When States Test Their Anti-Satellite Weapons

ABSTRACT

The United States, Russia, China, and India are the only states that have tested anti-satellite weapons (ASATs) by deliberately destroying orbiting satellites. In this paper, a mix of practical and aspirational factors are investigated in the context of heightened propensity for a state's testing of ASATs. The strategic competition and rivalry between these global and regional space powers generates an environment of conflict and insecurity. In the absence of an international treaty to constrain behavior, these states are driven to amass counterspace capabilities to secure their assets and establish space dominance.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

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139. Narendra Modi (official account), Twitter, March 27, 2019, https://twitter.com/narendramodi/status/1110800868058660864?lang=en.

140. Weeden and Samson, “Global Counterspace Capabilities.”

141. Dwayne Day, “To Attack or Deter? The Role of Anti-Satellite Weapons,” The Space Review, April 20, 2020, https://www.thespacereview.com/article/3927/1; Dwayne Day, “Blunt Arrows: The Limited Utility of ASATs,” The Space Review, June 6, 2005, https://www.thespacereview.com/article/388/1; Jaganath Sankaran, “China's Deceptively Weak Anti-Satellite Capabilities,” The Diplomat, November 13, 2014, https://thediplomat.com/2014/11/chinas-deceptively-weak-anti-satellite-capabilities/.

142. Mike Wall, “Don't Panic about Russia's Recent Anti-Satellite Test, Experts Say,” Space.com, April 2020, https://www.space.com/russia-anti-satellite-weapon-fears-overblown.html#xenforo-comments-30812.

143. Matthew A. Hallex, and Travis S. Cottom, “Proliferated Commercial Satellite Constellations: Implications for National Security.” JFQ: Joint Force Quarterly no. 97 (2020, 2nd Quarter): 20–29.

144. Ibid.; also see Sankaran, “China's Deceptively Weak Anti-Satellite Capabilities.”