An Australian Approach to Space Warfare

ABSTRACT

Australia is currently experiencing a reinvigorated space program with a new space agency, significant industry investment in space ventures, and the Australian Defence Force embracing the military advantage conferred by space systems. Coincidentally, geostrategic instability has led Australia’s government to raise its military preparedness in the face of increased risk of state-on-state conflict. Accordingly, military planners are considering not only what future space capabilities are needed by Australia, but the prospect of space warfare and what the state should do to protect its equities in the space domain. We conclude that developing a stronger normative framework is the best option for the preservation and growth of Australia’s future space capabilities.

Disclosure statement

The research that formed the basis of this article was funded by a grant from the Australian Department of Defence. Each of the authors have previously worked in the Australian Department of Defence and Duncan Blake continues to be employed in a part-time capacity as a Reserve legal officer in the Royal Australian Air Force. These interests have been disclosed fully to Taylor & Francis. The authors do not anticipate any conflicts arising from these past or current relationships with the Australian Department of Defence.

Disclaimer

This paper represents solely the views of the authors and does not represent the official policy or position of any department or agency within the Australian Government.

Notes

¹ Australian Space Agency, Advancing Space – Australian Civil Space Strategy 2019–2028 (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2019), 12, https://publications.industry.gov.au/publications/advancing-space-australian-civil-space-strategy-2019-2028.pdf (accessed July 4, 2021); Department of Defence, 2020 Defence Strategic Update, (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2020), 38–39, https://www1.defence.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-11/2020_Defence_Strategic_Update.pdf (accessed July 10, 2021).

² Articulated by Australia’s (then) Minister for Industry, Science and Technology, the Honourable Karen Andrews MP’s foreword in the Australian Space Agency’s Advancing Space – Australian Civil Space Strategy, see Australian Space Agency, Advancing Space – Australian Civil Space Strategy 2019–2028, (Commonwealth of Australia: Canberra, 2019), II, https://publications.industry.gov.au/publications/advancing-space-australian-civil-space-strategy-2019-2028.pdf (accessed February 19, 2022).

³ Royal Australian Airforce, Operations Series, ADDP 3.18, Operational Employment of Space, (Canberra: Defence Publishing Service, 2010); Royal Australian Air Force AFDN 1–19 Air-Space Integration (Air and Space Power Centre, 2019), 1–74, 53–54, 61, https://airpower.airforce.gov.au/publications/afdn-1-19-air-space-integration (accessed November 11, 2021).

⁴ Department of Defence, 2020 Defence Strategic Update, 3. See also: National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2040 – A More Contested World (United States of America: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, March 2021), 1–3, https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/GlobalTrends_2040.pdf (accessed February 11, 2022).

⁵ Subsequent to Russia’s November 15, 2021 ASAT Test, the official Russian narrative appears to have been that Russia and China have been attempting, for years, to bring the U.S. and others to the diplomatic table to prevent the further weaponization of space. And, that in light of the reticence of the U.S. and others to come to the table, and similar tests conducted by the U.S. and others, the test was a reasonable measure to assure its security and increase its Defense capability. This has resulted in NATO coming to the table and proposing international measures to prevent the further weaponization of space. See: TASS Russian News Agency, “NATO proposes to Russia to Refrain from Conducting Anti-Satellite Tests”, February 2, 2022, https://tass.com/defense/1396445(accessed February 9, 2022). See also Deganit Paikowsky, “Why Russia Tested Its Anti-Satellite Weapon”, Foreign Policy, December 26, 2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/12/26/putin-russia-tested-space-asat-satellite-weapon/(accessed February 9, 2022). See also Tom Balmforth, “‘Razor-sharp precision’: Russia Hails Anti-Satellite Weapons Test”, Reuters, November 18, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/russia-dismisses-us-criticism-anti-satellite-weapons-test-2021-11-16/ (accessed February 11, 2022).

⁶ For a comprehensive summary of Australia’s investment in commercial and military space capabilities see, Australian Space Agency, State of Space Report – A Report by the Australian Government Space Coordination Committee, 1 July 2019–30 June 2020 (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2020), 61–68, https://www.industry.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-12/state-of-space-report-2019-20.pdf (accessed July 20, 2021); Minister for Foreign Affairs, “New Measures to Help Grow Australia’s Civil Space Sector”, Media Release, July 1, 2021, https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/marise-payne/media-release/new-measures-help-grow-australias-civil-space-sector (accessed July 20, 2021); Department of Defence, “Defence Announces Space Division”, May 19, 2021, https://news.defence.gov.au/media/media-releases/defence-announces-space-division (accessed July 20, 2021).

⁷ Department of Defence, “Defence announces Space Division”, https://news.defence.gov.au/media/media-releases/defence-announces-space-division, (accessed 10 February 2022).

⁸ Matthew L. James, “Australia’s Space Heritage,” Space Policy 8, no. 4 (November 1992): 323, https://doi.org/10.1016/0265-9646(92)90065-4.

⁹ Department of Defence, “History of the Woomera Prohibited Area,” Australian Government Department of Defence – Woomera Protected Area, https://www1.defence.gov.au/bases-locations/sa/woomera/about (accessed May 21, 2021); Australian Government, “Our History – DST in South Australia,” Australian Government Defence Science and Technology Group, https://www.dst.defence.gov.au/discover-dst/our-history (accessed May 20, 2021).

¹⁰ Depending upon the location of launch and the role of the nation, Australia could be seen as the third, fourth or fifth nation to launch its own satellite. In reference to comments regarding Australia’s admission to the “space club”, and Paikowsky, Paikowsky’s research establishes that the ‘space club’ is not a formal entity and accordingly the criteria for a valid claim to have joined the ‘space club’ is uncertain. Nevertheless, Paikowsky concludes that, because a spare American-made Redstone booster was used to launch WRESAT1 from Australian territory, Australia could not be considered a ‘full’ member of the space club, Deganit Paikowsky, The Power of the Space Club (Cambridge: University Press, August 2017), 135. See also: Kerrie Dougherty, Australia in Space: A History of a Nation’s Involvement (ATF Press, 2017), 45. See also: (Australian) Department of Defence, “WRESAT – Weapons Research Establishment Satellite”, https://www.dst.defence.gov.au/innovation/wresat-%E2%80%94-weapons-research-establishment-satellite (accessed February 9, 2022).

¹¹ Robbin Laird, “a Look back at the Australian Space Effort”, Defense.info, December 30, 2021, https://defense.info/global-dynamics/2021/12/a-look-back-at-the-australian-space-effort/ (accessed July 6, 2022). Richard Tanter, “Fifty years on, Pine Gap should reform to better serve Australia”, The Conversation, December 9, 2016, https://theconversation.com/fifty-years-on-pine-gap-should-reform-to-better-serve-australia-65650 (accessed July 6, 2022).

¹² Kerrie Dougherty, “Lost in space: Australia dwindled from space leader to also-ran in 50 years,” The Conversation, September 22, 2017, https://theconversation.com/lost-in-space-australia-dwindled-from-space-leader-to-also-ran-in-50-years-83310 (accessed July 4, 2021).

¹³ Andrew Dowse, “Schriever – an Australian Perspective,” High Frontier 7, no. 1 (November 2010): 19, https://www.afspc.af.mil/Portals/3/documents/HF/AFD-101116-028.pdf (accessed July 10, 2021).

¹⁴ Royal Australian Air Force AFDN 1–19 Air-Space Integration, 3, 29.

¹⁵ Royal Australian Air Force Doctrine Notes demonstrate an increasing interest in the use of space capabilities in time-critical operational and tactical contexts. AFDN 1–19 in particular notes that reliance on 5^th generation capabilities on space infrastructure, and it follows that the work of, for example, No. 1 Remote Sensing Unit (RAAF), in collating SDA information and the Australian Space Operations Centre (AusSpOC) in disseminating it, is a tactical matter. See: Royal Australian Air Force, Operations Series, ADDP 3.18; Royal Australian Air Force AFDN 1–19 Air-Space Integration (2019), 39; See also recent developments of tactical military space applications, such as the Gunsmoke-J satellites, Nathan Strout, “With all three Gunsmoke-J satellites on orbit, the Army is ready to test space-based targeting”, DefenseNews, July 12, 2021, https://www.defensenews.com/battlefield-tech/space/2021/07/12/with-all-three-gunsmoke-j-satellites-on-orbit-the-army-is-ready-to-test-space-based-targeting/ (accessed July 24, 2021).

¹⁶ Australian Space Agency, Advancing Space – Australian Civil Space Strategy 2019–2028 (2019), 6, 12–13.

¹⁷ United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, Space Economy Initiative, 2020 Outcome Report (United Nations, 2021), 4–5, https://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/Space%20Economy/Space_Economy_Initiative_2020_Outcome_Report_Jan_2021.pdf (accessed July 20, 2021).

¹⁸ Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into Developing Australia’s Space Industry, The Now Frontier: Developing Australia’s Space Industry, (November 11, 2021), https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/House/Industry_Innovation_Science_and_Resources/SpaceIndustry/Report/section?id=committees/reportrep/024732/77075 (accessed February 11, 2022).

¹⁹ As described in the 2009 U.S. Department of Defense Space Posture Review and built upon in the National Security Space Strategy. Though the report is no longer available from official online sources, a copy may be found at https://aerospace.org/sites/default/files/policy_archives/SPR%20Interim%20Report%2012Mar10.pdf and specific reference to this alliterative device in the (archived) “Fact Sheet: National Security Space Strategy” https://archive.defense.gov/home/features/2011/0111_nsss/docs/2011_01_19_NSSS_Fact_Sheet_FINAL.pdf (last accessed July 4, 2021).

²⁰ The number of launches has increased year on year, with Bryce Tech listing 1,700 smallsats launched between 2012 and 2019, representing a 11-fold increase in “proportion of upmass.”: See BryceTech, Smallsats by the Numbers 2020 (BryceTech, 2020), slide 5, https://brycetech.com/reports, (accessed July 5, 2021); Keith Rosario, “Securing spectrum for Space 2.0,” The Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 11 Mar 2020, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/securing-spectrum-for-space-2-0/ (accessed 5 July, 2021).

²¹ Paul B. Larsen, “Outer Space: How Shall the World’s Governments Establish Order among Competing Interests,” Washington International Law Journal 29, no. 1 (December 2019): 32–34, https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/pacrimlp29&i=9 (accessed July 10, 2021).

²² Ibid.

²³ Malcolm Davis, The Australian Defence Force and contested space (The Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2019), 17–28, https://s3-ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/ad-aspi/2019-08/The%20Australian%20Defence%20Force%20and%20contested%20space.pdf?VersionId=wQYhCQ5uzv3P8EnSDUogcTsJf8L27jkr (accessed July 5, 2021).

²⁴ Brian Weeden and Victoria Samson, Global Counterspace Capabilities: An Open Source Assessment, (Secure World Foundation, April 2021), xxx-xxxi, https://swfound.org/media/207162/swf_global_counterspace_capabilities_2021.pdf (accessed July 5, 2021); Todd Harrison, Kaitlyn Johnson, Joe Moye, Makena Young, Space Threat Assessment 2021 (The Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 2021), 1–46, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/210331_Harrison_SpaceThreatAssessment2021.pdf?gVYhCn79enGCOZtcQnA6MLkeKlcwqqks (accessed July 20, 2021); Todd Harrison, Kaitlyn Johnson, Makena Young, Defense Against the Dark Arts in Space (The Centre for Strategic and International Studies & Rowan & Littlefield, 2021), vi, 1–6, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/210225_Harrison_Defense_Space.pdf?N2KWelzCz3hE3AaUUptSGMprDtBlBSQG (accessed July 20, 2021).

