On integral theory: an exercise in dialectical critical realism

ABSTRACT

This article offers an omissive critique of integral theory. To this objective, the article draws upon dialectical logic to investigate the affinities between integral theory and critical realism. Section 1 identifies new possibilities regarding the role of metatheory in practice by unpacking the metatheoretical coordinates of critical realism and integral theory. After providing a brief history of the origins of critical realism and integral theory, I review the ontological, epistemological, and methodological metatheorems of dialectical critical realism, and I put them to work to provide an omissive critique of integral theory. Then I introduce the notion of strictly non-dialectic because it functions to explain formally how integral theory relates to critical realism. Section 2 isolates the inadequacies at every moment in the passage from the MELD dialectic. Section 3 concludes the article with a discussion of the implications of foregrounding a critical realist ontology for integral theory.

KEYWORDS:

• Dialectical critical realism
• integral theory
• metatheory
• omissive critique
• strictly non-dialectic

Acknowledgment

I would like to thank two anonymous reviewers and the General Editor for their helpful comments.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 It refers to Bhaskar's concept of axiology of freedom initially developed in his seminal work on dialectical logic (1993/2008) and then in its subsequent work (1994, 144–58).

2 Within basic critical realism, there are three main groups of theory: transcendental realism, a philosophy of science (see Bhaskar 1975/2008); critical naturalism, a philosophy of social science (see Bhaskar 1979/2007); and the theory of explanatory critique, a philosophical theory of value (see Bhaskar 1986/2009). The concept of explanatory critique is the means by which critical realists aim to resolve the dichotomy between facts and values. The notion of explanatory critique may be illustrated succinctly in three simple stages: (1) commitment to critiquing false or inadequate beliefs, (2) critique of action that is grounded in false beliefs, and (3) removal of the causes of false beliefs. For more on the second phase of dialectical critical realism, see Bhaskar (1993/2008), and for more on the third phase of the philosophy of metaReality, see Bhaskar (2002/2012).

3 Although Ken Wilber himself, chief proponent of integral theory, may describe its development as non-linear, in several phases, and 'as far from [a] sequential, ladder-like, clunk-and-grind series of steps (Wilber 1995, p. xviii), I have followed Marshall's (2016) integral realist viewpoint to delineate it nonetheless in three phases: endo, ecto, and in praxis. The main reason for this stratification is twofold: On the one hand, it provides an accessible point of departure for the new reader as it may be contrasted with the three-phase outline of critical realism by referencing dates of publication of their respective key texts, and in this manner, the reader will find yet another affinity between critical realists and integral theorists. On the other hand, it describes the last phase as open, evolving, and with a strong backbone in its applications, current or otherwise; viz, in praxis. Esbjörn-Hargens' (2010c, 19) succinct history of IT's academic emergence and research programme provides snapshots of its formative years and lays the applied, theoretical, and constructive foundations for 'enacting an integral future'. The initial endo-phase of integral theory may be understood as an internal voyage or what Ken Wilber saw as a vision or perspective from within, mainly concerned with reductionisms (e.g. see Wilber 1995, 115, and his notion of flatland in Wilber 2000, 70–73). The second ecto-phase took Wilber’s integral theory externally in a quest for an all-encompassing, indeed integral, paradigm capable of combining and connecting knowledge from a variety of scientific, philosophical, and even mystical-spiritual fields of study (see Wilber 2005, 1); and the third phase of in praxis may be understood as the new beginning, a dawn in vision referring to an integral era in which we see its applications in action (Wilber 2010, 431). The development of the application of integral theory remains an ongoing project.

4 See e.g. Bhaskar and Hartwig (2010) and Collier (1994) for introductions. For a defence of realism, and in particular, critical realism as a subset of the academic discipline of philosophy of science that is ‘mainly concerned with ontology, with being', I refer the reader to Sayer (2000, 23).

5 A current historical analysis of integral theory, and one that includes their First Biennial Integral Theory Conference, is provided by Schwartz and Esbjörn-Hargens (2019) and Forman and Esbjörn-Hargens (2010), respectively, together with the two-volume result of a multi-year symposia series documented by Hedlund and Esbjörn-Hargens (2023) and its companion chronicled by Hedlund et al. (2016).

6 In particular, it is important to differentiate between Wilber’s writings and others in the integral community – see e.g. the contributions of Hampson (2007), Marshall (2012, 2016), and Rutzou (2012, 2014), including their arguments for a fertile ground for CR-IT dialogs found in Despain (2013, 2014, 2016) and Bhaskar et al. (2016) propositions. There is, also, avant-garde scholarship that takes IT to the next level of applied perspectives such as in Wilber's (2019) engagement with realism and idealism, including, IT's influence on the systematic inclusion of a wide range of academic disciplines such as, a view of an integrative higher education (Hampson and Rich-Tolsma 2023), and vision of an integral moral philosophy (Schwartz 2015; Schwartz and Esbjörn-Hargens 2019), together with applications related to integral political-economic discourse and policy (Bowman, 2022), and in arguing for integral investments in the reallocation of resources as a path for holistic wellbeing (Bozesan 2020), to provide a few examples.

7 I refer to Wilber's (2019, 470) view of integral theory as it provides us with his current understanding of reality, as he states, ‘when I focus on the outside (“ontological”) view, I focus on the existing elements of the AQAL Framework’; it is thus worth echoing Schwartz (2010, 231) to remind us what the so called ‘outside (“ontological”) view’ means: ‘Metatheoretical application typically involves the use of Integral Theory and its AQAL model to coordinate preexisting theories within a given domain of inquiry’. I now paraphrase, it means that integral theory, at least how its chief proponent sees it, equates ontology to AQAL, and its many metatheoretical applications involve a view mainly concerned with epistemology as it pertains to the integration of aspects of reality. Arguably, in current metatheoretical applications, IT may have elements of the distinct concepts of ontology, epistemology, immanent critique, and transcendental argumentation as it engages with realism in general; however, it was not conceived initially in such precise critical realist terms.

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Iskra Nunez

Iskra Nunez received her PhD from the University of London, Institute of Education. She is the author of Critical Realist Activity Theory: An Engagement with Critical Realism and Cultural-Historical Activity Theory (Routledge, 2014).