The Semiotic of Accusation: Thinking About Deconstruction, Development, the Critique of Practice, and the Practice of Critique

Abstract

This paper explores the aim, structure and language use of the deconstructive critique of developmental psychology as a specific methodology, i.e. a specific practice of critique. The analysis focuses on the past work of a group of authors captured under the term “critical psychology of development” (e.g., Morss 1996; Walkerdine 1988; Bradley 1989). The aim is to examine why this valuable critique has apparently failed to effectively engage or unsettle the developmental mainstream. Exploring the efficacy of language use within this critique, it is argued that the “language of deconstruction” inadvertently engenders a semiotic of accusation, that is, a self-perpetuating structure of bizarre anti-theses and accusations. Inspired by the work of Deleuze, Stengers, and Latour the paper aims to disentangle the counter-effective use of language from the relevant critique, in order to revive the critique and illustrate its relevance to practice.

The analysis is developed alongside a case example from the author's past experience training as a psychological expert assessing child witnesses for courts in Germany. While examining the issues surrounding psychological knowledge used in legal practice, the analysis reflects on the dilemmas of being an expert practitioner, and a researcher with a background in discursive critical psychology trying to theorise psychological and legal practices critically. Highlighting the inherent volatility of practice operations, it is argued that practice itself could be seen as the interface, or relay, through which critical theorising becomes effective, by operating directly upon or alongside practitioners' already existing awareness of the paradoxes and instabilities of their practice. Engaging directly with such epistemologies of practice could open up wider perspectives toward critical methodologies for social change.

Keywords:

• critical psychology of development
• semiotic of accusation
• deconstruction
• developmental psychology
• practice research
• child witness practice
• Deleuze
• critical methods

Acknowledgements

For valuable comments and critique on earlier drafts of this paper I would like to thank Stephanie Taylor, Nick Lee, and two engaged anonymous reviewers.

Notes

¹The authors mentioned here as CPOD have in the meantime developed their critique or moved into different fields (Burman 2006, 2008; Bradley 2005; Walkerdine 2004). For this paper I am deliberately focussing on the less recent work of these authors that constituted the CPOD. This is to capture CPOD as a coherent phenomenon of its time and thus as an exemplary analytic construct. While the authors' relationship to forms of deconstruction may have changed, there is overall agreement that the critique put forward in the original CPOD is still highly relevant to mainstream discourses and practice today (see, e.g., Burman 2008).

“Deconstruction” is neither a specific technique nor a specific “method” of critique. It is a philosophical term first introduced by Jacques Derrida who explicitly acknowledges its versatile nature and applicability (Derrida 1999). In this article I use of the term deconstruction only with reference to the very specific function it has within the texts of the CPOD.

²Name and some details are altered to ensure anonymity.

³This introduction relates exclusively to the CPOD. Within the wider arena of critical psychology there are numerous other takes on discursive critical psychology (Billig 1996; Wetherell & Potter 1992).

⁴The Salem witch trials, held in Salem, Massachusetts, in 1692, are still quoted by some to highlight the unreliability of child witnesses (Spencer & Flin 1993; Ceci & Bruck 1995).

⁵See also Lee (1999, 2001).

⁶Psychological experts are routinely used in the German legal system to assess witnesses. Their task and method differs dramatically from expert practice in, for example, Britain, the United States, or Australia (see Köhnken 2002, 2004). In Motzkau (2006) I have systematically compared child witness practice in Engalnd/Wales and Germany, offering a detailed analysis of the different expert practices.

⁷I have discussed the significance of Deleuze's work for the critical analysis of psychological research and legal practice elsewhere in detail (Motzkau 2006, 2009b).

⁸This is my own terminology, specific to this analysis. I am using these concepts purely as a means to illustrate and unfold my critical analysis of the language of deconstruction (see also Motzkau 2001, 2005a; Hildebrand-Nilshon, Motzkau & Papadopoulos 2001).

⁹This reference search was conducted in the context of previous research (Motzkau 2001) using a “cited reference search” in the Social Science Citation Index for the years 1989 to 2000. In addition, recent textbooks on developmental psychology were checked for references.

¹⁰I use the term “double-double-bind” as a metaphorical extreme version of Bateson's concept of the “double-bind” (see Watzlawick et al. 1967).

¹¹Paul, who had already arrived at the court building when the defendant's decision to confess was announced, was visibly disappointed and confused when told that he was not going to be heard in court. The defendant was convicted and received a jail sentence a few days later. We have not had any contact with Paul afterwards and thus can only speculate about his reaction to the outcome of the trial. From what he told us during the interview, this seemed to be the outcome he was expecting. Whether he was happy about the result is a more complex question that even Paul may find difficult to answer.

¹²Latour elaborates this in relation to Science and Technology Studies' own long standing debate around construction and realism (Latour 1999). Further, it is interesting to note that Latour has his own struggle with what he considers the detrimental effects of deconstruction. To separate deconstruction and constructivism, Latour suggests the slightly unwieldy term “compositionism” as an escape from the detrimental implications constructivism has come to imply (Latour in press).