Uganda elections: Museveni’s success at what cost?

In 2016, I wrote an editorial in African Identities questioning whether Uganda can ever have free elections (Ahluwalia, 2016). Five years later, following the 14 January 2021 elections, the emphatic answer is no. A decade ago, beginning in Tunisia, the Arab Spring swept through much of North Africa and parts of the Middle East. When the Mubarak regime fell in Egypt, it was clear that the people had simply had enough of the brutality and marginalisation of the opposition. What was remarkable was that peoples from across the political spectrum coalesced, risking their lives determined to topple the repressive regime.

The optimism of the Arab Spring led many to believe that a new dawn had emerged and that repressive regimes across the world would heed the demands of their populations and that democracy would prevail in their countries. From as far-flung places like Fiji to Myanmar, military regimes appeared to embrace a newfound spirit and moved towards freer political systems that seemed to be responsive to the demands of their people and an international community that appeared to demand genuine reform.

The optimism of just a mere decade ago, however, seems to be waning with democracy retreating globally. Nowhere is this most clearly manifest then in Myanmar, where following another round of elections recently, the military simply intervened and removed the popular leader Ang Sung Su Chi and placed her under arrest. In Myanmar, the military decided that even the façade of democracy was no longer adequate. Rather, what they demanded was total control. Although the people of Myanmar have taken to the streets demanding the release of Ang Sung Su Chi, the repression, crackdown and violence illustrates the power and might of the military and its willingness to use excessive force against its own people.

In Fiji, much like Myanmar, elections since the promulgation of the 2013 Constitution have been highly problematic. A nationwide constituency has replaced the single member constituency within a unicameral Parliament. Most importantly, in both countries, enshrined in the constitution is the right of the military to intervene in the ‘national interest’. It is widely accepted that the judiciary and all independent institutions including the electoral commission are severely compromised given the influence that the military regimes continue to exert. In recent history, there are few examples of military dictators relinquishing power. Indeed, if a regime came to power via the gun then it would be safe to assume that their ultimate removal will be at the behest of the gun. Elections in such a context have become nothing more than a legitimising exercise for the dictators and their cronies to remain in power at any cost.

The 2021 Ugandan elections are clearly steeped in these very vagaries of power. Yoweri Museveni was predictably returned to power with 58% of the vote in the first round despite protestations by the main opposition leader Robert Kyagulanyi Sentamu, a musician who is widely known as Bobi Wine, of widespread rigging. Wine was subjected to continuous harassment during the campaign with numerous arrests, being shot at, and severe forms of intimidation. The violence in the lead-up to election day had already witnessed more than 50 people being killed and a large number severely injured. Immediately after the election, Wine was placed under house arrest. The government also ordered a complete lockdown of the internet the night before, clearly aimed at silencing dissent, opposition and even the election observers. It was not surprising that the United States on the election eve pulled out of being an election observer citing irregularities, violence and abuse of power that needed to be investigated. The EU echoed similar concerns.

Although Uganda adopted its current constitution in 1995, it has been amended from time to time to allow the President to retain power at all cost. This has included removing the limits on Presidential terms as well as the removal of the age limit imposed on candidates. The timing and manner in which these amendments have been adopted leave little doubt that they have been enacted to secure power for the incumbent. The constitution is lauded as sacrosanct, but its spirit is violated when politically expedient.

The democracy façade that now prevails in these countries says much about the political culture that has developed and the unlikelihood that such dictators will relinquish power. In the case of Museveni, who has now been in power for 35 years with another 5 years secured, there appears to be no plans to step down. The veneer of democracy, constitutionalism, elections and the institutions such as the legislature and judiciary albeit highly compromised, raise the question of why these dictators are committed to legitimising their rule in this particular fashion. It is here that the international donor community has much to answer. They have often legitimised such regimes for their own geopolitical interests at the expense of what are good governance principles, ethics and values– all of which are fundamental to the future democratic health of these nations. In short, they are willing to tolerate the most intolerant of regimes or even worse perpetuate the political maelstrom to further their own self interests.

Where does that leave Uganda? Whilst Museveni has secured another term, the long-term prognosis for Uganda is that its youth bulge is set to implode. This demographic coupled with ethnic overtones as well as a rural and urban divide has the country on an inevitable trajectory of change and some sort of transition. Given the militarisation of politics in places like Fiji and Myanmar and Uganda, this does not augur well for any immediate democratic project. There is little doubt that a transition will happen, as it did in Zimbabwe, but the real question will be at what cost to Uganda’s future?