Introduction

ABSTRACT

Did India-US relations strengthen under Trump? Was there greater political, diplomatic, strategic, and defense cooperation between the two largest democracies in the world under the Trump administration? Was there increasing convergence or divergence at the bilateral and multilateral level, in relations with third countries, and in the realm of regional security and geopolitics? This special issue answers these questions and highlights that answers are not straight forward, but more nuanced than one might expect. Contributors reach the following conclusions. First, bilateral ties received a significant boost in the Modi-Trump era because of the camaraderie between the two leaders and shared apprehensions about China’s rise and aggressive foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific. Second, despite the burgeoning partnership between the two countries, there were areas of both convergence and divergence between the two countries under the Trump administration regarding democracy, trade and commerce, the UN, multilateralism and global governance, and climate change, relations with third countries including China, Russia, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran, and in the realm of regional security and geopolitics in the context of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad). Third, the Trump administration, especially President Trump, played a significant role in mitigating or exacerbating the convergence/divergence in almost all the issue areas.

Did India–US relations strengthen during the Trump administration? Was there greater political, diplomatic, strategic, and defense cooperation between the two largest democracies in the world during the Trump administration? Was there increasing convergence or divergence between the two countries at the bilateral and multilateral levels, in relations with third countries, and in the realm of regional security and geopolitics? This special issue answers these questions and highlights that answers are not straightforward, but more nuanced than one might expect.

During the Modi-Trump era, India–US ties received a significant boost leading to greater political, diplomatic, strategic, and defense cooperation. The bilateral relationship was elevated to a “Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership” during Trump’s India visit in February 2020.¹ The two countries worked closely with each other on counter-terrorism with the US (along with France and the UK) playing a crucial role to designate Masood Azhar, the head of Jaish-e-Mohammad, as a terrorist under the United Nations (UN) Security Council (UNSC) 1267 Committee rules.² The US became an important source of advanced military equipment for India’s military with bilateral defense trade increasing from zero in 2008 to US$20 billion in 2020.³ India and the US have also increased joint military exercises – the US conducts more military exercises with India relative to any other non-North Atlantic Treaty Organization country. India and the US institutionalized the 2 + 2 dialogue – a meeting of the defense and foreign ministers of the two countries – which further strengthened the India-US strategic partnership.

At the 2 + 2 dialogue in December 2019, the two countries noted the deepening strategic partnership based on their shared values such as human rights, justice, freedom and commitment to the rule of law. They also highlighted their shared common strategic objectives such as a “free, open, inclusive, peaceful, and prosperous Indo-Pacific”⁴ and the Quad (comprising the US, India, Japan and Australia) and India–US–Japan trilateral to achieve these objectives. The two countries also signed the Industrial Security Annex agreement which allows Indian private sector companies to jointly manufacture defense equipment and welcomed the increasing growing cooperation between the navies of the two countries and their commitment for enhancing anti-terrorism cooperation.⁵

At the 2 + 2 dialogue in October 2020 in New Delhi, the two countries agreed to further strengthen and expand cooperation to tackle the challenges emerging from COVID-19 including the development of vaccines, to cooperate on regional security with both sides reiterating their “commitment to maintaining a free, open, inclusive, peaceful, and prosperous Indo-Pacific,”⁶ further strengthening of Quad and advancing security and defense co-operation with the two countries signing the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA). The agreement allows the armed forces of the two countries to expand geospatial information sharing. In the ongoing India–China standoff in Ladakh, the US called out China as the aggressor and agreed to support “India to defend its territorial sovereignty and liberty.”⁷

Shared apprehensions about China’s rise and aggressive foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific provided the glue for the “comprehensive strategic partnership” between New Delhi and Washington during the Trump administration, as illustrated by the burgeoning political, defense and strategic ties. The US has concerns regarding China’s aggressive military posture toward Taiwan, the disputed islands in the South China Sea and East China Sea, challenging the US hegemony in the Indo-Pacific, China changing the rules of the game through its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and other factors. India has deep anxieties regarding China’s forays into the Indian Ocean and South Asia which India considers its own backyard. India has expressed concerns regarding China’s “string of pearls strategy” especially its political, diplomatic, economic, and military support to Pakistan. India is deeply concerned regarding China using Pakistan as a proxy to contain India’s rise and ensure it is enmeshed in South Asian affairs, and unable to challenge China’s quest of becoming the preeminent power in the Indo-Pacific.⁸ However, analysts assert that the bilateral relationship became narrower during the Trump administration.⁹ Scholars have also highlighted the divergence between the two countries at the bilateral, regional and multilateral level, with respect to relations with third countries, and regarding regional security and geopolitics.

