A State's Choice: Nuclear Policy in a Changing World Between Libya and North Korea

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Notes

1. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics , New York: Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 18.

2. Ibid., p. 22.

3. Scholars have tried to open the “black box”. Scott Sagan focused on the effect of bureaucracy on policy; see Scott Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search for the Bomb”, International Security , Vol. 21 No. 3, Winter 1996/1997. See also Donald Mackenzie, Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile Guidance , Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990; and Steven Flank, “Exploding the Black Box: The Historical Sociology of Nuclear Proliferation”, Security Studies , Vol. 3 No. 2, Winter 1993/1994, pp. 259–294.

4. Jervis, op. cit., p. 118.

5. Nietzsche, The Will to Power , p. 493. The inherent problem that might occur here is about the author perception. Is it objective? Nietzsche's solution was “for the purpose of preserving beings such as ourselves, such judgments (synthetic a priori judgments) must be believed to be true; although they might of course still be false judgments! Therefore, we humans need to act as if we are certain of what we are doing even though we cannot be certain.

6. Jervis, op. cit., p. 18.

7. T. V. Paul, Power Versus Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons , Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2000, p. 22.

8. A.F.K. Organski, World Politics , New York: Alfred A. Knopf (2nd edn 1968), pp. 313–335.

9. Quoted in Albert Carnesale, Paul Doty, Stanley Hoffmann, Samuel P. Huntington, Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and Scott Sagan, Living with Nuclear Weapons , Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983, p. 215.

10. Based on Ariel E. Levite, “Never Say Never Again”, International Security , Vol. 27 No. 3, Winter 2002/2003, p. 60.

11. See also Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambitions: Why States Constrain Their Nuclear Capability , Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995; Mitchell Reiss, Without the Bomb: The Politics of Nuclear Nonproliferation , New York: Columbia University Press, 1988; and Barry R. Schneider and William L. Dowdy (eds), Pulling Back from the Nuclear Brink: Reducing and Countering Nuclear Threats , London: Frank Cass, 1988.

12. Quoted in Levite, p. 74.

13. Scott Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of the Bomb”, International Security , Vol. 21 No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, pp. 54–86.

14. See also Donald Mackenzie, Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile Guidance , Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990; and Steven Flank, “Exploding the Black Box: The Historical Sociology of Nuclear Proliferation”, Security Studies , Vol. 3 No. 2, Winter 1993/1994), pp. 259–294.

15. See also Peter Liberman, “The Rise and fall of the South African Bomb”, International Security , Vol. 26 No. 2, Fall 2001, pp 45–86.

16. In a letter to President Eisenhower in 1959, de Gaulle wrote: “A France without world responsibility would be unworthy of herself, especially in the eyes of Frenchmen… It is for that reason that she intends to provide herself with an atomic armament. Only in this way can our defense and foreign policy be independent, which we prize above everything else”, Sagan, pp. 79.

17. Dirk Vandewalle, Libya since Independence: Oil and State-building , Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998, p. 122.

18. Comprehensive research on this issue was conducted by Bahgat Gawdat, “Oil, Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Libyan Diplomatic Coup”, The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies , Winter 2004, pp. 373–394.

19. Seif El-Islam claimed that, until recently, Israel was indeed a threat, but that “things have changed” – the Palestinians no longer want military aid, but rather prefer political aid, such that “the Arab-Israeli conflict is no longer Libya's concern after the Arabs have chosen peace”. He nevertheless stressed that “Libya will not recognize or negotiate with Israel”, and called upon Israeli Jews of Libyan descent to return to Libya and “give up the lands taken from the Palestinians”, El-Zaman , 23 March 2004.

20. Seif El-Islam stated that Libya is destined to distance itself even more from “the so-called Middle East”, having decided to promote a comprehensive policy of reform instead of the “no longer necessary” continued investment in the military sector, Libyan News Agency , 13 October 2004.

21. This was well illustrated in the area of military procurement. After announcing that it would abandon its nuclear program, Libya also announced that it would discontinue any military or economic co-operation with countries identified with the proliferation of unconventional weapons, and that it would no longer trade in missile technologies with countries that had not signed international anti-proliferation treaties – namely Iran, North Korea and Syria, Libyan News Agency , 13 May 2004. On the other hand, it expressed its wish to procure from the United States 22 aircraft for civilian purposes, Reuters , 17 June 2004.

22. The regime has largely been successful in its struggle against terrorism, relying on its traditional foundations (the loyalty and effectiveness of security organizations; forcefulness against those identified as opposed to the regime; a delicate balance of power in top political ranks; and effective information campaigns) to prevent any threat to its centralist nature.

23. See a detailed analysis by Michael J. Mazarr, North Korea and the Bomb: A Case Study in Nonproliferation , New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995, pp. 25–28.

24. Roger Dingman, “Atomic Diplomacy during the Korean War”, International Security , Vol. 13 No. 3, Winter 1988–1989, pp. 60–86.

25. The United States positioned 280mm nuclear artillery shells and short-range nuclear missiles in South Korea. See http://www.nti.org for information on US–North Korean relations during and after the Korean War (1950–1953).

26. Suh Dae Sook, Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader, New York: Columbia University Press, 1988, p. 143.

27. Marcus Noland, Korea after Kim Jong-Il, Washington DC: Institute for International Economics, 2004.

28. Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “North Korea's Nuclear Program 2005”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists , Vol. 61 No. 3, May/June 2005, pp. 64–67.

29. No major deference (less then 5 per cent) indicated between the economic statuses of the states before the “year of change” (2003).

30. The three states have faced massive international pressure during 1991–2003.

31. Graham E. Fuller, “The Intractable Problem of Regional Powers”, Orbis , Vol. 40, Fall 1996, pp. 609–622