![Sample our Politics & International Relations journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5947/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Politics-International-Relations.jpg"})
Notes
1. Shaun Gregory is Head of the Department of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford, UK, and Director of the Pakistan Security Research Unit (PSRU). He was formerly Visiting Fellow at the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad (ISSI), Visiting Associate of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA), New Delhi, and Visiting Professor at l’Institut d’Etudes Politiques, Sciences-Po, Paris. The author is indebted to Jamie Revill for research support for this paper and to Rodney Jones, Rifaat Hussain, and Bruno Tertrais for discussion on various points.
2. Many studies have addressed nuclear command and control issues in South Asia. Among the best are: Zafar Iqbal Cheema, “Pakistan's Nuclear Use Doctrine and Command and Control”, in Peter R. Lavoy et al, Planning the Unthinkable, New York: Cornell University Press, 2000, pp. 123–145, and Zia Mian, A Nuclear Tiger by the Tail: Some Problems of Command and Control in South Asia, PU/CEES Report No. 328, June 2001.
3. By nuclear infrastructure the author is referring to the nuclear weapons, their delivery systems and the command and control arrangements, which support the negative and positive control of the weapons.
4. For an excellent overview of this clandestine network and the process by which Pakistan acquired nuclear technology see Gordon Corera, Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity and the Rise and Fall of the AQ Khan Network, London: Hurst and Company, 2006.
5. On Pakistan's nuclear history see Zahid Malik, Dr AQ Khan and the Islamic Bomb, Hurmat Publications, 1992, and Shahid ur Rehman, Long Road to Chagai, Print Wise Press, 1999.
6. Sean P. Witchell, “Pakistan's ISI: The Invisible Government”, International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Vol. 16 No. 3, 2003, pp. 374–388.
7. However, more than fences and guards are needed to assure security. Fundamental shifts in mind-set and strategic culture are also necessary and take time. See Ivan Khripunov, “Nuclear Security: Attitude Check”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January/February 2005.
8. Of many good sources see: http://www.ceip.org/files/pdf/Deadly_Arsenals_Chap11.pdf, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/index.html and http://www.cdi.org/issues/nuke f&f/database/panukes.html.
9. Data drawn from http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Pakistan/index.html, Deadly Arsenals, Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005 at http://www.proliferationnews.org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/pakistan, and http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/Pakistan/facility/fatehjung.htm.
10. See respectively: Benazir Bhutto, quoted in “No PM Knew About Country's N-capacity: Benazir”, The News International, Pakistan (Internet edition), 24 October 1999 and Strobe Talbot, Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy and the Bomb, Washington DC: Brookings Institute, 2004, pp. 154–169.
11. See, for example, Mary Anne Weaver, Pakistan: In the Shadow of Jihad and Afghanistan, Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 2002, pp. 21–22. Musharraf was, after all, the architect of the Kargil misadventure.
12. Ahmad Tariq Karim, “Pakistan: Stalking Armageddon?”, Contemporary South Asia, Vol. 10 No. 1, Spring 2001, pp. 131–149.
13. See James Thomson, Psychological Aspects of Nuclear War, John Wiley, 1985 and Norman F. Dixon, On the Psychology of Military Incompetence, London: Pimlico Press, 1994.
14. Paul ’t Hart, Groupthink in Government, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1994.
15. See Ahmad Faruqui, “Failures in Command: Lessons from Pakistan's Indian Wars, 1947–1999”, Defense & Security Analysis, Vol. 17 No. 1, 2001, pp. 31–40. See also his Rethinking the National Security of Pakistan: The Price of Strategic Myopia,Ashgate Books, 2003, esp. Ch. 2, 4 and 5, and Sumit Ganguly, The Origins of War in South Asia: The Indo-Pakistani Conflicts Since 1947, Boulder: Westview Press, 1994.
16. Maleeha Lodhi, “Anatomy of a Debacle”, Newsline, July 1999.
17. Cotta-Ramusino and Maurizio Martelline, Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Stability and Nuclear Strategy in Pakistan, Landau Network – Centro Volta, January 2002.
18. The interview was conducted in Rawalpindi in March 2005.
19. In 2004, an unremarked article appeared in the UK's Daily Telegraphclaiming that the USA had provided Pakistan with a missile launch code system to prevent the unauthorized use of Pakistan's nuclear missiles. See David Blair, “Code Changes ‘Secure’ Pakistan Warheads”, Daily Telegraph, 9 February 2004.
20. There has been much speculation that the USA may have transferred PAL technology to Pakistan, something Pakistan has denied. Technology transfer does indeed seem unlikely given the risks of exposure in relation to the NPT and the risks of sensitive US technology finding its way into Chinese hands. Pakistan has indeed denied any technical assistance from abroad with safety and security issues. See “Outside Help in Protecting N-assets Denied”, Dawn, 8 February 2004.
