“If one is Orthodox, one should not strive for luxury”: political values and the changing strategies of anti-corruption CSOs in Russia

ABSTRACT

By analysing the changing strategies adopted by anti-corruption CSOs in Russia, this article sheds light on the role of political values in the anti-corruption field. We argue that the rise of a conservative discourse in Russia that places greater emphasis on values has created both limitations and opportunities for CSOs. With this ‘conservative turn’, the question of ‘foreign influence’ has gained prominence in political debates. As an effect of this discourse, the label ‘foreign’ has been applied to certain CSOs, limiting their ability to claim neutrality on the basis of expert knowledge. In the context of the fight against corruption, however, references to the ‘foreign’ are present both in the government’s rhetoric and in societal narratives. By responding to a conservative anti-corruption discourse ‘from below’, certain CSOs have adopted a new strategy of reaching out to an ideologically diverse audience to maintain their non-political positioning.

KEYWORDS:

• Anti-corruption CSOs
• Russia
• political values
• conservatism
• (de)politicization
• alternative anti-corruption narratives

Acknowledgments

This article is the output of a research project implemented as part of the Basic Research Programme at the National Research University Higher School of Economics (HSE University). We would like to thank two anonymous reviewers for their excellent comments on previous drafts of this article and Jamievee Bautista and Ruby Amanda Oboro-Offerie for providing research assistance. All remaining errors are our own. Finally, we would like to extend our warmest thanks to our interviewees for their readiness to share their thoughts and experiences with us on the topic of anti-corruption initiatives in Russia.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 Corruption, as a deviation from a standard or norm, is generally understood as a deviation from Weberian legal rationality.

2 In certain post-Soviet countries, grassroots organizations that do not receive external funding are viewed as more legitimate than an ‘engineered civil society’ (Ishkanian 2014) supported by donors.

3 In the quotes included in our analysis, some CSO workers describe their organizations as non-partizan, emphasizing their use of expertise and distinguishing themselves from other organizations. Others claim that neutrality is neither possible nor desirable. We have anonymised the interviews in order to capture how CSO workers talk about other organizations in the field and the difficulties they encounter when carrying out their activities.

4 Although it was created without external support, it received funding from foreign partners such as the World Bank.

5 The law on ‘foreign agents’ requires organizations that engage in political activity and receive foreign funding to register as foreign agents.

6 In June 2021, the Anti-Corruption Foundation, together with other organizations linked to Aleksei Navalny, was banned and classified as ‘extremist’ by the authorities.

7 Kremlin.ru: ‘Zasedanie Soveta po protivodeistviiiu korruptsii’, 26.01.2016. Available at: http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/51207 (accessed September 2020).

8 Interview with CSO worker, Moscow, March 2020. The ‘vertical of power’ in Russia refers to the strengthening of the central state and the establishment of a group of trusted and loyal collaborators around Vladimir Putin during his first term as president (Monaghan, 2012).

9 Interview with CSO worker, Moscow, July 2020.

10 Interview with CSO worker, Moscow, May 2020.

11 Interview with CSO worker, Moscow, May 2019.

12 Interview with CSO worker, Moscow, May 2019.

13 Interview with CSO worker, Moscow, May 2019. This quote refers to governmental funding for CSOs and the system of grants allocated to civil society actors whose work is in line with the government’s agenda (Fröhlich & Skokova, 2020).

14 Interview with CSO worker, Kaliningrad, August 2019.

15 Interview with CSO worker, Moscow, May 2020.

16 Interview with CSO worker, Moscow, February 2021.

17 Interview with CSO worker, Moscow, February 2021.

18 Interview with CSO worker, Kaliningrad, August 2019.

19 Interview with CSO worker, Kaliningrad, August 2019.

20 Interview with CSO worker, Moscow, May 2019.

21 Interview (1) with CSO worker, Moscow, July 2020.

22 Interview (2) with CSO worker, Moscow, July 2020.

23 Interview with CSO worker, Moscow, May 2019.

24 Interview with CSO worker, Moscow, August 2019.

25 Interview with CSO worker, Kaliningrad, August 2019.

26 Interview (1) with anti-corruption expert (former CSO worker), Moscow, October 2019. This quote refers to the process of establishing organizations that support the government’s agenda to implement state policies (as discussed above).

27 Interview with CSO worker, Moscow, October 2019.

28 Interview (1) with CSO worker, Moscow, October 2019.

29 Interview (1) with CSO worker, Moscow, October 2019.

30 Interview (1) with CSO worker, Moscow, October 2019.

31 Interview (2) with anti-corruption expert (former CSO worker), Moscow, October 2019.

32 Interview (1) with CSO worker, Moscow, October 2019.

33 Interview with CSO worker, Moscow, February 2021.

34 Interview with CSO worker, Moscow, February 2021.

35 Interview with CSO worker, Moscow, February 2021.

36 Interview with CSO worker, Moscow, May 2019.

37 Interview with CSO worker, Moscow, May 2019.

38 Interview with CSO worker, Moscow, February 2021. This worker claims that religious leaders at the international level are more outspoken than in the Russian context.

39 A CSO worker also mentions a recent attempt by the government ‘to reach out to global institutions with the aim of forming a coalition’. Interview with CSO worker, Moscow, February 2021.

40 Pavlova (2015, p. 120) further remarks that international cooperation is legitimate in the case of the Russian government, while the same transnational ties are used to delegitimise the opposition and civil society actors. A CSO worker also observes these two directions in the government’s policies: ‘We [Russia] are part of the UN; our language is an official UN one, part of the G20. I believe it is difficult to deliver this message also because of another trend in Russian society: the archaization of society. The government would like to push it in another direction, to the root, to the archaic.’ Interview with CSO worker, Moscow, May 2019.

41 Interview with expert, board member of anti-corruption CSO, Moscow, February 2021. Referring to the principal–agent model in liberal theory, she/he observes that ‘[a] harsher punishment will only increase the price of the bribe.’

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Francesca Chiarvesio

Francesca Chiarvesio is a PhD Candidate in Sociology and Research Assistant at the International Laboratory for Social Integration Studies, HSE University, Moscow.

Lili Di Puppo

Lili Di Puppo is Assistant Professor at the School of Sociology, Faculty of Social Sciences, HSE University, Moscow.