²⁵ The Defense Science Board, Technology and Innovation Enablers for Superiority in 2030 (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Under Secretary of Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, 2013), xii, https://dsb.cto.mil/reports/2010s/DSB2030.pdf (accessed July 5, 2021).

²⁶ Brian Weeden and Victoria Samson, Global Counterspace Capabilities: An Open Source Assessment (Secure World Foundation, 2021), xxx-xxxi.

²⁷ The increasing dual-use nature of civilian and military satellites and number of military satellites in LEO increasingly begs the question, “What would constitute valid military targets in space?”. See Larsen, “Outer Space: How Shall the World’s Governments Establish Order among Competing Interests,”: 39; BryceTech, “Smallsats by the numbers, 2020”, slide 10 “Number of smallsats by operator type”, BryceTech, 2020, https://brycetech.com/reports/report-documents/Bryce_Smallsats_2020.pdf (accessed July 10, 2021).

²⁸ Malcolm Davis, “The commercial advantage in space’s grey zone,” The Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Jun 16, 2021, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-commercial-advantage-in-spaces-grey-zone/ (accessed July 5, 2021).

²⁹ Ramin Skibba and Undark, “The Ripple Effects of a Space Skirmish,” The Atlantic, July 12, 2020, https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2020/07/space-warfare-unregulated/614059/ (accessed July 5, 2021);

Weeden Samson, Global Counterspace Capabilities: An Open Source Assessment (2021), xxxi.

³⁰ For example, as reflected by the U.S. House Science, Space and Technology Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics’ February 11, 2020 hearing on Space Situational Awareness, specifically Witness Testimony from Mr Daniel Oltrogge – House Committee on House Science, Space and Technology, Space Situational Awareness: Key Issues in an Evolving Landscape: Witness Statement – Mr Daniel Oltrogge, 116th Cong., February 11, 2020, H. Do, 1–4, https://www.congress.gov/event/116th-congress/house-event/110487 (accessed July 5, 2021); Joseph N. Pelton, “A path forward to better space security: Finding new solutions to space debris, space situational awareness and space traffic management,” The Journal of Space Safety Engineering 6, no. 2 (June 2019): 94, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jsse.2019.04.005.

³¹ Department of Defence, 2020 Force Structure Plan (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2020), 62, paragraph 6.8, https://www1.defence.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-11/2020_Force_Structure_Plan.pdf (accessed July 20, 2021); Malcolm Davis, “ADF to being a New Space Mission”, The Australian, October 31, 2020, https://www.theaustralian.com.au/special-reports/defence/adf-to-begin-a-new-space-mission/news-story/058854620414ba0bea2bc5442ca48be1 (accessed July 20, 2021).

³² Department of Defence (Australia), 2020 Defence Strategic Update, 38–39.

³³ Australia – as well as 17 other nations, including the United States – was one of the first 18 nations to form the ad hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS); United Nations, General Assembly, 13^th session, Res 1348 (XIII) Question of the Peaceful Use of Outer Space (United Nations, 1958), 5–6, https://www.unoosa.org/pdf/gares/ARES_13_1348E.pdf (accessed July 5, 2021).

³⁴ The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty), 610 UNTS 205, opened for signature 27 January 1967, entered into force 10 October 1967, ratified by Australia 10 October 1967; Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space (Rescue Agreement), 672 UNTS 119, opened for signature 22 April 1968, entered into force 3 December 1968, ratified by Australia 18 March 1986; Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (Liability Convention), 961 UNTS 187 opened for signature 29 March 1972, entered into force 1 September 1972, ratified by Australia 20 January 1975; Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (Registration Convention), 1023 UNTS 15, opened for signature 14 January 1975, entered into force 15 September 1976, ratified by Australia 11 March 1986; Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Moon Agreement), 1363 UNTS 3, opened for signature 18 December 1979, entered into force 11 July 1984, ratified by Australia 6 August 1986. See: United Nations – Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Legal Subcommittee, Sixtieth session, Status of International Agreements relating to activities in outer space as at 1 January 2021 (United Nations, 1958), 5–10, https://www.unoosa.org/res/oosadoc/data/documents/2021/aac_105c_22021crp/aac_105c_22021crp_10_0_html/AC105_C2_2021_CRP10E.pdf (accessed July 5, 2021).

³⁵ United Nations, General Assembly, 89^th Plenary Meeting, Res 34/68 Agreement Governing Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 1979 (United Nations, 1979), 77–80, https://www.unoosa.org/pdf/gares/ARES_34_68E.pdf (accessed July 5, 2021).

³⁶ Obvious examples of the importance of the United States in influencing Australia’s involvement in space governance include Australian – U.S. defense arrangements, e.g. the Australia New Zealand United States Security Treaty (ANZUS), the Joint Defence Facility Pine Gap – whose significance to the Australia/U.S. relationship was articulated by the former Minister of Defence, the Honourable Christopher Pyne, in a February 2019 Ministerial Statement on Australia-United States Joint Facilities – and Australia’s support for the Moon to Mars Mission. See: Australian Government, Ministerial Statements, Australia-United States Joint Facilities (Parliament of Australia, 2019), https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22chamber%2Fhansardr%2Fe0e7b3e2-2c86-47b4-8de2-de9e8f0f224b%2F0026%22;src1=sm1 (accessed July 31, 2021). For a clear articulation of the importance of supporting the U.S.’s space programs and ambitions for Australia, see: Frances Adamson, Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Space: Bringing order to the final frontier”, speech, United Nations Association of Australia, Canberra, Australian Capital Territory, October 4, 2018, https://www.dfat.gov.au/news/speeches/Pages/space-bringing-order-to-the-final-frontier (accessed July 5, 2021).

