Being there: US Navy organisational culture and the forward presence debate

ABSTRACT

This article argues that the US Navy’s roles (which have historically been bifurcated between warfighting and political use of force) manifest in its organisational culture as two different concepts of war: the US Navy as diplomatic actor and the US Navy as warfighting force. The conflict between these different concepts of war can be seen in the current debate about the definition and function of presence. The debate about presence is not just theoretical, but represents a deep and enduring conflict within the Navy as an organisation about its concept of war. Since the end of WWII, the Navy has been designing its fleet architecture according to a Mahanian concept of war, despite the preponderance of non-lethal missions and activities. The result is a mismatch between platforms and tasks.

KEYWORDS:

• US Navy
• organisational culture
• presence
• military diplomacy
• concepts of war

Acknowledgement

The author would like to thank Peter Dombrowski and Jonathan Caverley for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor

Montgomery “Mitzy” McFate is a professor at the US Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. Formerly, she was the Senior Social Scientist for the US Army’s Human Terrain System. She has held positions at RAND and the Institute for Defense Analyses, and the US Navy’s Office of Naval Research, where she was awarded a Distinguished Public Service Award by the Secretary of the Navy. She has served on the Army Science Board and the Defense Science Board, and was an instructor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Dr. McFate received a BA from UC Berkeley, a PhD in Anthropology from Yale University, and a JD from Harvard Law School. She is the editor of Social Science Goes to War (Oxford University Press, 2015) and author of Military Anthropology (Oxford University Press, 2018). She was a key contributor to US Army Field Manual 3–24, Counterinsurgency.

Notes

1 Peter Fanta quoted in Sydney J. Freedberg Jr, ‘Navy’s Dilemma: What Kind of Presence?’ Breaking Defense (January 19, 2016), https://breakingdefense.com/2016/01/navys-dilemma-what-kind-of-presence/

2 Stephen Van Evera, ‘The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War’, International Security 9, no. 1 (1984): 58–107; Alastair Finlan, Contemporary Military Culture and Strategic Studies: US and UK Armed Forces in the 21st Century (London: Routledge, 2013); Mikael Weissmann and Peter Ahlström, ‘Mirror, Mirror on the Wall, Who is the Most Offensive of them all? – Explaining the Offensive Bias in Military Tactical Thinking’, Defence Studies (2019). doi: 10.1080/14702436.2019.1599287

3 US Navy, ‘Mission’ (undated), https://www.navy.com/about/mission.html

4 One possible exception might be Operation Praying Mantis in 1988.

5 Jerry Hendrix and Benjamin Armstrong, ‘The Presence Problem: Naval Presence and National Strategy’, CNAS Report (January 2016): 4.

6 Kevin Rowlands, ‘Decided Preponderance at Sea: Naval Diplomacy in Strategic Thought’, The Naval War College Review 65, no. 4 (Autumn 2012): 89.

7 Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, Force Without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1976), 38.

8 Philip D. Zelikow, ‘Force without War, 1975–1982’, Journal of Strategic Studies 7, no. 1 (March 1984): 35.

9 W. Eugene Cobble, H. H. Gaffney and Dmitry Gorenburg, For the Record: All U.S. Forces’ Responses to Situations, 1970–2000 (with additions covering 2000–2003) (Washington, DC: CNAS, 2005).

10 Kevin Rowlands, Naval Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War Global Order (dissertation, King’s College London, 2015), 144, note 15. The sum is more than 100% because the two are not mutually exclusive and purposes are rarely binary.

11 Ibid., 48.

12 Peter M. Swartz, Sea Changes: Transforming U.S. Navy Deployment Strategy: 1775–2002 (Alexandriz, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 2002), 102.

13 Blechman and Kaplan, Force Without War, 13.

14 Edward Rhodes, Jonathan M. Dicicco, Sarah S. Milburn and Thomas C. Walker, Presence, Prevention, and Persuasion: A Historical Analysis of Military Force and Political Influence (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books 2003), 4–5.

15 Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (2015), 9.