21. Under US pressure General Pervez Musharraf has made a very public effort post-9/11 to impose discipline on the ISI, Pakistan's leading intelligence agency, including replacement of successive ISI Directors and by imposing three-year service rotation on ISI staff. This speaks of a lack of trust of the ISI prior to 9/11 and makes the ISI an unlikely guardian of Pakistan's nuclear codes. Further no ISI representative sits formally on the NCA.
22. For details of Pakistan's National Command Authority and chain of command see Rizwan Zeb, “David Versus Goliath? Pakistan's Nuclear Doctrine: Motivations, Principles and Future”, Defense and Security Analysis, Vol. 22 No. 4, December 2006, pp. 394–397.
23. Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, The Armed Forces of Pakistan, London: Allen and Unwin, 2002 and Brian Cloughley, A History of the Pakistan Army, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
24. See Jane's Military Communications, private subscription at http://jmc.janes.com/ public/jmc/index.shtml and Jane's C4I, private subscription at http://jc4i.janes. com/public/jc4i/index.shtml; see also ICPS Website, Military-Databases Pakistan at http://www.ipcs.org/Military.jsp.
25. “Harris Corporation awarded $68 million to provide Falcon II for Pakistan”, Pakistan Defense, available at http://www.pakistan.com/news/MonthlyNews Archive/2005/Feb 2005.htm.
26. The US Pressler Amendments in place from 1990 prohibited the transfer of military communications technology from the US to Pakistan, though this did not stop some US companies seeking to circumvent Pressler. See, for example, “Raytheon to Make $25million Pakistan Settlement”, AP News, 27 February 2003.
27. This famous incident had been subject to extensive scrutiny, though little attention has been placed on the issue of communications connectivity. See, for example, Mary Anne Weaver, Pakistan: In the Shadow of Jihad and Afghanistan, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2002, pp. 11–17; see also the General's own account in Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006, pp. 120–134.
28. India has had Israeli support in accessing state of the art electronic warfare systems. See “New Electronic Warfare System Developed”, Businessline, 21 January 2004; and “Samyukta Presented to the Army”, The Hindu, 20 January 2004.
29. See: “Paksat Project” (2005) available at http://www.paksat.com.pk.
30. A. A. Khan, “Pakistan Communications Restored”, BBC News Online, 8 July 2005, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/4664983.stm.
31. Zia Mian et al, “Early Warning in South Asia: Constraints and Implications”, Science and Global Security, Vol. 11 No. 1, 2003, pp. 109–150.
32. See Desmond Ball, “Signals Intelligence in Pakistan”, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 18 No. 2, May 1995, pp. 195–214.
33. Statement of President Musharraf quoted in “Pakistan to Launch Remote Sensing System”, Dawn, 22 August 2005, p. 1.
34. Pakistan launched two earlier satellites platforms to test a range of technologies. BADR-A launched in 1990 failed after 46 days; BADR-B launched in December 2001 is still in orbit but passes over Pakistan only for 10–15 minute intervals with limited CCD camera capability.
35. Pakistan can have little confidence in either to aid it should a regional nuclear drama unfold. The USA abandoned Pakistan to its fate in the wars of 1965 and 1971, and forced an ignominious retreat on Pakistan in 1999. China has proven similarly unwilling to risk being embroiled in conflict on Pakistan's behalf.
36. An aircraft, which took off well within the outer arc of Pakistan's radars could, for example, be on targets much more rapidly. The performance of each of the radar systems erodes steeply in relation to small targets such as cruise or standoff missiles.
37. As a comparator Pakistan was unable or unwilling to do anything to prevent the heavy Indian air assaults on Pakistani positions around Kargil at the height of the crisis in 1999. See Jasjit Singh (ed.), Kargil 1999: Pakistan's Fourth War for Kashmir, Knowledge World Press, 1999, pp. 144–188.
38. One-point safety refers to a complex US nuclear doctrinal idea which, greatly simplified, means that a nuclear weapon is fail-safe in relation to any individual unintended external force (physical, electrical, etc) applied to the weapon.
39. There has been speculation that Pakistan operates a three-person rule, but that has not been stated officially and may simply be rhetorical one-upmanship.
40. Interview with General Kidwai. A higher figure of 10,000 personnel has also been suggested. The author is grateful to Bruno Tertrais for discussions on this point. As the “eyes and ears” of the Chief of the Army, the MI may also have a role in monitoring the ISI for the President. See Owen Bennett-Jones, Pakistan; Eye of the Storm, Vanguard Press, 2002, pp. 238–241.
41. Zeb, op cit., p. 396.
42. “Musharraf Says Nuclear Arsenal in Safe Hands, US Not So Sure”, Dawn, 16 October 2000.
