India's Changing Policy on Space Militarization: The Impact of China's ASAT Test

Abstract

China's anti-satellite (ASAT) test of January 2007 has brought renewed focus on space security. The test also appears to have forced a re-evaluation of India's traditional declaratory policy against the militarization of space and more specifically created pressures for an Indian ASAT system. India's policy itself does not appear to have fully changed yet but there are signs of some fluctuations. This article examines the impact of the Chinese ASAT test on India's policy on space militarization and on India's ASAT policy. The first section of the article tracks Indian policy on space militarization and the small indicators of fluctuation in that policy, some of which predate the Chinese ASAT test. The article then examines how India's ASAT policy also shows some indicators of change, though this transformation is not yet complete, and nor is it clear that the transformation will take place. The article also identifies changes in Chinese ASAT capability as the key driver in India's rethinking about ASATs.

Acknowledgments

I wish to express my thanks to the two anonymous reviewers for their critical comments that have helped sharpen this article. I would also like to thank my colleagues at the Observer Research Foundation for extending support while working on this project. The views expressed in this paper are mine and do not represent the views of ORF.

Notes

1. The words militarization and weaponization have been used interchangeably in the academic and policy circles. However, in this article, the author wishes to make the distinction between the two terms. Militarization is the term used to connote the use of space assets for military purposes whereas weaponization refers to use of space assets including ground components for offensive capabilities and to destroy other space assets.

2. ISRO is India's civilian space agency. DRDO is an Indian research and development agency that works entirely on military applications.

3. “Ex-ISRO chief calls China's A-SAT a cause for worry,” Press Trust of India, September 14, 2009, cited in Victoria Samson, “India's Missile Defense/Anti-satellite Nexus,” The Space Review, May 10, 2010. Accessible via http://www.thespacereview.com

4. Secretary in the Department of Science and Chairman of ISRO and Space Commission K. Radhakrishnan recently noted that China's ASAT weapon is a threat not only to India but to the entire world because of the space debris it created. He added that the 2007 test had produced 3000 particles, which itself is an issue of concern in addition to worry regarding “their (space debris from the Chinese test) possible collision with our operational satellites.” See “India Says Chinese Anti-Satellite Program A Global Threat,” Space Daily, April 12, 2010. Accessible via http://www.spacedaily.com. However, in the immediate aftermath of the test, DRDO was of the opinion that it had no plans to develop anti-satellite weapons. After the test, one DRDO scientist is reported to have told the media that India has no plans to enter the ASAT weapons sphere, instead the DRDO was focusing on building a “long-range cruise vehicle, a submarine-launched ballistic missile system and a medium-range surface to air missile with Israel.” See Shiv Aroor, “Beijing Test a Reminder, But India Not Interested,” Indian Express, January 20, 2007. Accessible via http://www.indianexpress.com

5. “India and Russia in Nuclear Deal,” BBC News, January 25, 2007. Accessible via http://www.news.bbc.co.uk

6. Sandeep Dikshit, “Let's Jointly Utilize Outer Space: Antony,” The Hindu, February 06, 2007. Accessible via http://www.thehindu.com

7. Rajeev Lochan, former Scientific Secretary, Indian Space Research Organization, “Indian Space Programme and Some Reflections on Collective Security In Space” (presentation, Collective Security in Space: Asian Perspectives conference, Tokyo, Japan, April 23, 2007).

8. Joan Johnson-Freese, “US Perspectives on Space Security” (presentation, Collective Security in Space: Asian Perspectives conference, Tokyo, Japan, April 23, 2007).

9. “The Space Security Index: Fact Sheet,” Space Security Index. Accessible via http://www.spacesecurity.org

10. Indian Space Research Organization. Accessible via http://www.isro.org (accessed October 12, 2011).

11. C. Jayaraj, Secretary General, Indian Society of International Law, “India's Space Policy and Institutions.” Accessible via http://www.oosa.unvienna.org (accessed October 3, 2011).

12. Rajeev Lochan, former Scientific Secretary, Indian Space Research Organization, “Indian Space Programme and Some Reflections on Collective Security In Space,” (presentation Collective Security in Space: Asian Perspectives, Tokyo, Japan, April 23, 2007).

13. The techno-scenario sketches made by Dhawan, and slightly modified by V. Siddhartha are available in his article. V. Siddhartha, “Military Dimensions in the Future of the Indian Presence in Space,” Journal of the United Service Institution of India Vol. CXXX, No. 540 (April-June 2000), p. 251.

14. “IAF will be Model for World by 2025: Kalam,” IANS, Times of India, March 07, 2007. Accessible via http://www.timesofindia.indiatimes.com.

