Smaller State Perspectives on the Future of Space Governance

Abstract

Current debates over impending developments in military and civilian uses of space raise deeper questions of how the expanding human presence in space over the next century might unfold. Appreciating the full range of challenges and opportunities posed by this uncertain future requires exploring all scenarios and perspectives comprehensively. As a contribution to such analysis, this article draws insights from the outlooks of smaller states toward national and global space priorities. The first two sections summarize and contrast United States and Canadian policy trajectories and dispositions in their respective space programs. The third section assesses how differences in smaller state perspectives can contribute to developing an analytically rigorous concept of space power. The fourth section then examines how juxtaposing alternative scenarios for the long-term development of human space presence, consistent with power-based theory, offers a stronger foundation for explaining and assessing current conditions than does making limiting assumptions of inevitable future trajectories. The article concludes that more inclusive analysis of serious future possibilities also enables more complete assessment of current space security challenges.

Notes

This definition of “weaponization” is paraphrased from Space Security 2004 (Toronto: York Centre for International and Security Studies, 2005), 121, 137.

Rather than arbitrarily adopting one of the many specific definitions of “space weaponization,” this article utilizes the term as a conceptual model. This approach is less adequate to delimit specific technologies and conflict scenarios but more useful to highlight the strategic qualities that various space-related force application technologies share.

Detailed comparisons of capabilities are difficult, and are subject to highly uncertain future technological developments. The increasing human presence in space may see the leading states increase their monopolies on current capabilities and resources for future development. These capabilities might also become more dispersed. For example, a revolutionary new technology offering space launch capabilities to most states would dramatically level the playing field. Further complicating calculations is the potential for asymmetric capabilities to offer strategically sufficient balance in competitive situations.

This article treats the categories of “larger” and “smaller” states as ideal types. Distinguishing between states which do and do not possess independent space launch capability approximates these ideal types. However, some states of moderate spacefaring capability or ambition might express elements of both ideal types—Canada is one example. The article does not catalog the policies and capabilities of various states, which are characterized by considerable variety. Instead, it aims deductively to underscore the outlooks that smaller states tend to share in contradistinction to the viewpoints of larger states, drawing on terrestrial comparisons in the process.

National Science and Technology Council, “Fact Sheet, National Space Policy,” The White House, September 19, 1996, p. 4, < http://history.nasa.gov/appf2.pdf > (accessed 10 October 2007).

U.S. Space Command was disbanded on 1 October 2002, and its responsibilities were handed over to U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM).

United States Space Command (USSC), Vision for 2020, p. 4, http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/usspac/visbook.pdf (accessed 10 October 2007).

Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization, January 11, 2001, Executive Summary, p.10 (Hereafter Space Commission Report). http://www.dod.mil/pubs/space20010111.html (accessed 10 October 2007).

Space Commission Report, (note 8), p. 12.

Space Commission Report, (note 8), p. 17.

Counterspace Operations, Air Force Doctrine Document 2-2.1, 2 August 2004, < http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/afdd2_2_1.pdf > ; Space Operations, Air Force Doctrine Document 2-2, 27 November 2006 < http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/usaf/afdd2_2.pdf > (accessed 10 October 2007). Cf. Theresa Hitchens, “Weaponizing Space: Is Current U.S. Policy Protecting Our Security?,” Statement Before The National Security and Foreign Affairs Subcommittee, House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, U.S. Congress, May 23, 2007, pp. 10–13, < www.cdi.org/PDFs/HitchensTestimony.pdf > (accessed 10 October 2007).

“Executive Summary,” Air Force 2025 (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, August 1996), Chapters 2, 3, 6. Principal portions of the study are archived at < http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/usaf/2025/ > (accessed 10 October 2007).

“Executive Summary,” (note 12), Chapters 3, 4. Under the influence of inter-service rivalries, this relatively abstract expectation may reflect parochial Air Force interests as much as strategic acuity.

“Executive Summary,” (note 12), Chapter 6.

