The boundaries of religion in international human rights law

Abstract

Intergovernmental institutions constitute “ecological” settings in which international human rights laws and norms are developed and shaped over time. Yet understandings of these settings remain limited. Notable feminist scholars of international law have argued that uncritical reliance on gendered dichotomies—such as objective/subjective, legal/political, and binding/nonbinding—has stunted knowledge of these spaces. I extend this critique by arguing reliance on yet another gendered dichotomy—the secular/religious—has further limited knowledge in this area. Moving past this unreflective reliance provides needed space to identify previously unrecognized ways supposedly local and global factors intersect to shape human rights norm-making within intergovernmental legal institutions. I demonstrate this using data collected as part of a qualitative study that examined how UN officials who work with women’s rights conceptualize the meaning of religion and its relationship to the human rights legal standards they work to interpret, monitor, and advance.

Notes

1 Interviews were also conducted with other relevant UN, state, and NGO officials. These interviewed were not analyzed as part of this article.

2 I use “religion-related identities” to refer to committee members’ identities as religious, nonreligious, and spiritual but not religious, as well as to their identification with particular religious traditions.

3 Aspects of this third micro-interactive process have been identified in previous research. Zwingel (2016) uncovered CEDAW Committee members’ identification of their cultural and regional diversity as a source of their competence. Årsheim (2018, p. 246) noted the committee’s use of cross-national comparison. My analysis increases empirical evidence of these findings and extends theorizing about them.

4 Interview respondents’ names have been omitted to protect their privacy, in accordance with the researcher’s approved Internal Review Broad (IRB) project proposal. When needed, other identifying markers have also been omitted or changed to protect their privacy. Both current and former CEDAW Committee members were interviewed as part of this study in part to obscure the identities of those interviewed. This article also includes quotes by committee members and state delegates made during public portions of CEDAW sessions I observed. Most were transcribed using publicly available recordings of these meetings. Nevertheless, the names and state affiliations of those quoted have been omitted to limit unneeded identification of those involved in these meetings.

5 Given the small and visible nature of the CEDAW Committee and of the state delegations involved in CEDAW sessions, I have not included the names of the states reviewed during CEDAW sessions I observed to further obscure the identities of the people involved in these sessions.

6 Analysis of the frequency with which references to “religion” and related terms were used during the CEDAW meetings I observed is outside of the scope of this article. However, as Årsheim (2018, p. 67) argued, “the frequency with which the selected terms [e.g., “religion”] have been used by the committees” is of limited utility. It “would entail an acceptance that every deployment of religion or … other associated terms … be equally important in mapping the religion-making of the committees” which “would not problematize the religion-secular binary” (p. 67, note 3). Still, for context, we can look at the frequency with which the CEDAW Committee produces statements on issues such as legal pluralism that involve factors commonly identified as religious. Here, Årsheim’s (2016) analysis of CEDAW concluding observations created between 1993 and 2010 is useful. He found the committee included comments about “legal pluralism” in its concluding observations to “66 [state] reports, an average of two for each [CEDAW] session” (p. 177).

7 Plural legal systems have more than one system of law. They often include one or more religion-based legal systems.

8 The citation for this concluding observation has been redacted to obscure the identities of the people involved in this session. Bolding removed.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the Association for the Sociology of Religion, Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, University of Notre Dame, the Global Religion Research Initiative at the University of Notre, National Science Foundation (Award Number: 2029490), Nanovic Institute for European Studies, Society for the Scientific Study of Religion and Center for the Study of Religion and Society, University of Notre Dame.

Notes on contributors

Shanna Corner

Shanna Corner is a visiting assistant professor of sociology in the Department of Sociology and Social Work at Hope College. She is also a research affiliate at the Center for the Study of Religion and Society at the University of Notre Dame. Her research focuses on human rights, gender, religion, law, culture, and morality.