16 Chief of Naval Operations, Design for Maritime Superiority, version 2.0 (Washington, DC: US Navy, December 2018), 6, 14.

17 Edgar H. Schein, “‘Three Cultures of Management: The Key to Organisational Learning’,” Sloane Review (Fall 1996): 11. Available at: https://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/three-cultures-of-management-the-key-to-organisational-learning/

18 While this is my own definition of organisational culture, there are many alternative definitions. See Edgar H. Schein, Organisational Culture and Leadership, 4th ed. (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2010); H. Trice and J. Beyer, ‘Studying Organisational Cultures through Rites and Ceremonials’, Academy of Management Review 9, (1984): 653–69; Peter J. Frost, Larry F. Moore, Meryl Reis Louis, Craig C. Lundberg and Joanne Martin, eds., Reframing Organisational Culture (Sage, 1991).

19 Robert L. O’Connell, Sacred Vessels: The Cult of the Battleship and the Rise of the U.S. Navy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); William M. McBride, Technological Change and the United States Navy, 1865–1945 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000); Peter Karsten, The Naval Aristocracy: The Golden Age of Annapolis and the Emergence of Modern American Navalism (New York: The Free Press, 1972); Roger W. Barnett, Navy Strategic Culture: Why the Navy Thinks Differently (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2009).

20 Barnett, Navy Strategic Culture, 57–73.

21 Sir John Fisher quoted in Barbara W. Tuchman, The Guns of August: The Outbreak of World War I (New York: Random House, 1992), 387. The same idea of self-reliance and adaptability is found in Design for Maritime Superiority, 7: “We strive to accomplish what needs to be done, even in the absence of direct orders”.

22 Barnett, Navy Strategic Culture, 68–73.

23 Michael A. Palmer, Command at Sea: Naval Command and Control since the Sixteenth Century (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 320–21.

24 Admiral Burke quoted in Jerry MacArthur Hultin, ‘The Business behind War Fighting’, United States Naval Institute Proceedings (September 1999): 59. See also Design for Maritime Superiority, 7.

25 S. Rebecca Zimmerman, Kimberly Jackson, Natasha Lander, Colin Roberts, Dan Madden and Rebeca Orrie, Movement and Maneuver: Culture and the Competition for Influence among the U.S. Military Services (Santa Monica: RAND, 2019), 53.

26 Barnett, Navy Strategic Culture, 80. A related theme in Navy culture is “command by negation”: “in which the subordinate commander, guided by a broad understanding of his superior commander’s intentions, acts within his own significant discretion unless his superior specifically negates, or vetoes, his actions … ” Idem, 81.

27 Karl Builder, Masks of War (Washington, DC: RAND, 1989), 131.

28 Ibid., 132.

29 For a variety of different definitions of the US Navy’s missions, see Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (2015), section 3 and Stansfield Turner, ‘Missions of the US Navy’, US Naval War College Review 26, no. 5 (1974): 3.

30 For a history see George Feifer, Breaking Open Japan: Commodore Perry, Lord Abe, and American Imperialism in 1853 (New York: Smithsonian Books, 2006). For a typical treatment of Perry’s leadership, see David Skaggs, Oliver Hazard Perry: Honor, Courage, and Patriotism in the Early U.S. Navy (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2006). In 2009, the US Navy launched the USNS Matthew Perry, a combat logistics force ship that will help the Navy maintain global forward presence. Bill Doughty ‘Warrior-Diplomat Commodore M.C. Perry Honored, Remembered’, Navy.mil, August 17, 2009, http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=47632.

31 B. A. Fiske, ‘The Diplomatic Responsibility of the United States Navy’, US Naval Institute Proceedings 40 (May/June 1914); Charles Oscar Paullin, Diplomatic Negotiations of American Naval Officers, 1778–1883 (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1912); Rowlands, ‘Decided Preponderance at Sea’, 89–105.

32 See, for example, Peter D. Haynes, Toward a New Maritime Strategy: American Naval Thinking in the Post-Cold War Era (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2015).