Tim Weiner, “Air Force Seeks Bush's Approval for Space Weapons Programs,” New York Times, May 18, 2005. http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/18/business/18space.html (accessed 10 October 2007).

Theresa Hitchens, Michael Katz-Hyman, and Victoria Samson, “Space Weapons Spending in the FY 2007 Defense Budget,” March 6, 2006, < www.stimson.org/space/pdf/FY07SpaceWeapons.pdf > (accessed 10 October 2007).

“U.S. National Space Policy,” White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), October 6, 2006, < http://www.ostp.gov/html/US%20National%20Space%20Policy.pdf > (accessed 10 October 2007). For a critical assessment see Hitchens, “Weaponizing Space,” (note 11).

USSC, “Vision,” (note 7), p. 5 (emphasis original). See also “Introduction,” United States Space Command Long Range Plan, April 1998 < http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/usspac/lrp/toc.htm > (accessed 10 October 2007).

Jim Garamone “Joint Vision 2020 Emphasizes Full-spectrum Dominance,” American Forces Press Service, June 2, 2000, < http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2000/n06022000_20006025.html > (accessed 10 October 2007).

Joint Doctrine for Space Operations, Joint Publication 3-14, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 9, 2002, < http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_14.pdf > (accessed 10 October 2007). cf. Hitchens, “Weaponizing Space,” (note 11), p. 7.

Theresa Hitchens, Victoria Samson, and Sam Black, “Space Weapons Spending in the FY 2008 Defense Budget,” Center for Defense Information, February 21, 2007, < http://www.cdi.org/PDFs/Space%20Weapons%20Spending%20in%20the%20FY%202008%20Defense%20Budget.pdf > (accessed 10 October 2007). The approximate $1 billion spending does not include an unknown amount of classified spending. The report notes that in the FY08 request many relevant “top line” budgets became classified.

“Counterspace,” (note 11), Foreword. General Lance Lord, former commander of U.S. Space Command, has been quoted as stating, “the war in space began during Operation Iraqi Freedom.” Mike Moore, “Space war—now we're jamming'!” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 61.2 (March/April 2005): 6–8.

Dana J. Johnson, “Medium and Small Powers—Perspectives on Space and Security,” presentation to the Forum on Space and Defense Studies, U.S. Air Force Academy Center for Space and Defense Studies, Colorado Springs, 13 January 2006.

Toward Fusion of Air and Space: Surveying Developments and Assessing Choices for Small and Middle Powers, RAND-Fisher Institute for Air and Space Strategic Studies Conference, Tel Aviv, Israel, 19–20 March 2001.

Andrew Godefroy, “Canada's early space policy development 1958–1974,” Space Policy 19 (2003):137.

Christopher Gainor, “Canada's Space Program, 1958–1989: A Program without an Agency,” Acta Astronautica 60:2 (2007): 132–139.

Jocelyn Mallett, “Canada's Space Programme,” Space Policy 6 (1990).

Roger Handberg, “Outer Space as a Shared Frontier: Canada and the United States, Cooperation between Unequal Partners,” American Behavioral Scientist 47:10 (June 2004).

“Canada's Space Program,” (note 26) and “Canada's Early Space Policy,” (note 25), pp. 138–139.

Lydia Dotto, Canada and the European Space Agency: Three Decades of Cooperation. (Norodwijk, Netherlands: European Space Agency Publications Division, 2002); “Canada's Space Program,” (note 26), pp. 132–139.

National Paper: The Canadian Space Program (Saint-Hubert: Canadian Space Agency, 1999); John Kirton, “Canadian Space Policy,” Space Policy 6:1 (1990): 61–71.

“Canada's Early Space Policy,” (note 25), p. 140; “Canada's Space Program,” (note 26), pp. 132–139.

“Canada's Space Program,” (note 26), pp. 132–139.

Canadian Space Agency, State of the Canadian Space Sector 2000 (Saint-Hubert: Author, External Relations Directorate, 2002).