15. A. P. J. Abdul Kalam and Y. S. Rajan, India 2020: A Vision for the New Millenium (New Delhi: Penguin, 1998), p. 38.

16. “Kalam Defends Chandrayaan,” The Hindu, January 20, 2008. Accessible via http://www.hindu.com

17. Some of these aspects are dealt with in Anita Bhatia, “India's Space Program: Cause for Concern?” Asian Survey, Vol. 25, No. 10 (October 1985), pp. 1027–1028.

18. Siddhartha, “Military Dimensions in the Future,” p. 249. Siddhartha, during this period, was Officer on Special Duty in the Secretariat of the Scientific Adviser to the Raksha Mantri, Ministry of Defense, New Delhi.

19. Sentiments relating to how India may not want to make the same mistake in the space domain as it did in the case of nuclear weapons are expressed by Peter Brown in an article quoting Saurabh Gupta of the Samuels International Associates of Washington, DC. For details see Peter Brown, “India Targets China's Satellites,” Asia Times, January 22, 2010. Accessible via http://www.atimes.com

20. For an excellent but slightly dated overview of India's space program, as well as the kind of covert linkages between civilian and military applications of space, see Dinshaw Mistry, “The Geostrategic Implications of India's Space Program,” Asian Survey, Vol. 41, No. 6 (November-December 2001), pp. 1028–1040; and Dinshaw Mistry, “India's Emerging Space Program,” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 2 (1998), pp. 162–167. The potential military implications of India's space program have been a concern for Western analysts for some time. See Jerrold F. Elkin and Brian Fredericks, “Military Implications of India's Space Programme,” Air University Review (May-June 1983). http://www.airpower.au

21. Jayaraj, “India's Space Policy and Institutions.”

22. Jayaraj, “India's Space Policy and Institutions.”

23. C. Raja Mohan, “Rising India: Partner in Sharing the Global Commons?,” The Washington Quarterly Vol. 33 No. 3 (2010). Accessible via http://www.twq.com

24. Speech by Mrs. Indira Gandhi to the UN General Assembly, 38th sess., 9th plenary mtg., September 28, 1983. Accessible via www.meadev.nic.in; and “Rao Warns of Arms Race in Outer Space,” Strategic Digest, Vol. 14, No. 3 (March 1984), p. 232, cited in Ashley J. Tellis, “The Evolution of US-Indian Ties: Missile Defense in An Emerging Strategic Relationship,” International Security Vol. 30, No. 4 (2006), p. 114.

25. “India Opposes SDI,” Strategic Digest Vol. 15, No. 10 (October 1985), p. 1304, cited in Tellis, “The Evolution of US-Indian Ties,” p. 114.

26. Mohan, “Rising India”

27. Cited in Vojtech Mastny, “The Soviet Union's Partnership with India,” Journal of Cold War Studies vol. 12, no. 3 (Summer 2010), p. 77.

28. Rajya Sabha, Unstarred Question No. 166, US High Tech for Space War, Answered on November 20, 1997.

29. “India Asks US to Give Up Missile Testing,” Hindu, July 4, 2000, cited in Tellis, “The Evolution of US-Indian Ties,” p. 125.

30. “Interview with the Minister of External Affairs Mr. Jaswant Singh,” Times of India, July 24, 2000, cited in Tellis, “The Evolution of US-Indian Ties,” p. 125.

31. Jayaraj, “India's Space Policy and Institutions.”

32. Jayaraj, “India's Space Policy and Institutions.”

33. As cited in Ravi Tomar, “US Missile Defense Program: Responses from South Asia,” May 22, 2001. Accessible via http://www.aph.gov.au

34. “PM Welcomes US Initiative,” The Hindu, May 11 2001. Accessible via http://www.hindu.com

35. V. Sudarshan, “The Triangle,” Outlook, May 21, 2001. Accessible via www.outlookindia.com. On some of the other domestic opposition, see “What Was the Hurry on NMD, Cong. Asks Govt.,” The Hindu, May 04, 2001. Accessible via http://www.hindu.com; “India to Hear out Armitage on NMD,” The Hindu, May 11, 2001. Accessible via http:// www.hindu.com.