33 Peter D. Haynes, American Naval Thinking in The Post-Cold War Era: The U.S. Navy and The Emergence of a Maritime Strategy, 1989–2007 (dissertation, Naval Postgraduate School, June 2013), 107.

34 Interview, 2017. In general, Admiral Richardson believes in a balance of presence and warfighting. “It’s a logical trap to try and describe a navy in terms of one dimension — presence or posture, capability or capacity. The nation expects rightly so for us to deliver a navy that balances both of those”. CNO Admiral Richardson, quoted in Sydney J. Freedberg Jr, ‘Navy’s Dilemma: What Kind of Presence?’ Breaking Defense (January 19, 2016), https://breakingdefense.com/2016/01/navys-dilemma-what-kind-of-presence/

35 Julian Corbett, England in the Seven Years’War—A Study in Combined Strategy (London: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1907), 6. For an overview on the concept of naval diplomacy see J. J. Widen, ‘Naval Diplomacy—A Theoretical Approach’, Diplomacy & Statecraft 22 (2011): 715–733.

36 Builder, Masks of War, 133.

37 Ibid., 135.

38 Haynes, Toward a New Maritime Strategy, 6.

39 Blechman and Kaplan, Force Without War, 12.

40 Ibid., 54.

41 James David Meernik, Political Use of Military Force in US Foreign Policy (New York: Routlege, 2004).

42 Edward Rhodes, et al., Presence, Prevention, and Persuasion, 2.

43 Daniel Gouré and Rebecca Grant, ‘U.S. Naval Options for Influencing Iran’, Naval War College Review 62, no. 4 (2009): 13.

44 Joseph L. Votel, Charles T. Cleveland, Charles T. Connett and Will Irwin, ‘Unconventional Warfare in the Gray Zone’, Joint Forces Quarterly 80 (Jan. 1, 2016).

45 David Capie, ‘Structures, Shocks and Norm Change: Explaining the Late Rise of Asia's Defence Diplomacy’, Contemporary Southeast Asia 35, no. 1 (April 2013): 1–26.

46 Kristin Gunness, ‘China's Military Diplomacy in An Era of Change’, paper presented to the National Defense University symposium on ‘China's Global Activism: Implications for U.S. Security Interests’, National Defense University, 20 June 2006, 2; John S. Van Oudenaren and Benjamin E. Fisher, ‘Foreign Military Education as PLA Soft Power’, Parameters 46, no. 4 (Winter 2016–17).

47 Van Oudenaren and Fisher, ‘Foreign Military Education as PLA Soft Power’, 107.

48 See, for example, Sebastian Brun, ‘From Show of Force to Naval Presence, and Back Again: The U.S. Navy in the Baltic, 1982–2017’, Defense & Security Analysis 35, no. 2, (2019): 117–32.

49 Rhodes et al., Presence, Prevention, and Persuasion, 394.

50 Ibid., 395.

51 Edward Rhodes, Jonathan M. Dicicco, Sarah S. Milburn and Thomas C. Walker, ‘Forward Presence and Engagement’, Naval War College Review 53, no. 1 (Winter 2000).

52 Sam J. Tangredi, ‘The Rise and Fall of Naval Forward Presence’, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 125 (May 2000): 28–33; Bradford Dismukes, National Security Strategy and Forward Presence: Implications for Acquisition and Use of Forces (Washington, DC: Center for Naval Analyses, 1994), 76.

53 Many thanks to CPT Geoffrey S. Gage for this observation. Unofficially, presence has been defined as both a posture and a mission – however ambiguous. Dismukes, ‘National Security Strategy’, 76.

54 Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (2015), section 3. This has changed over time. In an influential article in 1974 Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner USN explained what he saw as the US Navy’s four missions – strategic deterrence, sea control, projection of power ashore, and naval presence, which he claimed were the products of an evolutionary process. Stansfield Turner, ‘Missions of the US Navy’, 3.

55 Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (2015), 2.

56 Henry J. Hendrix, ‘An Influential “Shaping” Navy’, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 137, no. 2 (February 2011): 23.

