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ABSTRACT
Large-scale illegal fishing commenced in Australian coastal reefs 1970. Since, the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) has been “out of synch” with matching its Tier 2 constabulary vessels to their mission. The pattern is that “mission goalposts” shift post-acquisition, reflecting changes to UNCLOS. Post-WWII, the RAN employed wartime escorts in patrol roles, and wartime launches for littoral constabulary. The RAN has recreated this mix in the twentyfirst century. This paper traces this process and associated problems. Minimum resources are assigned to constabulary functions in peacetime, yet the units involved are arguably the most operational and politically sensitive. Vessel unsuitability has consistently meant personnel problems, over-use of constabulary vessels, and high maintenance costs. Australia's strategic situation is deteriorating towards a point where the rising risk demands mobilisation responses. This would include rapid acquisition of large numbers of Tier 2 assets to meet existing and conflict low-mix roles.
Acknowledgements
The views expressed in this article are those solely of the author and do not reflect the policy or views of the Australian Naval Studies Group, Royal Australian Navy, or the Australian Department of Defence. The writer would like to express his sincere gratitude to the President of the Australian Naval Institute Vice Admiral Peter Jones RAN (retd) and to Dr Thomas-Durell Young of the USN Postgraduate School who provided invaluable comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 Captain Gatacre was referring to the need for Cold War era expeditionary planning, reflecting WWII and WWII experience.
2 https://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-12-21/tasmania-police-reveal-value-of-cocaine-haul-on-chinese-ship/8138244 accessed 6 January 2021.
3 ‘Low-mix tasks’ are those which do not require highly capable warships to perform. As numbers of ships are low in peacetime, capable warships are often used in constabulary tasks. In conflict, there are too few such ships for the tasks they are designed for. The normal response is to acquire large numbers of smaller, less capable warships, armed auxiliaries and small craft. These perform all the lower level tasks and free the capable warships for high-end wartime functions. Maritime constabulary functions exist at all times and expand in times of conflict.
4 These tasks expand from fisheries and anti-smuggling responsibilities to include port security and defence (including boom defence against advanced AUV), seaward approach defence, littoral patrol, forward operating base protection and littoral control, coastal forces operations, rear area MCM, defensive minelaying, lower-threat-area ASW, offshore oil and gas industry asset protection, anti-raider patrols and maritime domain awareness information gathering. They require large numbers of smaller, lower-capability assets to perform what are simple tasks compared to high-intensity war-fighting.
5 This term was defined to the author by Professor Peter Dennis (UNSW ADFA) as referring to periods where there is currently no serious strategic threat and where navies struggle to sustain fundamental capabilities and have areas where their capability can be described as ‘hollow’. The RAN faced such a period during the 1970s to 1990s when certain capabilities declined to low levels. All navies have such periods during their history.
6 A. Cooper, ‘The Korean War Era’, in The Australian Centenary History of Defence, Vol. III, The Royal Australian Navy, ed. D. Stevens (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2001), 155–180, 155–156.
7 Australian Border Force, Guide to Australia’s Maritime Security Arrangements (GAMSA), https://www.abf.gov.au/about-us/what-we-do/border-protection/maritime/reports-and-publications. The size and scale of this task have greatly increased since due to expansions of the territorial sea from three nautical miles to twelve from a territorial baseline, the addition of 200nm EEZ and the rights inherit in continental shelf extensions.
8 Commonwealth of Australia, Australian Maritime Doctrine 2010 (Canberra, 2010), 113–121. The amount and degree of applicable force are defined by the appropriate legal mandate.
9 A. Cooper, ‘The Korean War Era’, in The Australian Centenary History of Defence Vol III, The Royal Australian Navy, ed. D. Stevens (Oxford University Press, 2001), 155–180, 162.
10 NATO considers that an FFG needs 108 sea days to retain the basic qualifications to pass key certifications.
11 This figure was widely reported in media, for example, see https://theconversation.com/factcheck-did-1200-refugees-die-at-sea-under-labor-38094. The figure originated with the Australian Border Deaths Database as maintained by the Border Crossing Observatory, a research network based at Monash University. https://www.monash.edu/arts/border-crossing-observatory/research-agenda/australian-border-deaths-database. The figure is known to be very incomplete. For example, no research was done into illegal immigrant smugglers which vanished after departing Sri Lankan and Indian ports.