³⁷ During this time, Australia could be considered a leader with the U.S. – despite (arguable) current opposition now. Coincidently, this occurred around the same time as the negotiation of United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), particularly regulation of the deep seabed, Antarctica and the rise of the concept of ‘Common Heritage of Mankind’ (CHM). Unpopular because of this, the Hawke government acceded (late) because it saw it as an extension of nuclear disarmament measures. See: Cait Storr, “Why did Australia sign the Moon Treaty? A decision made under electoral pressure in the 1980s has lasting consequences for policy in the present.,” The interpreter, The Lowy Institute, May 24, 2021, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/why-did-australia-sign-moon-treaty (accessed July 5, 2021).

³⁸ Australian Space Agency, State of Space Report 2021, Commonwealth of Australia, April 2022, 28–37, https://www.industry.gov.au/publications/state-space-report-2021 (accessed July 5, 2021).

³⁹ NASA, NASA, International Partners Advance Cooperation with First Signings of Artemis Accords, ed Sean Potter (NASA, 14 October 2020), https://www.nasa.gov/press-release/nasa-international-partners-advance-cooperation-with-first-signings-of-artemis-accords (accessed July 5, 2021); Malcolm Davis, “Commitment to Artemis Accords affirms Australia’s rising star in space,” The Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Jan 12, 2021, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/commitment-to-artemis-accords-affirms-australias-rising-star-in-space/ (accessed July 5, 2021).

⁴⁰ United Nations, Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly, 2222 (XXI), Treaty On Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (United Nations, 1967), https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/outerspacetreaty.html (accessed July 5, 2021).

⁴¹ United Nations, Moon Agreement, Article 11, 79.

⁴² Namrata Goswami and Peter A. Garretson, “1. Introducing the Concept of Great Power Competition for Space Resources,” in Scramble for the Skies: The Great Power Competition to Control the Resources of Outer Space (Lexington Books, 2020), 21–22.

⁴³ States who are parties to the Moon Agreement and concurrently also signatories to the Artemis Accords: Australia, Mexico, Saudi Arabia. States who are signatories (but not parties) to the Moon Agreement, and concurrently also signatories to the Artemis Accords: France, Romania.

⁴⁴ Strategic leaders in the U.S. have seemingly coined and run with the depiction of space as the “wild west”, notably General John W. Raymond’s comment, “The Outer Space Treaty says you can’t have nuclear weapons. That’s about what it says. The rest is the wild, wild west,”. In his 2020 State of the Union address to Congress, (former) President Donald Trump very warmly embraced the rhetoric of the Wild West and applied it to space: “ … America has always been a frontier nation. Now we must embrace the next frontier, America’s manifest destiny in the stars. … Our ancestors braved the unknown; tamed the wilderness; settled the Wild West … We are Americans. We are pioneers. We are the pathfinders. We settled the New World … ”. Strategic leaders of other countries appear to share similar views, though couched in different terms, such as Air Vice Marshall Simon Rochelle, Royal Air Force, stating “the fight is on” in outer space. See: Joey Roulette, “U.S. builds alliances in ‘wild, wild west’ of space: general”, Reuters, September 19, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-spacecommand-idUSKBN1W330C (accessed July 22, 2021); Teo Armus, Trump’s ‘manifest destiny’ in space revives old phrase to proactive effect”, The Washington Post, February 5, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/02/05/trumps-manifest-destiny-space-revives-old-phrase-provocative-effect/ (accessed July 22, 2021); Cahal Milmo, “Military chief warns UK ‘fight is on in space’ and Britain needs to ‘speed up’ its response to threats”, inews, September 10, 2019, https://inews.co.uk/news/uk/military-chief-space-warfare-exclusive-news-british-army-337153 (accessed July 22, 2021); Chad Crowell, “The Final Frontier: Preventing Space from Becoming the Wild West through the Establishment of Internationally Recognized Property Rights,” George Mason Journal of International Commercial Law 11, no. 1 (Fall 2020): 81, https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/gmjintco11&i=85 (accessed July 5, 2021).

⁴⁵ Marcal Sanmarti, “The Scramble for the Moon”, New Zealand International Review, 46 (3) (May 2021): 11–14, https://search.informit.org/doi/10.3316/informit.756498651243711; Sissi Cao, “Russia Just Sided With China in a New Space Cold War. How Do They Match Up With NASA?”, Observer, March 10, 2021, https://observer.com/2021/03/china-join-russia-lunar-project-nasa-artemis-space-race/ (accessed July 22, 2021).

⁴⁶ P. J. Blount, Space Traffic Coordination: “Developing a Framework for Safety and Security in Satellite Operations”, Space: Science & Technology, 2021: 7, https://doi.org/10.34133/2021/9830379.

⁴⁷ Larsen, “Outer Space: How Shall the World’s Governments Establish Order among Competing Interests,”: 30.

⁴⁸ The Outer Space Treaty being the most notable with provisions for the banning of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in space (See Article IV). Other examples including the remaining 4 space-focused UN treaties, the Constitution and Convention and Radio Regulations of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) Convention, the Convention on the Prohibition of Any other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification and the Partial Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

⁴⁹ Noting bilateral (and diplomatic) relationships may wax and wane. A particularly appropriate example being the Treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, commonly known as the “New START Treaty”. The Treaty was extended to February 4, 2016 and includes specific provisions for the limits of nuclear weapons, sharing of information regarding the type and use of weapons (including pre-launch notification of ballistic missile launches). See: U.S. Department of State, “New Start Treaty,” U.S. Department of State, last modified June 24, 2021, https://www.state.gov/new-start/ (accessed July 6, 2021).

⁵⁰ North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), The North Atlantic Treaty (1949) (NATO, 1949), 1–18, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/stock_publications/20120822_nato_treaty_en_light_2009.pdf (accessed July 6, 2021).

⁵¹ Department of External Affairs, Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America [ANZUS], 1952 no. 2 (Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service, 1997), https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Completed_Inquiries/jfadt/usrelations/appendixb (accessed July 6, 2021).