“Canada's Space Program,” (note 26), pp. 132–139.

J. Bates, “Canadian Military Mulls Tandem Radarsat Mission,” Space News, May 13, 2002, p. 20; cf. James Fergusson and Stephen James, “Report on Canada, National Security and Outer Space,” Canadian Defense and Foreign Affairs Institute (June 2007), p. 33, < http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/CanadaNationalSecurityandOuterSpace.pdf > (accessed 10 October 2007).

Canadian Space Agency, Radarsat, Annual Review 1998/99 (Saint-Hubert: Author, 1999); “Canada and the European,” (note 30), pp. 20–21.

Eric Choi and Sorin Nicelescu, “The Impact of US Export Controls on the Canadian Space Industry,” Space Policy 22 (2006): 29–34.

See, e.g., “Canadian Space Policy,” (note 31), pp. 61–71.

Despite the track record, Canada, like the U.S., has not always maintained consistent and farsighted policies, and Canadian analysts continue to debate future courses. See Anthony Salloum, “Canada Badly Needs a National Space Policy,” Embassy (2007), < http://www.embassymag.ca/html/index.php?display=story&full_path=/2007/june/20/spacepolicy/ > (accessed 10 October 2007).

The Canadian Space Agency, 2007–2008 Estimates: Report on Plans and Priorities, Government of Canada, (2007), pp. 11, 20, < http://www.space.gc.ca/asc/pdf/FINAL_RPP_07-08_e.pdf > (accessed 10 October 2007).

Advocacy in Canada for greater attention to military space concerns often coincides with calls for greater Canadian independence in space-related capabilities, including development of an independent launch capacity. For a recent example, see “Report on Canada, National Security and Outer Space,” (note 36).

Some of history's greatest theorists of political power also were informed by experiences of weakness—for Hobbes, it was the endemic civil strife of the England of his day; and for Machiavelli, the easy victimization of the small Italian city-state.

For classic renditions, see David Baldwin, The Paradoxes of Power (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1989); and David Baldwin, “Power and International Relations,” In The Handbook of International Relations, Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth Simmons, Eds. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Press, 2002), pp. 177–191. Critiques of the classical approach to power tend to offer alternatives still conceptualized in relative terms. See Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” International Organization 59 (Winter 2005): 39–75.

The term “soft power” was coined by Joseph Nye; for a recent articulation see Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. New York: PublicAffairs, 2005.

Michael Krepon, Theresa Hitchens, and Michael Katz-Hyman, “Preserving Freedom of Action in Space: Realizing the Potential And Limits of U.S. Spacepower,” Stimson Center, Report No. 66, May 2007, p. 1. Washington D.C. < http://www.stimson.org/pub.cfm?id = 437 > (accessed 10 October 2007).

This perspective is likely reinforced by the small size of the domestic organizations that deal with space-related activities, which leaves the activities less bureaucratically differentiated; linkages among space sectors are more visible and relevant.

Some defenders of U.S. space weaponization intentions argue that it will not prompt an arms race in space because smaller states lack an interest in such capabilities, which “would not fit the defense strategies of many nations.” See Steven Lambakis, “Space Weapons: Refuting the Critics,” Policy Review 105, February & March 2001, < http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3479337.htm > (accessed 10 October 2007). Such arguments overtly fail to distinguish interests and capabilities, and with respect to space ignore the range of space activities that touch upon the interests of smaller states.

