The evolution of norms: American policy toward revolution in Iran and Egypt

ABSTRACT

Is there a growing norm against violence towards civilians that constrains how the United States deals with its client states? This article examines two similar cases that suggest there is. In Iran in 1978 and in Egypt in 2011, the United States faced a possible revolution by a democratic/Islamist opposition, yet American policy makers gave their major regional ally opposite advice. In 1978, the White House urged the Shah to crack down on the opposition, and, in 2011, it pressed the Mubarak regime, as well as other regimes, to refrain from violence. This indicates that in situations where the American government is culpable for a potential bloodbath, policy makers are loath to take on that responsibility, which significantly shapes their policy toward revolution in a way that it did not when President Carter called the commitment to human rights “absolute.”

Acknowledgment

The author would like to thank Darren Hawkins for his comments on an earlier version of this article.

Notes on contributor

Chad E. Nelson is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Brigham Young University.

Notes

1. See, for example, Apodaca (2006), who begins her narrative in the 1970s. Moyn (2010) makes a more controversial broader claim that the 1970s was the decade when human rights talk became significant on a global scale.

2. I use the term “client” not to imply that such regimes are mere pawns or puppets of the United States with no autonomy, but that the United States has a heavy degree of influence. In fact, the American ability to influence these regimes is often exaggerated, which furthers the perceived culpability of the United States for human rights violations perpetrated by the client states.

3. The rival superpower, the Soviet Union, was also a considerable counterrevolutionary power, but America's sphere of influence was greater and more revolutions during this period were leftist rather than liberal.

4. While the quote is often repeated, it is rarely put into context. Adams' speech was a rejection of the call from British liberals to unite with them against the Holy Alliance, as well as a rejection of Henry Clay's (misinterpreted) call for the Americas to form a counterpoise to the Holy Alliance (Whitaker 1941: 344–369).

5. This is not to suggest that the United States was always the primary partner responsible for the hostility that existed between the United States and successful revolutions. Snyder (1999) argues that the United States made attempts to reconcile with new revolutionary regimes, but the breakdown in relations was due to revolutionaries initiating hostilities with the United States as a means to discredit their more moderate domestic rivals that had ties with the United States.

6. How human rights norms become established has generated a considerable literature. See, for example, Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink (2013).

7. Given the level of anti-Americanism that motivated the Iranian Revolution, it was thought that a new regime would certainly not be as friendly to the United States, but it would have to confront the reality of a Soviet power and remain on relatively cordial terms with the United States (see, e.g., Sullivan 1978; Precht 1978; Vance 1983: 343). This is in fact what occurred when the provisional Bazargan government was in power (Emery 2013: 73–130). Even after the second revolution that consolidated Khomeini's control, the radicalization of the revolution did not translate into a pro-Kremlin approach. With the uprising in Egypt, figures such as Hillary Clinton and Robert Gates were concerned that Islamists could hijack the liberals, citing the Iranian Revolution as an example, and the consequences for US interests could be dire (Clinton 2014: 341; Gates 2014: 502, 504).

8. Even if one argues that there were some differences in the interests at stake, they would not be able to explain the dramatic variation in American policy toward these revolutions, as I will argue below.

9. For the argument that controlled comparisons derive much of their effectiveness when combined with process tracing, see George and Bennett (2004: 151–179).

10. Carter was criticized even within his administration by Patricia Derian for his sidestepping of the human rights issue (Emery 2013: 37–38).

11. For the expressed assumption that a military government would entail a massive crackdown, see, for example, Sullivan (1978).

12. See the speeches excerpted in Lizza 2011.

13. (Wittes 2008: 97–101). Blaydes (2011), though, argues that Mubarak actually used the elections to enhance his power.

14. (Snider and Faris 2011). See, for example, a former Bush speechwriter's account (Latimer 2011) of gutting a strongly worded speech to be given by Bush in 2008, which had called for human rights and democracy in Egypt.

15. See also Bouchet (2013: 50).

16. Whether or not the Obama administration's admonition to exercise restraint was the cause of military's restraint is a matter of debate. Lynch (2013: 92) considers Washington's pressure an important if not widely recognized cause. Kandil (2012), on the other hand, emphasizes the previous grievances that the Army had with the Mubarak regime, which made them not particularly averse to see Mubarak go. Another factor was that officers feared whether conscripts would heed the call to crack down if ordered.

17. The White House made statements to this effect on February 18th, March 2nd, 11th, 13th, and 18th, and April 5th, 2011.

18. For President Obama's call to the king, see Obama (2011c).

19. Parsi (2012: 99) argues that “Obama waited until June 23, 2009, to condemn the violence in Iran” but, in fact, the administration publicly did so numerous times from June 15th onward. See, for example, Obama (2009b).

20. The increasing emphasis on the international components of regime contestation includes not just the literature on revolutions but also the literature on the external effects on democratization, or lack thereof. For one such example, regarding US policy in the Arab world, see Berger (2011).