57 Swartz, Sea Changes, 101.

58 Lynn E. Davis, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Melanie W. Sisson, Stephen M. Worman and Michael J. McNerney, U.S. Overseas Military Presence What Are the Strategic Choices? (Washington, DC: RAND, 2012), 4. In contrast, the cumulative military forces, bases and activities constitutes the overall US global security posture.

59 JP 1-02, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. Similarly, Bradford Dismukes defines presence in terms of effects: “operating forces forward to influence what foreign governments think and do”. Dismukes, ‘Forward Presence’, 1.

60 Doctrine Centre, Joint Doctrine Publication 0-10, UK Maritime Power (5th ed.), (Shrivenham, UK: Ministry of Defence, October 2017).

61 CAPT. Robert C. Rubel, USN (Ret.), ‘Cede No Water: Strategy, Littorals, and Flotillas’, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 139, no. 9 (September 2013): 40–5.

62 White House, National Security Strategy, 25.

63 Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), 34.

64 White House, National Security Strategy, 47.

65 Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (2015), 2

66 Ibid., i.

67 Design for Maritime Superiority, 15.

68 Swartz, ‘Sea Changes’.

69 Hendrix, ‘An Influential “Shaping” Navy’.

70 Haynes, Toward a New Maritime Strategy, 5.

71 Christopher P. Cava, ‘Interview: Admiral John B. Nathman’, Defense News, 4 August 2006.

72 Larissa Forster, Influence without Boots on the Ground: Seaborne Crisis Response (Newport: Naval War College Press, 2013), 14.

73 See, for example, James Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy, 1919–1979 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1981); Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-first Century (New York: Routledge, 2009); Ken Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy (New York: Crane Russak, 1977).

74 Adm. James Foggo III, ‘Forward Deployed Diplomacy: 200,000 Tons Strong’, US Naval Institute Blog, 2 May 2019, https://blog.usni.org/posts/2019/05/02/forward-deployed-diplomacy-200000-tons-strong

75 Dismukes, National Security Strategy, 14–5.

76 Foggo III, ‘Forward Deployed Diplomacy’.

77 Harlan Ullman, ‘Power, Politics, Perceptions and Presence: What’s it all about?’ in Naval Forward Presence: Present Status, Future Prospect, ed. Daniel Gouré (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 1997), 42.

78 Hendrix and Armstrong, The Presence Problem, 14.

79 Robert E. Looney, ‘Market Effects of Naval Presence in a Globalized World: A Research Summary’, in Globalization and Maritime Power, ed. Sam J. Tangredi (University Press of the Pacific, 2004), 5.

80 Robert J. Carr, ‘The Mission is Warfighting, Not Relief’, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 136 (December 2010): 10.

81 Robert C. Rubel, ‘Straight Talk on Forward Presence’, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 141, no. 3 (Mar 2015): 24–9. Italics added.

82 Daniel Gouré, ‘The Tyranny of Foreign Presence’, Naval War College Review 54, no. 3 (Summer 2001): 16.

83 See also Design for Maritime Superiority, 8.

84 Dismukes, National Security Strategy, 14.

85 Gouré, ‘The Tyranny of Foreign Presence’, 16.

86 Ullman, ‘Power, Politics, Perceptions and Presence’, 42. The Navy’s 1994 Forward  …  From the Sea, codified that the “primary purpose of forward-deployed naval forces is to project American power from the sea to influence events ashore in the littoral regions of the world across the operational spectrum of peace, crisis and war”. Jay L. Johnson, Forward . . . From the Sea (Washington, DC: U.S. Navy, March 1997).

87 Gouré, ‘The Tyranny of Foreign Presence’, 16.

88 Steven Wills, ‘The Effect of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 on Naval Strategy, 1987–1994’, Naval War College Review 69, no. 2 (2016): 26.

89 See DOD Directive 5100.1, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Components, 25 September 1987 (mimeograph), 11–13.