36. Tellis, “The Evolution of US-Indian Ties,” p. 126.

37. Tellis, “The Evolution of US-Indian Ties,” p. 126.

38. C. Raja Mohan, “Indo-US Dialogue on NMD,” The Hindu, March 14, 2001. Accessible via http://www.hindu.com

39. “Joint Declaration between the Russian Federation and the Republic of India,” Ministry of External Affairs, December 03, 2004. Accessible via http://www.mea.gov.in. Peaceful use of outer space continued to be a theme in the Joint Statement issued during President Abdul Kalam's visit to Moscow in March 2005 and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit to Moscow as well. For details see “Joint Statement State Visit of the President of India Dr. A. P. J. Abdul Kalam to the Russian Federation,” Ministry of External Affairs, March 26, 2005. Accessible via http://www.mea.gov.in; and “Indo-Russia Joint Statement on the Outcome of the Official Visit of Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh to the Russian Federation,” Ministry of External Affairs, December 07, 2005. Accessible via http://www.mea.gov.in.

40. “Statement by Shri Jayant Prasad, Permanent Representative of India to the Conference on Disarmament,” Geneva, Ministry of External Affairs, February 02, 2006. Accessible via http://www.mea.gov.in

41. “Address by External Affairs Minister at the Inaugural Session of the International Seminar on Aerospace Power in Tomorrow's World,” Ministry of External Affairs, February 04, 2007, Accessible via http://www.mea.gov.in; “Pranab for Peaceful Use of Outer Space,” The Hindu, February 05, 2007. Accessible via http://www.thehindu.com

42. Military uses of space assets have been in vogue for some time. India has been arguing for the ban on placement of weapons in outer space increasing the potential for weaponization.

43. Address by Mr. Pranab Mukherjee, Minister for External Affairs at National Defense College, New Delhi, Ministry of External Affairs, November 03, 2008. Accessible via http://www.mea.gov.in. The issue of space and its militarization have been highlighted at the highest levels of the government even while emphasizing the importance of the peaceful uses of outer space. See, “Address by NSA at the 9^th IISS Asia Security Summit,” Ministry of External Affairs, June 05, 2010. Accessible via http://www.mea.gov.in; Address by Foreign Secretary at Harvard on “India's Global Role,” Ministry of External Affairs, September 20, 2010. Accessible via http://www.mea.gov.in

44. This section will deal only with the military aspects of China's space program that is contributing to the insecurities in Asia and beyond. The civilian programs are dealt with in several writings; see Jayan Panthamakkada Acuthan, “China's Outer Space Programme: Diplomacy of Competition or Co-operation?,” China Perspectives Vol. 63 (January-February 2006). Accessible via http://www.chinaperspectives.revues.org

45. “Look Up! Is It a Threat? Or a Plea for a Ban?,” New York Times, January 21, 2007. Accessible via http://www.nytimes.com

46. In 2006, the IAF began the ground work for the setting up of an Aerospace Command that will be able to effectively use space-based assets for military needs. In fact the need for an aerospace command was first articulated in the late 1990s by the then Air Force Chief Air Chief Marshal S. K. Sareen who had argued for the need to combine all the space-based assets for military and surveillance activities. See “India Begins Work on Space Weapons Command,” Indo Asian News Service, Space Daily, April 12, 2006. Accessible via http://www.spacedaily.com

47. “India Building A Military Satellite Reconnaissance System,” Defense Industry Daily, August 10, 2005. Accessible via http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com, cited in Jessica Guiney, “India's Space Ambitions: Headed Toward Space War?,” CDI Policy Brief, May 2008. Accessible via http://www.cdi.org

48. Jing Dong Yuan, “The Dragon and the Elephant: Chinese-Indian Relations in the 21^st century,” The Washington Quarterly Vol. 30, No. 3 (2007), p. 133.

49. “China's National Defence in 2000,” Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, October 16, 2000. Accessible via http://www.china.org.cn

50. Jason Sherman, “China Looks Askance at Space War Game,” Defense News, February 28, 2001, cited in Jayan Panthamakkada Acuthan, “China's Outer Space Programme: Diplomacy of Competition or Co-operation?,” China Perspectives Vol. 63 (January-February 2006). Accessible via http://www.chinaperspectives.revues.org

51. While China argues vehemently argues for non-militarization of space at international fora, it believes that it cannot wait for long. Hence, China has continued with its military programs in space although China's militarization and weaponization moves have direct and most serious bearing on the regional space programs. For instance, the Chinese envoy on disarmament at Geneva Hu Xiaodi stated the three “cannot wait,” namely, “We cannot wait until outer space weapons become a reality and cause real harm; we cannot wait until one country takes the lead in introducing weapons to outer space and spurs other countries to emulate; we cannot wait until outer space weapons proliferate before we take measures.” See Chen Jian, “Chinese Representative Speaks at the United Nations: Save a Piece of Peaceful and Quiet Sky for the Future Generations,” Zhongguo Xinwen She, October 22, 2003, in FBIS-CHI-2003-1022 (October 27, 2003), cited in Srikanth Kondapalli “China's Space Power,” Air Power Journal Vol. 4, No. 1 (Spring 2009). Accessible via http://www.aerospaceindia.org

