Chinese Northeast Asia policies and the tragedy of Northeast Asia's security architecture

Abstract

China's status-quo-oriented post-Cold-War grand strategy of promoting cooperative security and multipolarity on the basis of the UN system is not applied in Northeast Asia. China's definition of its interests in Northeast Asia runs up against those promoted by the US alliance system, and no common political framework exists to encourage Beijing and Washington to adopt definitions that correspond to global rules of proper state conduct. Scholars and policymakers often base their analyses of Northeast Asian strategic uncertainty on the assumption that China applies its grand strategy in Northeast Asia as elsewhere, but that the regional context makes successful implementation difficult. This article instead argues that China has persuaded the international community that Northeast Asia is a region where special rules apply, justifying that Chinese policies towards Taiwan, Japan and the Korean peninsula are exempt from the principles of state conduct underpinning China's global grand strategy.

Keywords:

• Northeast Asia
• grand strategy
• China
• US alliance system

Notes

1 Examples of analyses along these lines include David Shambaugh, ‘China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order’, International Security 29, no. 3 (2004–5): 64–99; David Kerr, ‘The Sino-Russian Partnership and U.S. Policy toward North Korea: From Hegemony to Concert in Northeast Asia’, International Studies Quarterly 49, no. 3 (2005): 411–38; Yong Deng and Thomas G. Moore, ‘China Views Globalization: Toward a New Great-Power Politics?’, Washington Quarterly 27, no. 3 (2004): 117–36; Wu Xinbo, ‘The End of the Silver Lining: A Chinese View of the U.S.–Japanese Alliance’, Washington Quarterly 21, no. 1 (2005–6): 119–30.

2 Evan S. Medeiros, ‘Strategic Hedging and the Future of Asia–Pacific Stability’, Washington Quarterly 21, no. 1 (2005–6): 145–67; Brad Glosserman, ‘China and the New Geometry of East Asia’, China 1, no. 1 (2003): 103–18; David C. Kang, ‘Hierarchy, Balancing, and Empirical Puzzles in Asian International Relations’, International Security 27, no. 4 (2003–4): 165–80; Michael Yahuda, ‘Chinese Dilemmas in Thinking about Regional Security Architecture’, Pacific Review 16, no. 2 (2003): 189–206.

3 For this argument, see for example Yahuda, ‘Chinese Dilemmas in Thinking about Regional Security Architecture’; Christopher R. Hughes, Chinese Nationalism in the Global Era (London: Routledge, 2006), 151–6.

4 Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell, University Press, 1984), 13.

5 Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein, ‘Beyond Realism: The Study of Grand Strategy’, in The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy, ed. Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), 3–21.

6 Arthur A. Stein, ‘Domestic Constraints and Extended Deterrence’, in The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy, ed. Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), 123.

7 John Mueller, ‘The Impact of Ideas on Grand Strategy’, in The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy, ed. Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), 56.

8 Liselotte Odgaard, ‘China's Premature Rise to Great Power’, Audit of the Conventional Wisdom, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, April 2007, http://web.mit.edu/CIS/pdf/Audit_04_07_Odgaard.pdf

9 One group of scholars argues that China's rise will be accompanied by an aggressive foreign policy similar to that implemented by the United States at present. This argument is based on the observation that the United States is promoting an order based on its alliance system. This system cannot accommodate China's rise as a military great power with legitimate claims to Taiwan and its exercise of a determining influence on global security arrangements. China is therefore compelled to develop a Sino-centric alternative to Washington's designs for a future world order. Some scholars see this development as inevitable, whereas others see it as a reversible outcome of US foreign policy. See for example John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001), 360–402; Thomas J. Christensen, ‘China's Rise and Challenges for U.S. Security Policy’, International Security 25, no. 4 (2001): 5–36. A second position argues that China's rise will be peaceful. This assessment is based on the notion that China's regional rise is conducive to peaceful coexistence or even enhanced cooperation since, the principal concern of the Beijing government is to prevent social upheaval that would bring down CCP rule and dismember the country. China has no interest in conducting an assertive foreign policy that requires allocating undue resources for imposing an order based on Chinese interests rather than the common interests of states. See for example David Shambaugh, ‘China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order’, International Security 29, no. 3 (2004): 64–99; Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘Is China a Status Quo Power?’, International Security 27, no. 4 (2003): 5–56. A third position proposes that the means China is going to use to fulfill its long-term foreign policy goals are as yet unknown. Beijing's concept of a cooperative foreign policy may be seen as an attempt at assessing whether the international environment is able to accommodate vital Chinese interests such as its claim to jurisdiction over Taiwan and its demands for safe energy supplies. If the returns on this foreign policy concept prove unsatisfactory, China may revert to an assertive foreign policy involving the use of force, provided its economic and military capabilities allow it to hold the position of a global great power. See Yahuda, ‘Chinese Dilemmas in Thinking about Regional Security Architecture’, 189–206; Hughes, Chinese Nationalism in the Global Era, 151–6.

10 China's budgetary allocations for defence purposes have become increasingly transparent with the publication of defence white papers for the past decade. Nevertheless, the figures released by the government are inadequate. According to International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the publicly reported defence budget only represents part of actual military expenditure. For example, proceeds from defence sales are not included, and procurement, research and development, subsidies to domestic defence companies and most pensions for retired personnel are funded from elsewhere within the state budget. For a detailed discussion see IISS, The Military Balance 2007 (London, 2007), 341.

11 World Bank Group, ‘WDI Data Query’, 30 April 2007, http://devdata.worldbank.org/data-query/ (accessed 3 June 2007).

12 Population below US$1 a day and population below US$2 a day are the percentages of the population living on less than US$1.08 a day and US$2.15 a day at 1993 international prices. A number of methodologies exist for determining absolute poverty, but no general agreement exists on the most precise measure. Here I refer to the international rather than the national poverty line for purposes of comparison, see World Bank Group, ‘2006 World Development Indicators: 2.7. Poverty’, 2006, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/table2-7.pdf (accessed 3 June 2007).

13 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, ‘World Investment Report 2006: FDI from Developing and Transition Economies: Implications for Development’ (New York and Geneva: United Nations, 2006), http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir2006_en.pdf (accessed 13 May 2008), 55 and annex table B1, 305.

14 Interview with Professor, School of International Studies, Peking University, Beijing, 13 November 2004.

15 Yahuda, ‘Chinese Dilemmas in Thinking about Regional Security Architecture’, 192.

16 China has started to see the sovereignty principle in more flexible terms, according to some authors, see for example Allen Carlson, Unifying China, Integrating with the World: Securing Chinese Sovereignty in the Reform Era (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005). However, it is not yet clear to what extent China is willing to compromise absolute sovereignty in practice. So far, the dominant trend remains China's defence of the traditional notion of sovereignty, including non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states. See for example Bates Gill, Rising Star: China's New Security Diplomacy (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2007).

17 Interview with Associate Research Professor Yuan Peng, China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, Beijing, 12 November 2004.

18 Hughes, Chinese Nationalism in the Global Era, 139–46.

19 ‘Zouzhen Man – as Ancient as Peking Man’, China Daily, 21 July 2003, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003-7/21/content_246919.htm (accessed 15 June 2007).

20 ‘President Sets Forth Guidelines on Taiwan’, China Daily, 4 March 2005, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-03/04/content_421902.htm (accessed 15 June 2007).

21 ‘Full text: China's National Defense in 2006’, China View/Xinhua Online, 29 December 2006, http://news.xinhuanet.com/English/2006-12/29/content_5547029.htm (accessed 15 June 2007).

22 Interviews with Chinese intelligence, October 2006.

23 Interview with Shi Yinhong, Professor of International Relations, Renmin University of China, Beijing, 15 November 2004; interview with Professor Chu-Cheng Ming, Department of Political Science, National Taiwan University, Taipei, 23 January 2007.

24 Interview with Bih-jaw Lin, Professor of Diplomacy and Vice-President, National Chengchi University, Taipei, 25 January 2007.

25 ‘President Sets Forth Guidelines on Taiwan’, China Daily, 4 March 2005.

26 White House, ‘The National Security Strategy of the United States of America’, 16 March 2006, http://www.whitehouse.gov/ncs/nss/2006/ (accessed 23 June 2007).

27 For an overview of continuity and change in mainland China's Taiwan policy, see Steven Goldstein, ‘The Sixteenth Party Congress and Cross-Strait Policy: Old Wine in Old Bottles?’, Journal of African and Asian Studies 38, nos 4–5 (2003): 464–91.

28 Interview with Cheng-Yi Lin, Research Fellow, Institute of European and American Studies, Academia Sinica, Taipei, 22 January 2007.

29 Interview with Vice-President Chien-min Chao, Foundation on International and Cross-strait Studies (FICS), Taipei, 23 January 2007.