But the Trump administration is no different from the previous US administrations in the new millennium. In the twenty-first century, although India–US relations have blossomed with the two largest democracies in the world perceiving each other as natural partners, there were avenues of convergence and divergence in the bilateral relationship under different US Presidents/administrations. The turning point in the bilateral relationship was President Bill Clinton’s visit to India in 2000. What made US look at India in a different light is the vast economic potential of India and India’s emergence as a market for American goods and services. This is after the bilateral relationship hit the nadir after the nuclear explosions conducted by India in May 1998 (Pokhran II). The Clinton administration had a very strong focus on nuclear nonproliferation and it slapped sanctions against India. The US also used its clout to stop all assistance to India from multilateral lending agencies such as the International Monetary Fund, World Bank and others and led an international campaign to isolate India.

During the Vajpayee-Bush period (2001–2004), there was convergence of views on terrorism, especially state sponsored terrorism (read Islamist fundamentalism and extremism) and this brought the two countries closer. In a stark departure from conventional Indian foreign policy, India offered military bases to the US in the “war against terror” in Afghanistan. India even considered sending troops to Iraq, alongside the US and not under the auspices of the UN. The Singh-Bush era (2004–2009) witnessed the strengthening of the economic, political, diplomatic, military, and strategic ties. Both leaders enjoyed a good relationship, and India and the US signed the “Civil nuclear deal” in 2005 which was approved by the US Congress in 2008. The deal highlighted the US acceptance of India as a nuclear power, de-hyphenated India and Pakistan in the US calculus and paved the way for India to emerge as a major player in the international arena.¹⁰ It also laid the foundations for a strategic partnership between the two countries. However, India continued to blame the US for equating it with Pakistan, unmindful of the differences between the two South Asian neighbors, and for providing economic, political, diplomatic and military support to Pakistan which has been used against India.

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President Barack Obama enjoyed a good camaraderie. However, during Obama’s first term, the bilateral relations were again impacted due to a change in the US policy regarding China and Pakistan. The US had been embroiled in the Afghan war for almost a decade and Obama needed Pakistan to bring the Taliban to the negotiating table and bring peace in the war-ravaged country. India was mindful of Obama’s tilt. The US started engaging with China under the aegis of G2 much to India’s chagrin, with India perceiving itself as a hedge against China during the Bush administration. Another issue was Obama’s tough stance regarding India’s nuclear program and his insistence that India sign the nuclear nonproliferation treaty which New Delhi considers as discriminatory. Although the US perceived India as a linchpin in its “pivot” to the Asia-Pacific and a counter balance to China, Congress Party’s “nonalignment” nostalgia and “anti-Americanism” continued to hamper the bilateral relations so much so that by 2013, the bilateral relationship had become lethargic and reached a new low.¹¹

During the Modi-Obama period (2014–2017), the bilateral relationship was reinvigorated and economic, trade, defense and strategic ties strengthened. The two leaders met numerous times – in 2014, 2015, 2016 and 2017—with Modi calling Obama his “friend” and stated that he shared a “special wavelength” with him. There was a qualitative change and a fundamental transformation in the relationship. Obama again endorsed India’s candidature for a permanent seat with veto power in the UNSC in 2015¹² with the endorsement welcomed and supported by the US Congress. In June 2016, the India–US joint statement described the bilateral relationship as “Enduring Global Partners in the Twenty-first Century.” In 2016, the US labeled India as major defense partner. This allowed India to enjoy some of the benefits enjoyed by the US treaty allies, especially access to defense technology.¹³ The two countries also signed the Logistics Support Agreement which allows the two countries to share military logistics and access to each other’s military bases. However, human right violations, religious intolerance and violence against minorities, especially Muslims and secular and liberal advocates, and restrictions on civil-society organizations led to occasional bumps in the bilateral relationship.¹⁴

Bearing in mind, the convergence/divergence between the two countries during different US administrations, this special issue examines the convergence and/or divergence between India and the US regarding democracy, trade and commerce, the UN, multilateralism and global governance, and climate change, relations with third countries including China, Russia, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran, and regional security and geopolitics in the context of the Quad during the Trump administration. Contributors to this special issue analyze the rationale for the convergence and divergence between the two countries at the bilateral, trilateral, regional and multilateral level and illustrate the role of the Trump administration (especially President Trump) in mitigating or exacerbating the convergence/divergence in the specific issue area. The contributors employ Singer’s “levels of analysis”¹⁵ to analyze and illustrate the convergence and divergence in the India–US bilateral ties during Trump.

