https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0908-7512
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ABSTRACT
Three Baltic States (3Bs), like most eastern NATO countries, treat the war in Ukraine as a strong national interest: if Russia is stopped in Ukraine, it will not be capable of inflicting any harm to them. As a result, national decision-makers are making hard choices on which military capabilities need to be transferred to Ukraine and what must remain for national needs. The results indicate that 3Bs Defence Ministers understand the importance of supporting Ukraine with lethal and non-lethal items. 3Bs acquire major arms from various countries with different spending levels and have limited ability for combined procurement opportunities, although they seek to develop similar military capabilities. It is assessed that 3Bs will not deliver newly acquired major arms to Ukraine and will continue delivering reliable legacy systems. Therefore, allocating funds for combined major arms procurements implemented by the third party like the U.K.-led International Fund for Ukraine, is the most viable option to continue supporting Ukraine.
Acknowledgements
I would like to extend my warm thanks to anonymous reviewers for their advice, proofing remarks, and overall encouragement.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
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14 T. Nõmm, ‘Armament of Estonia: Arms Procurements of the Ministry of Defence in the 1990s’, Estonian Yearbook of Military History 4 (2014): 199–216.
15 S. Perlo-Freeman and S. Wezeman, ‘Military Spending in Europe in the Wake of the Ukraine Crisis’, in SIPRI Yearbook (Oxford University Press, 2015).
16 J. Dvorak and B. Pernica, ‘To Free or Not to Free (Ride): A Comparative Analysis of the NATO Burden-Sharing in the Czech Republic and Lithuania–Another Insight into the Issues of Military Performance in the Central and Eastern Europe’, Defence and Security Analysis 37, no. 2 (2021): 164–76, https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2021.1919345.
17 V. Veebel and I. Ploom, ‘Are the Baltic States and NATO on the Right Path in Deterring Russia in the Baltic?’ Defense and Security Analysis 35, no. 4 (2019): 406–22, https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2019.1675947.
18 M. Andžāns and V. Veebel, ‘Deterrence Dilemma in Latvia and Estonia: Finding the Balance Between External Military Solidarity and Territorial Defence’, Journal on Baltic Security 3, no. 2 (2017): 29–41.
19 P. Szymański, Between Continuation and Adaptation: The Baltic States’ Security Policy and Armed Forces (Warsaw, Poland: OSW; 2015), https://shorturl.at/BHJX1.
20 V. Veebel and I. Ploom, ‘Are the Baltic States and NATO on the Right Path in Deterring Russia in the Baltic?’ Defense and Security Analysis 35, no 4 (2019): 406–22, https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2019.1675947.
21 P. Belkin and H. Kaileh, The European Deterrence Initiative: A Budgetary Overview (CRS, 2021), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/IF10946.pdf.
22 L. Béraud-Sudreau and B. Giegerich, ‘NATO Defence Spending and European Threat Perceptions’, Survival 60, no. 4 (2018): 53–74, https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2018.1495429.
23 N. Vanaga, ‘Baltic Military Cooperation: Seeking a Common Response’, Strategic Review 11 (2016), https://shorturl.at/wJNU4.
24 M. Andžāns and U. Romanovs, ‘The Trilateral Military Cooperation of the Baltic States in the “New Normal” Security Landscape’, in Security in the Baltic Sea Region: Realities and Prospects The Rīga Conference Papers, edited by A. Sprūds and M. Andžāns, 14–22 (Riga: Latvian Institute of International Affairs, 2017).
25 K. Stoicescu and M. Lebrun, Estonian-French Defence Cooperation – Where Estonian Pragmatism Meets French Vision (Tallinn, Estonia: ICDS, 2019), https://rb.gy/fzqvk.
26 M. Šešelgytė and E. Indrašiūtė, ‘European Defence Version 2.0: What Does It Offer for Lithuania?’, in Lithuania in the Global Context: National Security and Defence Policy Dilemmas, ed. I. Matonytė, et al. (Vilnius, Lithuania: LKA, 2020), 117–30, https://shorturl.at/lqFLZ.
27 P.D. Wezeman and J. Gadon, and S.T. Wezeman, Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2022 (Washington, DC: SIPRI, 2023), https://shorturl.at/nzFZ0.
28 D. Mix, ‘Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania: Background and U.S.-Baltic Relations’, CRS, Report No.: R46139, 2022. https://shorturl.at/bcjtv.
29 K. Usha, ‘The Ukraine Conflict, Fear of Russian Aggression and Security Dilemma of Baltic States’, South Asian Journal of Diplomacy (2015): 39–56.
30 D. Takacs, ‘Ukraine‘s Deterrence Failure: Lessons for the Baltic States’, Journal on Baltic Security 3, no. 1 (2017): 1–10.
31 L. Zdanavičius and N. Statkus, ‘Strengthening Resilience of Lithuania in an Era of Great Power Competition: The Case for Total Defence’, Journal on Baltic Security 6, no. 2 (2020): 1–21.
32 S. Flanagan, et al., Deterring Russian Aggression in the Baltic States Through Resilience and Resistance (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2019), https://shorturl.at/arwG8.
33 M. Andžāns and V. Veebel, ‘Deterrence Dilemma in Latvia and Estonia: Finding the Balance Between External Military Solidarity and Territorial Defence’, Journal on Baltic Security 3, no. 2 (2017): 29–41.
