this study.

Table 1. Number of interviews and hierarchical level of interviewees.

Position	Interviewees	Interviews
Top-Level Management (current and former)	11	11
Middle Management in Strategic Areas	6	7
Advising/Consulting/Analysing	6	6
Public stakeholders (ministry level)	2	2
Private stakeholders (attorneys of minority shareholders)	2	2
Total	27	28

Table 2. Number of specialized media reports subjected to in-depth analysis.

Organization	First Cycle	Second Cycle (case-specific)	Total
Bank of Brazil (BB)	29	33 (FIES: 9; BP: 15; CREDAGRI: 9)	62
Eletrobras	40	19 (MP579: 10; FEDDIST: 9)	59
Petrobras	38	22 (GASCONG: 8; IPOBR: 5; PRECODD: 9)	60
Total	107	74	181

Table 3. Values attributed to variables (columns) in the respective cases (rows)^.a,b.

Case	INST_EFIC	STK_PUB	STK_PRIV	BALANC	EST_SOC	OBS_SUCES
FIES	1	1	0	1	1	1
BP	1	0	0	1	1	0
CREDAGRI	1	1	0	1	1	1
MP579	0	1	1	0	1	0
FEDDIST	0	1	0	0	1	0
GASCONG	0	1	1	0	1	0
IPOBR	1	0	0	1	0	1
PRECODD	1	0	0	0	0	0

a The cases, variables and their labels are found in Tables 3 and 4, respectively.

b Cases in which the company was able to at least minimally satisfy public and private stakeholders are shown in italic.

In order to untangle the complexities in the cases studied, we adopted the approach used by Pettigrew’s (1985) for analysing organizational change, focusing on context (internal and external), process and content (Pettigrew 1985, 1987). As discussed in more detail in Appendix E, our analysis considers these three dimensions as contributing to the outcomes of the cases observed and to comprehension of the phenomena involved. Both institutional and stakeholder theories highlight the influence of context on organizational decision-making (Phillips et al. 2019).

3.1. Selection of cases and research process

In this multiple-case study, eight cases were compared, using csQCA. Data was obtained from and about three Brazilian hybrid SOEs in the form of interviews, specialized media reports and information made public by the companies and relevant government agencies. We used the provision of Brazilian Law 13.303 as the criteria for choosing the companies from which we would select the eight cases for our study. This cut-off contrasts substantially with the criteria used by Bruton et al. (2015), who included in their study even firms with a virtually non-existent participation of public capital in their shares, like Vale and Embraer (Bruton et al. 2015, 101), and thus unlikely to produce decision situations suitable to the goals of our study.

As detailed below and in Appendix E, we conducted two cycles of data collection, condensation, analysis and exhibition (Miles, Huberman, and Saldanha 2013).

To select the hybrid SOEs to be investigated, we used the following criteria: (1) relevance in terms both of public interests and of economic interests; (2) size (annual gross operating revenue equal to or greater than R$ 90 million – about US$ 17 million); (3) variety of economic sectors represented; and (4) controlling ownership by the Brazilian Federal Government. We considered the guidelines for selection of cases from Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) aimed at theory building studies. On the basis of these criteria, we selected the following hybrid SOEs for further investigation: Bank of Brazil (BB), from the financial sector; Eletrobras, from the electric power sector (generation and distribution); and Petrobras, from the petroleum extraction and distribution sector.

The number of cases was defined considering csQCA requirements (Ragin 2014; Rihoux and Lobe 2009), disconsidering the criticism of Marx and Dusa (2011) regarding the minimum number of cases for QCA studies, as our interest was in preserving the qualitative aspect of QCA, rather than a merely quantitative sampling (Ragin 2014). The specific cases for study − 3 from Bank of Brazil (BB), 2 from Eletrobras, and 3 from Petrobras – were selected because results of the first cycle of data collection and analysis revealed that they involved differing public and private interests and institutional logics. The cases selected are presented in Appendix A.

3.2. Data collection and analysis

Data was obtained from semi-structured interviews, specialized media reports and information made public on their respective internet sites by the companies chosen for study and by the government agency responsible for the coordination and governance of Brazilian SOEs.