52. The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu, soon after the missile defense test in January 2010, categorically stated that the Chinese test was “defensive in nature and is not targeted at any country,” whereas the Chinese language media reports have a different message. For details see, “China Conducts Test on Ground-based Midcourse Missile Interception,” Xinhua News, January 11, 2010. Accessible via http://www.news.xinhuanet.com; and Source: 我国“陆基中段反导拦截技术试验”初步分析, # 文章提交者：强袭冲击 加贴在 陆军论坛 铁血论坛 http://bbs.tiexue.net/bbs32-0-1.html, 2009年1月11日, Trans., Google.bbs.tiexue. net. For more details on the Chinese missile defense test, see Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, “China's Missile Defence Test: Yet Another Milestone?,” IDSA Comment (New Delhi: Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, February 2010). Accessible via http://www.idsa.in

53. “The Assassin's Mace: China's Growing Military Might,” The New Atlantis (Summer 2004), p. 109. Accessible via http://www.thenewatlantis.com. See also, “China is Developing Anti-Satellite Weapon as Counter-Measure,” Ming Pao, January 30, 2001, in FBIS-CHI-2001-0130, May 02, 2001, cited in Srikanth Kondapalli, “China's Space Power,” Air Power Journal Vol. 4, No. 1 (Spring 2009). Accessible via http://www.aerospaceindia.org

54. Victor N. Corpus, “America's Acupuncture Points: Part 2 – The Assassin's Mace,” Asia Times Online, October 20, 2006. Accessible via http://www.atimes.com

55. “China's Space Activities in 2006,” The Information Office of China's State Council, October 12, 2006. Accessible via http://www.fas.org; “China's Space Activities,” The Information Office of China's State Council, November 22, 2000. Accessible via http:// www.fas.org

56. For a detailed analysis of the recent Chinese initiatives on space, see Peter J. Brown, “China's Space Program Poised to Surge,” Asia Times, January 06, 2010. Available at www.atimes.com

57. Brown, “China's Space Program Poised to Surge.”

58. “Ex-ISRO chief calls China's A-SAT a cause for worry,” Press Trust of India, Sept. 14, 2009. Accessible via www.ptinews.com

59. Rajya Sabha, Unstarred Question No. 313, Weaponization of Space, Answered on March 01, 2007.

60. Jangveer Singh, “China's Space Test Unethical: ISRO Chief,” Tribune, February 06, 2007. Accessible via http://www.tribuneindia.com

61. “Technology Perspective and Capability Roadmap,” HQ Integrated Defense Staff, PP&FD/WSOI Division, updated May 20, 2010, p. 57. The document also indicated a timeframe, to develop the ASAT weapons by 2015.

62. “India Readying Weapon to Destroy Enemy Satellites,” Indian Express, January 03, 2010. Accessible via http://www.expressindia.com

63. “India Has Anti-satellite Capability: DRDO,” Hindustan Times, February 10, 2010. Accessible via http://www.hindustantimes.com

64. “India Too has Technology to Intercept, Destroy Rogue Satellites,” Hindu Business Line, February 23, 2008. Accessible via http://www.thehindubusinessline.com

65. “India Too has Technology to Intercept, Destroy Rogue Satellites,” Hindu Business Line, February 23, 2008. Accessible via http://www.thehindubusinessline.com

66. Bhargavi Kerur, “Air Chief Marshal PV Naik Wants Missiles to Destroy Enemy Satellites,” Daily News & Analysis, January 23, 2010. Accessible via http://www.dnaindia.com

67. Bhargavi Kerur, “Air Chief Marshal PV Naik Wants Missiles to Destroy Enemy Satellites,” Daily News & Analysis, January 23, 2010. Accessible via www.dnaindia.com

68. Shiv Aroor, “India's ASAT Concept A Hybrid of Agni and AAD,” Livefist, February 12, 2010. Accessible via http://www.livefist.blogspot.com

69. Matthew Hoey, “Space Weapons Should Be Part of Upcoming US-India Strategic Dialogue,” Space Transparency, June 01, 2010. Accessible via http://www.wagingpeace.org

70. Department of State, Bureau of Oceans, Environment and Science, “Fact Sheet on US-India Space Cooperation,” March 02, 2006. Accessible via http://www.spaceref.com

71. Address by Shyam Saran, Special Envoy of Prime Minister at Brookings Institution, Washington, Ministry of External Affairs, March 23, 2009. Accessible via http://www.mea.gov.in