90 Builder, Masks of War, 31.

91 Wills, ‘The Effect of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 on Naval Strategy, 1987–1994’, 28.

92 Haynes, Toward a New Maritime Strategy, 244.

93 Ibid., 244.

94 Haynes, Toward a New Maritime Strategy, 244.

95 Wills, ‘The Effect of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 on Naval Strategy, 1987–1994’, 37.

96 Don M. Snider, ‘The US Military in Transition to Jointness: Surmounting Old Notions of Interservice Rivalry’, Air and Space Power Journal (Fall 1996): 19.

97 Bryan Walker and Sarah A. Soule, ‘Changing Company Culture Requires a Movement, Not a Mandate’, Harvard Business Review (June 20, 2017); K. Grint, ‘Determining the Indeterminacies of Change Leadership’, Management Decision 36, no. 8 (1998): 503; Gerard Seiits, Cases in Organizational Behavior (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publication, 2006); W. Warner Burke, Organization Change: Theory and Practice (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2002).

98 Eleanor D. Glor, ‘Identifying Organisational Patterns: Normative and Empirical Criteria for Organisational Redesign’, Journal of Public Affairs Education 14, no. 3 (Fall, 2008): 311–33.

99 Andrew Krepinevich, ‘Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities’, March 5, 1999.

100 Wills, ‘The Effect of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 on Naval Strategy, 1987–1994’, 23.

101 Ibid., 11.

102 Swartz, Sea Changes, 61.

103 Builder, Masks of War, 127.

104 Of course, force requirements are driven by many factors such as Congress, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the combatant commanders. However, it is also true that the Chief of Naval Operations has Title 10 responsibility to man, train and equip, and that war plans and force architecture are produced by the Navy. Therefore, the Navy’s concept of war should be considered as a variable in the equation.

105 Builder, Masks of War, 135.

106 For example, “in the 1980s the Navy’s goal of a 600-ship Navy came before and was a separate effort from the Maritime Strategy”. Haynes, Toward a New Maritime Strategy, 239.

107 Alfred T. Mahan, Naval Strategy: Compared and Contrasted with the Principles and Practice of Military Operations on Land (Boston: Little, Brown, 1911), 199.

108 O'Connell, Sacred Vessels, 67.

109 Walter Millis, Arms and Men: A Study in American Military History (Rutgers University Press, 1981), 161. Peter Karsen, Naval Aristocracy: The Golden Age of Annapolis and the Emergence of Modern American Navalism (New York: Free Press, 1972), 428.

110 Ivan T. Luke, ‘Naval Operations in Peacetime: Not Just “Warfare Lite”’, Naval War College Review 66, no. 2 (Spring 2013): 15.

111 Ronald O'Rourke, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2012), 38.

112 Secretary of the Navy Sean O'Keefe, From The Sea: Preparing The Naval Service For The 21st Century (Washington, DC: US Navy, 1992).

113 Secretary of the Navy John H. Dalton, Forward . . . From The Sea (Washington, DC: US Navy, 1992).

114 Thomas P.M. Barnett, Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Putnam, 2004), 63–70.

115 Haynes, American Naval Thinking in the Post-Cold War Era, 108.

116 Les Aspin, Bottom Up Review (Washington, DC: Secretary of Defense, 1993).

117 William M. Beasley Jr., ‘Closing the Presence Gap’, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 141, no. 11 (Nov 2015): 52–8.

118 Ibid., Frigates were replaced by the littoral combat ship (LCS). Robert O. Work, The Littoral Combat Ship: How We Got Here and Why (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2013), 2.

119 Beasley, ‘Closing the Presence Gap’, 52–8.

120 Swartz, Sea Changes, 111.

121 Luke, ‘Naval Operations in Peacetime’, 12.

122 Robert Gates, ‘Remarks of Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates’, Naval War College Review 63, no. 4 (2010): 14.

123 Haynes, Toward a New Maritime Strategy, 45.

124 Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (2015), section II.