We interviewed 13 people from BB, six from Eletrobras, and eight from Petrobras − 27 interviewees and 28 interviews. These took place between February 2017 and May 2018, in person when possible or by telephone. All interviews were conducted in Portuguese, from which we translated to English only the excerpts used in this paper. Translations were cross-checked, one of the authors being a native English-speaker and the other a native Portuguese-speaker, and both authors fluent in both languages.

In particular, we sought experienced top-level management and technical personnel who served the governing boards of the hybrid SOEs of interest. In addition, we interviewed people from relevant federal government ministries, and attorneys representing private stakeholders. We concluded the interviewing process when we had identified a sufficient number of cases for our research purposes and data saturation had been reached (Eisenhardt 1989).

The number of interviewees and their hierarchical levels are shown in Table 1, and further information on interviewee selection is given in Appendix E.

In addition to interviews and media reports, we used documents and information made available by the respective companies on their websites, and data with respect to those companies available on the website of the agency of the federal government then responsible for coordination and governance of SOEs (Bowen 2009). This information was used in the analysis of the internal and external contexts of the eight cases with respect to the companies’ respective financial situations, strategic directions, approach to stakeholders, board composition, governance structure and policies, and the like. Articles from the specialized media were another source of information in both the first and second cycles of analysis, as shown in Table 2. More detailed information on these sources and on the processes of data collection, coding and analysis are provided in Appendix E.

During the second cycle of data collection and analysis we attributed values to six variables, five independent and one dependent, developed during the first cycle, using data collected in both the first and second cycles. A value of 1 was attributed if the variable was present in the case, while a value of 0 was attributed if it was absent. The independent variables were: institutionalization of market-supporting structures, practices and discourses, salience of private stakeholders, salience of the public stakeholder, nature of the objective sought, and use of active strategies to balance public/private interests. The dependent variable was the satisfaction, at least minimally, of both public and private stakeholder demands. In addition, we identified the respective public and private interests involved in each case, the strategies used to deal with them and the outcomes for the hybrid SOE. The interests identified are shown in Appendix C. The values attributed are shown in Table 3 and were input into the software Tosmana for processing.

Analysis of the truth table produced by Tosmana, and reproduced in Appendix F, revealed no logical contradictions. This, according to Ragin (2014), is evidence of the adequacy of the theoretical model used to guide the research, although this fact alone cannot be used to make a final statement in this regard (Marx and Dusa 2011).

In the following section we discuss our findings and develop propositions based on these findings that can be tested in further research.

4. Results and discussion

The final formula resulting from the csQCA analysis described in the previous section is as follows:

$\text{INST}\_\text{EFIC*\hspace{0.17em}stk}\_\text{priv*\hspace{0.17em}BALANC*\hspace{0.17em}EST}\_\text{SOC+INST}\_\text{EFIC*\hspace{0.17em}stk}\_\text{pub*\hspace{0.17em}stk}\_\text{priv*\hspace{0.17em}BALANC}$

This final formula can thus be read as follows:

Satisfaction, at least minimally, of both public and private stakeholder interests in hybrid SOEs is the result of institutionalization within the company of market values, structures and practices AND the absence of salience on the part of private stakeholders AND the active use of balancing strategies by company managers AND the presence of a social/public objective OR it is the result of institutionalization within the company of market values, structures and practices AND absence of salience on the part of the public stakeholder AND absence of salience of private stakeholders AND active use of balancing strategies by company managers.

In the first combination of variables leading to the outcome, salience of the public stakeholder is shown to be irrelevant when the objective sought is social/public in nature. In this path, whatever the salience of the public stakeholder, the absence of salience on the part of private stakeholders is necessary. Strong manifestation of external pressures in favour of determined actions were more frequently observed as originating from the public stakeholder, seen as salient in five of the eight cases studied. For their part, private investors were observed to act primarily as evaluators and critics of the demands made by the controlling shareholder (government) and of the actions taken by the company. They tended to flex their muscles only when initiatives originating from the government or from the company itself were perceived as being contrary to their interests. This was most likely to occur when the objective of the action was perceived as not conforming to market logic. An example of this, seen in the MP579¹ case and reported in the specialized media, is the following:

Moreover, one of Eletrobras’ major individual shareholders […] will ask CVM [the body that regulates capital markets in Brazil] that the controller [federal government] not vote on the renewal of the concessions [… because] complying with Provisional Measure 579 means that Eletrobras accepts reducing, by more than half, the billions in credits receivable owed it by the Union [federal government]. ‘This is an evident situation of conflict’, he evaluates. (Ragazzi and Schüffner 2012 Nov 26)

The question of salience, however, cannot be considered in isolation. The internalization of market-oriented values, structures and practices (not merely discourses) by the firm is also a necessary condition for successful satisfaction of both public and private interests, as is its active pursuit of strategies for balancing these interests. Without the presence of both these conditions in conjunction with the absence of salience of the private stakeholders, satisfaction of both sets of interests does not occur when the objective pursued is not an economic one.

Unsurprisingly, the existence and use of market structures and practices by SOEs was found to be of importance to private investors, providing assurance that their interests will not be neglected, even when the objective pursued is social or public in nature. The lack of these mechanisms sends a different signal, as pointed out by Interviewee 13, a former high-level manager in the context of discussion of the MP579 case that had an unsuccessful outcome:

So, people were put in, without the slightest notion of management, without accountability, without governance, without a business plan … What is the future plan? Do I want to give a return [on investments] of 8%? There is no such thing! (Interviewee 13)

A similar view was expressed by a major private investor who has holdings in at least one of the companies whose cases were studied. This individual’s view of the importance of solid governance practices was clear:

Publicly traded private companies have improved a lot, looking out for compliance and with the presence of independent people on the boards. But as for the state-owned companies – which shouldn’t even exist – it’s still a farce. The State should not be a manager (Valenti 2016, Mar 23).

Kraatz and Block (2008) suggested that organizations that operate in a context of plural institutional logics may have the need to pay even more attention to governance than other organizations. Our research data corroborate the importance of the existence of and adherence to governance policies in such contexts. Even if such structures and values are in place, however, the active use of balancing strategies by company management is also necessary. Interviewee 6, currently a high-ranking staff member of BB, spoke as follows about the efforts of management to pursue strategies that would balance the interests of both Government and private investors in the FIES case:

So, all the difficulties we went through with FIES, and there were a lot, you know, involving practically the entire Bank to help us find a way. Never to … to bury [the program], but to find a way [to make it work for us]. (Interviewee 6).

Equally important, the evidence points to the necessity for companies to actively pursue strategies for balancing interests with the objective of truly seeking at least minimal satisfaction of the demands of the private stakeholders. It is perceptible in the MP579 and BP cases that attempts were made to placate private investors by means of a posteriori reparatory measure, some of them merely formal in nature. We observed, however, that when the objective sought was essentially contrary to the interests of private stakeholders, such actions were perceived negatively by those stakeholders, leading to loss of the company’s legitimacy, as suggested by Meyer and Rowan (1977). An example of this is given by Interviewee 15, a former high-ranking staff member of the Ministry for Mining and Energy, with respect to the attempt to neutralize the negative consequences of a decision that favoured government interests in disregard of those of other stakeholders in the MP579 case:

[…] for the consumer, all well and good, because it did away with the cost of the subsidy [for depreciation and amortization costs] and eliminated it from the cost of energy. […] And what happened? […] The consumer began paying only the cost of operations and maintenance to those who stayed with the concession, who renewed the concession, which was around 30% or less. […] The companies that had been making some money lost a huge amount of revenue. […] it left the company financially unbalanced. (Interviewee 15).

Based on these observations, we developed the following propositions:

Proposition 1 (P1)

: satisfaction of the interests of both public and private stakeholders when the action proposed by/for a hybrid SOE is not primarily guided by market logic requires the existence of institutionalization within the company of market values, structures and practices and the use of active balancing strategies by company managers.

Proposition 2 (P2)

: salience of private stakeholders tends to not occur when the hybrid SOE has institutionalized market values, structure and practices and uses balancing strategies that are not mere formalities.

Proposition 3 (P3)

: salience of the public stakeholder does not impact satisfaction of the interests of both public and private stakeholders when private stakeholders are non-salient, the company has institutionalized market values, structures, and practices and actively pursues strategies for balancing public and private interests.