India-US relations: a three-level analysis

In 1959, Kenneth Waltz in his seminal work “Man, the State, and War: An examination”¹⁶ introduced the three images or units of analysis in international relations (IR). The first image refers to the individual or the decision-maker: his cognition, beliefs, values, personality and management style. The second image is the state which focuses on the nature of the state and societal actors: state structure that is Westminster/parliamentary versus Presidential form of government, strong and weak states, and society centered as in the US versus state centered as in France; role of elites, interest groups, bureaucracies, and political parties; political regimes whether democratic, quasi-democratic, democratizing, or non-democratic; role of media and public opinion; history and culture; domestic economic systems that is socialist/communist, capitalist, or mixed economic systems; national character that is whether a state is unified with little possibility to exploit cleavages or economic, political, social, ethnic, linguistic, and religious cleavages can be exploited easily, among other aspects of the state. The third image is the international system comprising states. The emphasis is on the distribution of power among the states in the anarchical international system and how systemic pressures influence and constrain a state’s FP contingent on its economic, political, and military capabilities or material power. It also considers the number of major powers in the system, alliance formation, and structure of the system.

IR scholars from different schools and scholars studying Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), a sub-field of IR, have employed the three images to formulate different theories and frameworks to explain the nature of states and their action in the international system.¹⁷ In 1961, Singer redefined the three images as the three “levels of analysis,” an analytical model.¹⁸ Singer’s “levels of analysis” can provide a comprehensive analysis of a country’s FP or relations with other states, but it does not say which level of analysis is the best to explain a FP outcome or relations between states.¹⁹

Sumit Ganguly’s edited volume employed Singer’s “levels of analysis” to provide a broad overview of India’s foreign policy since its independence in 1947.²⁰ The “levels of analysis explains” India’s relations with countries in South Asia, great powers such as the US, Russia and China, countries in the European Union and East Asia. Similarly, Singer’s “levels of analysis” is useful in identifying, measuring and analyzing the influence of various causal factors which have shaped India–US relations. For instance, the first level of analysis, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s cognition, his ideological proclivity for socialism and bias against capitalism and western powers explains why India’s economic system was influenced significantly by centralized Soviet planning and India followed a policy of “nonalignment.” Similarly, the third level of analysis, systemic pressures and the Cold War (bipolar structure of the international system) explains why India and the US did not enjoy amenable relations from 1962 to 1991. Deeply ingrained mistrust of the US in the Indian bureaucracy (the second level of analysis) also explicates why India–US relations are not as comprehensive as they should be considering the systemic pressures due to China’s rise.

Organization of the special issue

The first four essays of the special issue examine the convergence/divergence between India and the US during the Trump administration regarding democracy, trade and commerce, the UN, multilateralism and global governance, and climate change, and highlight that the ideational convergence between President Trump and Prime Minister Modi led to both convergence and divergence in the specific issue area. Both Trump and Modi are nationalists. Both love political grandstanding and firmly believe that they can achieve the best solutions, deals, and outcomes. Both are considered as divisive leaders and have not condemned violence against minorities in their respective countries. Both have been chastised by the domestic as well as international media and civil society in their respective countries for targeting minorities. Both are populist leaders who pursued protectionist policies and were unwilling to open their domestic markets for international trade with the US withdrawing from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and India from the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).

In the first essay, Irfan Nooruddin and Vibhav Mariwala argue that congruence in beliefs and ideas (undermining democracy at home, and nationalism and anti-minority views, which both used for domestic electoral gain) between Trump and Modi created a bonhomie between the two leaders and undermined democracy in the “oldest” and the “largest” democracies. Trump did not criticize Modi for atrocities against minorities (unlike his predecessor, President Obama). On the contrary, the huge crowds at the “Howdi, Modi” event in Houston in 2019 and in Ahmedabad during Trump’s visit to India in February 2020 signaled Trump’s backing which helped Modi to reaffirm his support in India by marketing or politicking it as an “endorsement by the biggest global superpower.” The securitization of the “China threat” and India’s participation in the Quad further strengthened bilateral ties and provided almost a carte blanche to Modi to enervate democracy in India.

