Risk communication within military decision-making: pedagogic considerations

ABSTRACT

Risk management is a decision-support process and a vital tool for military planning and decision-making. Today, several nations utilize risk-based approaches to analyze the level of security in military operations. There are both strengths and challenges in applying risk-based approaches to support military decisions. In this article, the challenges related to risk communication are investigated with the aim of describing how a military organization should train to create a good environment for effective risk communication. The analysis finds that it is important for the organization to define and consistently use a shared risk understanding. Such a shared risk understanding will need a systematic development process that focuses on the future decision makers’ and analysts’ education and training. To reach understanding, all involved parties must have the chance to identify the problem, reflect on its implications, test different solutions and develop a solution.

KEYWORDS:

• Risk communication
• pedagogic considerations
• military decision-making
• risk management
• uncertainties
• risk understanding

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

ORCiD

Hans Liwång http://orcid.org/0000-0002-8968-9793

Notes

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31. Ibid.

32. Ibid.

33. Thompson, op. cit., in note 6.

34. Bakx and Nyce, op. cit., in note 26.

35. Boholm, op. cit., in note 6.

36. Thompson, op. cit., in note 6.

37. Ibid.

38. Boholm, op. cit., in note 6.

39. Gibson et al., op. cit. note 29.

40. Thompson, op. cit., in note 6.

41. Gibson et al., op. cit., in note 29.

42. Ibid.

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52. Liwång, Ericson, and Bang, op. cit., in note 3.

53. Liwång, op. cit., in note 47; Bakx and Nyce, op. cit., in note 26.

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55. Turner and Tennant, op. cit., in note 8.

56. Friesl, Sackmann, and Kremser, op. cit., in note 12. Moorkamp et al., op. cit., in note 7; Tardy, op. cit., in note 7.

57. Liwång, op. cit., in note 47; Liwång, Ericson, and Bang, op. cit., in note 3.

58. Turner and Tennant, op. cit., in note 8.

59. Liwång, op. cit., in note 47; Liwång, Ericson, and Bang, op. cit., in note 3.

60. Liwång, op. cit., in note 47.

61. Frosdick, op. cit., in note 4.

62. Bakx and Richardson, op. cit., in note 1; Turner and Tennant, op. cit., in note 8.

63. Liwång, op. cit., in note 47.

64. Thompson, op. cit., in note 6.

65. NRC, ‘Appendix N–2, Making Full Use of Scientific Information in Risk Assessment’, in Science and Judgment in Risk Assessment, ed. National Research Council (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1994).

66. Ibid.

67. Bakx and Nyce, op. cit., in note 26.

68. Lundqvist, op. cit., in note 46.

69. Turner and Tennant, op. cit., in note 8.