In this regard, we understand the use of balancing strategies to include not making policy decisions that are openly contrary to the interests of the stakeholders involved, in the first place. Our data suggest that such initial decisions render ineffectual any strategies later undertaken to soften their effects, thus characterizing such strategies as mere formalities. In addition, we observed that successful strategies for balancing public and private interests addressed the essence of those interests rather than merely giving the appearance of doing so or of attempting to provide only peripheral and short-lived compensations or even to disguise the decision taken to make it appear better to the stakeholders whose interests are harmed.

Noteworthy is the fact that balancing may require not only reminding the public stakeholder of the importance of the private interests at stake but also convincing private stakeholders of the importance of the social interests in the situation. The evidence suggests that hybrid SOEs cannot distance themselves from either public or private institutional logic without loss of legitimacy.

Importantly, our findings also reveal that the question of salience cannot be treated as an isolated factor or as the only relevant condition for successful management of the interests of both public and private stakeholders. In fact, decisions taken that observe only the salience of a given stakeholder at the moment of decision can lead to disastrous results for the company, as can be seen in the MP579 case. Here government, at the time of decision, was undoubtedly the salient stakeholder. Eletrobras’s decision to yield to pressures from this powerful stakeholder, with no attention to other necessary conditions, resulted in severe financial losses and damage to the company’s credibility. Salience may even be irrelevant, depending on the presence or absence of other conditions.

Salience of a powerful stakeholder can be moderated by the institutional environment and the company’s own legitimacy. For example, in the MP579 case, the pressures of the government on Eletrobras were counteracted by strong salience of private stakeholders and, even though the government’s demands prevailed, it was not without heavy damage to its reputation. Also, we observed that companies with a higher level of legitimacy and self-institutionalization (Kraatz and Block 2008) are able to face demands of salient stakeholders with less tendency to simply acquiesce.

Similarly, by itself the adherence to market practices by the company is not sufficient for satisfaction of both public and private stakeholder interests, nor is the isolated pursuit of active balancing strategies. Success in satisfying the interests of both public and private stakeholders in hybrid SOEs is a complex phenomenon that involves the objective sought (content of the decision) and the process of conciliation of these interests, in conjunction with conditions in the internal and external organizational contexts.

In support of our understanding that the satisfaction of the interests of public and private stakeholders in a given situation is a product of the specific context, content and process (Pettigrew 1985), we compare the GASCONG and PRECODD cases. In neither of these cases did Petrobras, the hybrid SOE involved, succeed in satisfying both public and private stakeholder interests; and in both cases the company’s pricing policy for gasoline was at issue, although with important differences in terms of the orientation and substance of that policy. In the first case, the decision taken was to freeze prices in the domestic market, complying with government’s pressures, which has been long displeasing shareholders and other private players. In the second, it was decided to let prices fluctuate freely in accordance with prices on the international market, complying with shareholders’ pressures. However, the outcome was disastrous for public interests, due to the impact of the rapid escalation of fuel prices on the trucking industry.

The GASCONG and PRECODD cases also serve to illustrate another finding of this study. As in the MP579 case, they reveal that decisions made solely to satisfy a given stakeholder without reference to other necessary conditions, will not balance public and private stakeholder interests. In addition, the PRECODD case instantiates the fact that stakeholder salience is a dynamic rather than fixed quality. In this case a dormant – albeit powerful – private stakeholder (the trucking industry) became salient and plunged the country into a state of near-chaos. It was necessary for Petrobras, in accordance to the request of government, to roll back this decision.

Criticisms both of stakeholder theory and of institutional theory, particularly neo-institutional theory, point to their assumption of limited capability on the part of organizations and their managements to proactively interact with and influence their environments (Kraatz and Block 2008; Pache and Santos 2010, 2017; Stinchcombe 1997). The evidence of our study clearly shows that satisfaction of public and private stakeholder interests depends as much upon factors that are under direct control of the organization, in its internal context (i.e. the policy decisions it elects to pursue, the strategies it adopts to conciliate the interests involved) - as seen in the FIES, CREDAGRI and IPOBR cases – as it does on external factors over which it has little or no influence. In all of the successful cases in our study, company management proactively sought to influence the context. Some examples of such efforts are excerpted below.