The second essay by Surupa Gupta, contrary to the first, highlights that similar mind maps of the two leaders – nationalist leaders following mercantilist economic ideology and undertaking protectionist policies – and domestic political imperatives and political constituencies led to divergence in trade and commerce between the two countries. Trump’s “America first” doctrine clashed with Modi’s “make in India” initiative and an increasingly protectionist India under Modi leading to a trade dispute between the two countries. Trump undertook harsh measures against India such as imposing tariffs, freezing several visa categories and removal of India from the Generalized System of Preference list to force change in Indian policies. India on the other hand was more cautious regarding its retaliatory measures due to the difference in the material capabilities between the two countries. Trump’s diatribes and shaming tactics further vitiated the atmosphere and exacerbated the trade tensions, with both countries unable to sign a limited trade deal.

The third essay by Kate Sullivan de Estrada highlights that although Trump and Modi are populist leaders, the two countries diverged on multilateralism. While the US under Trump retreated from and debilitated multilateralism and global governance, India under Modi surged forward and exhibited very strong commitment to global governance and multilateralism, with the Modi government criticizing Trump administration for its multilateral policies. The divergence can be explained by the difference in the populisms of the two leaders and their support base, and the different ways in which both sought to counter China’s rise. Trump’s populism stressed sovereignty with international institutions encroaching upon US freedoms, economic interests and national security with Trump resorting to great power politics in the wake of increasing China’s global influence. Modi was strongly committed to multilateralism because it helped him to enhance India’s image and his personal reputation at the global stage, and cater to his right-wing Hindu base by creating an image of India as a Hindu nation. However, Modi’s behavior was conforming to the long historic trend in India influenced by domestic factors with Modi declaring the same level of solidarity on global issues as Indian leaders before him.

During the Trump administration, there was convergence between India and the US regrading energy trade especially regarding fossil fuels such as oil, gas and coal as illustrated by Vyoma Jha in the fourth essay. While there was steady convergence on energy security and climate change during the Bush and Obama administrations, divergence arose during Trump because his administration was indifferent regrading climate change. While Trump believed that climate change was a myth, domestic politics and the fossil fuel lobby also influenced Trump administration’s policies. Modi administration wanted to tackle climate change and was proactive in its multilateral commitments because of Modi’s personal beliefs and his embrace of clean energy. Moreover, this also aided Modi to garnish his image for the domestic audience in India with New Delhi willing to fill the vacuum created by a retreating US. Other domestic factors also influenced India’s policies on climate change and embracing green energy.

The next four essays discuss India-US convergence/divergence with respect to China, Russia, Pakistan-Afghanistan and Iran. The essay on China by Deepa Ollapally and Raj Verma highlights that China’s rise was the raison d'etre for the increasing convergence and strategic alignment between the two countries. After the Galwan Valley clash, New Delhi welcomed the Trump administration’s more aggressive stand towards China, and the reinvigorated Indo-Pacific strategy and the Quad. However, this was achieved despite Trump’s idiosyncrasies and transactional approach to foreign policy. While Trump wanted India to play a more active role in countering China in the Indo-Pacific, New Delhi was unwilling to play the role of a military balancer against China. Divergences regarding India’s policy of strategic autonomy/multi-alignment, India’s historical penchant for a low-risk approach and fears of abandonment and entrapment dictated India’s policy. There was also divergence regarding the geographical expanse of the Indo-Pacific with India more focused on the Indian Ocean.

Raj Verma in his essay highlights the increasing divergence between India and the US during the Trump administration with respect to Russia due to the deteriorating Russia–US relations, antagonistic US–China relations and the strengthening China–Russia strategic partnership. Although The Trump administration like previous US administrations was aware of the time-tested India–Russia strategic partnership and strategic congruence, it wanted New Delhi to realize that Russia was an unreliable defense partner in the long term, reduce its dependence on Russian weapons systems and increase defense cooperation with the US. The Trump administration also considered imposing sanctions on India under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) for arms purchases from Russia with concerns amongst US officials that Trump might use CAATSA as a bargaining chip to get a better trade deal which may jeopardize India-US relations. However, adhering to its policy of multi-alignment and its anxieties regarding Russia’s burgeoning ties with China and Pakistan, India was unwilling to compromise its strategic partnership with Russia and give up on its defense ties with Moscow.

