A Cross-Cultural Practical Moral Discourse on Human Rights for Women

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Notes

We are not making the claim that such a praxis-based approach has not occurred at all in philosophical writings but simply that it has not occurred to the extent that could be considered mainstream and beneficial. For examples of such praxis-based moral discourses, see writings by Bunch (1990), Chen (1995), Nzegwu (1995), and Tinker (1990).

These workshops are organized in collaboration with the Asia Pacific Advisory Forum on Judicial Education on Gender Equality Issues “which is committed to developing and delivering gender equality education in the Asia-Pacific region” (Swayam brochure).

See, for example, Li (2001), Sen (2004), and Teson (2001) for a good discussion of the importance of validating the universality of human rights, even while recognizing cultural particularities.

For a detailed discussion of problems arising from simplistic generalizations about women in other cultures, see Benhabib (1995) and Narayan (2000).

See, for example, Tinker's outline of “the differences among three groups of women and men that have exerted major influence on the gradual evolution of the field of women: advocates, practitioners, and scholars” (Tinker 1990: 27).