⁵² North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), “Brussels Summit Communiqué – Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels 14 June 2021”, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, June 14, 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_185000.htm (accessed July 6, 2021).

⁵³ Department of External Affairs, ANZUS, Article IV & V.

⁵⁴ Adelaide Law School, “The Woomera Manual,” The University of Adelaide, last modified May 29, 2020, https://law.adelaide.edu.au/woomera/ (accessed July 5, 2021).

⁵⁵ The Australian Defence Force (ADF) provided a grant to the University of Adelaide to develop the Woomera Manual on International Law of Military Space Operations to understand “the military application of international law to military space operations”. It is important to note the ADF supports the conduct of the project, not necessarily its precise outcomes. See: Australian Space Agency, Space Coordination Committee, State of Space Report: A Report by the Australian Government Space Coordination Committee, 1 January 2018–30 June 2019 (Commonwealth of Australia, 2020), 45, https://www.industry.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-05/state-of-space-report-2018-19.pdf (accessed July 5, 2021).

⁵⁶ Article VI, Outer Space Treaty.

⁵⁷ Federal Register of Legislation, Space (Launches and Returns) Act 2018 (Cth) No. 123, 1998, Compilation No. 9 (2019), https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2019C00246 (accessed July 6, 2021).

⁵⁸ Including the issuance and launch facility license to operate a launch facility. See: Space (Launches and Returns) Act 2018 (Cth), in particular: Part 3 – Regulation of space activities and high powered rockets; Part 4 – Liability for damage by space objects; Part 5 – Liability for damage by high power rockets.

⁵⁹ Space (Launches and Returns) Act 2018 (Cth). See in particular: Part 5 – Register of Space Objects.

⁶⁰ Space (Launches and Returns) Act 2018 (Cth). See in particular: Part 3, 34 – Applying for the grant, variation or transfer of an Australian launch permit, subsections (1) – (4); Part 3, 46 G – Applying for the grant, variation or transfer of an overseas launch permit, subsections (1) – (4).

⁶¹ Federal Register of Legislation, Customs (Prohibited Exports) Regulations 1958 (Cth), https://www.legislation.gov.au/Series/F1996B03403 (accessed July 25, 2021). See in particular Part 3, Division 4A.

⁶² Federal Register of Legislation, Defence and Strategic Goods List 2019 (Cth) (2019), https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/F2019L00424 (accessed July 6, 2021).

⁶³ Australian Space Agency, Australian Civil Space Strategy 2019–2028.

⁶⁴ Todd Harrison, Zack Cooper, Kaitlyn Johnson and Thomas Roberts (2017). Escalation and deterrence in the second space age (CSIS/Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham, 2017), https://www.csis.org/analysis/escalation-and-deterrence-second-space-age (accessed November 11, 2021).

⁶⁵ Malcolm Davis, Strategy: the Australian Defence Force and contested space.

⁶⁶ Royal Australian Air Force AFDN 1–19 Air-Space Integration.

⁶⁷ Malcolm Davis, Strategy: the Australian Defence Force and contested space, 36.

⁶⁸ Department of Defence, 2020 Defence Strategic Update.

⁶⁹ Kim Gosschalk, “Defence announces new space division”, Space Australia, May 31, 2021, https://spaceaustralia.com/news/defence-announces-new-space-division (accessed July 10, 2021).

⁷⁰ Chief of Air Force (RAAF), Air Marshal Hupfeld makes this distinction clear, see quotes in: Andrew Greene, “RAAF planning for new military space command as it celebrates 100^th anniversary”, ABC News, March 31, 2021, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-03-31/raaf-looks-to-space-as-it-celebrates-100-years/100039914 (accessed July 24, 2021); Josh Butler, “Concerns over ‘weaponisation of space’ as RAAF launches Space Force”, The New Daily, May 20, 2021, https://thenewdaily.com.au/news/2021/05/20/australia-space-defence/ (accessed July 10, 2021).

⁷¹ Malcolm Davis, Strategy: the Australian Defence Force and contested space, 29–34.

⁷² Government of Canada, Strong Secure Engaged, Canada’s Defence Policy Department of National Defence, June 6, 2021, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/policies-standards/canada-defence-policy.html (accessed July 24, 2021); Royal Canadian Air Force, Operations – Canadian Space Operations Centre, Canadian National Defence, October 13, 2020, http://www.rcaf-arc.forces.gc.ca/en/space/operations.page (accessed July 10, 2021).

⁷³ The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, China’s National Defense in the New Era – White Paper (The People’s Republic of China, 2019), http://english.scio.gov.cn/node_8013506.html (accessed July 8, 2021).

⁷⁴ Ministry of Defence, Annual Report 2018–19, (Ministry of Defence, Government of India), https://www.mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/MoDAR2018.pdf (accessed July 10, 2021); Mian Zahid Hussain, and Raja Qaiser Ahmed, “Space Programs of India and Pakistan: Military and Strategic Installations in Outer Space and Precarious Regional Strategic Stability.” Space Policy 47 (2018): 63–75; Robert Farley, “Managing the Military Problem of Space: The Case of India.”, The Diplomat, April 19, 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/managing-the-military-problem-of-space-the-case-of-india/ (accessed July 10, 2021); Rajat Pandit, “Satellite-killer not a one-off, India working on star wars armoury”, The Times of India, April 7 2019, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/satellite-killer-not-a-one-off-india-working-on-star-wars-armoury/articleshow/68758674.cms (accessed July 10, 2021).

⁷⁵ Ministry of Defence, “Medium Term Defense Program (FY 2019 – FY 2023) – provisional translation.” National Defense Program Guidelines and the Mid-Term Defense Program, Ministry of Defense, Government of Japan, December 18, 2018, https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d_act/d_policy/national.html (accessed July 10, 2021); Amano Hisaki, “Japan’s Space Policy”, Nippon.com, April 12, 2021, https://www.nippon.com/en/in-depth/d00680/ (accessed April 12, 2021); Japan Ministry of Defense, “National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2019 and beyond.” National Defense Program Guidelines, Government of Japan, December 18, 2018, http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/pdf/2019boueikeikaku_e.pdf (accessed July 10, 2021); Yasuo Otani, and Naohiko Kohtake, “Applicability of Civil and Defence Dual Use to Space Situational Awareness System in Japan.” Space Policy 47 (2018): 140–147, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.spacepol.2018.11.001; Hidetaka Yoshimatsu, “Exploring the China factor in Japan’s foreign and security policy in outer space.” Australian Journal of International Affairs 75 3 (2021): 305–322, https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2021.1882384.

⁷⁶ Space was identified as “a Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) sector in 2015”, see: Cabinet Office, National Security Capability Review (March 2018), 31, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/705347/6.4391_CO_National-Security-Review_web.pdf (accessed July 8, 2021); Ministry of Defence (MOD), “Guidance – UK Space Command,” Gov.UK, April 1, 2021, UK Ministry of Defence, https://www.gov.uk/guidance/uk-space-command (accessed July 8, 2021); Ministry of Defence, Guto Bebb, and The Rt Hon Gavin Williamson CBE MP, UK poised for take-off on ambitious Defence Space Strategy with personnel boost (Gov.UK, 21 May 2018), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-poised-for-take-off-on-ambitious-defence-space-strategy-with-personnel-boost. See also the MOD defence space strategy headlines document, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/712376/MOD_Pocket_Tri-Fold_-_Defence_Space_Strategy_Headlines.pdf (both accessed July 8, 2021); Ministry of Defence, Joint Doctrine Publication 0-30 – UK Air and Space Power (Second Edition) (Wiltshire: Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC), 2017), UK Ministry of Defence, Chapters 5–8: 69–118, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/668710/doctrine_uk_air_space_power_jdp_0_30.pdf (accessed July 8, 2018).

⁷⁷ The French Ministry For the Armed Forces, “Space Defence Strategy – Report of the “Space” Working Group 2019” (2019): https://www.defense.gouv.fr/english/layout/set/print/content/download/574375/9839912/version/5/file/Space+Defence+Strategy+2019_France.pdf (accessed January 26, 2022).

⁷⁸ Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, “Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, General of the Army Valery Gerasimov holds briefing for foreign military attaches”, Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, Russian Federation, December 24, 2020, http://eng.mil.ru/en/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12331668@egNews (acccessed July 10, 2021); Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, 2019, “Russian Defence Minister speaks at the plenary meeting of the IX Beijing Xiangshan Forum,” Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, Russian Federation,” October 21, 2019, http://eng.mil.ru/en/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12257820@egNews (accessed July 10, 2021); “Roscosmos General Information”, Roscosmos, http://en.roscosmos.ru/119/ (accessed June 9, 2021); Russian Federation, Press release, “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (translated),” Hosted on the website of the The Embassy of the Russian Federation to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, June 29, 2015, https://rusemb.org.uk/press/2029 (accessed June 9, 2021); Skibba and Undark, “The Ripple Effects of a Space Skirmish”.

⁷⁹ Hussain and Ahmed “Space Programs of India and Pakistan: Military and Strategic Installations in Outer Space and Precarious Regional Strategic Stability.”: 69.

⁸⁰ Despite simultaneous avowed commitments to the peaceful use of the space domain. See Morgan Artyukhina, “US Space Force Operations Chief Confirms Working on Space-Based Directed-Energy Weapons”, Sputnik, July 18, 2021, https://sputniknews.com/military/202106181083178576-us-space-force-operations-chief-confirms-working-on-space-based-directed-energy-weapons/ (accessed July 10, 2021).

⁸¹ Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Russian Defence Minister speaks at the plenary meeting of the IX Beijing Xiangshan Forum”.

⁸² Russian Federation, Press release, “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (translated),”.

⁸³ States condemning the test included Australia, the European Union, the U.S., UK, France, Germany, Japan, South Korea and others. See Malcolm Davis, “The ramifications of Russia’s reckless anti-satellite test”, The Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, November 18, 2021, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-ramifications-of-russias-reckless-anti-satellite-test/ (accessed February 9, 2022).

⁸⁴ Pandit, Satellite-killer not a one-off, India working on star wars armoury.

⁸⁵ Canadian National Defence, Strong Secure Engaged, Canada’s Defence Policy, 57.

⁸⁶ The French Ministry For the Armed Forces, Space Defence Strategy – Report of the “Space” Working Group 2019, 4, 24–25.

⁸⁷ I.e. Australian Defence Force Space Command, Canadian Space Operations Centre, Indian Space Defence Agency, Japanese Air Self-Defense Force, UK Space Command.

⁸⁸ E.g. the Five Eyes alliance, Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (https://www.dfat.gov.au/international-relations/regional-architecture/quad), the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/guideline2.html), etc.

⁸⁹ Yoshimatsu, “Exploring the China factor in Japan’s foreign and security policy in outer space.”: 308.

⁹⁰ Hussain and Ahmed “Space Programs of India and Pakistan: Military and Strategic Installations in Outer Space and Precarious Regional Strategic Stability.”: 65.

⁹¹ Otani and Kohtake, “Applicability of Civil and Defence Dual Use to Space Situational Awareness System in Japan.”: 141.

⁹² Hussain and Ahmed, “Space Programs of India and Pakistan: Military and Strategic Installations in Outer Space and Precarious Regional Strategic Stability.”: 65–68.

⁹³ Ministry of Defence, Government of India, “Annual Report 2018–19.”, 95.

⁹⁴ Hussain and Ahmed, “Space Programs of India and Pakistan: Military and Strategic Installations in Outer Space and Precarious Regional Strategic Stability.”: 69; Ramin Skibba and Undark, “The Ripple Effects of a Space Skirmish,”.

⁹⁵ The ‘dynamic’ nature of the tension in space warfare policy comparison arises in part from what has variously been described as the ‘strategic chain’ and ‘security trilemma’. This is intended to reflect the increasingly inter-connected nature of international security in which the actions of one state to improve its own security relative to another state can lead to reactions by third states (and more) to counter the original actions. This ‘security trilemma’ has been applied to the space security relations between, for example, China, India and Pakistan. Zulfqar Khan and Ahmad Khan, “Space Security Trilemma in South Asia”, Astropolitics (2019) 17:1, 4–22.

⁹⁶ Anand Kumar Sharma, “Mission Gaganyaan India’s Biggest Space Challenge”, Science Reporter (January 2020): 20, http://nopr.niscair.res.in/bitstream/123456789/52983/1/SR%2057%281%29%2020-24.pdf (accessed Jan 26, 2022).

⁹⁷ XE currency converter, as Feb 1, 2022. 13,949 Crore Inr to USD, https://www.xe.com/currencyconverter/convert/?Amount=139490000000&From=INR&To=USD (accessed February 1, 2022).

⁹⁸ Ministry of Finance, Government of India, “Notes on Demand for Grants, 2021–2022, Demand No. 94, Department of Space”, 326, https://www.indiabudget.gov.in/doc/eb/sbe94.pdf (accessed January 26, 2022) or https://openbudgetsindia.org/dataset/department-of-space-2021-22-budget/resource/3b901844-3e81-4501-a6b8-b933eea03cc9 (accessed February 1, 2022).

⁹⁹ Rounded to the nearest 1. XE currency converter, as February 1, 2022. 13,949 AUD to USD, https://www.xe.com/currencyconverter/convert/?Amount=3300000&From=AUD&To=USD (accessed February 1, 2022).

¹⁰⁰ Converted from AUD to USD and rounded to the nearest 1. XE currency converter, as February 13, 2022, https://www.xe.com/currencyconverter/convert/?Amount=13700000&From=AUD&To=USD (accessed February 13, 2022). For Australian Government specific budget allocations to the Australian Space Agency (“expense measures”) see: The Commonwealth of Australia, “Budget 2018–19, Budget Measures Budget Paper No. 2 2018–19”, 60, 153, https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/library/budget/2018_15/upload_binary/bp2_combined.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf#search=%22library/budget/2018_15%22 (accessed Jan 26, 2022): Parliament of Australia, “Industry Support”, “Sector-specific measures” https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/BudgetReview202122/IndustrySupport (accessed Jan 26, 2022).

¹⁰¹ Australian Government, The Hon Melissa Price MP (former), “Australia’s first national space mission central to Budget 2022–23”, media release, https://www.minister.industry.gov.au/ministers/price/media-releases/australias-first-national-space-mission-central-budget-2022-23 (accessed July 6, 2022). Converted from AUD to USD and rounded to the nearest 1. XE currency converter, as July 6, 2022, https://www.xe.com/currencyconverter/convert/?Amount=38500000&From=AUD&To=USD (accessed July 6, 2022).

¹⁰² The Commonwealth of Australia, “Budget 2018–19, Budget Measures Budget Paper No. 2 2018–19”; Parliament of Australia, “Industry Support”, “Sector-specific measures”.

¹⁰³ The Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) specifically references “Security in Space” as a key requirement for a strong, safe and economically prosperous Australia. This includes working with international partners to implement “robust rules and norms to maximise the benefits of greater access to space while tackling challenges …”; and the Australian Defence Force to “strengthening its space surveillance and situational awareness capabilities” in response to an increasingly congested, contested and competitive space environment. See: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2017), 97, https://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/minisite/2017-foreign-policy-white-paper/fpwhitepaper/pdf/2017-foreign-policy-white-paper.pdf (accessed July 6, 2021); See also specific reference to the congested and competitive domain in remarks by the former Minister for Defence, Senator the Hon Linda Reynolds CSC: (Former) Senator the Hon Linda Reynolds CSC, (Former) Minister for Defence, Defence in space: securing the new frontier (Australian Government, Department, 28 July 2020), https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/minister/lreynolds/statements/defence-space-securing-new-frontier (accessed July 6, 2021).

¹⁰⁴ Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, ‘Crowded, Congested, and Contested: New Challenges for Outer Space Governance’. Ploughshares Monitor 39, no. 3 (Autumn 2018): 5, https://login.wwwproxy1.library.unsw.edu.au/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&AN=132026998&site=ehost-live&scope=site (accessed July 10, 2021).

¹⁰⁵ David A. Koplow, “The Fault is Not in Our Stars: Avoiding an Arms Race in Outer Space,” Harvard International Law Journal 59, no. 2 (Summer 2019): 331–388, 331, https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/hilj59&i=343 (accessed July 8, 2021); Rafał Kopec, “Space Deterrence: In Search of a ‘Magical Formula’,” Space Policy 47 (February 2019): 126, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.spacepol.2018.10.003.

¹⁰⁶ Surya Gablin Gunasekara, “Mutually Assured Destruction: Space Weapons, Orbital Debris And The Deterrence Theory For Environmental Sustainability”, Air & Space Law, Vol. 37, January 6, 2012: 2, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1980710: Alan Boyle, “Pentagon worries that satellite attacks could spark ‘mutually assured destruction’”, GeekWire, November 6, 2020, https://www.geekwire.com/2020/satellite-attacks-spark-new-kind-mutually-assured-destruction/ (accessed July 22, 2021).

