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ABSTRACT
This paper focuses on two assumptions oft discussed in the academic literature: that the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), the Moscow Patriarchate, and Patriarch Kirill are part and parcel of the Kremlin’s regional strategy, and that the Orthodox Churches in Eastern Europe (particularly those in former Soviet states), are appendages to the Russian Orthodox Church and also part of the Kremlin’s regional strategy, effectively creating fifth columns for the Kremlin. There is extensive academic literature debating both assumptions, particularly as regards Georgia’s and Ukraine’s relations with Russia. However, these two are not the only states on the frontlines of Russian-Western geostrategic tensions. The Baltic States, as members of both the EU and NATO, are equally vital and possibly even more so. As the English-language academic literature concerning the relationship between the Kremlin, the ROC, and the Baltic States is limited, this paper attempts to further that conversation and asks whether, by more openly embracing Baltic Orthodox churches, the Baltic governments could limit Kremlin strategic influence in the region.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes
1 For more on this, see Köllner, ed. Orthodox Religion and Politics in Contemporary Eastern Europe.
2 Cottey, ‘Astrategic Europe’.
3 Lantis and Howlett, ‘Strategic Culture’.
4 It is important to emphasise the difference in the terms Russia, and The Kremlin. The first term refers primarily to the country and its people, while the second term refers specifically to the federal government of Russia. In the literature, this second term is also often interchanged with Putins Regime, or even Putin.
5 Marsh, ‘Putins Grand Strategy’; Borshchevskaya, The Kremlins Strategic; Kuhrt and Feklyunina, eds., Assessing Russias Power; and Conley et al., The Kremlin Playbook.
6 Borshchevskaya, The Kremlins Strategic Objectives.
7 Marsh, ‘Putins Grand Strategy’.
8 Jakniūnaitė, ‘Invested in Ukraine’; and Bruģe and Bukovskis, ‘Fearing the Worst’.
9 Leustean, ‘Eastern Christianity and Politics’; Rimestad, ‘Orthodox Churches of Estonia’; Runce and Avanesova, ‘The Latvian Orthodox Church’; and Laukaitytė, ‘The Orthodox Church in Lithuania’.
10 Runce and Avanesova, ‘The Latvian Orthodox Church’.
11 Papathomas and Palli, ‘The Autonomous Orthodox Church of Estonia’.
12 According to Phidas, The Church of Estonia, in 1920 Orthodox adherents made up 20% of Estonias population, and 85–90% of those adherents were ethnically Estonian. Just as importantly, between 1945 and 1991, all three Baltic States (though, most specifically Estonia and Latvia) experienced extensive influxes of migrants from Russia and other Soviet republics who, subsequently, used Russian as their primary language and identified primarily as Orthodox, significantly altering the demographics of Orthodoxy in both Estonia and Latvia (Rimestad, ‘Orthodox Churches of Estonia’; and Runce and Avanesova, ‘The Latvian Orthodox Church’). Lithuania largely avoided this immigration and subsequent demographic and religious changes.
13 Rimestad, ‘Orthodox Churches of Estonia’, 301–303.
14 Belle Damm and Cooley, ‘Resurrection of the Russian Orthodox Church’.
15 The very concept of ethnicity is heavily debated. It is widely recognised that ethnicity is a social construct and that ethnicity is constantly changing. Therefore, the claim by the Kremlin and the ROC that they are the protectors of the Rus, or Russians becomes problematic specifically because it is impossible clearly to specify who the Rus or Russians truly are. For example, as pointed out below, many linguistic Russians in the Baltic States identify primarily as Baltic rather than Russian. Importantly for this paper, this debated concept of ethnicity, as we will see below, allows the Kremlin and the ROC to cast a much wider net based on their own determination of who qualifies as Rus or Russian.
16 Petro, ‘The Russian Orthodox Church’.
17 Leustean, ‘Eastern Orthodoxy, Geopolitics’’.
18 Diamant, ‘Orthodox Christians in Central’.
19 Suslov, ‘“Holy Rus”’; and Feklyunina, ‘Soft Power and Identity’.
20 Kilp and Pankhurst, ‘The Political Role’’.
21 Feklyunina, ‘Soft Power and Identity’; Rousselet, ‘The Church in the Service’’; Simons, ‘Perceptions of Russias Soft Power’; Goble, ‘Russian National Identity’; Fridman, ‘The Danger of “Russian Hybrid Warfare”’; and Petro, The Russian Orthodox Church’.
