Status-Differentiated Rights

Abstract

This article defines status-differentiated rights and identifies examples from international principles, declarations, and conventions. Drawing on the work of Peter Jones and Will Kymlicka, status-differentiated rights are compared and contrasted to group and group-differentiated rights. Using Jack Donnelly's three-tiered scheme of substance-interpretation-implementation, the article also demonstrates how status-differentiated rights complicate the equal-special rights binary; this is because some rights are status undifferentiated at one level, yet status differentiated at another. This article concludes that addressing the diverse harms faced by (members of) vulnerable status groups requires both “ordinary” human rights and status-differentiated rights.

Notes

¹For a critique of Roth's argument, see Sylvain (2011).

²It should be noted that, due to limitations of space, some status groups such as detainees, prisoners, and migrant workers have been omitted. These status groups tend not to be included in the group rights debate.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Elizabeth Baisley

Elizabeth Baisley is a graduate student at Queen's University in Canada. She wrote this article under the supervision of Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann while studying at Wilfrid Laurier University in Canada.

For her support, guidance, and comments on this article, I am grateful to Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann. I also thank Andrew M. Robinson and the two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions.