Development of Space Launch Vehicles in India

ABSTRACT

The Indian space program is a spacefaring success story with demonstrated capability in the design and building of application and scientific satellites, and the means to launch them into desired orbits. The end-to-end mission planning and execution capability comes with a high emphasis on self-reliance. Sounding rockets and small satellite launch vehicles provided the initial experience base for India. This experience was consolidated and applied to realize larger satellite launch vehicles. While many of the launch vehicle technologies were indigenously developed, the foreign acquisition of liquid propulsion technologies did help in catalyzing the development efforts. In this case, launch vehicle concept studies showed the inevitability of using a cryogenic upper stage for geosynchronous Earth orbit missions, which proved to be difficult technically and encountered substantial delays, given the geopolitical situation. However, launch capability matured from development to operational phases, and today, India’s Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle and Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle are in a position to meet both domestic and international market demands.

Acknowledgments

The author thanks all of his colleagues in the International Strategic and Security Studies Program at the National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS) for various discussions and suggestions. Specifically, the author would like to acknowledge V. Siddhartha, Adjunct Professor, for going through the manuscript and making valuable suggestions, and Mrunalini Deshpande, Junior Research Fellow, for editing the manuscript. Thanks also go to P.V. Manoranjan Rao for providing permission to quote from A Brief History of Rocketry in India. The author also acknowledges the constant support and encouragement provided by Baldev Raj, Director, NIAS.

Notes

1. The Department of Atomic Energy concluded an agreement with Sud Aviation of France for the licensed manufacture of two-stage Centaure rocket in India. The know-how transfer included drawings, equipment specifications, and training of some engineers in the Sud Aviation plant in France.

2. E. V. Chitnis gives a first-hand account of “selecting site for satellite launching” in the chapter titled “Early ISRO: 1961–1971,” edited by P.V. Manoranjan Rao, From Fishing Hamlet to Red Planet: India’s Space Journey (New Delhi, India: Harper Collins India, 2015), 20–21.

3. The series of indigenously developed sounding rockets were named Rohini Sounding Rockets and the team of engineers at SSTC was called Rohini engineers. The complete group of engineers constituted the Rohini Consultative Committee, which was used by Sarabhai for nucleating and brainstorming ideas.

4. K. D. Wood, Aerospace Vehicle Design Volume II: Spacecraft Design (Chicago, IL: Johnson Publishing, 1964).

5. For details of L4S and Mu launch vehicles, see Encyclopedia Astronautica, http://www.astronautix.com/ (accessed August 2016).

6. The Federation of American Scientists describes the SCOUT launch vehicle in some detail, http://fas.org/spp/military/program/launch/scout.htm (accessed August 2016).

7. There is evidence of Indian interest in SCOUT in the early years of the Indian space program. Also, there is a mention of Homi Bhabha having tried for the technology transfer of SCOUT from the United States in February 1965. See P. V. Manoranjan Rao and P. Radhakrishnan (eds.), A Brief History of Rocketry in ISRO (New Delhi, India: University Press, 2012).

8. Vikram Sarabhai founded the first management institution in India—the Indian Institute of Management at Ahmedabad, India.

9. The launch vehicle systems consisted of the four propulsive stages, heat shield, guidance package, telemetry, and tele-command. The launcher and tracking system development were also included in the subsystem development projects.

10. A totally different type of control, using jet vanes mounted at the exit of the first-stage nozzle, was used in SCOUT.

11. The multiple development agencies in solid propellant rocket systems and distribution of tasks among them by the SLV project management are described in Rajaram Nagappa, “Evolution of Solid Propellant Rockets in India,” Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) Monographs, Special Publication Series, Defense Scientific Information and Documentation Center (DESIDOC), New Delhi, 2014, 79–81.