Stuti Bhatnagar’s essay on Pakistan-Afghanistan highlights India–US convergence and divergence with respect to the two countries which is most likely to persist in the strategic calculus of the two largest democracies. Trumps beliefs, domestic factors in both the countries and structural calculations in both countries’ security and strategic calculus led to both convergence and divergence between India and the US regarding the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. Both India and the US were concerned regarding terrorism emanating from Pakistan. Trump was critical of Pakistan’s support to terrorist organizations and even suspended military assistance, but this did not derail US-Pakistan bilateral relations significantly because Pakistan was and will continue to remain important for the US’ goals and objectives in Afghanistan. Trump’s dialogue with the Taliban and legitimizing Islamabad’s role in Afghanistan, his questioning India’s contributions in Afghanistan and his offer to mediate in the India-Pakistan rivalry ruffled feathers in New Delhi.

In the essay on Iran, Vinay Kaura argues that Trump’s personality and his beliefs, domestic politics in the US, strengthening Iran–China relations and the security dynamics in the Middle-East influenced Trump administration’s policies toward Iran and created divergence between India and the US over Iran. Trump administration’s efforts to check an expansionary Iran in the region and bring about regime change in Iran created India–US divergence because Washington was unwilling to fully accommodate New Delhi’s interests with respect to Tehran. Similarly, New Delhi’s dependence on Tehran to counterweigh Islamabad in South Asia and Central Asia, especially through the strategic Chabahar port, created obstacles for the former to accommodate the US’s interests in the region. However, this divergence did not affect the overall convergence in the bilateral ties with the Trump administration finding a middle ground by engaging and pressurizing India on the latter’s relations with Iran.

In the final essay, Anit Mukherjee argues that there was both convergence and divergence between the two countries during the Trump administration regarding the Quad. China’s flexing of economic, political, military and diplomatic muscle in the Indo-Pacific led to the reconceptualization of the Quad. Trump’s adversarial position and policies regarding China persuaded the other Quad members, especially India to shed their inhibitions. His delegative mode of governance also allowed the US government officials to engage with other member states and take due cognizance of their sensitivities and interests. Despite the convergence on Quad, divergence manifested itself over the institutionalization of the Quad and expansion of the group because India wanted/wants to establish a modus vivendi with China and New Delhi’s fear of “entrapment and abandonment” vis-à-vis the Quad. Frictions and disagreements in other issue areas such as over Russia, Pakistan, Iran and trade also cast their dark shadows over the Quad.

Some takeaways

Some key themes emerge from these essays. First, bilateral ties received a significant boost in the Modi-Trump era because of the camaraderie between the two leaders. Second, shared apprehensions about China’s rise and aggressive foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific buttressed the burgeoning bilateral relationship. Third, the Trump administration, especially President Trump, played a significant role in mitigating or exacerbating the convergence/divergence in almost all the issue areas. Fourth, during the Trump administration, India-US ties became more transactional with rhetoric of shared values taking a back seat. This was predominantly due to Trump’s cognition and the transactional nature of this foreign policy decision-making.

The following prognosis can also be made after reading the essays. First, India-US relations will further strengthen under the Joseph Biden administration despite the divergence in other areas including trade and commerce, multilateralism and global governance (although not to the same extent as under Trump) with democracy and liberal values taking a back seat, although the US administration and the Congress will time and again comment on democratic backsliding, infringement of human rights and plight of minorities in India under the Modi government.

Second, a rising, assertive and aggressive China will provide the necessary glue to further cement political, diplomatic, strategic and defense ties despite divergence/frictions in other aspects of the bilateral relationship. The US will continue to take measures to enhance India’s comprehensive national strength and augment its global status as a rising power to counter balance China in the Indo-Pacific. Third, India, will be reluctant to play the role of the balancer to China in the Indo-Pacific. India’s focus will continue to be on the Indian Ocean instead of the Pacific Ocean despite Washington seeking New Delhi to play a bigger role in the Indo-Pacific region.

Fourth, ceteris paribus, India’s policy of multi-alignment with the aim of maintaining its strategic autonomy will endure which may create frictions between New Delhi and Washington especially in the context of India–Russia relations. Fifth, the divergence on Iran will persist under Biden but can be mitigated if Tehran and Washington can reach a nuclear deal. Domestic factors in Iran will also significantly influence the trajectory of US–Iran relations and create friction between New Delhi and Washington regarding Tehran. Finally, the divergence on Pakistan-Afghanistan is also expected to continue under the Biden regime as long as Washington believes that Islamabad is (has) the solution(s) to the problems in Afghanistan.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

¹ “Joint Statement on the third India-U.S. 2 + 2 Ministerial Dialogue.” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. October 27, 2020, https://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/33145/Joint+Statement+on+the+third+IndiaUS+2432+Ministerial+Dialogue (accessed April 20, 2022).

² Raj Verma, “China’s new security concept: India, terrorism, China’s geostrategic interests and domestic stability in Pakistan,” The Pacific Review 33, no. 6 (2022): 991–1021.

³ “U.S. Security Cooperation With India.” US Department of State. January 20, 2021. https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-india/#:~:text=The%20PM%20Bureau%20supported%20the,Commercial%20Sales%20_DCS_%20processes (accessed May 1, 2022).

⁴ “Joint Statement on the Second India-U.S. 2 + 2 Ministerial Dialogue.” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. December 19, 2019. https://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/32227/Joint+Statement+on+the+Second+IndiaUS+2432+Ministerial+Dialogue (accessed April 20, 2022).

⁵ “Joint Statement on the second,” Ministry of External Affairs.

⁶ “Joint Statement on the third,” Ministry of External Affairs; “Highlights of 2020 U.S.-India 2 + 2 Ministerial Dialogue.” Press Statement, US Department of State. October 27, 2020 https://www.state.gov/highlights-of-2020-u-s-india-22-ministerial-dialogue/#:~:text=Secretary%20of%20State%20Michael%20R,Secretary%20of%20Defense%20Mark%20T.&text=During%20the%20meeting%2C%20Secretary%20Pompeo,for%20regional%20security%20and%20prosperity (accessed April 20, 2022).

⁷ “US asks India to resist China ‘aggression’ at Himalayan border” South China Morning Post, May 21, 2020, https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/south-asia/article/3085368/us-asks-india-resist-china-aggression-himalayan-border (accessed April 22, 2022).

⁸ Raj Verma, “Domestic Political Drivers and Chinese Diplomacy: Xinjiang and Counter-Terrorism in South Asia.” Asian Perspective, 44, no. 4 (2020): 561–586.

⁹ Shivshankar Menon. “League of Nationalists: How Trump and Modi Refashioned the U.S.-Indian Relationship.” Foreign Affairs (September/October 2020). https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-08-11/modi-india-league-nationalists (accessed May 2, 2022); Alyssa Ayres, “Democratic Values No Longer Define U.S.-Indian Relations: Principles Take a Back Seat to Realpolitik.” Foreign Affairs (March 11, 2020), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/india/2020-03-11/democratic-values-no-longer-define-us-indian-relations (accessed May 2, 2022).

¹⁰ Harsh V. Pant, “The India – US–China triangle from New Delhi: overcoming the ‘hesitations of history.’” India Review 18, no. 4 (2018): 386–406.

¹¹ Shubhrajeet Konwer, “US – India Relations: The Shadowboxing Era.” Strategic Analysis 44, no. 1 (2020): 15–30.

¹² Obama had also endorsed India for the UNSC seat with veto power in 2010 and 2013.

¹³ Joshy Paul, “US and India: Emerging offshore balancing in Asia.” India Review 18, no. 3 (2020): 221–242.

¹⁴ George Abraham, “Why America does not fully trust Modi.” DailyO. June 6, 2016. https://www.dailyo.in/politics/modi-in-us-human-rights-violations-religious-minorities-bjp-rss-barack-obama-hindutva/story/1/11039.html (accessed May 1, 2022).

¹⁵ David J. Singer, “The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations,” World Politics, 14, no. 1 (1961): 77–92. The problem with the “levels of analysis” is that it does not consider the interaction between the different units. It assumes that all the units behave independently of each other giving rise to the agent-structure problem in IR that is whether the agent (state and second level) influences/shapes the social structure and vice-versa. For a detailed analysis of the agent-structure problem in IR see Colin Wight, Agents, Structures and International Relations: Politics as Ontology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

¹⁶ Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).

¹⁷ FPA scholars also employ group (behavior) as a level of analysis. See Valerie M. Hudson, “Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations.” Foreign Policy Analysis 1, no. 1 (2005): 1–30.

¹⁸ Singer, “The Level-of-Analysis Problem.”

¹⁹ Singer, “The Level-of-Analysis Problem,” 90.

²⁰ Sumit Ganguly edited Engaging the World: India’s Foreign Policy Since 1947 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2016).