30 World Bank Group, ‘WDI Data Query’.

31 Ibid. Foreign direct investments, net inflows, balance of payments, current US dollars.

32 Edward J. Lincoln, ‘Japan: Using Power Narrowly’, Washington Quarterly, Winter 2003, http://www.cfr.org/publication/6634/japan.html (accessed 23 June 2007).

33 Ministry of Finance Japan, ‘Outward Direct Investment by Country and Region’, Foreign Direct Investment, 2004, http://www.mof.go.jp/english/fdi/2004b_2.htm (accessed 3 June 2007).

34 IISS, The Military Balance 2007, 406–11.

35 Llewelyn Hughes, ‘Why Japan Will Not Go Nuclear (Yet): International and Domestic Constraints on the Nuclearization of Japan’, International Security 31, no. 4 (2007): 67–96.

36 IISS, Strategic Survey 2004/5: An Evaluation and Forecast of World Affairs (London: Routledge, 2005), 363.

37 Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, National Defense Programme Guideline, FY 2005, approved by the Security Council and the Cabinet on 10 December 2004, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/2004/1210taikou_e.html (accessed 1 July 2007).

38 Interview with General, Japanese Self-Defense Forces, Tokyo, 7 August 2006.

39 Interview with senior official, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, 10 August 2006.

40 Interview with senior official, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, 14 August 2006.

41 Interview with Professor of International Relations, Shizuoka Kenritsu University, Tokyo, 13 August 2006.

42 Interviews with Chinese intelligence, October 2006.

43 Interview with high-ranking Chinese military official, expert in defense and national policy studies, Beijing, 20 November 2004.

44 Interview with Yuan Peng, 12 November 2004.

45 Interview with high-ranking Chinese military official, 20 November 2004.

46 Chih-yu Shih, China's Just World: The Morality of Chinese Foreign Policy (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1993), 133–4.

47 Interview with Professor, Beijing, 9 November 2004.

48 Interview with Yuan Peng, 12 November 2004.

49 Interview with Research Professor Jin Canrong, Renmin University of China, Beijing, 4 November 2004.

50 Interview with Professor, Renmin University of China, 1 November 2007.

51 Interview with Akio Watanabe, former president of Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS), Tokyo, 10 August 2006; ‘Japan, US Sign Defence Pact’, BBC News, 17 December 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/4104301.stm (accessed 5 June 2007).

52 Interview with journalist, Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 13 August 2006.

53 For a more detailed account of Beijing's concerns on the Korean peninsula, such as fear of refugees from North Korea etc., see Liselotte Odgaard, The Balance of Power in Asia–Pacific Security: U.S.–China Policies on Regional Order (London: Routledge, 2007), 171.

54 David Isenberg, ‘Nukes: Is Pandora Chinese? Part 1: The “Arch-proliferator”’, Asia Times Online, 23 June 2004, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/FF23Ad02.html (accessed 5 June 2007).

55 Interview with Charles L. Pritchard, until 2003 special envoy for negotiations to the DPRK, US Department of State, 12 October 2004.

56 United Nations Security Council, Department of Public Information, News and Media Division, New York, Security Council 5551st meeting, ‘Security Council Condemns Nuclear Test by Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1718 (2006)’, 14 October 2006, SC/8853, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8853.doc.htm (accessed 6 July 2007); Mark J. Valencia, ‘Maritime Interdiction of North Korean WMD Trade: Who Will Do What?’, Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network: Policy Forum Online, 3 November 2006, http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0698Valencia.html (accessed 6 July 2007); interview with former Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) professor, Beijing, 20 October 2006.

57 Interview with researcher affiliated with the Korea Institute for Defense Analysis (KIDA), 27 January 2005.

58 Interview with Yuan Peng, 12 November 2004. China only accepted multilateral talks due to international pressures, from, among others, Washington, which expected multilateral talks to help it single out North Korea as a pariah state. The failure of initial talks between the United States and North Korea in Beijing also moved China to accept the six-party talks. See Odgaard, The Balance of Power in Asia–Pacific Security, 434.

59 Interview with Professor Su Hao, Deputy Director, Center for International Security, China Foreign Affairs University, Beijing, 10 November 2004.

60 C. Kenneth Quinones, ‘South Korea's Approaches to North Korea: A Glacial Process’, in Korean Security Dynamics in Transition, ed. Kyung-Ae Park and Dalchoong Kim (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 19–48.