[… We have a relationship with] technical assistance companies … rural extension [agencies] … We are in contact with … Embrapa [a government-owned company that undertakes research and technological innovation for Brazilian agriculture] … We have contact […] with various actors, who represent these entities nationally [… like] cooperatives […], Government […], producers, […] Conab [a government agency for food supply], […] banks … but mainly listening to small producers […] through their unions, associations … (Interviewee 5, CREDAGRI case).

The main point of the restructuring [of BR Distribuidora, in the IPOBR case] had to do with the minority shareholders, who will have more power in the new model of the company. […] minority shareholders will have veto powers in certain matters. […] the restructuring had the objective of making BR Distribuidora’s governance more stock-market friendly (Rocha, Polito, and Ramalho 2017 Sep 6).

[…] student funding in Brazil was a very bad business at that time … and then, [the government said:] ‘We are going to change FIES and we are going to put Banco do Brasil to do this’. We said: ‘Great! But we have costs!’ […], right? we’re encouraging new doctors, new lawyers, new engineers … ’ right? In theory I gain a client almost for free, right? and I get paid for it! And the best: […] you stay with that client for at least twenty years! (Interviewee 4 on FIES case).

We caution, however, that even when it occurs in conjunction with the other conditions of the configuration for a satisfactory outcome, successful use of proactivity requires adequate reading and understanding of the organizational context and the choice of strategies appropriate for that context. Given the problem of asymmetry of information (Kulkarni 2000; Waterman and Meier 1998; Jensen and Meckling 1976) and the unpredictability of events, the company may not always be able to correctly interpret the situation in which it finds itself. This was seen in the PRECODD case, for example, where the organization proactively took measures to satisfy the interests of its private stakeholder investors but conditions in the broader context led to frustration of both the public and private interests at stake.

Importantly, some hybrid SOEs seemed better able than others to withstand stakeholder demands which were harmful to the opposite institutional logic. The Bank of Brazil (BB), for example, operates in a highly competitive sector, the financial market, and is exposed to strong regulation in both the national and international contexts. Our data suggest that, congruent with the predictions of the literature on institutional transitions, this exposition to the private and highly-regulated banking environment led the company to develop governance mechanisms more tailored to meet multiple institutional logics. Interviewee 26, from BB, gives evidence of this process:

[…] […] and that is the importance of corporate governance as a bulwark … you establish pricing policies … and approve this at your highest level of governance, in addition to meeting requirements and norms […] or the regulator, the Central Bank. That involve, for example, not working with products and services that generate a negative [profit] margin. So, all the time we say to the controller [government], we do not refrain from doing any kind of business with the government as long as it does not damage our policy […] (Interviewee 26).

Conversely, we observed a lack of ability to resist external pressures on the part of the companies in the FEDDIST and GASCONG cases – Eletrobras and Petrobras, respectively – which took place prior to the major reformations undertaken with respect to SOE in Brazil. In these companies, the adoption of and adherence to market logics and institutions and participation by private stakeholders were relatively low before these changes, which made it difficult for hybrid SOEs to resist pressures from their controlling shareholder (government) to steer strategic decisions in a direction contrary to the interests of private stakeholders. We therefore propose:

Proposition 4 (P4): Without institutionalization of market structures and practices of governance, satisfaction of both public and private interests does not occur.

The evidence of our study suggests that business firms in Brazil, including hybrid SOEs, are operating in a context of institutional transition like that described by Peng (2003). Since at least the 1990s, technological change, the opening of markets to foreign competition, deregulation, and increasing involvement with international financial markets have been increasing pressures, both direct and indirect, for greater use of arm’s-length, market-supporting institutional structures for business transactions. Direct efforts to influence such changes occur when foreign and domestic private investors, customers, regulatory agencies and so on, press companies to adhere to market-supporting standards, regulations and practices. These pressures can affect the individual level, as well (e.g. the requirement for professional certification), as proposed by Graffney et al. (2014).