43. This point is made by John Pike of the FAS, quoted in Aziz Haniffa, “Pakistan Missile Base said to be Easy Target”, India Abroad, 24 March 2000.
44. For this and an elaboration of Sagan's nuclear pessimism see Scott Sagan, “Perils of Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia”, Asian Survey, Vol. 41 No. 6, 2001, pp. 1064–1086.
45. There are multiple reasons for making this argument, not least that civil nuclear personnel are not subject to equivalent degrees of security clearance and monitoring, civil nuclear sites do not have in place similar levels of physical security, and the military has only limited oversight of activities within the civil nuclear sector, a point Musharraf has made many times in denying knowledge of the activities of A. Q. Khan.
46. Jordan Seng, “Less is More: Command and Control Advantages of Minor Nuclear States”, Security Studies, Vol. 6 No. 4, Summer 1997, pp. 50–92.
47. These main airbases capable of supporting nuclear weapons operations are understood to be: Chaklala, Chander, Faisal, Kamra, Kohat, Masroor, Mianwali, Mirpur Khas, Multan, Murid, Nawabshah, Peshawar, Rafiqui, Risalpur, Samungli, Sargodha, Shahbaz, Sukkur and Vihari.
48. One notable exception to this is the missile and possible warhead component storage facility at Sargodha to the west of Lahore, little more than 120 miles from the Indian border and a short thrust across the plains between Amritsar and Lahore.
49. For an excellent overview of this relationship see Zahid Hussain, Frontline Pakistan, IB Tauris, 2007.
50. Hassan Abbas, Pakistan's Drift Into Extremism”, M. E. Sharpe Press, 2005.
51. “We are walking into the American Trap”, Rediff.com, 12 February 2004, at http://www.rediff.com/news/2004/feb/12inter.htm.
52. Kathy Gannon, I is For Infidel, Public Affairs Press, 2005, pp. 127–149.
53. Discussions in Islamabad.
54. Musharraf has been subject to at least seven known assassination attempts. See for example “Pakistani Links Military to failed Plot to Kill Him”, New York Times, 28 May 2004, p. 12.
55. Ron Suskind, The One Percent Doctrine, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006, pp. 155–157 and 204–206.
56. On this latter point, an important example is the meetings of two of Pakistan's top nuclear scientists with al-Qaeda operatives and Osama Bin Laden himself in 2000 and 2001. See Corera, op cit., pp. 161–164. A useful analysis of the motivations and objectives of nuclear terrorism can be found in Robin Frost, Nuclear Terrorism After 9/11, Adelphi Paper 378, IISS, December 2005, pp. 55–62.
57. Zahid Hussain, op. cit.
58. “Musharraf on the Tightrope”, The Economist, 13 October 2001, pp. 22–23.
59. Anwar Iqbal, “US Contingency plans for Pakistani Nukes”, The Washington Times/UPI, 19 January 2005.
60. On Kargil 1999 see Ashley Tellis, Christine Fair et al, Limited Conflict Under the Nuclear Umbrella: India and Pakistan: Lessons from the Kargil Crisis, Santa Monica: RAND, November 2001. For the Indian view see; Jasjit Singh (ed.), Kargil: Pakistan's Fourth War for Kashmir, New Delhi: South Asia Books/ IDSA, October 1999; for Pakistan's position see Shireen Mazari, The Kargil Conflict 1999: Separating Fact From Fiction, Islamabad: ISS, 2003; Shaukat Qadir, “An Analysis of the Kargil Crisis”, RUSI Journal, April 2002, pp. 24–30; and Farzuna Shakoor, “The Kargil Crisis: An Analysis”, Pakistan Horizon, Vol. 52 No. 3, July 1999, pp. 49–65. On the 2001/2002 stand-off see V. K. Sood and Pravin Sawhney, Operation Parakram: The War Unfinished, New Delhi: Sage Press, 2003. See also: Arzan Tarapore, Holocaust or Hollow Victory: Limited War in South Asia, IPCS Research Papers, February 2005. S. Kalyanaraman, “Operation Parakram: An Indian Exercise in Coercive Diplomacy”, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 26 No. 4, October–December 2002, p. 485. The whole article repays reading pp. 478–492.For an insightful discussion see Rajesh Basrur, “Coercive Diplomacy in a Nuclear Environment: The December 13 Crisis”, in Rafiq Dossani and Henry S. Rowen, Prospects for Peace in South Asia, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005, pp. 301–325.
61. A powerful case is however made by Sumit Ganguly and Devin T. Hagerty, Fearful Symmetry: India-Pakistan Crises in the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons, University of Washington Press, October 2006.
62. See S. Gregory, Rethinking Strategic Stability in South Asia, SASSU Report No. 3, September 2005. See also, Michael Quinlan, “How Robust is India–Pakistan Deterrence?”, Survival, Vol. 4 No. 4, Winter 2000, pp. 141–154.