Analyzing Moroccan Foreign Policy and Relations with Europe

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Notes

Steven R. David, ‘Explaining Third World Alignment’, World Politics, Vol. LXIII, no. 2 (January 1991), pp. 233–56.

For the Istiqlal and the UNFP, the claim on the Sahara was part of the historic agenda of the nationalist movement of which they had been an integral and historic part. For the military, the Sahara presented an opportunity to display both their readiness and ability to defend the Kingdom as well as confront their adversaries in the Algerian military with whom they had clashed in the brief border war of 1963.

Morocco had been willing to make concessions on fishing rights with Spain in order to secure Spain's withdrawal from the Sahara. It had similarly agreed to fully recognize Algeria's claim on disputed border territories in 1969 in order to tacitly pave the way for Algeria's recognition of Morocco's claim on the Western Sahara.

See John Damis, ‘The Impact of the Saharan Dispute on Moroccan Foreign and Domestic Policy’ in I.W. Zartman (ed.), The Political Economy of Morocco (New York: Praeger, 1987), p. 198.

The jail of Tazmamart in Southern Morocco was the prison where the soldiers who had attempted a coup d'état against King Hassan in the early 1970s were jailed in inhuman conditions.

The Istiqlal gave up questioning the monarchy's legitimacy in the 1970s whereas the USFP did so effectively and definitely only in the 1990s.

For details on Morocco's Islamist movements see Mohamed Tozy, Monarchie et Islam Politique au Maroc (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 1999) and Michael J. Willis, ‘Between Alternance and the Makhzen: At-Tawhid wa Al-Islah's Entry into Moroccan Politics’ The Journal of North African Studies Vol. 4, no. 3 (Autumn 1999).

Hammad Zoutini, ‘Les Interets Nationaux: Entre la pratique de la Politique Exterieure du Maroc el les Besoins d'une Redefinition par Rapport au Nouveau Systeme international’ in Mohamed Jari (ed.), Rapport Annuel sur l'Evolution du Systeme International (RAESI) 1997 (Rabat: GERSI [Groupes d'Etudes et Recherches sur le Système International], 1997), p. 321.

There are, however, still limits to press coverage of the Sahara. In 1999 an edition of the Le Journal newspaper was banned for carrying an interview with the leader of the Polisario Front, Mohammed Abdelaziz Marrakechi.

See Yahia H. Zoubir, ‘Reactions in the Maghreb to the Gulf War’, Arab Studies Quarterly Vol. 15, no. 1 (Winter 1993).

King Mohammmed VI has argued that Morocco had been ‘literally carved up’ during the course of the twentieth century. Mohamed Ben El Hassan Alaoui [King Mohamed VI]: La Coopération entre l'Union Européenne et les Pays du Maghreb (Paris: Editions Nathan, 1994), p. 102.

See particularly John Damis, ‘The Western Sahara Dispute as a Source of Regional Conflict in North Africa’ in Halim Barakat (ed.), Contemporary North Africa: Issues of Development and Integration (Kent: Croom Helm, 1985) and Yahia H. Zoubir, ‘Algerian–Moroccan Relations and their Impact on Maghribi Integration’, The Journal of North African Studies, Vol. 5, no. 3, (Autumn 2000).

On the origins of the Arab Maghreb Union see Mary-Jane Deeb, ‘The Arab–Maghribi Union and the Prospects for North African Unity’, in I. William Zartman and William Mark Habeeb (eds.), Polity and Society in Contemporary North Africa (Boulder: Westview, 1993).

On the problems encountered by the Arab Maghreb Union see Robert A. Mortimer, ‘The Arab Maghreb Union: Myth and Reality’ in Yahia H. Zoubir (ed.), North Africa in Transition (Florida: University Press of Florida, 1999).

The Economist Intelligence Unit: Morocco: Country Profile 2001 (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2001) pp. 63–4.

Imports from Morocco to the EU constituted just 0.6 percent of total EU imports in 2001, whilst EU exports to Morocco made up 0.8 percent of the Union's total exports in the same year. European Commission: Bilateral Trade Relations: Morocco (http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/bilateral/ mor.htm).

For details on the agreements signed between the EC/EU and Morocco and the restrictions placed on Morocco's export capabilities see Alaoui, La Coopération entre l'Union Europeenne et les Pays du Maghreb, pp. 34–40; and John Damis, ‘Morocco's 1995 Association Agreement with the European Union’, The Journal of North African Studies Vol. 3, no.4 (Winter 1998).

Economist Intelligence Unit, Morocco: Country Profile 2001, p. 43.

Damis: ‘Morocco's 1995 Association Agreement with the European Union’, p. 106.

Economist Intelligence Unit, Morocco: Country Profile 2001, p. 42.

Economist Intelligence Unit, Morocco: Country Profile 2001, pp. 63–4.

Economist Intelligence Unit, Morocco: Country Profile 2001, p. 42.

Economist Intelligence Unit, Morocco: Country Profile 2001, p. 63.

Mohamed VI performed his internship in the office of Jacques Delors in the period 1988–89 and obtained his Doctorate of Law from Sophia Antipolis University in Nice in 1993. His doctoral thesis was published in 1994: Mohamed Ben El Hassan Alaoui [King Mohamed VI], La Coopération entre l'Union Européenne et les Pays du Maghreb (Paris: Editions Nathan, 1994).

Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, ‘Israel and Morocco: A Special Relationship’, The Maghreb Review Vol. 21, 1–2, (1996), p. 37.

See Abdelkhaleq Berramdane, Le Maroc et l'Occident (Paris: Karthala, 1987).

See: Miguel Hernando de Larramendi, La Política Exterior de Marruecos (Madrid: Mapfre, 1997).

See Berramdane, Le Maroc et l'Occident.

Mehdi Ben Barka was the main leader of the UNFP and a key figure of the Moroccan left. He was in exile in Paris when he was kidnapped – and later assassinated – by Moroccan security forces. His kidnapping and disappearance provoked the ire of French authorities in general, and General De Gaulle in particular. French Moroccan relations were cool for a long period of time after the event.

See Yahia H. Zoubir ‘The Geopolitics of the Western Sahara Conflict’ in Yahia H. Zoubir (ed.) North Africa in Transition (Talahasse: University Press of Florida, 1999).

See M. Larramendi, La Política Exterior de Marruecos.

Bernabé López Garcia and Miguel H. de Larramendi, ‘Spain and North Africa: Towards a “Dynamic Stability”’ Democratization, Vol. 9, no. 1 (Spring 2002), pp. 170–91.

See Larramendi, La Política Exterior de Marruecos.

See A. Berramdane, Le Maroc et l'Occident.

Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, (London: Penguin, 1993).

Charles Krauthammer, ‘The Unipolar Moment’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, no. 1 (Winter 1990–91).

Hassan II, The Challenge (London: Macmillan, 1978), p. 169.

Maghrebi states could also have tried to negotiate with the EU in unified ranks. This would have strengthened their hands in the negotiating process. However, the current state of the AMU does not allow for any hope of possible co-ordination in that direction.

BBC News: Business: ‘Morocco Warned Over EU–US Trade Deals’ (http://news.bbc.co.uk/ go/em/fr/–/2/hi/business/2661081.stm).