12 The author was the Maritime Industry Liaison Officer at Border Protection Command in 2007 when the Rudd Government initiated this seaborne illegal immigrant trade, and was able to observe the impact of this situation on RAN constabulary operations at first hand.
13 The Armidale class PC HMAS Bundaberg was destroyed by fire in 2014 while in dockyard hands under repair. One of these Cape classes can be considered a replacement.
14 The 1988–1998 Bougainville Civil War caused immense damage to Bougainville’s society and population. Estimates of the number killed range from ‘a couple of thousand’ to 20,000. While the real figure will never be known, Bougainvilleans generally consider 9000–12,000 to be a reasonable estimate.
15 Helpem Fren means "help a friend" in Solomon Islands Pidgin.
16 N. Van der Bijl, Confrontation: War with Indonesia 1962–1966 (Barnsley, Pen & Sword Military, 2009), 133–134.
17 These were HMNZS Hickleton and Santon. They remain unique as the only commissioned RNZN warships to have never been to New Zealand, as they were manned for a specific operation and were loaned by the RN, not purchased.
18 Van der Bijl, Confrontation: War with Indonesia 1962–1966, 133–134, 141.
19 Attack class 100 tons (light) 146 tons (full load), 32.8m/107 ft, 24 knots, 1 40 mm Bofors, 2 x .50 cal MG, 19 crew. For comparison, the contemporary Vosper-designed RMN Keris class was 109 tons (light), 32m/105 ft, 28knot, 2 40 mm Bofors, 2x MG, 23 crew. Five were built for service in Papua New Guinean waters. The length reduction made them uncomfortable seaboats in Australian waters.
21 Clear project objectives had to cover primary objectives to achieve performance within the agreed cost boundaries and secondary objectives including manpower, sustainment, training systems. Tertiary objectives included technology acquisition and industrial capability development.
22 The author served on HMAS Yarra during this deployment. The presence and marginal value of the unmodernised Yarra were accepted as she was the trials ship for the Mulloka sonar and was understood to be conducting shallow-water tropical trials. The presence of the two FCPB was not seen in a positive light by the RSN, RMN or RN, according to discussions with their officers, as they were clearly fisheries protection craft of negative value during the major exercise phases. However, their contribution during the littoral anti-SOF and anti-infiltration part of the exercise was highly regarded. This was the old ‘gunboat’ role learned during Confrontation.
23 These are the North Rankin, Perseus, Goodwyn, Echo/Yodel, Sculptor, Keast/Dockrell, Wilcox and Angel gas fields and the Lambert/Hermes, Cossack/Pioneer and Wanaea/Cossack oil fields. The North Rankin platform is one of the largest capacity gas production platforms in the world and serves as the central hub of the Woodside-operated North West Shelf Project's offshore gas production system. It is located 135 kilometres north-west of Karratha, Western Australia.
25 1992 was the year the Australian Defence Intelligence Organisation presented an analysis to the international Maritime Intelligence Conference (hosted alternatively by the US Office of Naval Intelligence at Suitland, Maryland, MODUK in London and NDHQ Canada) showing the feasibility of land reclamation for base construction at Mischief Reef, which the PRC was then in the early stages of controlling. The PRC occupied Mischief Reef in 1995. Initial stages of construction of the base there commenced in 2012.
26 It is strongly noted that this was never the intent or view of the Rudd Government. This viewpoint was that expressed by illegal immigrant smugglers based in Indonesia.
27 Brodersen, AIRCDRE A.A. Report dated 28 June 19 (Objective BN16271788) paras 27–30. VCDF Mobilisation Planning Steering Group Terms of Reference dated July 2020.
28 Australian Strategic Policy Institute. At the ASPI ’Çhina Masterclass’ conferences 15–16 April 2019. During his keynote address on 15 April ASPI Executive Director Peter Jennings directly compared the intent of the PRC’s island chain strategy to Imperial Japan’s ‘Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere’ expansion during 1942.
29 See M. Linden, ‘The need to build the second tier of the Navy order of battle – mine countermeasures’, The Navy: The Magazine of the Navy League of Australia (Vol. 83 No. 1, January–March 2021), 7–11.
30 The WWII Bathurst class was designed pre-war as a low-end combatant. Entering production as WWII commenced in 1939, 60 were eventually built.