34 L. Zdanavičius and N. Statkus, ‘Strengthening Resilience of Lithuania in an Era of Great Power Competition: The Case for Total Defence’, Journal on Baltic Security 6, no. 2 (2020): 1–21.
35 V. Veebel and I. Ploom, ‘Are the Baltic States and NATO on the Right Path in Deterring Russia in the Baltic?’Defense and Security Analysis 35, no. 4 (2019): 406–22, https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2019.1675947.
36 Ibid.
37 C. Harper, T. Lawrence, and S. Sakkov, Air Defence of the Baltic States (Tallinn, Estonia: ICDS, 2018), https://shorturl.at/uxH58.
38 B. Hodges, T. Lawrence, and R. Wojcik, Until Something Moves: Reinforcing the Baltic Region in Crisis and War (Tallinn, Estonia: ICDS, 2020), https://shorturl.at/lGMX3.
39 P. Szymański, The Multi-Speed Baltic States. Reinforcing the Defence Capabilities of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia (Warsaw, Poland: OSW, 2017), https://rb.gy/bq4yp.
40 Reinsalu kutsus Balti kolleege üles suurendama kaitse-eelarveid (kaitseministeerium.ee., 2014), https://rb.gy/r0ukq.
41 Krašto apsaugos ministerija skiria materialinę paramą Ukrainai (kam.lt., 2014), https://shorturl.at/dhtE6.
42 Ministras R. Karoblis Kijevo saugumo forume: “Lietuva skatina sąjungininkes skirti strateginį dėmesį Ukrainai” (kam.lt., 2018), https://rb.gy/9p761.
43 ES gynybos ministrų susitikime didžiausias dėmesys skirtas įvykiams Ukrainoje (kam.lt., 2014), https://shorturl.at/hjA5.
44 Eesti saadab Ukraina toetamiseks riigile 2400 püstolit (kaitseministeerium.ee., 2020), https://shorturl.at/dosNP.
45 Eesti ja Saksamaa kingivad Ukrainale välihaigla (kaitseministeerium.ee., 2022), https://shorturl.at/fgBIW.
46 Pabriks: Latvia is among the European Leaders in Providing Assistance to the Armed Forces of Ukraine Ministry of Defence (mod.gov.lv., 2022), https://shorturl.at/iouW2.
47 Bayraktar-Vanagas Pristatytas Lietuvos Visuomenei (kam.lt., 2022), https://shorturl.at/rvEZ0.
48 Austin: Contact Group Continues Stand with Ukrainian People (U.S. DoD, 2023), https://shorturl.at/lDHNX.
49 The Eleventh Meeting in Ramstein Format Looks into New Support to Ukraine (kam.lt., 2023), https://shorturl.at/ghwAS.
50 Joint Statement – The Tallinn Pledge (gov.uk., 2023), https://shorturl.at/bcAQW.
51 Ukraine to Receive Multi-Million Pound Capability Boost from International Fund (gov.uk., 2023), https://shorturl.at/gsCKU.
52 Metinis Lietuvos indėlis kovoje už Ukrainos laisvę – milijonai šaudmenų ir tūkstančiai ginklų, grąža – išmoktos pamokos ir sustiprinta Lietuvos gynyba (kam.lt., 2023), https://shorturl.at/glyJ2.
53 NATO-Ukraine Trust Funds (NATO, 2022), https://shorturl.at/duRY7.
54 EDA Brings Together 25 Countries for Common Procurement of Ammunition (eda.europa.eu., 2023), https://shorturl.at/qsyM7.
55 European Peace Facility (consilium.europa.eu., 2023), https://shorturl.at/cuW07.
56 EU Allies Query Estonia’s Bumper Refund from Weapons to Ukraine (politico.eu., 2023), https://shorturl.at/imDSW.
57 Information on Defence Expenditures (NATO, 2022), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49198.htm; Lithuania Raises 2023 Defence Spending by Nearly €98 m (lrt.lt., 2023), https://rb.gy/7f5y1; Latvian Defence Spending Hits 2.25% of GDP (lsm.lv., 2017), https://rb.gy/m84uw; J.W. Noh, Small in Size, Estonia Majorly Invests in Defence During War in Ukraine (hani.co.kr., 2023), https://shorturl.at/lGX59.
58 Importer/Exporter TIV Tables (SIPRI, 2023), https://shorturl.at/vwzEM.
59 Arms Transfers Database (SIPRI, 2023), https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers; Latvia Will Invest Additional Funds in Strengthening Air Defence Capabilities (mod.gov.lv., 2023), https://rb.gy/cksc1.
60 Information gathered from official 3Bs ministries of defence websites www.kaitseministeerium.ee; www.mod.gov.lv; www.kam.lt.
61 Importer/Exporter TIV Tables (SIPRI, 2023), https://shorturl.at/crswB; Trade Registers (SIPRI, 2023), https://shorturl.at/iotDL.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Donatas Palavenis
Donatas Palavenis, a researcher at the BPTI, a major of the Lithuanian armed forces, serving at the Warfare Institute, and a doctoral candidate at the General Jonas Žemaitis Military Academy of Lithuania. His research interests are defence industry, defence policy, political economy, defence economics, and arms procurement.