The debate and decision left neither side completely content. Steven Staples, Missile Defence: Round One (Lorimer: Ottawa, 2006; ISBN: 1550289292) provides one insider's account of the episode. Cf. Tariq Rauf, “Canada's Perspectives on NMD,” Forum on The Missile Threat and Plans for Ballistic Missiles Defense: Technology, Strategic Stability and Impact on Global Security, Parliament, Library Room, Società Italiana per la Organizzazione Internazionale (SIOI), Rome, Italy, 18–19 January 2001, < http://www.mi.infn.it/~landnet/NMD/rauf.pdf > (accessed 10 October 2007). Prior to the March 2005 announcement, Canada accepted linking joint NORAD capabilities to U.S. missile defense systems, a decision that may have been more significant to the bilateral defense relationship. The advent of the Conservative government January 2006 raised the prospect that the March 2005 decision would be reconsidered. However, Prime Minister Stephen Harper has stated he will ask Parliament to hold a free vote on the issue only if the U.S. renews its request of Canadian participation, which the U.S. has indicated it is not intending to do. In that event, Canadian non-participation in U.S. missile defense development will stand for the time being.

Cf. “Jingoism Will Get Us Nowhere in Global Space Affairs,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, Oct. 30, 2006, p. 58; cited in “Weaponizing Space,” (note 11) p. 16.

The definitive articulation is Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979). Contemporary international theory evinces several schools of thought; but all recognize the absence of formal government in the relations among sovereign states.

On the strategic implications of differing states of technological development, see, Stephen van Evera, “Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War,” International Security 22:4 (Spring 1998): 5–43.

Recent U.S. support for ratification of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) implicitly recognizes the practical relevance of this principle even under the anarchic conditions of modern international relations.

Daniel Deudney, “The Philadelphia System – Sovereignty, Arms-Control, and Balance Of Power in the American States-Union, Circa 1787–1861,” International Organization 49:2 (Spring 1995): 191–228.

Ibid.

Ibid, pp. 201, 204. The Constitution did not legalize rebellion, of course, and the Civil War was fought in part over this ambiguity; its result, eliminating any presumed right of succession, constituted a fundamental transition of the system.

Ibid, p. 216.

There are important differences in the situations; not least of which being that North America, unlike space, already had human habitation. This difference yields distinctions in the ethical terms for new expansion of human presence in the two cases, but existence of that historical dynamic nevertheless remains common.

Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz, “Space Law and Governance Structures for a United States Space Power Theory: Looking Back to the American Experiment to See a Possible Future,” draft paper presented at the Space and Defense Conference, U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, CO, 11–12 January 2007. The phrase “ferocious and sanguinary contests of Europe” is from Thomas Jefferson, Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Short (1820), Jefferson Digital Archive < http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/jefferson/quotations/foley > (accessed 10 October 2007); as cited by Gabrynowicz.

George Kennan [pseudonym X], “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs (July 1947) < http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19470701faessay25403/x/the-sources-of-soviet-conduct.html > (accessed 10 October 2007).

For a contrary assessment, see William C. Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” International Security 24:1 (Summer 1999): 1–41. Wohlforth's self-consciously realist analysis concludes that so long as U.S. primacy is “clear and comprehensive,” other states will see counterbalancing as “a costly and probably doomed venture.” This analysis, however, does not delve into previous realist theory on “balancing” versus “bandwagoning,” nor does it reckon with twenty-first century opportunities to effectively balance with selective asymmetric capabilities.

Ashley J. Tellis, “Punching the U.S. Military's ‘Soft Ribs’: China's Antisatellite Weapon Test in Strategic Perspective,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Policy Brief 51, May 2007; and Philip C. Saunders and Charles D. Lutes, “China's ASAT Test: Motivations and Implications,” Institute for National Strategic Studies Special Report, National Defense University, June 2007.

Tellis observes: “Space arms control advocates are right when they emphasize that the advanced powers stand to gain disproportionately from any universal regime capable of protecting their space assets.” Tellis' arms control pessimism derives not from its lack of utility to the U.S., but from the logic that, precisely because of that utility, China (and presumably some other U.S. rivals) “simply cannot permit the creation of such a space sanctuary,” making the objective “unattainable.” This formulation usefully directs attention away from the metaphysics of multilateralism and toward the politics of the possible. “Punching the U.S. Military's,” (note 62), pp. 33–34.

Unnamed retired Air Force officer, cited in, “Weaponizing Space,” (note 11), p. 17.