India-US-Russia dynamics in the Trump era

ABSTRACT

Out of more than thirty strategic partnerships signed by India, its ties with the US and Russia are crucial for achieving economic and strategic objectives in the Indo-Pacific and the Eurasian region respectively. There was a growing convergence on bilateral, regional, and global issues with the US during Trump years, but there was divergence between the two countries on Russia. While Washington perceived Russia as a competitor and interfering in the domestic affairs of the US, Moscow on the other hand perceived the US as attempting to not only expand its influence in Russia’s backyard but also undermining Russia’s leadership and its political system. The relationship was also adversarial because the Sino-American escalation coincided with an increasing Russia-China bonhomie. Russia remained a valuable partner for India and India hoped for improved US-Russia ties under Trump. However, adversarial US-Russia ties cast a dark shadow on India-Russia ties. The US complained and was even contemplating sanctions on India for its purchase of S400 air defense systems from Russia. India’s reliance on Russian defence equipment and its policy of multi-alignment further increased tensions between India and the US although India-US strategic alignment has increased under Trump.

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No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

¹ Frank O’Donnell and Mihaela Papa, “India’s multi-alignment management and the Russia–India–China (RIC) triangle,” International Affairs 97, no. 3 (2021): 801–822. Ian Hall argues that the genesis of foreign policy of multi-alignment can be traced to the Manmohan Singh governments. Ian Hall, “Multi-alignment and Indian foreign policy under Narendra Modi,” Round Table 105, no. 3 (2016): 271–86.

² Hall, Multi-alignment and Indian: Thorsten Wojczewski, “India’s vision of world order: multi-alignment, exceptionalism and peaceful co-existence,” Global Affairs 3, no. 2 (2017): 111–123.

³ Cited in O’Donnell and Papa, “India’s multi-alignment management,” 807.

⁴ Rohan Mukherjee, “Chaos as opportunity: the United States and world order in India’s grand strategy,” Contemporary Politics, 26, no. 4 (2020): 420–438 .

⁵ “Joint Statement on the third India-U.S. 2 + 2 Ministerial Dialogue,” Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), India, October 27, 2020, https://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/33145/Joint+Statement+on+the+third+IndiaUS+2432+Ministerial+Dialogue (accessed April 20, 2022).

⁶ Sameer Lalwani and Tyler Sagerstrom, “What the India–Russia Defence Partnership Means for US Policy,” Survival 63, no.:4 (2021): 149–182.

⁷ For a detailed discussion regarding Singer’s levels of analysis see the Introduction to the special issue.

⁸ Sameer Lalwani, Frank O’Donnell, Tyler Sagerstrom, and Akriti Vasudeva, “The influence of arms: explaining the durability of India–Russia alignment,” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs 4, no. 1 (2021): 2–41.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Nayanima Basu, “Moscow Agreement’ – Jaishankar & Wang Yi road map for Ladakh peace gets a name,” The Print, February 25, 2021, https://theprint.in/diplomacy/moscow-agreement-jaishankar-wang-yi-road-map-for-ladakh-peace-gets-a-name/611906/ (accessed May 10, 2022).

¹¹ Andrei P. Tsygankov, “The Revisionist Moment: Russia, Trump, and Global Transition,” Problems of Post-Communism 68, no. 6 (2021): 457–467.

¹² Trump has never accepted that Russia interfered in the elections and did not criticize Putin which created further doubts regarding Trump’s dealings with Russia with any contact between the White House and Russia carefully

scrutinized for signs of nefarious content.

¹³ CAATSA also included Iran and North Korea and sought to punish any country which dealt with the three countries.

¹⁴ Jeremy Kuzmarov, “‘A New Battlefield for the United States’: Russia Sanctions and the New Cold War,” Socialism and Democracy 33, no.: 3 (2019), 47.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Angela Stent, “Trump’s Russia Legacy and Biden’s Response” Survival 63, no.:4, 55–80.

¹⁷ Elias Götz and Camille-Renaud Merlen, “Russia and the question of world order,” European Politics and Society 20, no.: 2 (2019), 135.

¹⁸ Artyom Lukin, “The Russia–China entente and its future,” International Politics 58, no.: 3 (2021), 363–380.

¹⁹ Lowell Dittmer, “The Strategic Triangle: An Elementary Game-Theoretical Analysis,” World Politics 33, no.: 4 (1981), 485 −515.

²⁰ Raj Verma, “China’s new security concept: India, terrorism, China’s geostrategic interests and domestic stability in Pakistan,” The Pacific Review 33, no. 6 (2020): 991–1021.

²¹ Lalwani et al. “The influence of arms.”

²² “Despite sanctions, govt to trade with Russia, Iran; India-US ties stressed?” Business Standard, May 30, 2018, https://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/despite-sanctions-govt-to-trade-with-russia-iran-india-us-

ties-stressed-118053000226_1.html (accessed May 12, 2022).

²³ Sriram Lakshman, “CAATSA| The spectre of U.S. sanctions,” The Hindu, July 12, 2020, https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/caatsa-the-specter-of-us-sanctions/article32053452.ece (accessed May 12, 2022).

²⁴ Paul O’Shea, “‘Making the alliance even greater’: (Mis-)managing U.S.-Japan relations in the age of Trump,” Asian Security 17, no. 2 (2021):195–215.

²⁵ “India set to get US waiver on missile deal with Russia”, The Times of India, July 25, 2018, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/us/india-set-to-get-us-waiver-on-missile-deal-with-russia/articleshow/65126545.cms (accessed May 12, 2022).

²⁶ Jeff Smith, “U.S. CAATSA Sanctions and India: Waivers and Geopolitical Considerations,” Heritage Foundation,

April 1, 2021, https://www.heritage.org/asia/report/us-caatsa-sanctions-and-india-waivers-and-geopolitical-

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²⁷ Lalwani and Sagerstrom, “What the India–Russia Defence”.

²⁸ Ibid., 150.

²⁹ “Despite sanctions, govt. to trade”.