More indirectly, exposure of national business firms to foreign institutions through trade, investment, competition with multinational companies, as well as to foreign culture (through films, cable news. TV series, and so on), as suggested by Graffney et al. (2014) also provides an awareness of and certain pressure to conform to norms of behaviour accepted internationally as legitimate. The hybrid-SOEs studied, like other Brazilian firms, have been confronted with these pressures for institutional transition. We could observe that the results of the eight cases in our study were consistent with the level of experience and expertise of the respective hybrid SOE in dealing with market-oriented institutional forces. For example, as seen in Appendix D. the process of exposure to foreign markets of the Bank of Brazil began in the 19^th century, while that of Petrobras and Eletrobras (which are younger companies, although both are decades old) began much later, and initially, due to the inherently oligopolistic nature of their activities (petroleum and electric energy, respectively), in circumstances in which competition was limited or absent. None of the three firms has ever been dependent on its international presence. We therefore argue that a firm’s level of exposure to and experience in dealing with international market-oriented structures and logics contributes to the ability of its management to understand these logics and adopt structures and practices supportive of arm’s-length transactions, contributing, in turn, to their ability to successfully satisfy the interests of both public and private stakeholders.

As discussed earlier, the literatures on institutional transitions and plural institutional logics are congruent and mutually enriching, the first dealing with how new institutional structures and practices emerge in the business context to coexist and compete with those already established, while the second is concerned with the logics that underpin these structures and practices. The findings of our study support the proposition of Peng (2003) that exposure to international institutions is a contributing factor in the institutional transition from personalized exchanges to the kind of market-oriented, rule-based, arm’s-length transactions demanded by stakeholders adhering to private institutional logic.

As postulated by Peng (2003), the industry in which the firm operates influences a firm’s adaptation to arm’s-length forms of transaction. The financial sector, in which the Bank of Brazil is inserted, has, historically, been subject to a higher level of international regulation than is the case for petroleum and electric energy, which face domestic but not international regulation. An example is the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, established in 1974 (Bank for International Settlements n.d.). However, regulation of any significant economic activity has been growing. An example is the United States’ Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 intended to protect against financial fraud, which requires all publicly traded companies in the United States, whether domestic or foreign, to annually present detailed financial disclosure reports. The financial sector, however, both domestically and internationally imposes strict supervision; and we saw in our research that the need for compliance with banking standards played a non-negligible role in the outcomes of the cases.

The evidence of our study demonstrates that satisfaction of the interests of both public and private stakeholders in the context of institutional transition faced by hybrid SOEs depends considerably on the firm’s exposure to and capacity to internalize market institutions. We found no evidence that the kind of strategy employed to face institutional pressures (Oliver 1991) influenced the outcomes in the eight cases studied. We argue that any one of these strategies may be employed successfully, if this use is suitable to the situation faced and genuinely aimed to balance or conjoin the interests of both public and private stakeholders.

Finally, and importantly, our research data reveals not only that at least minimal satisfaction of the interests of both public and private stakeholders is possible, but also that the conjoining of public and private stakeholder interests is possible, even in contexts of institutional transition. For example, in the IPOBR case, the public stakeholder was able to keep an important company among its assets, while at the same time private investors were assured that governance would be taken seriously and that market values would be respected. This resulted in a demand for 2.5 times the number of shares on offer, with 70% of this demand originating from foreign investors (Mandl & Torres 2017). Similarly, the failure to attend to the expectations of any of the institutional logics represented by their respective stakeholders can lead to major consequences for hybrid-SOEs. As of the final writing of this paper, the Brazilian government has just sold the majority of its shares of Eletrobras (Peduzzi 2022, Jun 10), relinquishing the role of controller of the company, although whether this event has any relationship with factors discussed on this paper remains for future study.

Overall, our data suggest that satisfaction of both public and private stakeholder interests in a hybrid SOE can range from non-satisfaction of either set of interests, to satisfaction of one set of interests only, to minimal satisfaction of both sets of interests through trade-offs, to conjoining of interests.

5. Conclusions

In this paper we examined whether and how hybrid SOEs in Brazil can successfully manage the differing demands of their public and private stakeholders. We used convergent concepts from stakeholder theory and institutional theory, complemented with insights from the literatures on institutional transitions, institutional pluralism and hybrid organizations, to understand under what conditions hybrid SOEs can successfully satisfy the interests of stakeholders that embody different institutional logics. We conclude that balancing public and private interests in hybrid SOEs is the outcome of a combination of factors, involving the internal and external context, the process, and the content in each case.