¹⁰⁷ David A. Koplow, “Deterrence as the MacGuffin: The Case for Arms Control in Outer Space”, Journal of National Security Law & Policy, Sacramento 10, no. 2 (2019): 312–314, https://login.wwwproxy1.library.unsw.edu.au/login?url=https://www-proquest-com.wwwproxy1.library.unsw.edu.au/scholarly-journals/deterrence-as-macguffin-case-arms-control-outer/docview/2395872985/se-2?accountid=12763; James P. Finch, Shawn Steene, “Finding Space in Deterrence: Toward a General Framework for “Space Deterrence”, Strategic Studies Quarterly 5, no. 4 (Winter 2011): 11–13, http://www.jstor.org/stable/26270535; Eric J. Zarybnisky, Lt Col, USAF, “Celestial Deterrence: Deterring Aggression in the Global Commons of Space”, Naval War College (2018): 78, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1062004.pdf (accessed July 24, 2021); Krista Langeland, Derek Grossman, Tailoring Deterrence for China in Space (RAND Corporation, 2021): 16–17, https://doi.org/10.7249/RRA943-1 or https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA943-1.html (accessed August 1, 2021); Ellen Pawlikowski, “Resiliency and Disaggregated Space Architectures – White paper”, Air Force Space Command (2019): 8–9, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1077222.pdf (accessed July 24, 2021).

¹⁰⁸ David Kuan-Wei Chen, “New Ways and Means to Strengthen the Responsible and Peaceful Use of Outer Space”, Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 48, no. 3(2020): 669–671, 673, https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/gjicl/vol48/iss3/3 (accessed July 10, 2021).

¹⁰⁹ “ARF Inter-Sessional Support Group Meeting on Confidence-Building Measures and Preventative Diplomacy – Agenda Item 7.2.4” – ASEAN Regional Forum Space Security Workshop, Updated Draft Concept Paper”, ASEAN Regional Forum: 1, https://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Annex-15-Updated-Concept-Paper-for-ARF-Workshop-on-Space-Security-ARF-SOM-Phnom-Penh-2012.pdf (accessed July 10, 2021).

¹¹⁰ Department of Industry, Science, Energy and Resources, “Australia signs NASA’s Artemis Accords”, Australian Government, Department of Industry, Science, Energy and Resources, October 14, 2020, https://www.industry.gov.au/news/australia-signs-nasas-artemis-accords (accessed July 6, 2021).

¹¹¹ Cheryl Pellerin, “Stratcom, DoD Sign Space Operations Agreement with Allies”, U.S. Department of Defense, September 23, 2014, https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/603303/stratcom-dod-sign-space-operations-agreement-with-allies/ (accessed July 6, 2021).

¹¹² Despite persistent challenges in establishing and agreeing to “rules of the road” in the space domain, the value of collective voices in respect of asserting what constitutes responsible behavior in the space domain cannot be understated. See: Kuan-Wei Chen, “New Ways and Means to Strengthen the Responsible and Peaceful Use of Outer Space,” 673 (2020): 675–676. Australia has already supported, and is actively participating in, the Open-Ended Working Group on reducing space threats, that was initiated by the UK – see: United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs, “Open-Ended Working Group on reducing space threats”, 2022, https://meetings.unoda.org/meeting/oewg-space-2022/ (accessed July 6, 2022).

¹¹³ Nancy Gallagher describes this well, as, “Space Governance for Global Security”, which assumes that “all current and future space users share the same strategic objectives attributed to the United States: to secure the space domain for peaceful use; to protect space assets from all hazards; and to derive maximum value from space for security, economic, civil, and environmental ends.” and from this assumption concludes, “space cooperation should have the positive objective of organizing space users to work together and accomplish more for less than they could on their own, not just the negative objectives of minimizing inadvertent interference, environmental degradation, or deliberate attack.” See: Nancy Gallagher, “Space Governance and International Cooperation,” Astropolitics 8, no. 2 (6 Dec 2010): 271, https://doi-org.wwwproxy1.library.unsw.edu.au/10.1080/14777622.2010.524131.

¹¹⁴ Rachel S. Cohen, “Building the New Space Coalition”, Air Force Magazine, March 26, 2021, https://www.airforcemag.com/article/building-the-new-space-coalition/ (accessed July 10, 2021); Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense & Global Security, “Space Domain Mission Assurance: A Resilience Taxonomy” (2015): 1, 4, 7, https://fas.org/man/eprint/resilience.pdf (accessed July 24, 2021); Ellen Pawlikowski, “Resiliency and Disaggregated Space Architectures – White paper” (2019): 12.

¹¹⁵ Though discussed in the context of deterrence to attack, the importance of international collaboration, condemnation and response is well articulated in: Krista Langeland, Derek Grossman, Tailoring Deterrence for China in Space (2021): 18, 34.

¹¹⁶ Andrew Greene, ABC News, March 31, 2021; Malcolm Davis, “ADF space command is the right next step for Australian space power”, The Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, May 5, 2021, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/adf-space-command-is-the-right-next-step-for-australian-space-power/ (accessed July 24, 2021).

¹¹⁷ John Goehring, “Why Isn’t Outer Space a Global Commons?” Journal of National Security Law and Policy 11, No. 3, forthcoming (2021): 1–8, https://jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Why_Isnt_Outer_Space_a_Global_Commons.pdf (accessed July 25, 2021).

¹¹⁸ Federal Register, “Encouraging International Support for the Recovery and Use of Space Resources”, Executive Order 13914, April 6, 2020, Presidential Document by the Executive Office of the President on 04/10/2020, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/04/10/2020-07800/encouraging-international-support-for-the-recovery-and-use-of-space-resources (accessed on July 6, 2022).

¹¹⁹ John S. Goehring, “Why Isn’t Outer Space a Global Commons?”, Journal of National Security Law & Policy 11, 573–590, https://jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Why_Isnt_Outer_Space_a_Global_Commons_2.pdf (accessed July 6, 2022).

¹²⁰ Bec Shrimpton, “The time is right for Australia to re-establish its reputation as a global space power,” The Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, June 8, 2021, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-time-is-right-for-australia-to-re-establish-its-reputation-as-a-global-space-power/ (accessed July 7, 2021).