Space, War, and Deterrence: A Strategy for India

ABSTRACT

India must accept and deal with the reality that conflicts and wars in today’s world will be driven by the increasing interdependence between conventional, nuclear, and space war. The role of space-based command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) assets, complemented by other ground- and space-based space situational awareness (SSA) components, is critical for deciding on the new national strategy for waging war and for the deterrence of war. Increasingly, the U.S.-China space dynamic determines the evolution of the global space order. To translate these challenges into an operational capability, India requires, at a minimum, a four-fold increase in capability to launch satellites into various orbits every year. The integration of C4ISR and SSA capabilities into a seamless network that facilitates real-time action is the key organizational and institutional component of the new strategy. More than the technology initiatives, the implementation of this strategy necessitates a clear aspiration on the part of India that it does have an important role to play on the global stage, and that it will carry out the organizational and institutional reforms for defending its national interests and national security.

Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank all colleagues of the International Strategic and Security Studies Program of the National Institute of Advanced Studies for their help in the writing of this article. The author would also like to thank Lalitha Sunderasan, Y.S. Rajan, V. Siddhartha, and Gopal Raj for their comments based on a critical review of the article.

Notes

1. For a more detailed elaboration of the evolution of the current space order, see S. Chandrashekar, “Space, War and Security—A Strategy for India,” http://isssp.in/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Space-War-and-Security-_A-Strategy-for-India.pdf (accessed August 2016).

2. For the current status of this constellation, see S. Chandrashekar and Soma Perumal, “China’s Constellation of Yaogan Satellites and the Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile: May 2016 Update,” http://isssp.in/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Yaogan-and-ASBM-May-2016-Report.pdf (accessed August 2016).

3. David S. McDonough, “The New Triad of the Bush Administration: Counter-Proliferation and Escalation Dominance in U.S. Nuclear Strategy,” International Journal 59, no. 3 (Summer 2004): 613–634.

4. For a rigorous economic evaluation of the benefits of the Indian space program, see U. Sankar, The Economics of India’s Space Program—An Exploratory Analysis (New Delhi, India: Oxford University Press, 2007), xiv, 312.

5. India was not aware of China’s ASAT test until well after the test was over. Though information on the orbital parameters of the Yaogan 9 A, 9 B, and 9 C constellation was available in the public domain, Indian establishments were unable to link these to an ELINT capability for quite some time.

6. WGS is a U.S.-led global advanced satellite system with a number of participating countries. This constellation of advanced GEO communications satellites provides global connectivity for all military operations. Australia, Canada, Denmark, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and New Zealand are part of this global system. See http://www.afspc.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=5582 (accessed August 2016).

7. See Chris Bergin, “ILS Proton M Launches the Highest Ever Throughput Satellite Viasat−1,” http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2011/10/ils-proton-m-launch-highest-throughput-satellite-viasat-1/ (accessed August 2016).

8. For an overview of these trends in satellite masses, see U.S. Federal Aviation Administration, “The Annual Compendium of Commercial Space Transportation: 2014,” February 2015, 100–104, https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ast/media/FAA_Annual_Compendium_2014.pdf (accessed August 2016).

9. For an assessment of past trends on which this projection is based, see Supra note 1, 27. Available evidence from the ground suggests that there is unmet demand for transponders over India.

10. See Stephen Clark, “One Web Launch Deal Called Largest Commercial Rocket Buy in History,” http://spaceflightnow.com/2015/07/01/oneweb-launch-deal-called-largest-commercial-rocket-buy-in-history/ (accessed August 2016).

11. See S. Chandrashekar and Soma Perumal, “China’s Constellation of Yaogan Satellites & the Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile: January 2015 Update,” http://isssp.in/chinas-constellation-of-yaogan-satellites-the-asbm-january-2015-update/ (accessed August 2016).

12. See “List of Earth Observation Satellites,” http://www.isro.gov.in/spacecraft/list-of-earth-observation-satellites (accessed August 2016).

13. The latest Cartosat satellite will have sub-meter resolutions, http://www.isro.gov.in/sites/default/files/pdf/pslv-brochures/PSLVC7.pdf (accessed August 2016).

14. See “PSLV C-19 RISAT-1,” http://www.isro.gov.in/sites/default/files/pdf/pslv-brochures/PSLVC19.pdf

15. Ibid.

16. The capacity of the Chinese Long March CZ 2 C or CZ 4B that have been used is 2100 kg to 2200 kg in Sun synchronous orbit.

17. See Union of Concerned Scientists Satellite Database, http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear-weapons/space-weapons/satellite-database.html#.Vgou932rHgI (accessed September 2016).

18. See presentation from Mike Safayan, “Overview of the Planet Labs Constellation of Earth Imaging Satellites—In Space to Help Life on Earth,” http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-R/space/workshops/2015-prague-small-sat/Presentations/Planet-Labs-Safyan.pdf (accessed August 2016).

19. See “SkySat Constellation of Terra Bella—Formerly SkySat Imaging Program of Skybox Imaging,” https://directory.eoportal.org/web/eoportal/satellite-missions/s/skysat (accessed September 2016).

20. See Supra note 1, 54, for details of the assessment.

21. W.M. Holmes, Jr., “NASA’s Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System,” IEEE Communications Society Magazine, September 1978, http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=1089760 (accessed August 2016).

22. See Union of Concerned Scientists Satellite Database, http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear-weapons/space-weapons/satellite-database.html#.Vgou932rHgI (accessed August 2016).

23. Ibid.

24. For details, see “DRTS: Data Relay Test Satellite,” http://global.jaxa.jp/activity/pr/brochure/files/sat10.pdf (accessed September 2016).

25. Harald Hauschildt et al., “European Data Relay System—One Year to Go!” Proceedings of the International Conference on Space Optical Systems and Applications (ICSOS), S1-3, Kobe, Japan, 7–9 May 2014, http://icsos2012.nict.go.jp/pdf/1569603307.pdf (accessed August 2016).

26. See Union of Concerned Scientists Satellite Database, http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear-weapons/space-weapons/satellite-database.html#.Vgou932rHgI (accessed August 2016).

27. Gary Davis, “History of the NOAA Satellite Program,” http://www.osd.noaa.gov/download/JRS012504-GD.pdf (accessed September 2016).

28. See “INSAT 3D,” http://www.isro.gov.in/Spacecraft/insat-3d (accessed August, 2016).

29. See Supra note 1, 64–67.

30. Supra note 2, 67–75.

31. The Gagan service uses the GPS, along with enhancements provided by a network of ground stations, to improve the accuracy of the standard GPS signals received by commercial receivers. For details, see http://www.isro.gov.in/sites/default/files/pdf/pslv-brochures/PSLVC22.pdf (accessed August 2016).

32. See Rajaram Nagappa, “The Promise of Small Satellites for National Security,” http://isssp.in/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Promise-of-Small-Satellites_R33-2015.pdf (accessed August 2016).

33. See Supra note 1, 80.

34. See “Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV),” http://www.isro.gov.in/launchers/gslv (accessed August 2016).

35. See “LVM3,” http://www.isro.gov.in/launchers/lvm3 (accessed August 2016).

36. These studies use publicly available information along with the National Institute of Advanced Studies’ in-house developed trajectory software.

37. The U.S. pivot to Asia and their new air sea battle doctrine are visible proofs of this dynamism.

38. See Supra note 1, 100–102.