12. This motor development was completed and the motor was flight qualified in the SLV-C flight.

13. A. E. Muthunayagam, “Liquid Propulsion in ISRO,” Chapter 2.10, in From Fishing Hamlet to Red Planet: India’s Space Journey, edited by P.V. Manoranjan Rao (New Delhi, India: Harper Collins India, 2015), 228–229.

14. Annual Report, Department of Space, 1972–1973. The extract quote: “a team has been constituted to analyze, study, and report on an optimum approach to the development of a multistage launch vehicle, capable of placing a satellite of about 800 kg weight in synchronous equatorial orbit.”

15. Gopal Raj, Reach for the Stars (New Delhi, India: Viking, 2000), 169–172.

16. Ibid., 172.

17. Annual Report Department of Space, 1981–1982.

18. Almost coincident with the launch of ASLV in March 1987 came the formation of MTCR. ISRO had started experiencing difficulty in procurement of materials and components from the United States ahead of MTCR. In respect to solid propulsion systems, difficulty was experienced in the procurement of PBAN resin, carbon fabric, and graphite, among other items. Indigenization efforts were underway in some of these systems and were accelerated. In fact, in the third flight of ASLV, the solid motor strap-ons propellant had to be changed, as PBAN was not available. Indigenously produced hydroxyl terminated polybutadiene (HTPB)-based propellant was used in its place. HTPB had superior energetic and aging characteristics over PBAN, and the resin was produced by an industry in Mumbai, India, based on ISRO know-how. Alternate European sources were available for procurement of the equivalent of DuPont Chemical’s Kevlar™49 fiber. ISRO had synthesized the polymer, but could not attract industry interest as the off-take was low. A similar situation existed in respect to other subsystems.

19. The motors were processed in different work centers. Employing a material selection and screening process, the standard deviation in key performance parameters could be contained within narrow bands. For a more detailed description of the performance of the motor, see Supra note 11, 96–97.

20. The failure of the PSLV maiden flight is reproduced from the chapter, “The Workhorse: Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle,” A Brief History of Rocketry in ISRO, 160–161.

21. Ibid., 164.

22. The stage nomenclature followed in ISRO used prefix S for solid, L for liquid, and C for cryogenic stages. The number following represented the mass of the propellant in the stage. Thus, L-110 meant a liquid stage with 110 t of propellant.

23. The propellant loading in S125 was subsequently increased to 139 t for use in PSLV. This improved motor designated S139 also is used for GSLV flights.

24. Liquid systems are more complex than solid propellant systems. However, it was not beyond the scope of Indian mechanical and propulsion engineers to take up the design of L110. This was doable as India assimilated the Viking engine technology and realized the L37.5 stage. The liquid propulsion development team, however, was not confident and the ISRO management preferred to take the proven route of employing L-40, a stage derived from the qualified L37.5 stage.

25. The MTCR of the export control items list includes components, subsystems, materials, and technology, which come under the purview of the ban. While it could be argued that a cryogenic stage can hardly be conceived and used for missile application, post-Soviet Russia, under its late president Boris Yeltsin, was beholden to the United States and not strong enough to resist the U.S. pressure.

26. GSLV using the indigenous cryogenic stage was labeled as Mark II to differentiate it from the flights involving Russia-procured cryogenic stages.

27. See article in this issue of Astropolitics: S. Chandrashekar, “Space, War, and Security: A Strategy for India,” Astropolitics 14, no. 2–3 (2016).

28. The satellites falling in the 3000+ kg category are: GSAT-8 (3093 kg), GSAT-10 (3400 kg), GSAT-16 (3181.6 kg), and GSAT-15 (3164 kg).

29. Details of LVM-3 can be garnered from ISRO, http://www.isro.gov.in/launchers/lvm3 (accessed August 2016).

30. “U.S., India Find Way around ITAR Export Laws with Bilateral Space Launch Agreement,” Parabolic Arc, Spaceflight, 13 July 2010, http://www.parabolicarc.com/2010/07/13/india-find-itar-export-laws-bilateral-space-launch-agreement/ (accessed August 2016).