125 Paul W. Taylor, ‘Maritime Civil Affairs’, Small Wars Journal (undated). Available at: smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/maritime-civil-affairs

126 Matt Daniels, ‘Navy Disestablishes MCAST’, Navy.mil (May 16, 2014), http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=81067

127 Paul W. Taylor, ‘Maritime Civil Affairs’, Small Wars Journal (undated). Available at: smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/maritime-civil-affairs

128 Matt Daniels, ‘Navy Disestablishes MCAST’, Navy.mil (May 16, 2014), http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=81067

129 Michael Fabey, ‘US Coast Guard to be placed in the vanguard of US maritime presence abroad’, Jane's Defence Weekly, March 8, 2018.

130 Dismukes, National Security Strategy, 67–8.

131 Arguably, “grey zone” operations have always been part of warfare. See Adda Bozeman, Strategic Intelligence & Statecraft: Selected Essays (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 1992).

132 See, for example, Michael J. Mazarr, Mastering The Gray Zone: Understanding A Changing Era of Conflict (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 2015); Antulio J. Echevarria, Operating in the Gray Zone: An Alternative Paradigm for U.S. Military Strategy (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 2016); Jahara W. Matisek, ‘Shades of Gray Deterrence: Issues of Fighting in the Gray Zone’, Journal of Strategic Security 10, no. 3 (Fall 2017); James J. Wirtz, ‘Life in the “Gray Zone”: observations for contemporary strategists’, Defense & Security Analysis 33, no. 2 (2017); Frank G. Hoffman, ‘Examining Complex Forms of Conflict: Gray Zone and Hybrid Challenges’, PRISM 7, no. 4 (2018).

133 General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., ‘Remarks and Q&A at the Center for Strategic and International Studies’, Joint Chiefs of Staff (undated), http://www.jcs.mil/Media/Speeches/Article/707418/gen-dunfords-remarks-and-qa-at-the-center-for-strategic-and-international-studi/

134 One could make the argument that warfighting preferences do not exist, and that the Navy has no control over its structure, forces or platforms since these are mere outcomes of combatant command requirements and the major contingency operations scenarios that the Services are directed to use as a basis for their programmes by the Department of Defense. However, it is also true that the Chief of Naval Operations has Title 10 responsibility to man, train, and equip, and that war plans and force architecture are produced by the Navy and thus do reflect their organisational preferences.

135 Beasley, ‘Closing the Presence Gap’, 52–8

136 Julian Corbett, Principles of Maritime Strategy (New York: Dover Publications (2012 [1911])), 113.

137 Captain Robert C. Rubel, ‘Straight Talk on Forward Presence’, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 141, no. 3 (March 2015): 24–9.

138 Thomas Mahnken, ‘Forward Presence in the Modern Navy: From the Cold War to a Future Tailored Force’, Naval History and Heritage Command (August 16, 2017); Roland J. Yardley, James G. Kallimani, John F. Schank and Clifford A. Grammich, Increasing Aircraft Carrier Forward Presence: Changing the Length of the Maintenance Cycle (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, W74V8H-06-C-0002, 2008).

139 Sam LaGrone and Megan Eckstein, ‘Navy Wants to Grow Fleet to 355 Ships; 47 Hull Increase Adds Destroyers, Attack Subs’, USNI News, 16 December 2016, https://news.usni.org/2016/12/16/navy-wantsgrow-fleet-355-ships-47-hull-increase-previous-goal.

140 Yardley, et al., Increasing Aircraft Carrier Forward Presence.

141 LaGrone and Eckstein, ‘Navy Wants to Grow Fleet to 355 Ships’, https://news.usni.org/2016/12/16/navy-wants-grow-fleet-355-ships-47-hull-increase-previous-goal.

142 Mahnken, ‘Forward Presence in the Modern Navy’.

143 Luke, ‘Naval Operations in Peacetime’, 11.

144 Interview, US Navy Commander, May 23, 2018.

145 Hendrix and Armstrong, The Presence Problem, 15.

146 David Ochmanek, Peter A. Wilson, Brenna Allen, John Speed Meyers and Carter C. Price, U.S. Military Capabilities and Forces for a Dangerous World: Rethinking the U.S. Approach to Force Planning (Washington, DC: RAND, 2017), 2.

147 US Navy, ‘Mission’ (undated), https://www.navy.com/about/mission.html