22 Hooper, ‘Russias “Traditional Values”’.
23 Conley et al., The Kremlin Playbook; and Tolz, ‘From a Threatening “Muslim Migrant” Back to the Conspiring “West”’.
24 Riabchuk, ‘Ukrainians as Russias Negative “Other”’.
25 See note 17 above.
26 Soroka, ‘Putins Patriarch’, 8.
27 Cleary, The Impact of Religion on Minority Identity and Community, 80. This view is shared by Kudors, ‘Orthodoxy and Politics in Latvia’, who asserts that Patriarch Kirill is detrimental for relations between the Kremlin and the Baltic States where his predecessor, Alexy, was largely seen as a positive for relations.
28 Ziegler, ‘Russia as a Nationalizing State’; and Lamoreaux and Flake, ‘The Russian Orthodox Church’.
29 Feklyunina, ‘Soft Power and Identity’, 784; Petro, ‘The Russian Orthodox Church’, 223; and Suslov, ‘“Holy Rus”’, 70.
30 Suslov, ‘“Holy Rus”’, 71.
31 Stoeckl, ‘The Russian Orthodox Church’, 144.
32 Torbakov, ‘The Russian Orthodox Church’.
33 Goble, ‘Russian National Identity’.
34 Rousselet, ‘The Church in the Service’, 51; and Soroka, ‘Putins Patriarch’, 6–7.
35 Petro, ‘The Russian Orthodox Church’, 225.
36 Torbakov, ‘The Russian Orthodox Church’, 164.
37 Mulford, ‘Non-State Actors’, 97; and Diamant, ‘Orthodox Christians in Central’.
38 Fridman, ‘The Danger of “Russian Hybrid Warfare”’; Sherlock, ‘Russian Politics and the Soviet Past’. Larrabee et al., concur with Fridman and Sherlock, but argue that while the Kremlin is not keen to engage in military conflict with the West over the Baltic States, it is able and, at a pinch, may just launch a sudden attack similar to that which happened in Crimea, 7–11.
39 Tsygankov, ‘Crafting the State-Civilization’, 151.
40 Schmidt, ‘Reflections on the Joint Declaration’, 95; and Marsh and Koesel, ‘Toward a Strategy for Engaging’, 46.
41 Petro, ‘The Russian Orthodox Church’, 221; and Simons, ‘The Russian Orthodox Church’, 5.
42 Petro, ‘The Russian Orthodox Church’, 226.
43 Jarzynska, ‘The Russian Orthodox Church’, 96.
44 In reaching out to all 10 respondents, we offered to conduct our correspondence based on anonymity. As all of our respondents agreed to our correspondence, and none of them openly stated that we could reveal their identities, they remain anonymous. The authors have a complete list of respondents. Our cleric respondents were found by contacting the respective churches via their main websites. Government respondents in Latvia and Lithuania were found on Ministry of Foreign Affairs websites. Our government respondent from Estonia was referred by our academic respondent at the University of Tallinn. The primary author has a professional relationship with all three academic respondents. Respondents included:
Government Employee, Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Government Employee, Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This interviewee was willing to talk about Latvian/Russian relations in general, and spoke in favour of governmental outreach to ethno-linguistic Russians in general, but stopped short of talking about the role of the ROC or the LaOC. Instead, on this issue they referred us to ‘Latvian State Security Services Annual Report for 2018’. Perhaps tellingly, while there was not even a mention of Orthodoxy or religion, the first several pages did cover the arrests and convictions of a few ethno-linguistic Russians for espionage on behalf of the Kremlin.
Government Employee, Estonian Ministry of the Interior
Cleric, Lithuanian Orthodox Church (LiOC)
Cleric, Latvian Orthodox Church (LaOC)
Cleric, Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church (EAOC)
Cleric, Estonian Orthodox Church – Moscow Patriarchate (EOCMP)
Academic, University of Tallinn
Academic, University of Latvia
Academic, with specific interest in Orthodoxy in Eastern Europe (in this case, naming the university would quickly identify the respondent).
45 According to Cleary, ‘The Impact if Religion on Minority Identity and Community’, nearly all adherents in the EAOC are Estonian, while nearly all adherents in the EOCMP are Russian speakers. Furthermore, almost all services in the EOCMP are in Russian.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Jeremy W. Lamoreaux
Jeremy W. Lamoreaux is professor of political science and international studies at Brigham Young University, Idaho. His research focuses on Russia, the Baltic States, NATO and the EU. He has articles in European Security, European Politics and Society, Geopolitics, Journal on Baltic Security, Journal of Baltic Studies, Palgrave Nature, and with Routledge and Rodopi. He is currently researching the Russia-EU relationship post-Brexit.
Michael Mabe
Michael Mabe is an alumnus of Brigham Young University, Idaho, with a degree in political science and international relations. His research focuses on cultural trends and how they influence political outcomes.