This paper contributes to research and practice, as well as to theory. Our analysis of the eight cases in this study, using csQCA, has revealed a set of conditions (QCA input variables) making it possible to develop testable propositions with respect to the management of the conflicting expectations of public and private stakeholders in hybrid SOEs. We demonstrate the relevance of the literature on institutional logics for stakeholder analysis, enabling the classification of stakeholder interests according to the institutional logics that underpin them. Similarly, we identify a mutually enriching a relationship between the institutional pluralism and institutional transitions literatures, relating institutional forms and structures to the institutional logics that support them, based on empirical evidence. Moreover, we have demonstrated, based on empirical evidence, that stakeholder salience is not the only factor to be considered in stakeholder management. These findings of our study can be of practical use to organizations in the management of their stakeholder relationships.

Our study provides some answers, as well, to the question raised by Peng (2003) with respect to what kind of conditions are likely to contribute to the strategic choices of domestic firms operating in environments of institutional transition. While all the business firms in an economy that is undergoing institutional transition are confronted by similar conditions of transition, not all have the same exposure to and experience with market-supporting logics and structures. Such exposure and experience were seen, in our study, to contribute to the use of strategies favourable to arm’s-length transactions.

Methodologically, our study makes a contribution in demonstrating that the analytical model of Pettigrew’s (1985) for examining change is useful, as well, for understanding another complex phenomenon about which little is known. In addition, we demonstrate the relevance of concepts from stakeholder theory to the successful management of institutional pluralism and that it is possible, under certain conditions, to satisfy or trade-off, or even conjoin conflicting demands from public and private stakeholders.

Limitations to our study are those usual in exploratory and case studies and those using QCA methods. While our study focused only on cases involving Brazilian hybrid SOEs, we believe its findings may be more broadly applicable. It would therefore be of interest, in the future, to investigate cases involving hybrid SOEs headquartered in other countries, other Brazilian hybrid SOEs, and other cases, including from the companies from which our cases were chosen. We note, as well, that while our study was restricted to hybrid SOEs in a context of institutional transition, conflicts between institutional logics arise in other types of firms and other types of institutional environments. Testing our model and propositions in a broader range of organization types and institutional contexts could deepen and broaden understanding of how to manage these kinds of conflicts. In addition, studies of the same phenomena using other methodologies and theories may provide additional insights and refinements. Finally, we propose that more theoretical and empirical studies be carried out on stakeholders using institutional theory, especially with regard to institutional pluralism and institutional transitions.

Acknowledgements

We specially thank Prof. Samantha Miles, Ph.D, from the Oxford Brookes University – Oxford (UK) for her frequent collaboration on this research and paper. Also, we would like to thank Prof. Dr. William Voorberg and the IRSPM 2019 Wellington (NZ) Conference colleagues, Prof. Dr. Edgar Reyes Jr. (in memorian), Prof. Dr. Emil Hoffman and the PPGA/GERIR Research Group from the University of Brasilia, researchers on business and administration of the Oxford Brookes University for their valuable collaboration on this work. Yet, we would like to also thank Prof. Dr. Graziela Alperstedt, from UDESC/ESAG University and Dr. Rosilene Marcon from UNIVALI University for their assessment on the thesis that resulted in this paper. Finally, we thank the Research Support Foundation of Federal District, Brazil (FAP-DF) and the Research Deanery of the University of Brasília for supporting this research.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Supplementary material

Supplemental data for this article can be accessed at https://doi.org/10.1080/14719037.2022.2117400.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Alexsander Dauzeley da Silva

Alexsander Dauzeley da Silva, University of Brasilia (UNB) – Post-Graduate Program of Business Management (PPGA), Brasilia, DF, Brazil; Visiting Researcher at the Oxford Brookes University – Oxford, UK; M.Sc by the State University of Santa Catarina (UDESC) – Florianopolis, SC, Brazil; Graduated in Informatics at the University of Planalto Catarinense (UNIPLAC) – Lages, SC.

Janann Joslin Medeiros

Janann Joslin Medeiros, Ph.D. – Associate Researcher at the University of Brasilia (UNB) – Post-Graduate Program of Business Management (PPGA), Brasilia, DF, Brazil; Ph.D at University of Southern California, CA, USA; M.Sc. by the George Washington University, DC, USA; Graduated in Political Science at University of Iowa, IA, USA.

Notes

1. Appendix 1 contains the list of cases.