The Stakes of Radical Politics have Changed: Post-crisis, Relevance and the State

Abstract

This paper flags up one central point: given that the stakes of radical politics have changed post-crisis, and the Left is proving to be ineffective, radicals need to revisit some fundamental debates. This not only requires us to continue with those initial reflections on the economy that draw upon Keynes and Marx. Other themes need re-examination in the post-crisis light too. My article revisits the role of three: namely (1) the state, (2) ethical lifestyle politics, and (3) radical philosophy today. I conclude by suggesting that the crisis has brought about new challenges in all three areas for radicals. These are the need to (1) create a new atmosphere where representational politics is seen more positively, (2) question the growing retreat into ethics and idealism, away from political instrumentality, and (3) point out that radical philosophy and politics, while related, are different.

Este artículo marca un punto central: dado que los riesgos de las políticas radicales han cambiado después de la crisis, y la izquierda está probando ser inefectiva, los radicales necesitan volver a visitar algunos debates fundamentales. Esto no sólo requiere que continuemos con aquellas reflexiones sobre la economía que se inspira en Keynes y Marx. Otros temas que necesitan reexaminarse a la luz de la pos crisis también. Mi artículo vuelve a visitar el rol de tres: (1) el estado, (2) políticas del estilo de vida ético, y (3) filosofía radical de hoy. Concluyo sugiriendo que la crisis ha llevado a cabo nuevos retos en todas las tres áreas para los radicales. Estas son necesarias para (1) crear una nueva atmósfera a donde la política representativa sea vista más positivamente, (2) cuestionar el creciente retiro dentro de la ética y el idealismo, lejos del medio político y (3) destacar que la filosofía radical y la política, aunque se relacionan, son diferentes.

Keywords:

• radical politics
• the state
• ethical lifestyle politics
• idealism
• radical political philosophy

Acknowledgements

My sincere thanks go to Barry Gills for inviting me to write for this special issue – an edition that demonstrates how Barry has tirelessly worked to expand the post-crisis debate into new and important areas. I am also extremely grateful to two anonymous reviewers for their astute comments on a previous draft.

Notes

This paper does not cover many of the new stakes of radical politics post-crisis. For example, it does not examine how, given the dramatic changes in the global economy, China will become one of the most dominant forces shifting the stakes of radical politics in the West in years to come (see Short, 2009, for a recent discussion of this).

Here I provide a brief definition of neo-liberalism. The 1970s were defined by inflation, increased accumulation of capital, unemployment, and a variety of fiscal crises. Neo-liberalism beat another radical politics, socialism, in apparently getting to the root of the problem, overturning it, and re-defining how society functions. Neo-liberal capitalism was developed by leaders like Ronald Reagan, Margaret Thatcher, and a network of powerful international institutions, such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. Often called ‘the American Model’, low wages and high inequality are not central concerns for this system, whose primary function is the liberation of corporate power. Neo-liberal ideologies believe this increases individual freedom through stimulating private debt. In opposition to the conditions of the 1970s, neo-liberalism and free market forces became the organising framework for society. From the deregulation of business and finance, both domestically and internationally, to encourage free movement of capital; low state spending; reduction of taxes on business and wealthy individuals; encouraging cut-throat competition rather than co-respective behaviour between large corporations; an attack by the state and large corporations upon unions; increasing use of temporary and part time wage-labour; holding back on discretionary fiscal policy to reduce unemployment; and privatisation of public goods like health care and educational systems (Kotz, 2009).

In the nineteenth century Nietzsche wrote about debt being a form of social guilt. However, by the end of the twentieth century people were veraciously feeding off corporations that stimulated individualism and freedom of choice through accumulation of private debt.

For Hardt and Negri (2000) such categories include ‘mass intellectuality’, ‘immaterial labour’ and ‘general intellect’. These describe the shift toward intellectual, immaterial and communicative labour-power.

As James Martin (2009, p. 120) says, to ‘support a radical politics is, for many, more a lifestyle choice in keeping with a consumer identity than a risky personal transformation’.

As Castree (2009) points out, other factors (not discussed in this essay) would surely include: ‘organisational and financial weaknesses within the Left; the fact that New Labour's and Bush/Obama's rescue packages have taken the edge off the crisis, thus defusing some of the public's anger; the deep sedimentation of liberal values on both sides of the Atlantic, such that Left ideals of equality and mutuality seem relatively unappealing; the comparative visibility and strength of conservative and even nationalist parties and groups in both countries; and the fact that New Labour and the post-Carter Democrats stole the Left's rhetoric and deprived many voters of a more robust sense of a ‘proper’ Left programme.'