31 In 2020, about 12 are planned as OPV and about 8 as RAS tenders for MCMV and survey use. The WWII result was the 60-strong Bathurst class corvette programme. The point to note is that the Bathurst class were the smallest, simplest and most affordable ‘high mix’ ocean-capable combatants it was possible to build in quantity, and they were in production when the war started.
32 Such a variant would of design necessity be based on the MCM RAS tender variant (Project SEA 1905) or hydrographic variant (SEA 2400). Both will require acoustic signature reduction and sonar systems.
33 Commonwealth of Australia, Naval Shipbuilding Plan (2017), https://www1.defence.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-05/NavalShipbuildingPlan.pdf (accessed January 2020).
34 These threats are constabulary, primarily to counter terrorism, transnational crime, illegal immigration, illegal fishing. To do this the ACOPV can operate year round within the Australian Search and Rescue Region, north of 50 degrees south.
35 This was not a pre-planned outcome.
36 A. Ross, Armed and Ready, the Industrial Development and Defence of Australia 1900–1945 (Sydney: Turton and Armstrong, 1995).
37 M. Hellyer, From Concentrated Vulnerability to Distributed lethality: or how to get more maritime bang for the buck with our offshore patrol vessels (Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, June 2020). Of note, by late 2020 the new Civmec yard was building ACOPV Hull 3 so efficiently that it became probable that it would be launched before Hull 2.
38 Hellyer, From Concentrated Vulnerability to Distributed, 13–14.
39 ASPI proposes this and Australia’s deteriorating strategic situation may demand it in the near term.
40 Small modular towed array systems exist for small combatants. An example is the GeoSystems TRAPS system. TRAPS has a compact footprint required for small combatants, fitting into a standard ISO container. Performance is limited; it is advertised as being able to detect submarines, torpedoes, and surface ships. However, such small systems are not comparable to Type 2087, which is a Low Frequency Active Sonar (LFAS) consisting of both active and passive sonar arrays. Thales describes 2087 as a towed-array that enables Type 23 frigates to hunt the latest submarines at considerable distances and locate them beyond the range at which submarines can launch an attack. Type 2087 is a very large system which requires a full deck height and width and about 37m of an Arafura’s 80m length: this would require a full redesign of the Arafura class. This would probably require elimination of the flight deck.
41 The ACOPV is built to Det Norske Veritas and Germanischer-Lloyd classification society GL-2007 standards.
42 The OPV helicopter deck will accept any helicopter up to 11 tons.
43 These were 12–16 gun brigantines or 18-gun sloops in the 18th century, gunboats or third class cruisers in the 19th, and corvettes or OPV during the 20th.
44 This is a strategic environmental factor, See: R. Babbage, Stealing a March: Chinese Hybrid Warfare in the Indo-Pacific, Issues and options for Allied Defence Planners (Washington: Centre for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2019), 2 vols.
45 EMTV News reported that the Chinese owned company was granted a contract to dredge sand sediments along the Fly River at a cost of K80 million per month. See https://www.thenational.com.pg/clean-up-of-mine-waste/ and https://theworldnews.net/pg-news/no-permit-issued-to-dredge-mouth-of-fly-river-tuke-says (accessed 11 February 2021).
46 https://www.afr.com/policy/foreign-affairs/more-than-just-fishing-behind-china-s-200m-deal-20201211-p56mmh (accessed January 2021).
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Mark L. Bailey
Dr Bailey joined the Royal Australian Navy in 1979 as a Seaman officer, serving aboard several RAN ships including the carrier HMAS Melbourne. He later specialised in security and intelligence. This was followed by work in Defence strategic logistics; as senior strategic intelligence analyst for the Australian Federal Police; as maritime industry liaison officer for Australian Border Protection Command and in counter-terrorist roles. Returning to the RAN as a reserve officer in Maritime Trade Operations in 2015, he is currently serving full time in RAN Capability Planning.
He is a graduate of the RAN Staff College and holds various degrees including a Doctorate from the University of New South Wales, Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA), his thesis is The Strategic and Trade Protection Implications of Anglo-Australian Maritime Trade 1885-1942. He has presented at numerous international and national conferences on the subject of the protection of maritime trade and is recognised as a leading academic expert in that field. He is a member of the ADFA Naval Studies Group, is working on a number of books and is the Australian coordinator for the international Corbett 100 conference series.