72. For detail on the problems and prospects of India-US space cooperation, see Peter J. Brown, “India and US Build Stronger Ties in Space,” Asia Times, August 07, 2009. Accessible via http://www.atimes.com. Currently, there are initiatives taken up by the US to ease the export control regulations recognizing the fast paced technological development around the world. For instance, the US Administration's Export Control Reform (ECR) initiative 2011 is moving several items from the US Munition List (USML) to the Commerce Control List (CCL). This will impact upon the sensitivity attached to a particular item in a positive manner and thereby ease the transaction of such an item. The President's broad guideline today is to put fewer items within the “higher fences” and accordingly there has been a reassessment of the USML Category XV (spacecraft systems and associated equipment) and the corresponding CCL categories. There is also fresh thinking as to how some of these items on these lists can be brought under the Presidential control, wherein the President could authorize sale/transfer through a statute. This could potentially remove a range of items software/technology from the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR)/Export Administration Regulations (EAR). This is seen as an important move since technological development is taking place at a radically fast pace and if the US is not able to adopt flexible measures, it is only likely to lose out, not just in commercial but in strategic terms as well.

73. “ISRO Hails US, India Technology Safeguards Agreement,” Satellite Today, July 30, 2009. Accessible via http://www.satellitetoday.com

74. The US space or even defense companies may like certain changes to be brought about, but those changes are going to be applicable even to China, as they see it. For the companies, it is a pure commercial deal and profit motives drive their arguments. The State Department works on the premise that any arms transfers or transfer of space technology would impact on the military balance in South Asia and that it would fuel arms race in South Asia.

75. Bharat Gopalaswamy and Harsh Pant, “Does India Need Anti-satellite Capability?,” Rediff News, February 09, 2010. Accessible via http://www.news.rediff.com

76. Peter J. Brown, “China Looks Beyond India-Japan Space Alliance to the US Connection,” Asia Times, November 12, 2008. Accessible via http://www.japanfocus.org

77. US nuclear umbrella and the security assurance with the US remain the best choice, without giving up the potential for a deterrent capability at a future date. This is also due to the fact that Japanese strategists continue to be concerned about possible US arms control agreements with China and North Korea that could leave Japan at a strategic loss, facing serious insecurities.

78. With North Korea emerging as a serious threat, there are two sets of arguments being developed: one, to push Japan closer to the US than ever before; and second, to push Japan to go independent, change their pacifist constitution and develop stronger diplomatic and military means to deal with the problem. It is likely that even while Japan is adopting more pro-active stance, it wants to ensure that it does not hamper the security alliance relationship with the US. As one scholar put it, Japan “neither wants to become entangled in a conflict situation, nor does it want to be abandoned by the US.” Therefore, one is likely to witness a mix of both pro-activism and “reactivism” in its foreign and security policy-making. See Jill Arase Margerison, “Consequences – A Change in Security Posture: Japan and North Korea,” Electronic Journal of Contemporary Japanese Studies, Discussion Paper 2 in 2003, May 09, 2003. Accessible via http://www.japanesestudies.org.uk

79. In fact, statements by US sometimes appear to be sending such a message. In March 2007, US Ambassador to Japan Thomas Schieffer urged Japan to do more in shouldering the burden of its own defense. Accordingly, Vice Minister Takemasa Moriya, Japan's No. 2 defense official said in an interview to Reuters, “Regarding what Ambassador Schieffer said, we think we have dealt appropriately with the security environment since the end of the Cold War. We think we are allocating resources appropriately to deal with actual threats,” and that any future increase in funding would be up to parliament. See “Japan Rejects US Criticism of Defense Spending,” Reuters, April 26, 2007. Accessible at http://www.javno.com

80. Brad Glosserman, “Japan Peers into the Abyss,” PacNet Newsletter Vol. 20 (March 20, 2008), cited in Emma Chanlett-Avery and Mary Beth Nikitin, “Japan's Nuclear Future: Policy Debate, Prospects, and US Interests,” CRS Report for Congress, February 19, 2009. Accessible via http://www.fas.org

81. In November 2009, Japan launched its own spy satellite to detect the movement of enemy ballistic missiles. Japan established the space-based reconnaissance system after the North Korean missile firing over Japanese territory in 1998. Japan was earlier relying on US satellites for such information, which gives them less time to respond. See Stephen Clark, “Japan Launches Spy Satellite Under Veil of Secrecy,” Spaceflight Now, November 28, 2009. Accessible via http://www.spaceflightnow.com

82. Peter J. Brown, “China Looks Beyond India-Japan Space Alliance to the US Connection,” Asia Times, November 12, 2008. Accessible via http://www.japanfocus.org

83. Brown, “China Looks beyond India-Japan Space Alliance.”